人肉搜索司法第一案之分析

人肉搜索引起了诸多的道德与法律问题。王菲诉三网站案将其引入了司法视野。论文从法理学角度,从人肉搜索的本体着手,分析其蕴含的权利冲突与价值矛盾,提出并论证何种规制规则是有效的,力求对破解此司法困局有所裨益。     

论柏拉图的规则观

我们通常认为,规则是理性的产品,并认为这种观点的肇端为柏拉图.但在柏拉图的著作中,规则中却是充斥着大量的非理性因素.柏拉图的《吕西斯篇》、《斐德罗篇》揭示了规则中人与人之间的爱欲,《理想国》则把这种爱欲规则上升到城邦与人之间的爱欲.     

Legal Principles and Legal Theory

Current legal theory is concerned with the presence of principles in law partly because they are at the core of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's rule of recognition. Hart's theory is threatened by the possibility that the identification of some principles follows an extremely relaxed rule of recognition, or even no rule at all. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test to ascertain what is the case in actual practice. On the other hand, the evaluative arguments which support Dworkin's proposal of principled adjudication are forceful but not conclusive. Moreover, since ultimate controversy over values is plausible, judicial discretion may sometimes be inevitable.     

Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited

This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them.     

Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists

There is a widespread view that one does either theory or empirical work, and that theory and empiricism represent distant concerns, opposing worldviews, and perhaps distinct mentalities or personalities. This prevalent view has deep roots and is also the result of pragmatic and understandable tendencies toward division of intellectual labor. Against this view, this essay suggests that the relations between theory and empirical study ought to be understood as more intimate and that making legal theory an explicit focus can improve empirical scholarship. We pursue this claim by articulating a basis for legal theory and by showing how that basis illuminates both the application and design of empirical research on law. Legal theory, we argue, follows jurisprudence in interrogating the law as a set of coercive normative institutions. The upshot of this approach is a recognition that an interdisciplinary analysis of law must rely on both a theory (explicit or implicit) of the way law's power and its normativity align and an account of the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally. We thus argue that legal theory is necessary in order to draw fruitfully on empirical research and further claim that legal theory provides guidance both for setting up an empirical research agenda on law and for designing research into specific topics.     

法律理论虚构:法律信仰的先决条件

法治之法必须是被信仰的法律,但具体的现实的法律根本不具备信仰的条件。要让人们信仰法律,就必须构筑法律信仰的条件。构筑法律信仰的重要手段是在建构法律理论时赋予其虚构的成份。鉴于上帝不是我国法律文化的组成部分,因而我们不能照搬西方的理论;又鉴于我国的国情,有必要把法律作理想法与现实法的划分。     

歧义与沟通:法律语境论

站在哲学和人类学的高度 ,从语境论分析古今中外人们对法律理解所造成的差异或歧义 ,着重阐述了中西法律的语境差异及近现代中国法律话语的置换 ,从时间和空间的层面看待法律语境存在的差别以及这种差别给法律带来的影响 ,并从观察者的认知思路和角色差异造成的语境分化沟通和反思“什么是法”。     

亚历山大·佩策尼克的法律转化与法律证成理论

亚历山大·佩策尼克一生的研究重点在于法律论证理论和认识论,特别是法律与正义上的融贯理论,在《作为合理性的理性:论法律证成》一书中提出了一套独特的法律转化与法律证成理论。在他看来,法学结论、司法裁决等既可以在法律语境之中充分证成,也可以在它之外加以证成。前者为法律语境内充分证成,其建立在既有的法律传统之上;后者为深度证成,它们作为商谈之最佳化条件下尽可能根本的证成而被法律人视为正当的前提提供某种支持或者批判。他成功地将法律解释的分析与我们这个时代最为核心的哲学、道德和文化问题结合起来。     

Emerging Legal Orders. Formalism and the Theory of Legal Integration

Using analogies from research in simulation and artificial societies and borrowing from Weinrib's Philosophy of Private Law, we show how a "private law" model of law and legal integration does not need to presuppose the state as a regulatory framework. Rather, the state emerges as a "second order property" from the private law interaction of individuals. We apply this to the debate about harmonisation in Europe. We show how a form of unity in diversity can be built up starting with such individual interactions, extended later to interactions between member states. But this does not need to end up in an individualistic and neo-liberal model, as in Weinrib, if we understand the underlying exchange relation in terms of Wilhelmsson's social contract law.     

The Derivational Theory of Legal Interpretation in Polish Legal Theory

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - The article presents so-called “derivational” theory of legal interpretation and...     

Legal Theory and Sociological Facts

The authors investigate MacCormick and Weinberger's claim that the Institutional Theory of Law provides a conceptual framework for the study of legal phenomena from a socio-legal point of view. They evaluate this claim by confronting both the Institutional Theory of Law and Weinberger's theory of action with two approaches in socio-legal theory, i.e. the instrumentalist and the constitutive approach. The conclusion is that the Institutional Theory of Law lends itself to empirical research from an instrumentalist perspective, for both place the concept institution in the context of law. Weinberger's theory of action may provide a basis for empirical research from a constitutive perspective. The authors make some suggestions for refinement of Weinberger's theory of action in order that the relation between institutions and action can be labeled dynamic.     

Doing Justice to Foucault: Legal Theory and the Later Ethics

This article provides a critical evaluation of Ben Golder’s and Peter Fitzpatrick’s recent Foucault’s Law, which it characterizes as a decisive intervention into both legal theory and Foucault scholarship. It argues in favour of Golder’s and Fitzpatrick’s effort to affirm the multiplicity of Foucault’s work, rather than treat that work as either unified by a consistent position or broken into a series of relatively stable periods. But it also argues against Golder’s and Fitzpatrick’s analysis of Foucault’s understanding of the law through a conceptual framework borrowed from Derrida, and especially Derrida’s distinction between law and justice. It shows how this approach to reading Foucault effectively transforms some of his more powerful criticisms of the law into defences of justice. In place of this interpretation, the second half of this paper initiates a reading of Foucault’s later work on ethics and the self in the ancient world. It develops the theme of an ethics, or a way of life, that takes shape at a distance from politics on the one side and law on the other.     

Form and Formalism: The View from Legal Theory

Abstract. The article considers Robert Summers' new book ( Summers 2006 ), in the context of Summers' earlier work and the role of form and formalism in other jurisprudential discussions. While accepting the value of a form‐centered approach to studying law, the article questions Summers' claim that his approach is clearly superior to (and not merely complementary with) traditional analytic theories, like those of Hart and Kelsen. The article also suggests that the book's discussion of form in contract and commercial law is somewhat disappointing, given Summers' expertise in this area, and the many difficult form‐related questions that area raises.     

Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal Theory: A Comment on Method

Over the last decade the Conference on Critical Legal Studies (CCLS) has rekindled an important debate about the study of legal ideologies. The work by scholars within this movement is provocative because it demands that we take seriously the contradictory needs and ideological parameters of liberal legalism. The growing body of work associated with this movement has not, however, included a criticism of the ideological underpinnings of legal methods in general and doctrinal analysis in particular. We begin with the premise that scholarship must include a self-critical method.
In Part I—The Political-Economic Constraints of Liberal Legal Scholarship—we explore why questions of methods, i. e. of how one asks and answers questions, has not been a central issue within CCLS. In Part II—Reformulation of Method—we present a beginning toward a framework for developing a self-critical method for understanding legal ideologies.