In the eye of the beholder: Meaning and structure of informal status in women's and men's prisons*

Applying an abductive mixed‐methods approach, we investigate the informal status systems in three women's prison units (across two prisons) and one men's prison unit. Qualitative analyses suggest “old head” narratives—where age, time in prison, sociability, and prison wisdom confer unit status—are prevalent across all four contexts. Perceptions of maternal “caregivers” and manipulative “bullies,” however, are found only in the three women's units. The qualitative findings inform formal network analyses by differentiating “positive,” “neutral,” and “negative” status nominations, with “negative” ties primarily absent from the men's unit. Within the women's units, network analyses find that high‐status women are likely to receive both positive and negative peer nominations, such that evaluations depend on who is doing the evaluating. Comparing the women's and men's networks, the correlates of positive and neutral ties are generally the same and center on covariates of age, getting along with others, race, and religion. Overall, the study points to important similarities and differences in status across the gendered prison contexts, while demonstrating how a sequential mixed‐methods design can illuminate both the meaning and the structure of prison informal organization.     

Sovereignty and International Order

Abstract. Sovereignty may be threatened by obligations and relations with other nations, states or powers from either an “internal” or “external” perspective. In this paper, I argue that these obligations and relationships may be compatible with a state's sovereignty if we understand the proper nature of authoritative relationships. This requires a model of “rational authority” which places emphasis on the first-person perspective of the subjects to authority.     

War and International Order in Kant's Legal Thought“*

Abstract. Kant's writings on international law and especially his Toward Perpetual Peace have been interpreted both in a “statist” and a “cosmopolitan” manner. In this article it is argued that these interpretations stem from an ambiguity in those writings. In the course of proposing a resolution of this ambiguity, the first question to be examined is the extent to which war forms a part of human history and of human nature. Secondly, Kant's arguments against the realistic position and the conditions for a lasting peace are presented. An interpretation is then offered both of the proposed league of nations and of the situation that exists when such a league is still absent. According to the interpretation offered here, Kant's writings fit partly within the tradition of the “just war.”¹     

Hannah Arendt's Moral Ontology: Comments on David Luban's Arendt on the Crime of Crimes

David Luban identifies a tension between Arendt's conception of ethnic identification in a context of persecution and her conception of humanity. That tension pertains to the reality—or realities—that Arendt addresses: the moral reality of her Bildung that appears throughout her work, and is centered on the “dignity of man,” on the one hand, and the divisive, “political” reality that she was forced to face when “attacked as a Jew,” on the other. By implicitly accepting that in a context of persecution one cannot escape the framing relevance of the “political” —an idea that is also present in her imaginary condemnation speech of Eichmann—Arendt betrays a fundamental theme of her work: “forgiveness” and the inherent possibility of a “new beginning.”     

Rorschach Tests,Pluralism, and Hopes for the Future: A Response to the Responses

In this essay, I address some of the concerns raised by contributors to the Symposium on Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. I argue that law and society scholarship focusing on race increasingly offers some of our field's best empirical analyses of the interpenetration of law and society; I emphasize the importance of the methodological and theoretical diversity that characterizes our fragmented field, arguing that our pluralism is one of our greatest strengths; I clarify my intended meaning of the term “real law” as I use it in the book's subtitle, as a way to underscore the socially constituted quality of all law; I attempt to rescue the reputation of dialectics from charges of “relativism”; and I reiterate my appreciation for our field's engagement with questions of social justice that has characterized it since its inception. In the second half of the essay, I briefly describe my current prison research and offer some thoughts for the future of our field.     

On the Wrong Track: Andrei Marmor on Legal Positivism,Interpretation, and Easy Cases

Abstract. The paper argues for the following points: (1) Marmor's own understanding of “legal positivism” is different from the understanding defended, e.g., by Herbert Hart and Norberto Bobbio, and apparently misleads him into the wrong track of a theoretical inversion; (2) Marmor's two‐stages model of (legal) interpretation—the understanding‐interpretion model—provides no support for Marmor's own positivistic theory of law; (3) Marmor's concept of interpretation is at odds both with the basic tenets of Hartian and Continental methodological legal positivism, on the one hand, and with the actual practice of legal interpretation in the Western world, on the other hand; (4) Marmor's concept of an easy case is likewise objectionable.     

