A Critical Theory of Social Suffering

Abstract

This paper begins by defending the twofold relevance, political and theoretical, of the notion of social suffering. Social suffering is a notion politics cannot do without today, as it seems indispensable to describe all the aspects of contemporary injustice. As such, it has been taken up in a number of significant research programmes in different social sciences (sociology, anthropology, social psychology). The notion however poses significant conceptual problems as it challenges disciplinary boundaries traditionally set up to demarcate individual and social phenomena. I argue that philosophy has a role to play in the attempt to integrate the diverging perspectives stemming from the social sciences. I attempt to show that, as it engages with the social sciences to account for the conceptual and normative issues thrown open by the question of social suffering, philosophy in fact retrieves the very idea of critical theory, as a conjugated critique of social reality and of its knowledge. I conclude by showing how the question of social suffering then becomes a useful criterion to distinguish between the different existing approaches in critical theory.     

Pierre Bourdieu: From Neo-Kantian to Hegelian Critical Social Theory

Abstract

This paper challenges the commonly made claim that the work of Pierre Bourdieu is fundamentally anti-Hegelian in orientation. In contrast, it argues that the development of Bourdieu's work from its earliest structuralist through its later ‘post-structuralist’ phase is better described in terms of a shift from a late nineteenth century neo-Kantian to a distinctly Hegelian post-Kantian outlook. In his break with structuralism, Bourdieu appealed to a bodily based logic of practice' to explain the binaristic logic of Lévi-Strauss' structuralist analyses of myth. Effectively working within the tradition of the Durkheimian approach to symbolic classification, Lévi-Strauss had inherited Durkheim's distinctly neo-Kantian understanding of the role of categories in experience and action—an account that conflated two forms of representation—‘intuitions’ and ‘concepts’—that Kant himself had held distinct. Bourdieu's appeal to the role of the body's dispositional habitus can be considered as a retrieval of Hegel's earlier quite different reworking of Kant's intuition-concept distinction in terms of distinct ‘logics’ with different forms of ‘negation’. Bourdieu commonly acknowledged the parallels of his analyses of social life to those of Hegel, but opposed Hegelianism because he believed that Hegel had remained entrapped within the dynamics of mythopoeic thought. In contrast, Durkheim and Lévi-Strauss, he claimed, by instituting a science of myth, had broken with it. This criticism of Hegel, however, relies on an understanding of his philosophy that has been rejected by many contemporary Hegel scholars, and without it, the gap separating Hegel and Bourdieu narrows dramatically     

Philosophy,Social Hope and Democratic Criticism: Critical Theory for a Global Age

Abstract

The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism.     

Competing Gender Paradigms: Gender Difference, Fetal Rights and the Case of Johnson Controls

Political debates over the concept of “fetal rights” pose in sharp relief questions regarding the meaning of biological gender difference for gender equality. Can the state's obligation to “protect” fetal health be used to modify or control women's behavior? If so, what does this mean for women's status as full and equal citizens in a democratic society? This article addresses these questions through an analysis of the political, legal, scientific and moral debates over “fetal protection policies” in hazardous workplaces.     

性别平等与社会公正

性别平等是社会公正的重要内容和基本要求.新中国成立以来特别是改革开放30年来,随着经济发展和社会进步,我国在促进男女性别平等和妇女发展方面卓有成效.但不容讳言,还存在许多深层次矛盾和问题.为此,需要政府、社会和妇女自身三个层面共同努力,齐抓共管、相互协调,有效促进性别平等和妇女发展,实现社会公正.     

Hope and Critical Theory

Abstract

In the first part of the paper I consider the relative neglect of hope in the tradition of critical theory. I attribute this neglect to a low estimation of the cognitive, aesthetic, and moral value of hope, and to the strong—but, argue, contingent—association that holds between hope and religion. I then distinguish three strategies for thinking about the justification of social hope; one which appeals to a notion of unfulfilled or frustrated natural human capacities, another which invokes a providential order, and a third which questions the very appropriateness of justification, turning instead to a notion of ungroundable hope. Different senses of ungroundable hope are distinguished and by way of conclusion I briefly consider their relevance for the project of critique today.     

Recognition and Social Justice: What Critical Theory Can Learn From Paid Domestic Laborers in the United States

Working in private homes, often isolated from the community and denied the legal rights and protections that most other workers enjoy, paid domestic laborers make up some of the most socially marginalized, vulnerable, and exploited workers in the United States today. This article explores the theoretical possibilities for an account of justice, based on the concept of recognition, to critique their work experiences, legal exclusion, and social status. To do so, it draws on the contrasting accounts of recognition advanced by Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, which focus on the psychological and the socio-structural dimensions of recognition respectively. While both theories generate compelling critiques of the conditions of domestic laborers, it is shown that neither one alone can capture the full range of injustices experienced, and that each can in fact complement the other. The article thus sketches an account of justice based on both the psychological and socio-structural dimensions of recognition.     

Injustice,Violence and Social Struggle. The Critical Potential of Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition

Abstract

Honneth's fundamental claim that the normativity of social orders can be found nowhere but in the very experience of those who suffer injustice leads, I argue, to a radical theory and critique of society, with the potential to provide an innovative theory of social movements and a valid alternative to political liberalism.