The Missing Link: Explaining the Political Mobilisation of Islam in Indonesia

Abstract

Why has an increase in personal piety among Indonesia's Muslims not translated into electoral gains for Islamic political parties? To help explain this conundrum, this article focuses on the role of Indonesia's mass Islamic social organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Using a political economy lens, it argues that control over state resources and the provision of social welfare facilities have helped political parties maintain power over the years and that NU and Muhammadiyah have at times played important mediating roles in this process. Extending this analysis into Indonesia's contemporary politics, it then proposes that since 2004 in particular, the health and education facilities provided by NU and Muhammadiyah are becoming less important to ordinary people in relation to the services provided by the state. It concludes that this trend has weakened the ability of these organisations to channel public support to political parties/candidates and is one reason why Islamic parties have not been able to capitalise on increased religiosity in the social sphere.     

Indonesia: The politics of inclusion

Much commentary on Indonesian politics since the fall of President Suharto in May 1998 has suggested that Indonesia's political system has remained just as exclusionary as it was prior to his fall, despite becoming much more democratic and decentralised. In contrast to this view, we argue that Indonesia's political system has become more inclusive, if only somewhat more so. The fall of Suharto and the subsequent process of democratisation have removed key obstacles to organisation by poor and disadvantaged groups and their NGO allies, making it easier for them to engage in collective action aimed at achieving pro-poor policy change. By making attainment of political office dependent on the support of the voting public, many of whom are poor and disadvantaged, these developments have also created an incentive for politicians to pursue policy changes that favour these groups or at least that appeal to them. At the same time, however, we argue that poor and disadvantaged groups have not become major players in the policy-making process. Despite the fall of Suharto and democratisation, these groups continue to lack the resources possessed by other participants in the policy-making process. Whereas the politico-bureaucrats and well-connected business groups have been able to exercise influence over policy by buying support within representative bodies such as parliament and mobile capital controllers, the IFIs and Western governments have been able to exercise influence by virtue of their structural power, poor and disadvantaged groups have had to rely on less potent ways of exercising influence such as holding demonstrations, engaging in lobbying activity and participating in public debates. We illustrate these points with reference to two policy issues: land reform and mining in protected forests. The article concludes by considering the future prospects for inclusive policy-making in Indonesia.     

The Japan‐US alliance and the Asia‐Pacific region

For the past fifty years the Japan‐US alliance has provided the framework for Asia‐Pacific security, says Jusuf Wanandi, Chairman of the Centre for Strategic International Studies in Indonesia and former research fellow at IIPS. The region's political and economic dynamics are changing, Wanandi says, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) supports an increased Japanese security role, with regional organizations acting as a conduit. But before Japan will win the confidence of some Asian neighbors, he says, Japan must open its economy, reform its domestic politics, and come to terms with its militaristic past.     

Rival Transnational Networks,Domestic Politics and Indonesian Timber

Scholars interested in the promotion of “good governance” and those interested in transnational advocacy networks both are concerned with the potential power of external actors to alter domestic political structures. This article analyses the networks promoting neo-liberalisation and democratic practices in Indonesia's forestry sector as rival transnational networks. The analysis finds that the Asian economic crisis and collapse of the Suharto regime provided a political opening for alliances between the two rival networks that helped to bring down the ruling oligarchy in timber, but the power of domestic oligarchs controlling the sector remains strong. In brief, there are limits to the power of both external networks vis-à-vis domestic power relations. Given the financial resources and constraints on non-governmental organisations, they may be unable to alter the deep structures of capitalist accumulation and distribution based in Indonesia's forest resources.     

Escaping the resource curse: The case of Indonesia

Abstract

Numerous studies have suggested that natural resource abundance is bad for development. In this context, Indonesia's rapid growth during the 1970s and 1980s seems remarkable. Why was Indonesia able to grow strongly and what are the implications of its experience for other resource abundant countries? I argue that its rapid growth was not simply a matter of policy elites making rational economic policy choices, but rather reflected two more fundamental factors: (i) the political victory of counter-revolutionary social forces over radical nationalist and communist social forces in Indonesia during the 1960s; and (ii) the country's strategic Cold War location and proximity to Japan. Accordingly, the main implication of its experience is that improved economic performance in resource abundant countries requires shifts in structures of power and interest and the emergence of external political and economic conditions that provide opportunities for growth.     

