ARE STREET‐LEVEL BUREAUCRATS COMPELLED OR ENTICED TO COPE?

Traditional studies of street‐level bureaucrats see the bureaucrat’s behaviour as a kind of self‐defence – a way to minimize negative aspects of the job and thereby job frustration. I argue – and empirically show – that it is equally relevant to consider at least part of street‐level bureaucrat behaviour as positively motivated – as a way of maximizing job satisfaction. Behavioural mechanisms such as coping are not just a way to avoid frustration, but also a way to gain satisfaction. This becomes clear when we attempt to explain differential treatment among regulated companies.     

TRANSFORMING NEW ZEALAND'S PUBLIC SECTOR: LABOUR'S QUEST FOR IMPROVED EFFICIENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Since its election in July 1984 the fourth Labour government in New Zealand has embarked upon the most radical and systematic reorganization of the state sector since the creation of a unified, non-partisan, career-oriented service in 1912. The reforms include the commercialization of many of the goods and services provided by state agencies, the turning of public trading enterprises into corporations, major administrative changes and the overhauling of state pay-fixing arrangements. This article examines the theoretical assumptions underpinning Labour's strategy and assesses the extent to which the new arrangements are likely to achieve their intended purpose of improving the efficiency, flexibility and accountability of the public sector.     

DOES PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY WORK? AN ASSESSMENT TOOL

In recent years, there has been a drive to strengthen existing public accountability arrangements and to design new ones. This prompts the question whether accountability arrangements actually work. In the existing literature, both accountability ‘deficits’ and ‘overloads’ are alleged to exist. However, owing to the lack of a cogent yardstick, the debate tends to be impressionistic and event‐driven. In this article we develop an instrument for systematically assessing public accountability arrangements, drawing on three different normative perspectives. In the democratic perspective, accountability arrangements should effectively link government actions to the ‘democratic chain of delegation’. In the constitutional perspective, it is essential that accountability arrangements prevent or uncover abuses of public authority. In the learning perspective, accountability is a tool to make governments effective in delivering on their promises. We demonstrate the use of our multicriteria assessment tool in an analysis of a new accountability arrangement: the boards of oversight of agencies.     

MULTI‐LAYERED ACCOUNTABILITY. PERFORMANCE‐BASED FUNDING OF UNIVERSITIES

In most Western countries there has been an increasing demand for new and different types of audit, evaluation and reporting systems that reveal the output of public sector organizations ( Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000 ). Quality assessments have had a profound impact on the funding of university research, most visibly in the UK. However, the relationship between qualitative and quantitative indicators of research performance has been an ongoing source of debate ( Bence and Oppenheim 2004 ). By exploring four different types of accountability relations, this paper investigates different stakeholders' perceptions of whether or not performance funding increases accountability and transparency, and poses the following questions: Does performance funding result in high accountability and high transparency? Does high accountability imply high transparency? Does high transparency lead to low accountability? Three main empirical sources have been utilized: a comprehensive survey of faculty at Norwegian higher education institutions, a stakeholder survey, and data from case studies of four universities.     

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT VALUES AND PERSON‐ORGANIZATION FIT: A SOCIO‐PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH AND EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION AMONG PUBLIC SECTOR PERSONNEL

This paper takes a socio‐psychological approach to NPM and its value‐based theory in public administration. We develop a model for the study of NPM values based on the idea of Person‐Organization Fit (POF) and examine it empirically. Findings, based on a survey of 205 Israeli local governance personnel, revealed that the POF of several core NPM values (that is, responsiveness, transparency, innovativeness, and achievement orientations) was positively related with job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and service climate, as reported by these public personnel. The findings suggest that, beyond modern strategies and effective policies for the public sector, lies an essential quest for NPM value‐fit with public personnel. Consequently, the study advocates a better theoretical and practical understanding of the socio‐psychological interfaces, such as POF, in public administration. Implications and directions for future studies are discussed, both in the context of public administration research and in the generic field of organizational behaviour theory and practice. The detailed results of the factor analyses are available directly from the authors.     

BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS: EFFECTS OF ELECTED GOVERNMENT,PUBLIC AGENDAS AND EUROPEAN ATTENTION ON THE UK BUREAUCRACY

What determines the bureaucratic agenda? This article combines insights from models of bureaucratic behaviour with agenda‐setting models of government attention to test the effects of elected government, public, and EU agendas on the bureaucratic agenda. Using time series cross‐sectional analyses of subject and ministry coded data on UK statutory instruments from 1987 to 2008, I find strong effects for both the elected government and EU legislative agendas on UK statutory instruments. Furthermore, by breaking the data into different sets based on their relationship with the EU, several logical differences in these effects are found. These results include the EU agenda having exclusive influence on instruments implementing EU directives, and the UK agenda being the sole driver of bureaucratic attention on those instruments that mention the EU but do not implement EU legislation. This article opens a new avenue for research on bureaucracy by approaching it as a unique policy‐making institution.     