Does the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Engage in “Trial by Media”?*

In recent years, heated debate has arisen concerning the media practices of Australia's competition and consumer regulator (“the ACCC”), with a number of industry leaders asserting that the ACCC engages in “trial by media.” The public disquiet surrounding the ACCC's use of the media was so significant that the Australian Parliament established an independent committee of inquiry (“the Dawson Inquiry”) to investigate (amongst other things) whether Australian competition legislation “provides adequate protection for the commercial affairs and reputation of individuals and corporations.” In its report, the Dawson Inquiry observed that widespread misgivings about the ACCC's media practices had emerged from the submissions that it had received. In its recommendations to the Australian Parliament, the Dawson Inquiry recommended that the ACCC should develop a media code of conduct to govern its use of the media, particularly in relation to enforcement proceedings. In making these recommendations, the Dawson Inquiry drew from a hitherto unpublished research study conducted in 2002 that sought to identify the extent to which the ACCC engages in “trial by media.” This article documents the design, methodological bases, and findings of that study in order to facilitate broader dissemination of the research findings upon which the Dawson Inquiry's policy recommendations concerning the ACCC's use of the media were based.     

The Juristic Study of Law's Formal Character

Abstract. The author summarizes the essential elements of a general theory he is developing which he calls “The Formal Character of Law.” He explains that law's formal character is a potentially major branch of legal theory that is still relatively unexplored. In his view, it is possible to identify formal attributes in (1) legal rules, (2) other basic legal constructs such as interpretive method, the principles of stare decisis, legal reasons, and legislative and adjudicative processes, and (3) a legal system viewed as a whole. For example, a legal rule has, in varying degrees, such formal attributes as generality, definiteness, and simplicity. (Other constructs have other formal attributes.) Such attributes are formal in the sense that they apply to or accommodate highly variable content and do not prescribe or proscribe content. Of course, legal phenomena have other characteristics besides their formality. The author's main technique for developing his theory is to address a common set of questions to the varied formal attributes of (l), (2), and (3) above. Among other things, the answers to these questions further explicate how law is formal, demonstrate that law is not merely a means of serving problem-specific policy but also serves formal values (which may sometimes trump or limit policy), treats the relations between form and content—specially how good form begets good content and bad form bad content, explores the design and implementation of appropriate formality—its “anatomy and physiology,” and analyses the “pathology” of legal form including not only the “formalistic” (the overformal), but also the “sub-stantivistic,” and shows how the overall theory is important both jurisprudentially and in practical ways.     

Fair Share Housing for Managed Growth

The Mt. Laurel decision represents the culmination of judicial thinking in exclusionary zoning type litigation. Implicit in decisions striking down local land use controls found to be “exclusionary” in nature has been the notion that a community has a legal duty to accept a “fair share” of the housing needs of the region. Fair share housing now begins to take on some substance with the New Jersey court's decision. Similar language on responsibilities for regional needs may be found in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in Kit-Mar and Girsh, and in the federal district court's opinion in Petaluma.     

Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge Informer: A Reconsideration

Hart's defense of the separation of law and morality is partly based on his refusal to accept Radbruch's solution of the well‐known grudge informer case, in his famous article “Statutory Injustice and Suprastatutory Law.” In this paper, I present a detailed reconstruction of the “debate” between Radbruch and Hart on this case. I reach the conclusion that Hart fails to address the issue that was Radbruch's primary concern, namely the legal position of the judiciary when dealing with criminal statutes. I suggest that Hart's separation thesis cannot be upheld in the face of this concern. In my argument, Hart's mistaken understanding of the verdict of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg that he refers to plays a crucial role.     

Understanding Suicide Across the Lifespan: A United States Perspective of Suicide Risk Factors,Assessment & Management

Suicide is a troubling, preventable phenomenon. Prior to attempts, individuals often seek help, prompting practitioners to perform risk assessments that ideally use evidence‐based risk management strategies. A literature review was performed using Harvard Countway Library of Medicine, Google Scholar, PubMed. Key words used were “Forensic Science,” “Suicide Risk Management,” “Pediatric Suicide Risk Factors,” “Adult Suicide Risk Factors,” “Geriatric Suicide Risk Factors,” “Suicide Risk Assessment.” Parameters limited articles to studies/reviews completed in the past twenty years in the United States. Results indicated predictors of suicide in juveniles were insomnia, burdensomeness, and recent conflicts with family or a romantic partner. Adults had greater risk if male, substance abusing, with marital/job loss. Elderly individuals with multiple medical comorbidities, hopelessness, and isolation were at higher risk. Everyone evaluated should be screened for access to firearms. Management of suicide risk involves providing the least restrictive form of treatment which maintains an individual's safety.     

