The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations under the Post-'11 September' Strategic Settings

Sino-US relations and cross-Strait relations are always interrelated and so is the US policy towards cross-Strait relations. The United States has taken its global strategic and fundamental national interests as points of departure. The Bush Administration has undergone a cycle of being tough towards China and titling towards Taiwan first and then readjusting towards the middle ground. There are many reasons to explain this change and the events of 11 September stand out very prominently. This change once again proves that once the US put strategic consideration first it will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the Taiwan issue should not be a damaging and/or diverting factor. However, there still exist fundamental differences over the Taiwan issue and the Bush Administration's military-to-military relations with and arms sales to Taiwan are matters of great concern.     

Continuity and change: the administration of George W. Bush and US policy toward Taiwan

This paper examines recent modifications in American policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). It contends that, while the George W. Bush Administration may have carried out a significant readjustment of US policy, available evidence suggests that it will not endorse any major upgrades in ties with Taipei during the foreseeable future. Like previous administrations, the Bush Administration now recognizes the value of engaging the People's Republic of China (PRC). This development holds important implications for the future trajectory of America's relations with Taiwan and the PRC and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific.     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

The Taiwan conundrum: heading towards a new war?

Taiwan's controversial 2004 presidential election has drastically changed the political landscape of the island. The balance of power is turning greatly in favor of the pro‐independence DPP and TSU coalition. China now focuses its energy on building up a well‐off society in an all‐round way. China will try its best to solve the Taiwan question peacefully. As Chen Shui‐bian has made up his mind to carry out his timetable for independence, Beijing is being driven into a corner. Chen Shui‐bian's victory not only constitutes a big challenge to China, but also a big challenge to the US. At the moment US–China relations are in one of the best stages of all time, but if the Taiwan issue goes out of control, US–China relations would be devastated, leading to a serious confrontation which might trigger a disastrous war between the two countries. In order to avoid such a worst‐case scenario, the two countries should coordinate to manage the situation and take effective measures to keep the issue under control.     

US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry?     

US‐China relations and the Taiwan factor

With the diplomatic warming of US‐China relations, the recent resumption of the Koo — Wang meeting and Taiwan's elections for legislators, mayors, and city councilors, cross‐Taiwan Strait relations are at another historical turning point. While the improvement of US‐China relations tends to relieve both sides from rhetoric exchanges of ‘China threat’ and ‘US‐Taiwan conspiracy’, Clinton's oral declaration of the ‘Three No's’ has raised serious concerns in Taiwan. With such a background, a group of experts and policy‐making participants from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China gathered again at a conference on ‘US‐China Relations and the Taiwan Factor’ in Washington, DC in mid‐October 1998. This was the second episode in a series of symposia on US‐China relations sponsored by the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS). The symposium attempts to provide a free, intimate, and long‐term forum for a group of influential experts with different perspectives from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. As a result, a deep understanding of common interests has been reached and clear differences have also been recognized through direct dialogue and frank exchange of ideas.     

“朋友·伙伴”意象下美国台海政策的局限—以美国对“入联公投”的政策态度为例

美国长期以来对台湾形成了“朋友·伙伴”的固有意象。在美国和台湾针对“入联公投”的博弈中，美国不断强渊“入联公投”不影响美台“朋友”与“伙伴”关系的性质，也没有对陈水扁当局采取有实质意义的惩罚措施，使美国的政策有不少保留的空间。美国对“朋友·伙伴”意象的盲目认知和坚持，无法阻止台湾某些政治人物和“台独”势力的挑衅行为，无法取信于中国政府和两岸人民，也不利于美国政府的决策者加深对台湾问题重要性和敏感性的认知，不利于台海地区长期的和平、稳定与发展。     

The impact and clash of ideologies: Sino‐US relations from a historical perspective