ON THE BUREAUCRACY OF BUREAUCRACIES: ANALYSING THE SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF OVERHEAD IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

Governments across the globe try to rebalance their budgets by rationalizing overhead operations. When overhead‐reducing policies are adopted, it is important to understand why some central government organizations have a higher overhead than others, and why organizational models to produce overhead efficiencies are used to different degrees. This study focuses on the Flemish context to analyse differences between central government organizations in the size and organization of two overhead processes: human resources management (HRM) and finance and control (FIN). Significant effects are found for autonomy, organizational size, spatial dispersion and budgetary stress, yet effects vary according to whether HRM or FIN is considered and whether the focus is on the size or the organization of HRM or FIN. Our findings have practical implications to get a process‐sensitive understanding of the size and organization of overhead, and theoretical implications as they cast light on factors that shape decision‐making in public organizations.     

THEORIZING AND EXPLAINING VOLUNTARY ACCOUNTABILITY

Public organizations are not only subject to statutory obligations to give account, but they also commit themselves voluntarily to additional accountability practices. What motivates the organizations to do so? After all, such practices are costly to the organizations in a number of ways. This study argues that public organizations opt for voluntary accountability for two main reasons: they regard it as an appropriate practice and they respond to perceived legislative threats. Building on these explanations, hypotheses are formulated on the variation in the degree to which organizations voluntarily render account. These hypotheses are tested using new data on voluntary accountability of 103 independent agencies in the Netherlands. The study finds that more voluntary account is rendered by agencies which deal with more salient policy issues, by agencies which depend on public funds, and by agencies with more staff. Agencies without legal personality render less voluntary account.     

TOP‐DOWN AND BOTTOM‐UP: INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON DEBT AND GRANTS AT THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN LOCAL LEVEL

This article investigates the impact of institutional factors on the relationship between grant funding and local debt in England and Germany. Using a panel dataset covering the period 2005–12, the research identifies a positive relationship between grants and local debt. The positive relationship between grants and debt is reduced due to the impact of political and administrative variables. The findings demonstrate three shortcomings of the current literature. First, in contrast to the dominant portrayal of German local administration as predominantly legalistic, partisan dynamics affect the allocation of grants to the German local level. Second, institutional variables operate differently depending upon grant type, providing a rationale against the scholarly practice of using aggregate grants. Third, grant mechanisms provide a promising key to unlock institutional dynamics in systems of multilevel governance, but only when scholars integrate institutional differences more explicitly in their research design than hitherto accounted for by political economy.     

SCALE AND POLICY IMPACT IN PARTICIPATORY‐DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM A MULTI‐LEVEL PROCESS

This article addresses two interrelated critiques of participatory‐deliberative democratic institutions: that they are beset by problems of scale and that they achieve weak policy impact. This article tests these criticisms through the case of the UK Sustainable Communities Act (SCA), a multi‐level process that is relatively strongly institutionalized. The evidence lends qualified support to these critiques. The article differentiates between contextual factors, related to the attempt to institutionalize participatory‐deliberative processes within existing socioeconomic and political structures, and design factors to do with institutional and process design. The case of the SCA calls for caution about the claim that multi‐level participatory‐deliberative processes can overcome problems of scale and policy impact, but the question remains open. The article ends by suggesting that expectations of direct policy impact might be too high. Rather than determinants of policy, multi‐level participatory‐deliberative processes might function best as agenda‐setters.     

WEBER AND KAFKA: THE RATIONAL AND THE ENIGMATIC BUREAUCRACY

Max Weber's and Franz Kafka's respective understandings of bureaucracy are as different as night and day. Yet, Kafka's novel The Castle is best read with Max Weber at hand. In fact, Kafka relates systematically to all the dimensions in Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy and give us a much‐contemplated parody, almost a counter‐punctual ideal type, based on four key observations: bureaucratic excesses unfold in time and space; a ‘no error’ ideology generates inescapable dilemmas; inscrutability is a life condition in bureaucracy; civil servants end up walking on the spot, just like the figures in Escher's painting: Ascending and Descending. Nevertheless, Weber and Kafka can both be right. While Kafka looks at the bureaucratic phenomenon through persons who are marginalized, Weber's perspective is historic‐comparative and top‐down. Are the observations of the one more correct than the other? The question is meaningless. As two opposite poles, Weber and Kafka ‘magnetize’ each other.     

FRAMING AND COUNTER‐FRAMING NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF GERMANY

In this paper I explore the conflict between managerial and bureaucratic models of public sector management from the discursive perspective in institutional theory. Taking the under‐researched case of Germany, I conduct a textual analysis of seminal publications in the discourse on public sector reform and reveal the subversive framing conflict which accompanies the proliferation of private managerial models in the public sector. As the most general result, a frame which advocates the transfer of business‐like managerial practices clashes with a counter‐frame which opposes this managerialization. I elucidate how these competing frames are composed, which of their components are core and which are peripheral, how the frames relate to each other, and which broader discourses they exploit for legitimization purposes. The results imply that the often assumed superiority of managerial over bureaucratic control is constructed through discourse rather than being a law‐like regularity.