The role of soft law in advancing the rights of persons with disabilities in the EU: A ‘hybridity’ approach to EU disability law

This article discusses the role of soft law in advancing the rights of persons with disabilities in the European Union (EU). In doing so, it revisits the emergence of the standalone, yet cross-cutting, field of ‘EU disability law’ through the lens of the ‘hybridity theory’ advanced inter alia by Trubek and Trubek. Being speculative in nature, this article construes EU disability law as a fruitful area for an enquiry into the dynamic relationship between hard and soft law. Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, soft law was crucial to attract disability within the sphere of action of the EU and to embed the social model of disability, displaying a value-setting role. In the post-Amsterdam period, soft law and hard law coexisted, being complementary to one another. Both contributed to a common objective, namely that of advancing equality of opportunities for persons with disabilities. After the conclusion of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the dynamic relationship between hard and soft law has become more complex and akin to what Trubek and Trubek define as ‘transformation’.     

Representing Theory and Theorising in Criminal Justice Studies: Practising Theory Considered

The author considers the role and place of theory in criminal justice studies. The argument is that the operation and interrogation of fundamental categories is integral to social scientific enquiry and if criminal justice studies is to resist a technocratic “protective service” orientation it must promote theorising and thinking conceptually via the texts which represent the discipline to undergraduates. Although theory is situated at the core of social science curricula, there is little or no agreement on its role or place in research and pedagogy. The dominant understanding of theory within criminal justice studies (including its sociological and criminological incarnation) is that it is something to be referred to. What is seldom emphasised in theory or methods texts is the practice of theorising. Texts that are designed to be the student’s first contact with the field of criminal justice studies, and which reflect broader attitudes toward social enquiry, seldom consider the methodological and pedagogical issues related to the production and role of analytic concepts and do not present social science as an imaginative or reflexive practice. Drawing on critical realist metatheory, this paper advances a distinction between social and sociological problems and social science and protective service toward illustrating that a social science approach to the study of criminal justice demands the operation and interrogation of analytic categories and explicit consideration of issues of epistemology and ontology. Works which seek to avoid this serve only to foster a passive rather than active engagement with their subject matter.     

Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law

This article examines the case for rules of company law which regulate the raising and maintenance of share capital by companies. The enquiry has practical relevance because the content of company law is currently under review, and the rules relating to share capital have been singled out for particular attention. The existing rules, which apply generally, are commonly rationalised as a means of protecting corporate creditors. The analysis considers whether such rules can be understood as responses to failures in the markets for corporate credit. It suggests that whilst the current rules are unlikely, on the whole, to be justified in terms of efficiency, a case may be made for a framework within which companies may 'opt in' to customised restrictions on dealings in their share capital.     

Culture, Autonomy and Djulibinyamurr: Individual and Community in the Construction of Rights to Traditional Designs

The remoteness enquiry in negligence, which serves to exclude the liability of defendants for harmful consequences that their careless conduct caused, but for which it seems unfair to penalise them, has long been beset by uncertainty. Indeed, a common view is that this area of the law can be explained only by reference to diffuse considerations of 'legal policy'. This paper, however, argues that the remoteness enquiry represents a principled response to a problem that can arise, at a deep level, in ascribing a harmful outcome to the negligent exercise of individual agency. The relevant problem concerns the possible mismatch between the hypothetical 'risk-claim' in virtue of which conduct was faulty and the causal set that subsequently materialised for harm. The 'revised risk theory' that emerges from this analysis accounts for the majority of remoteness determinations. However, a few exceptions are also considered where 'policy', in a restricted sense, operates to extend or curtail a negligent agent's legal responsibility.     

Consumer Redress Legislation: Simplifying or Subverting the Law of Contract

The growth of statutory consumer protection regimes in modern commercial societies has the potential profoundly to disrupt the private law landscape. Such schemes aim to increase access to justice for consumers by offering simplified and clear suites of rights and corresponding remedies. In so doing, however, they affect core areas of private law rights and remedies, and may come to undermine or replace existing contractual principles and policies. The result could be an incoherent system of private law with different principles and rules applying to commercial and consumer transactions. Coherence in the law requires that lawyers abandon their traditional ‘oil and water’ attitudes to legislative schemes and confront directly the interactions between these two bodies of law. This paper engages in that enquiry by considering the relationship between the relatively new consumer redress provisions in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and general law principles.     