Sino‐US relations over the last 100 years have been heavily affected by the ideological and cultural traditions of both sides; but the impact of ideas on each other has by no means been an even interaction. At the turn of the century when China and the US encountered each other, their destinies took opposite trajectories. While the US saw its dream of national greatness fulfilled with the continuous rise of its national power, China witnessed the sharp downfall from the peak of its self‐perception as the great central kingdom. Ever since then, all progressive intellectuals and reformers took inspiration from western ideas of democracy and freedom, while struggling at the same time against oppression and exploitation by western powers. These two aspects constitute the basic aspirations of the Chinese nation as a whole, which was summed up as ‘anti‐feudalism and anti‐imperialism’. One of the basic urges of Americans of all sorts in dealing with China throughout the years was to influence, educate and change China to its like. However, in front of Chinese revolutionary movments with democratic rights as part of their aims, the US government policies more than often favored the conservative or reactionary rulers. Meanwhile, the development of China takes its own course beyond the control of the US. Yet, under different circumstances, neither side could help placing hopes on the other. As for rulers of different Chinese adminstrations, they wavered between seeking American support in China's economic development and diplomacy on the one hand, and fear and resentment of American cultural influence on the other. Anti‐communism entered the US foreign policy thinking ever since the Russian Revolution. But US relations with the Chinese Communist Party have not been hostile all the way through but have undergone twists and turns. The period of best relationship between the US and the PRC took place in the 1980s and underwent a sharp turn after the events of 1989. Leaving aside other factors, the age‐long cultural paradigm of unrealistic hopes on each other, hence drastic disappointment, played a certain role. At present, The mentality of the bulk of Chinese including young students have also undergone a great change from the pre‐1989 period. The admiration for the US has receded and a certain degree of resentment of American pressure on China is on the rise. The pursuit of a strong and prosperous China remains the common and deep‐rooted national aspiration prevailing among Chinese of all ages and social strata and in this they identify themselves more with the government vs. foreign pressure, whatever their views on other subjects. The ideological aspect of difficulties in Sino‐US relations is not likely to go away in the foreseeable future and much wisdom is needed to handle it properly.     

美国民众对军售台湾支持率的影响因素研究——基于美国人对华态度实证调研

美国对外政策的制定通常需要有民意基础,然而现有研究鲜有从美国民众的视角探究美国对台军售。本文基于美国人对华态度实证调研的数据,利用单因子试验法测试美国民众在“中美关系”和“对台军售”间的权衡,并采用logistic模型来检查影响美国民众对台军售支持率的主要因素。结果表明即使对台军售会严重恶化或危害中美关系,58％的美国民众依然支持美国对台军售。政治倾向（温和派）、媒体和信息渠道（收听广播和浏览网络频率）、个人因素（性别、年龄）等是影响美国民众对台军售支持率的主要因素。终止美国对台军售,我国一方面需要有更加强有力的反制措施,另一方面可以尝试通过长期规划的网络传播手段来扭转美国民众对对台军售的支持。     

马英九上台后美国对台政策调整的背景分析

马英九上台执政后,美国对台政策的着力点由反对单方面改变台海现状转向正面评价台湾当局调整大陆政策和两岸关系的改善。美国的上述调整虽然有其现实的国家利益需求,但决策环境的变化也在对美国传统的对台思维和战略产生深刻的影响。未来四年,美国会继续发展美台关系,保持对台海局势的影响力,但随着两岸对话的不断深入,美国对台海局势的关注度可能会有所降低,台湾问题对中美关系的负面影响也可能趋于弱化。     

对美国“弃台论”相关争论的观察及美国对台政策走向分析

2008年马英九上台以来,两岸关系步入和平发展时期.美国政府官员和政策专家对在此时期美国对台政策是否应当调整发表了不同的看法,其中“弃台论”声音的出现,引起了美国官方和学界的高度关注和激烈争论.“弃台论”在美国国内产生了重要的影响,但从现实来看,“弃台论”尚未进入决策层面.当前美国对台政策并未发生结构性变化,美国并没有放弃对台湾的影响力.未来美国对台政策呈现出总体框架维持不变、局部修正的态势.     

美国民众涉台观点的Biprobit研究——基于美国人对华态度实证调研

自从台湾问题形成以来,美国历任总统都实行“双轨政策”,一方面承认“台湾是中国的一部分”,但又从没有放弃对“台独”的支持,如对台军售。了解美国民众涉台观点的形成和受到哪些因素的影响对我国制定相应的涉台政策有着重要意义。本文先后采用univariateprobit、bivari-ateprobit和seeminglyunrelatedbivariateprobit模型对美国民众在台湾省地位的认同和对台军售支持进行回归分析。分析结果显示美国民众对中国台湾省地位的认同显著地影响对台军售支持,认同“台湾是中国一部分”的美国民众在对台军售方面的支持也显著要高。这充分证实了美国是典型的现实主义者,他利用台湾问题来阻滞中国大陆的发展和海峡两岸的和平统一。     

Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese perceptions of the engagement policy debate in the United States

This paper argues that now, more than at any other time, the way that China‐US relations evolve will shape each country's interests and affect the development of global politics. Thus, at this critical point, it is important that the two countries develop a mutually beneficial relationship. In this respect Chinese views of US intentions matter because these views translate into policies; policies that influence US domestic politics and shape relations between the two countries. It is ironic, then, that while Chinese understanding of US domestic politics has never been better and its response to it has never been more sophisticated, the criticisms of China in the US have never been stronger than at any time since rapprochement in the early 1970s. And, pointing specifically to the debate in the US since 1994 over the Clinton Administration's engagement policy, Jia analyzes this as a key source of current Chinese frustrations.     