The Politics of Jurisprudence Revisited: A Swedish Realist in Historical Context

This article argues that juristic theories must be understood in relation to the historical conditions in which they have emerged. This is not to reduce theories to their context but to gain essential insight into their aims, meaning, and scope with the aid of such “external” reference points. Here I use the ideas of the Swedish legal realist Vilhelm Lundstedt to illustrate these claims, choosing his juristic theory for this purpose specifically because it has been so widely seen (at least by non‐Scandinavian interpreters) as deeply puzzling and “extreme.” The article argues that his central ideas are readily intelligible in historical context. But such a contextual examination of juristic ideas also makes it possible to assess what in them can properly travel beyond immediate context: in other words, what insights about the nature of the jurist's task can legitimately be taken from them for more universal application. Lundstedt's work, despite having been largely ignored or excluded from international juristic debate, has something to offer here if seen through a contextualising lens that sets the possibilities for its broader application in sharp relief.     

Rights and Resources—Libertarians and the Right to Life

The author addresses Robert Nozick's claim that: “The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition.” Hence Nozick insists that rights are violated if citizens are compelled to contribute to others' welfare, however urgent their needs may be. The author argues that it is characteristic of libertarian theories that they invoke the moral sanctity of private property against welfarist or egalitarian conceptions of social justice. Nozick's version of the libertarian critique has three conceptual pillars–“right,”“thing” and “space.” On that basis Nozick claims that talk of welfare “rights” can be condemned on the plane of rights. This is true, Nozick maintains, even of “the right to life.” The author contends that this argument fails. It equivocates over the idea of “rights”; and it misconceives crucial features of property. Nozick deploys exclusive “domain rights,” whilst attacking “important‐interest rights.” His historical‐entitlement theory fails as a justification of private property. The author argues that, so far as material objects are concerned, private property institutions depend upon trespassory rules which do not impose morally binding obligations unless basic needs are catered for. Furthermore, private property institutions also comprise monetary resources to which the spatial metaphor of exclusive rights does not apply. Holdings vested in any particular person at any particular time are stamped, morally, with a mix of contestable and mutable property‐specific justice reasons. Hence it is fallacious to suppose that ownership rights together exhaust all normative space over “things.” The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a right to various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these “rights” require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these. [≡] The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition. (Nozick 1974, 238)     

Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges between Hart and Ross*

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality.     

Enacting the “Incomprehensible China”: Modern European Jurisprudence and the Japanese Reconstruction of Qing Political Law

The great ambition of Japanese colonialism, from the time of its debut at the end of the nineteenth century, was the reformulation of Chinese law and politics. One of the most extraordinary examples of this ambition is The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire [Shinkoku Gyōseihō], a monumental enterprise undertaken by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan intended not only to facilitate Japanese colonial administration of Taiwan but also to reorder the entire politico‐juridical order of China along the lines of modern rational law. This article examines the legal analysis embraced in The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire and recounts its attempt to reconstruct the Qing's “political law” (seihō) by a strange, ambiguous, and hybrid resort to “authenticity.” The strangeness of this Japanese colonial production comes from Japan's dual position as both colonizer of Taiwan and simultaneously itself colonized by “modern European jurisprudence”(kinsei hōri). In uncovering the effects of modern European jurisprudence on the Japanese enterprise, we will discover Japan's pursuit of its own cultural subjectivity embedded in The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire, epitomizing the campaign of national identities observable in the process of East Asian legal modernization.     

Agency,Authority, and the Logic of Mutual Recognition

The “Cartesian” model of the rational subject is central to the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke and is “transcendentally” affirmed in Kant's account of ethics and legality. An influential body of Hegelian inspired critique has suggested, however, that the dialectical deficiencies of the dominant models of Liberalism in late modernity inhere in this “atomistic” or “self‐supporting” characterisation of the individual. The “atomistic” perspective appears as an obstacle not only to the coherent articulation of the compatibility of liberty and equality, but also to the attempt to express the mutuality of recognition between agents that might offer a genuinely communal conception of constitution and subject. Employing as a frame of reference Alan Brudner's analysis of these issues in his comprehensive Constitutional Goods (Brudner 2004) it is argued that legal and political theory might usefully adopt an understanding of Hegel's notion of “recognition” (Anerkennung) in this regard without drastic phenomenological reconstruction of the Cartesian or Kantian subject.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

Why the “Haves” Do Not Necessarily Come Out Ahead in Informal Dispute Resolution

This article explores the implications of Galanter's distinction between repeat and one‐off players to informal dispute resolution settings. Relying on quantitative and qualitative data regarding one British “private‐Ombudsman” scheme, the article analyzes the extent to which complaint handlers' decision making advantaged more experienced and better resourced firms and/or high‐status and more assertive complainants. The article's tentative theoretical proposition is that the typically indeterminate nature of informal dispute resolution settings renders them less susceptible to large organizations' and other repeat players' capacity to “play for rules.” Yet, this indeterminacy makes such processes more vulnerable to decision makers' reliance on heuristics.