INDONESIA’S 2019 ELECTIONS: A FRACTURED DEMOCRACY?

In April 2019, Indonesia carried out simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. With an estimated 192 million voters acceding to 800,000 polling stations, this was the world's largest direct presidential election. Barring some dispersed claims of irregularities, the mammoth task of electing public representatives at the national as well as provincial and local levels was successfully carried out. Indonesia's voters had to decide on the 575 members of the national parliament, as well as some 20,000 seats in the country's many provincial and local legislatures, including 2,207 provincial level MPs from 34 provinces and 17,610 local councillors from more than 500 local authorities. Voter turn-out was an estimated 81.9 percent, the highest yet since Indonesia's transition to full democracy. Thus, at first blush, this electoral exercise can be seen as a logistical and political achievement, and an addition to Indonesia's track record of successfully-held elections. Yet, despite its technical proficiency and solid participation, the 2019 polls highlight pervasive societal and geographic fault-lines and raise questions about the strength of Indonesia's democratic institutions.

In order to analyse the importance of these elections, this article is comprised of six parts. Following this introduction, the second section briefly discusses the salient aspects of Jokowi's first administration. The subsequent part sets out the run-up to the presidential campaign, paying particular importance to changes in ‘rules of the game’ that altered the structural dynamics of the elections. The fourth section compares and contrasts the campaigns of the two opposing coalitions and the fifth analyses the electoral results. The final section concludes by discussing the denouement of the elections before looking forward.     

Letter-writing and Transnational Activism on Behalf of Indonesian Political Prisoners: Gatot Lestario and his Legacy

Amnesty International estimated in 1977 that between 600,000 and 750,000 Indonesians had been or were still imprisoned as a result of the Army-led anti-communist violence in Indonesia in the mid-1960s. This article charts the relationship between members of Amnesty International and the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) with a political prisoner on death row in East Java, Gatot Lestario, a former leader of the Indonesian Communist Party. This article draws on the letters he wrote over a period of three years before his execution in 1985 and interviews with his pen pals. It traces the ways in which he encouraged his pen pals to advocate for human rights in Indonesia and their responses, as well as his own involvement in political prisoner advocacy. This case study illustrates the disappearance of Indonesia's previously close and solidary relationship with the socialist world and its replacement at the people-to-people level with human rights activism involving Western activists. This is particularly evident in the increasingly important role played by members of Amnesty International, the Quakers and other overseas organizations concerned with Indonesia. Finally, the article assesses Gatot Lestario's impact, after his execution, on the development of a long-term advocacy network for Indonesia's political prisoners.     

Bin Ali's Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means

The article tackles one principal question: Can the current dicing with democracy in Tunisia serve as a harbinger for good governance when it is founded on exclusionary political practices. It argues that Bin Ali's reforms represent yet another phase in the reproduction of hegemonic political practice which is about control not democratic power sharing. The article's analytical agenda is two-fold. Firstly, it will critically assess the nature of Bin Ali's 'electoral democracy'. In so doing, it looks at the tension between political rhetoric and practice. What becomes clear is that 11 years of 'electoralization' and 'parliamentarization' have not put an end to unlawful exclusion, muzzling of free expression, repression and disenfranchizement. Secondly, it will show that Bin Ali's obsession with hegemonic control may already be corroding his regime's legitimacy at home and denting its credibility abroad, especially in France. In this respect, the analysis will attempt to draw general conclusions from three recent crises. Specifically, can they be read as the first cracks in the monolith of singular rule in Tunisia? The article concludes on a negative and a positive note. On the negative side, Bin Ali, as this author believes, is not likely to give up power constitutionally. On the positive side, the April-May 2000 crises have placed his regime in the spotlight at home and abroad and may possibly galvanize civil society into pressuring the regime to reverse its return to a closed society.     

Latin American Democracy. What to Do with the Leaders?