Mainstreaming Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Family Law: The Israeli Child Protection Law as a Case Study

This article considers the contribution of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) to the theoretical development and practical advancement of reforms in child care law. It does so by presenting three dilemmas arising from The Israeli Youth Law (Care and Supervision) 1960 relating to its substance, procedures, and practice. TJ is a “field of enquiry” that examines the influence of the law on litigants in order to advance rules and practices that have therapeutic effects and to minimize the use of rules and practices that have antitherapeutic ones. Following the TJ methodology, we integrate psychosocial findings into the legal discussion. We propose some therapeutic practices, as well as legal reform to make the child protection legal regime more TJ friendly for children and families.     

From Public Sociology to Public Philosophy: Lessons for Law and Society

The late Philip Selznick's final book, A Humanist Science, examines the role of values and ideals in the social sciences, including the study of law and society. Throughout his academic career, Selznick was committed to what he called “legal naturalism,” a sociological version of the natural-law perspective, while his critics continue to adhere to various forms of positivism. But the age-old opposition between natural law and legal positivism today may be giving way to the quest for public sociology—a sociology that promotes public reflection on significant social issues and thus functions as a moral and political force. A Humanist Science ends with a strong plea for public philosophy. Public philosophy overlaps with public sociology but is a much stronger concept. Selznick's message of public philosophy may be another of his enduring contributions to the field of law and society.     

Stepwise Progression: The Past,Present, and Possible Future of Empirical Research on Law in the United States and the United Kingdom

The article distinguishes empirical research on law from other modes of legal enquiry. It charts the changing fortunes of empirical research on law in the United States and the United Kingdom and accounts for the differences between them. In both countries, the development has been uneven and intermittent rather than gradual and linear, with a number of important differences in trajectories, in particular: the number of growth spurts; their timing; the present position; and whether the rise and fall of activity refers to research on civil and criminal justice or on civil justice alone. The different trajectories are explained in terms of path dependency (the fact that developments in the present are shaped by developments in the past); sequential development (emphasizing the importance of timing and that developments in one institution may be contingent on developments in another); and institutional responsiveness (an institution's capacity to respond to opportunities in its external environment).     

Methodological Clarity or the Substantial Purity of Law? Notes on the Discussion between Kelsen and Pitamic

Leonid Pitamic was convinced that law could not be understood and explored by a single method aiming at a pure object of enquiry. He argued that it was necessary to employ other methods besides the normative one (especially the sociological and axiological methods), which, however, should not be confounded. Methodological syncretism can be avoided by clearly distinguishing between different aspects of law and by allowing the methods to support each other. By following this guideline, and by arguing according to a clear method, we can also open up a space for dialogue and for the juxtaposition of contrasting points of view.     

Fair Trial Rights and the European Community's Fight Against Fraud

The article surveys action taken by the European Community to combat fraud affecting its financial interests, focusing on the development of investigative authority granted to OLAF, the European‘Office Pour La Lutte Anti Fraude’ and its impact on the procedural rights of the alleged defrauder. It shows that the involvement of OLAF can be crucial for a national fraud investigation and subsequent criminal prosecution and that it meets the criteria set out by the Strasbourg organs for the applicability of Article 6 ECH. The article explores whether the legal sources governing the activities of OLAF or national—or rather, Community—law guarantee sufficient protection for the alleged defrauder and thus pay respect to principles arising from the rule of law in law enforcement. It is shown that general principles of Community law, which were mostly established in antitrust law, may provide a certain protection for the suspect, but may not protect him in all regards. It is thus argued that, in the long run, it will be necessary to provide special fair‐trial rights which offer protection to alleged defrauders from those infringements arising out of the specific features of a Community investigation.     

