Explaining Taiwan's Revisionist Diplomacy

Taiwan is a revisionist power. Its independence movement challenges a vital status-quo interest of mainland China's opposition to a de jure Taiwan declaration of independence and maintaining, however ambiguously, Taiwan's commitment to the ‘one-China’ formulation. Why is it that a small and vulnerable island off the coast of a great power has continued to challenge the vital interest of that great power and risk war? Adopting a ‘levels of analysis’ approach to Taiwan's mainland policy, this paper addresses this question by examining four prevalent explanations for Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy: (1) the mainland deterrent is ineffective, reflecting Taiwan doubts about either mainland capabilities or mainland resolve to wage a retaliatory war; (2) in an example of the security dilemma in alliance politics, US commitment to Taiwan, although aimed at deterring PRC use of force, encourages Taiwan to challenge the status quo because the Taiwan leadership is confident of US intervention and US ability to defend Taiwan; (3) because of the development of a ‘Taiwan identity’ and of corresponding domestic political pressures, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to adopt a pro-independence policy; (4) Chen Shui-bian has a personal commitment to Taiwan independence and has been willing to challenge the mainland's interest in one-China, despite risk of heightened conflict and regardless of domestic political considerations.     

Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy in the United States: the case of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs

This article examines the advocacy of overseas Taiwanese, particularly those in the United States, and their influence on US foreign policy and subsequently upon democratization in Taiwan. It concentrates particularly on the work of a Taiwanese non-governmental, non-profit advocacy group in the US—the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). This article first composes an organizational history of FAPA by investigating the questions and processes of why and how FAPA was formed at the local level in the US. Further, it analyzes how the organization mobilized its relatively modest local resources in the US through grassroots diplomacy to promote Taiwan's visibility in the US, to influence the US government on Taiwan-related issues, and to attempt to impact upon Taiwan's democratization. Through the presentation of FAPA's organizational history, this article ultimately tries to answer the question of whether a non-governmental organization such as FAPA and its grassroots diplomacy has had an impact on US foreign policy and Taiwan's democratization. Besides adding to the existing scholarly literature on the causes of Taiwan's democratization, this study on the formation and effectiveness of FAPA seeks to contribute to studies on NGOs' or non-state actors' grassroots diplomacy and lobbying efforts on governmental policies. Because FAPA functioned as an important diplomatic channel for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first opposition party in the post-World War II era, before it matured into a fully-developed national opposition party in the 1990s and consequently unseated the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000, this article is also an examination of an opposition movement's informal diplomacy.     

The Education of Chen Shui-bian: Taiwan's experience of divided government

From its founding, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party emphasized the role of the president. It advocated a variety of measures aimed at strengthening the presidency, including direct presidential elections. However, it was only when a DPP politician was elected president in 2000 that the party discovered just how weak Taiwan's president is. During his first year in office, President Chen Shui-bian repeatedly found himself stymied by an intransigent and uncooperative legislature. The conflict between the presidential office and the legislature climaxed in a confrontation over the executive's decision to cancel construction of Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plant. In the wake of the decision, some legislators attempted to recall Chen from office. In the second year of his presidency, Chen was more effective in working within the constraints of a divided government. Despite the difficulties its leaders faced in managing a divided government, however, the DPP has not changed its position in favor of presidentialism.     

2005年台湾"三合一"选举之评析

2005年底,台湾“三合一”选举结果揭晓,国民党在各项选举中都取得优势性胜利,民进党在县市长选举中遭受重大挫败,县市“议员”和乡镇市长当选数有小幅增长。亲民党、台湾团结联盟和新党,从当选席次、得票率等方面看,都已被边缘化。“高雄捷运”弊案所构成的特殊背景,成为此次选举的最大特征,并且直接影响选举的最终结果。此次“三合一”选举,必对台湾的政党结构体系以及台湾政坛产生重大影响,是当前台湾政局发展及其两岸关系未来走向的参考指标。     