The democratic deficit, or the gap between citizens' aspirations and their level of satisfaction, is increasing in Latin America. Such dissatisfaction helps to understand many of the region's presidential crises: since 1985, 23 Latin American presidents have left government abruptly. While civil society may have been able to provoke the fall of presidents, it has not managed to avoid the re‐emergence of deep‐rooted political practices under subsequent administrations. Extreme presidentialism, clientelism and populism have re‐emerged strengthened after deep political crises. This article offers some ideas regarding the impact that different types of political leaders can have on how well democracy works.     

Building Coptic Civil Society: Christian Groups and the State in Mubarak's Egypt

Mubarak's Egypt is a relatively liberal regime which nonetheless retains relatively tight controls on civil society activity so as to pre-empt political activism, particularly that arising from Islamist or secular rivals to the regime. In spite of the constraints of Egyptian politics and their subordinate status as dhimmis under Islam, Copts have managed to create a wide edifice of civil society in Mubarak's Egypt. The explanations for this reside the internal strength and vibrancy of Coptic institutions themselves and in the non-threatening and moderating influence displayed by Coptic civil society.     

Local elections and democracy in Indonesia: The Riau Archipelago

This essay examines the dynamics and outcomes of Indonesia's first-ever direct local executive elections in a case study of the gubernatorial election in the Riau Archipelago. Specifically, the essay examines the election process, identifies the major issues before, during and after the elections, and assesses voters' participation. The essay then examines the ways direct local executive elections have affected the dynamics of local politics in the country. Overall, this essay aims to further develop our understanding of political dynamics in the Riau Archipelago and grasp the practical significance of local political change in Indonesia more broadly.     

Islam,Islamism, and Post‐Islamism: Rediscovering Politics after the War on Terror

Over the past twenty years, an influential body of conservative scholarship has focused on the alleged conflict between Islam and the West. Following widespread criticism of this scholarship, a number of commentators have revived its core assumptions to claim that the real conflict is between liberal democracy within Muslim societies and the political ideology of Islamism. In this article we trace the evolution of this scholarship, and suggest that recent empirical developments in the Muslim world suggest the potential for post‐Islamist parties to successfully adapt to the demands of democratic competition within Muslim societies. In this context, the emerging conflict is not between Islam and the West, or Islamism and the West, but between two very different discursive practices within the Muslim world that invoke Islam for radically different purposes. A traveler enters the world into which he travels, but a tourist brings his own world with him and never sees the one he's in. ¹      

Khatami's Islamist-Iranian Discourse of National Identity: A Discourse of Resistance

Using a discourse approach, the article demonstrates that Khatami's construction of Iranian national identity is a discourse of resistance on the international and regional levels. This resistance is evident in the meanings attached to three sets of values: Iranian-Islamic culture, ‘dialogue among civilisations’ and Islamic mardumsālārī, which are referred to as the three pillars of the Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity. In terms of Iranian-Islamic culture, it is evident that Islam is Iranianised and furthermore the framework for the political apparatus is not simply politicised Islam, but rather Iranian political Islam. In terms of ‘dialogue among civilisations’, the resistance is not only to perceived Western hegemony in the international system, but also resistance to the dominance of the West and Western perspectives in the discipline of International Relations. Finally, Khatami establishes Islamic mardumsālārī as the most appropriate and authentic means of maintaining Iran as an independent nation.     

The Television Industry in Post-authoritarian Indonesia

This article examines the rise of capital in the Indonesian television industry. Following Richard Robison's seminal book, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, it suggests that a range of powerful economic and political interests have determined the dynamics of the evolution of this industry in Indonesia. During the heyday of the New Order, a commercial television industry was created in ways that suited the expansion of the business interests of oligarchic families. In the post-Soeharto era, a major interest of capital in this industry has been to overcome regulatory mechanisms that were put in place before the euphoria of reform and democratisation had abated. Moreover, there are strong connections between capital in the television industry and political groupings contesting power within Indonesia's democracy. While capital accumulation in this industry may not be as massive as in some others, the unique characteristics of television as a medium ensure that exerting control over it remains vital.     