An Exploration into Law and Narratives: The Case of Intellectual Property Law of Biotechnology

This essay explores the possibility of applying narrative analysis as a tool for the socio-cultural study of law. Narrative is understood to be both a form of representation of reality, as well as a starting point into the enquiry about the nature of reality itself. Consequently, an analysis of legal narratives could help to assess law’s impact on our understanding of social reality and of ourselves. The narrative context, which is examined for its plot and metaphors, is the intellectual property law of human biotechnology. The legal representation of techno-scientific knowledge in intellectual property law is contrasted against other conceptions of science, especially with the ones that are put forward by scholars in science and technology studies and anthropology. It is argued that the present legal narrative of human biotechnology and intellectual property not only lacks sufficient understanding of the scientific knowledge-making process but also, importantly, that it is in need of a self-reflexive understanding of its own practice. At the end, the possibility of changing the present legal narrative will be probed with the help of different narrative theories of the self and of representation, which have been advanced by White, Taylor and MacIntyre.     

Prolegomenon to a Southern Jurisprudence

It is good to take stock from time to time and to see how things stand in jurisprudence. So, what is the relationship of doctrine and theory with jurisprudence? Is private law theory apolitical while public law contains politics for the very many constitutional ends in the Global South? In India, legal theorist Chhatrapati Singh very originally asked if legal systems and normative systems were the same? Chhatrapati’s enquiry was however a species of the classical approach to the law that promotes the law’s purity. On the contrary, the postcolonial approaches account for the historical life as well as the political proclivities of the law. The private law theory often seen as impersonal and non-imperial comes under scrutiny in the postcolonial approaches. Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger notably problematized contract theory, while Upendra Baxi argued for mass tort as public law—contract and tort are both private law—to offer, if you will, a jurisprudence of the South. A southern jurisprudence essentially rejects an impersonal reading of the private law.

     

Sustainability through an integrated approach to decision making? A law and regulation case study

Many legal fields are relevant to all kinds of problems; however, decision makers often take a narrow approach, looking only at the base of the claim or the issue they are established to consider. This can led to imbalanced outcomes. There is a particular risk of this in respect of decisions regarding key societal challenges, which might be the subject of law and policymaking from several different perspectives. This paper explores the need and bases for a more integrated approach to decision making. It does so using a case study, and explores a range of laws that could be relevant to a business seeking to use technology and resources that could address climate change, the different decisions that courts can make (with a focus on the nature of the action, outcome and forum), and the resulting conflicts, synergies and areas of enquiry.     

The impact of international human rights norms—a “law undergoing evolution”

Abstract

In this paper, the author outlines the history of, and reasons for, the growing impact of international human rights jurisprudence upon the work of judges in New Zealand, Australia, England and elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Nations. Formerly, international and domestic law were virtually entirely separate. But now, there is increasing legal authority to support the use of international human rights jurisprudence in domestic judicial decision‐making. It can be done in the application of constitutional or statutory provisions reflecting universal principles stated in international treaties. But, according to the Bangalore Principles, it can also be done where there is a gap in the common law or where a local statute is ambiguous. The judge may then fill the gap or resolve the ambiguity by reference to international human rights jurisprudence which will ensure that domestic law conforms, as far as possible, to such principles.

In its decision in Tavita, the New Zealand Court of Appeal declared this to be “a law … undergoing evolution”. The author outlines some of the impediments and problems for the evolution. But he also collects the reasons why it is a natural and inevitable phase of the common law in the current age. He suggests that judges should be aware of the developments. In appropriate cases, they should inform their decisions with relevant international human rights jurisprudence. That will at least ensure that they develop domestic human rights law in a principled way, consistently with international law, and not in an idiosyncratic fashion “discovering” new fundamental rights which may otherwise be criticised as mere judicial invention.     

Authority and Authorisation

The core of Kelsen's strong views onauthority emerging from his concept of law is this:Authority of law, authority in law andauthority about law are one and the same thing.The conceptual problems suggested by these threedifferent prepositions must and can be solved in onefell swoop. Kelsen's core view will first be probed bygiving an account of what is a promising approachoffered in a fairly early text, Das Problem derSouveränität, namely, what it means to`set' or `posit' the law. Inevitably, this leadsto an interpretation of the Grundnorm, one thatintends to accommodate as many Kelsenian emphases aspossible. The Grundnorm will be presented as ashield against hypostatising authority. From there,some characteristics will be inferred of the type ofauthority that arises from Kelsen's account of legalknowledge, which will be called, somewhat polemically,authority without an author.     