陈瑸理“番”政策述论

陈瑸是清朝康熙年间著名清官,做过台湾县令和台厦兵备道。"番"指台湾原住民,是台湾社会处于原始状态的特殊群体。陈瑸的理"番"政策,包含着儒家文化的"民胞物与"的民本思想。他在理"番"中施仁政,与他的儒学修养有密切关系。     

National security vs. economic interests: reassessing Taiwan's mainland policy under Chen Shui‐bian

Having finished its first term, the Chen Shui‐bian Administration has found itself in deep water in the troubled cross‐Strait relations. Not only has Chen himself been making contradictory remarks, the Cabinet has been indecisive over issues related to China. The most difficult and irritating case for the DPP government has been the handling of the call made by high‐tech industries to allow them to invest in the mainland. The controversy seems to highlight a dilemma for Taiwan: while it needs the mainland market to save it from the current economic doldrums and create yet another potential ‘miracle’ of becoming a global economic powerhouse, it is worried that further economic engagement with its former rival may pose new kinds of threats to its national security. The debate over whether to allow an eight‐inch wafer foundry, the crown jewel of Taiwan's economy, to invest in the mainland market is but one case, albeit a highly significant one, of the difficult relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.     

美国因素在两岸关系和平发展进程中的影响

美国对两岸和谈的政策立场,是出于维系台海“不统、不独、不战”局面的战略考虑,以保证自己在台海地区的最大战略利益。美国既不希望两岸举行统一谈判又希望两岸达成和平协议的复杂心态,表现在一方面希望两岸进行谈判,降低敌对状态,另一方面又长期对台提供军售,使其增加与大陆相抗衡的资本。此一“双轨政策”对两岸和平关系的构建,有着不同方向的影响,往往起了互相抵消的作用。由于中国政府对台湾当局谋求“法理台独”的强烈反应以及台海紧张局势的升高,美国政府在20世纪90年代后期开始对两岸政治谈判采取较为积极的态度,反对台湾单方面改变现状。美国的上述战略考虑,在反对台湾“独立”、维系两岸和平这一点上,与中国政府的立场有相通之处,客观上为构建两岸关系和平发展框架提供了较好的外部条件。     

新时期的美国涉台关系及其制约因素

中美关系与两岸关系的大格局,决定了美国涉台关系的变化趋势.在政治上,美国乐见国民党连续执政和两岸关系的和平发展,但对于台湾被迫走向统一,存有疑虑,希望及时把握两岸和谈的具体进程.美方对台湾在“国防”、“外交”等领域予以多方面支持的目的,从短期看是同步强化美台关系,维护美国在台海地区的既有利益;从长期看则是增加台湾在两岸谈判中的筹码,谋取美国在台湾问题最终解决方案上的主动权.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

Research note on the Taiwan relations act: Executive and legislative differences

Since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the executive branch and the legislative branch have diverged on US‐Taiwan relations. As the executive branch created its version of the TRA, the Congress exerted its influence by adding security provisions. Yielding to the influence of Congress, President Carter accepted and signed into law the TRA. The 1982 Joint Communiqué contradicts the TRA. President Reagan signed this Communiqué which pledges that the US will decrease its arms sales to Taiwan. However, the TRA binds the US, by law, to sell a sufficient amount of defensive weapons to Taiwan for its security. How can the US provide sufficient amounts of defensive weapons to Taiwan if the US is decreasing its arms sales to Taiwan? The security provisions that Congress placed in the TRA comes into conflict with a presidential foreign policy statement. This paper finds that there is and has been a divergence of actions that occur even though the rhetoric and statements made by both sides seem similar. Traditionally, the Congress, has been the supporter, friend, and ally of Taiwan, whereas the administrations have been more concerned with US‐PRC relations. The TRA, being the law of the land, is contradicted by the 1982 Joint Communiqué. This paper illustrates the most recent differences between the Congress and Clinton administration.