Muslim identity and Islamic practice in post-Soviet Central Asia

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly independent countries of Central Asia had the opportunity to endorse religious freedom. Nevertheless, they chose for the most part to continue the policy of monitoring religious activity, on the pretext of protecting their countries from radical Islam. This study focuses on Islamic praxis in post-Soviet Central Asia. Based on a survey conducted in four Central Asian successor states (excluding Turkmenistan), it examines everyday Islam – observance of precepts, life-cycle rites, prayer and mosque attendance – as well as people's perceptions about the role of Islam in their lives and in the evolution of their societies and the place of Islam in local identity. The authors' findings have not always corresponded to usually accepted hypotheses and they have sought to analyse the reasons for this. Undoubtedly, the exigencies of the current political situation both act as a restraint on respondents in addressing the questions put to them and restrict their religious praxis outside the home. It is difficult to assess how far responses would have differed had the survey been conducted under more favourable circumstances; indeed, some of the questions may have been genuinely misinterpreted as a result of differences in outlook and the use of concepts.     

Responding to Western Critiques of the Muslim World: Deconstructing the Cliché of Islamophobia and the Genealogies of Islamic Extremism

This paper is premised on the questions of whether Islam as a religion, spiritual domain, cultural practice and philosophy should be held responsible for whatever activities the Muslims choose to do in their personal capacity. Does the ascribed status of individuals being Muslims and their choice of declaring themselves as terrorists in the name of Islam entail that they are true followers of the religion and have been theologically and spiritually inspired by it? These questions have sprung up because Islam as a religion has constituted the fundamental component of western interpretation of the reasons for the rise of violent extremism involving Muslim radicals. In this context, the objective of this paper is to examine how the contemporary western interpretations, linking the actions of Muslim extremist groups with those of the ontology and epistemology of Islam, are predicated on a faulty cognition of the nature and the guiding principles of that religion itself. To accomplish this, the paper critiques Samuel Huntington's ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and Bernard Lewis's version of the roots of Muslim extremism.     

University students of the middle east

The article considers Indonesia's democratic advance over the last five years, effectively the first term in office of President Yudhoyono. Focussing on the three threats which seemed most acute in 2004 - Fragmentation, Macroeconomic Instability and Terrorism, the author suggests that the handling of the post-tsunami situation in Aceh was a turning point which will need to be consolidated by decentralisation; that prudence by technocrats and responsibility by the political leadership ensured economic success; and that the terrorist threat was overcome, partly by a political recognition that a real threat existed which had to be faced, and partly by good police work.     

Prospects for Islam in post‐Soeharto Indonesia∗

The Islamic parties combined may win a majority of the popular vote in the general elections in Indonesia in June, says Professor Mitsuo Nakamura of the Department of Cultural Anthropology, Chiba University, but there is virtually no possibility that so‐called “Islamic fundamentalism” will gain influence, and little likelihood that a solid Islamic bloc dominating both legislative and executive bodies of the government would initiate a comprehensive program of Islamization. In this article, Nakamura discusses the implications of the growing number of Islamic political parties for the future of Indonesian politics, and whether the emergence of these parties is likely to be detrimental or conducive to the reconstruction of Indonesia's national life on a more democratic footing.     

The Indonesian crisis and beyond

The crisis in Indonesia is first and foremost a political crisis that has been exposed and complicated by the financial crisis, says Jusuf Wanandi, Chairman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. The riots of 14 and 15 May 1998 forced President Soeharto to transfer power to his vice‐president, B. J. Habibie. However, because Habibie lacks credibility and legitimacy as a leader, he has been considered from the outset a transition figure. There is great hope that the general elections in June 1999 will solve the questions about the legitimacy of the government, and restore stability, security, and economic development throughout Indonesia, but there are still many obstacles to overcome if the elections are to be held on schedule. Furthermore, if the election results are not deemed fair, a political upheaval will likely occur. Indonesia, Wanandi says, cannot afford any further mistakes.     

Indonesian politics: Current situation,future outlook

Where is Indonesia heading? How has Indonesia's experience since May 1998 changed Indonesian politics, and what developments can be expected in the future? Can the Habibie administration put Indonesia back on the development track? Professor Takashi Shiraishi of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, argues that since the collapse of the Soeharto regime there has been a dispersal of authority—political, social, and regional. Divisive issues that are at the very root of politics in Indonesia have once again come to the fore, and only if a broad national agreement can be formed will the government be able to prevent the current structural crisis from developing into a much more serious nation‐wide crisis.