Thinking like a lawyer/acting like a professional: communities of practice as a means of challenging orthodox legal education

Increasingly, there is pressure upon law schools, in Australia and elsewhere, to impress upon students the significance of the ethical and professional obligations of legal practice. The recent Carnegie Report explicitly looked to law schools “to initiate novice practitioners to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) like professionals”. Many law students, however, have little appreciation of legal ethics and any concept they may have of professionalism tends to be envisaged as applying only after graduation. In this paper, we explore the idea of a “community of practice”. Lave and Wenger, who coined the phrase, contend that “learning is conceived as a trajectory in which learners move from legitimate peripheral participant to core participant of the community of practice”. We will argue that law students should appreciate that they are entering the legal profession's community of practice and that all aspects of their conduct relevant to professionalism – not only academic integrity, but matters such as time management, teamwork, relationships with peers and staff – relate to this transition into a legal professional community. Such an approach may not only serve to impress upon students the significance of “professionalism” and ethics, but inculcate in them a sense of belonging to a professional community.     

Attack of the killer acronyms: the future of information technology law

This paper looks at the field of information technology (IT) law and its reliance on the buzzwords, jargon and acronyms that tend to alienate serious discussion about some of the deeper socio‐legal issues involved. It is often easy to become confused by the terminology and the technology, which has led to some non‐issues receiving too much interest (the year 2000 bug for example) and some valuable and worthy topics being almost ignored. Some writers and researchers may be tempted to neglect the field because of a lack of understanding of the technology, which may eventually lead to the end of IT law as a serious field of research. This paper will attempt to re‐ignite the jurisprudential debate about the future of IT law research, teaching and practice by looking at the possible trends emerging from the literature.     

Comments on Illegal War and Illegal Conduct: Are the Two Related?

This article examines whether there is a link between the legality or otherwise of an armed conflict under jus ad bellum and the subsequent conduct of the campaign under jus in bello. This is done by comparing two conflicts where the legality was not in serious dispute, the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and the Iraq War 1990–1991, and three where the legality has been questioned, Kosovo 1999, the ‘global war on terror’ and the Iraq War 2003. In looking for a common link, the author is drawn away from concerns over the jus ad bellum to doubts over the content of the relevant law governing the conduct of hostilities. Uncertainties in the law have occurred both from the extension to non-international armed conflict of ‘Hague law’, traditionally applicable only in international armed conflicts, and the overlap between human rights law and the law of armed conflict. The author concludes that there is a danger that the balance between military necessity and humanity may be disturbed so that the law will become impracticable in the cauldron of conflict to the detriment of all, soldier and civilian alike.

     

Schauer on Coercion,Acceptance, and Schizophrenia

This article provides a comment on The Force of Law (Schauer 2015), which is Schauer's new and illuminating contribution to the place of law in our societies and in our lives. It constitutes a strong defence of the importance of coercion in law. First, I consider cases where the law is not able to motivate human behaviour adequately, in order to show that legal coercion is not always justified. Second, I examine the Rawlsian distinction between the ideal and the nonideal theory and its application to the theory of law. Third, I tentatively argue that coercion has no place in ideal theory, but a core place in nonideal theory. In this way, it may be plausible to reconstruct the motivation to accept the law, at least when the law is normatively justified.     

Social Citizenship,Housing Wealth and the Cost of Social Care: Is the Care Act 2014 ‘Fair'?

This article assesses the extent to which it is ‘fair’ for the government to require owner‐occupiers to draw on the equity accumulated in their home to fund their social care costs. The question is stimulated by the report of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support, Fairer Care Funding (the Dilnot Commission) and the subsequent Care Act 2014. The enquiry is located within the framework of social citizenship and the new social contract. It argues that the individualistic, contractarian approach, exemplified by the Dilnot Commission and reflected in the Act, raises questions when considered from the perspective of intergenerational fairness. We argue that our concerns with the Act could be addressed by inculcating an expectation of drawing on housing wealth to fund older age: a policy of asset‐based welfare.