The cross‐strait talks of 1993—The rest of the story: Domestic politics and Taiwan's mainland policy

In April 1993 ‘unofficial’ representatives of the mainland and Taiwan met in Singapore. This was the most important cross‐strait meeting since the end of the civil war in 1949 and was held against a background of growing contact that had begun in the late 1980s. However, these meetings also came at a time when the political system in Taiwan was undergoing a process of dramatic change. The development of an opposition party, divisions within the ruling KMT party, a more assertive Legislative Yuan and the sprouts of interest group politics all provided a domestic context for the meetings in Singapore. This paper looks at the manner in which these domestic factors shaped the tone and substance of Taiwan's bargaining position at these talks.     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

莫让“两国论”“一边一国”论死灰复燃

3月18日，台湾岛内的一场选举，主张“台独”的民进党政权被民众唾弃。在“九二共识”基础上，国共交流平台进一步扩展，海协、海基两会恢复商谈，两岸关系和平发展新局已经形成。但是，“两国论”、“一边一国”论、“一中一台”等分裂言行在岛内外却未销声匿迹。     

The political economy of Taiwan's mainland policy

The emerging patterns of the cross‐strait interaction present a perplexing duality, revealing both the trends toward closer economic convergence and greater political divergence. Taiwan's mainland policy is both the manifestation and the catalyst of the two contradictory processes. It is the locus of confrontation of the various economic, social, and political forces that propels the two concurrent processes. It has been propelled by the epic changes in the global political economy, the market‐oriented reform in China, and Taiwan's economic restructuring process. It has also been prompted by the perceived challenges and opportunities brought about by the transition to the post‐Cold War era, the unraveling of structural conflicts between a status‐quo power (i.e., the US) and a rising power (i.e., the PRC) and by the politics of political succession within the CCP. In more immediate terms, it has been driven by the power struggle over political succession within the KMT, the bureaucratic process, the interest group politics, the partisan politics in both the electoral and legislative arenas, and the unfolding of the national identity crisis during Taiwan's recent transition to democracy.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

Securing Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: New challenges and opportunities

Cross-Taiwan Straits economic interaction is a political as well as an economic issue. General trends of economic interdependence and globalization that are weakening the role of the nation state should promote a focus of shared 'civilian governance' between Taiwan and mainland China. WTO entry will provide opportunities as well as challenges for cross-Strait economic relations. In anticipation of this dynamic, the new government in Taiwan is attempting to design a new national security web to guarantee Taiwan's 'economic security' in coping with Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on mainland China. As one key agent of globalization, economic cooperation in the urban areas on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may potentially improve relations between Taiwan and mainland China. As decentralization and privatization on mainland China proceed, major cities have developed closer interaction and systems of accountability with the civil society. From a prudent perspective, developing functional cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China at the urban level could be a first substantial step to confidence building between these two economies.     

Neo‐authoritarianism,polarized conflict and populism in a newly democratizing regime: Taiwan's emerging mass politics

A major obstacle to the consolidation of Taiwan's new democracy lies in the island's emerging mass politics. In recent years, three inter‐related trends have come to characterize Taiwan's political culture and citizen politics: uneven development of mass beliefs in democratic legitimacy, polarization of political cleavage, and a shift to political populism. First, political liberty, meaning primarily freedom of speech and due process, and separation of power meaning parliamentary oversight and judicial independence, have yet to become widely held democratic values among Taiwan's electorate despite visible progress in the development of formal democratic institutions. Next, the polarized conflict over national identity is potentially dangerous because it could result in both internal ethnic strife and external military intervention. Last, an intense lack of confidence in representative institutions and a low level of political tolerance pose a formidable challenge to the development of constitutionalism.     

Competing conceptions of Taiwan's identity: The irresolvable conflict in cross‐strait relations

Supporters of unification and Taiwan independence advocates view Taiwan's status through radically different logical frameworks. Unification supporters are guided by historical determinism. They believe that because Taiwan was part of China in the past, and because the island's residents have ancestral ties to mainland China, Taiwan is therefore an unalienable part of Chinese territory that must be brought under the control of the mainland Chinese state. In contrast, advocates of Taiwan independence are guided by the logic of pragmatism. In their view, cultural identity does not dictate political identity, and decisions about Taiwan's status should be guided by the will of the island's people, rather than by an abstract notion of historic destiny. Both of these approaches are rooted in long‐standing concepts of Chinese identity. Chinese ethnicity has long included both a hereditary and a cultural component. In the past, the cultural component allowed China to absorb populations on its periphery. Today, it serves as an outlet for Taiwan independence supporters seeking to redefine Taiwan as a political entity separate from the mainland Chinese state.     

The Taiwan conundrum: heading towards a new war?

Taiwan's controversial 2004 presidential election has drastically changed the political landscape of the island. The balance of power is turning greatly in favor of the pro‐independence DPP and TSU coalition. China now focuses its energy on building up a well‐off society in an all‐round way. China will try its best to solve the Taiwan question peacefully. As Chen Shui‐bian has made up his mind to carry out his timetable for independence, Beijing is being driven into a corner. Chen Shui‐bian's victory not only constitutes a big challenge to China, but also a big challenge to the US. At the moment US–China relations are in one of the best stages of all time, but if the Taiwan issue goes out of control, US–China relations would be devastated, leading to a serious confrontation which might trigger a disastrous war between the two countries. In order to avoid such a worst‐case scenario, the two countries should coordinate to manage the situation and take effective measures to keep the issue under control.     

“解严”后政党角力下台湾新闻自由的进步与迷思

台湾新闻自由实践在其政党角力中扮演着工具角色。换言之,新闻自由从来就不是政党角力的目的,只是权力斗争的工具。多党纷争时期,在野党高举“新闻自由”旗帜,与国民党争夺媒体资源。政党轮替后,对峙的国民两党都是表面附和“新闻自由”,实际上却采用隐性、间接的方式操控媒体。政党竞争带来了广电媒体的解禁、新闻自由法律法规的修正、新闻自由观念的成熟等正面效应。但政党对媒体的变相操控却让新闻自由异化,“只问政党,不问事实”的蓝绿媒体难以承担“第四权”责任。     

US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry?     

Chinese nationalism,Taiwan autonomy and the prospects of a larger war

In contrast to the belief that the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits crisis was caused by the visit of the President of Taiwan to Cornell University, in fact, the post‐Mao ruling groups in Beijing made forcing early reunification with mainland China on Taiwan a top priority soon after assuming power in 1978. This new focus on Taiwan's reunification reflects a policy switch. It is not a continuation of Mao era policies. The switch is basic. It involves a profound change in the content of Chinese nationalism from Mao era nationalism, which is seen by its critics in China as insufficiently promoting the national interests of the Chinese people. The new, post‐Mao nationalism in China not only challenges Taiwan's autonomy, it also could endanger peace in the Pacific‐Asia region. Consequently, it is important to rethink the political dynamics at work in China and in the region if the parties involved hope to avoid a larger war.     

Beijing’s New Strategies toward a Changing Taiwan

Beijing’s new strategies toward Taiwan are informed by neo-functionalism derived from European experiences, assuming that economic integration will eventually lead to political accommodation and integration. Despite the surprising Sunflower Movement and the fiasco of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the 2014 local elections, Beijing will try its best to maintain the momentum of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Facing a brand new Taiwan that seems an oddity to the mainland, however, Beijing has adapted to ‘the new normal’ with a slower pace, refocusing on the economic and cultural issues. Whether or to what degree Beijing will change its asymmetric engagements with the two main parties on the island, however, is contingent upon whether the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) can reach a balance of power domestically and whether their policies toward the mainland converge rather than diverge. At any rate, Beijing is likely to pay more attention to ordinary people’s feelings about cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges and consider quality of cross-Strait exchange as more important than quantity of activities.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.