The Angry Pamphleteer: True Threats,Political Speech,and Applying Watts v. United States in the Age of Twitter

Since the 1969 case Watts v. United States, courts have consistently held that politically motivated speech about or directed to public figures may be punished if it qualifies as a “true threat” rather than protected political hyperbole. Criticism of public officials lies at the core of First Amendment protection, even when that criticism is caustic or crude. Such caustic speech appears on Twitter with increasing frequency, often pushing the boundaries of the constitutional guarantees of free speech. Through an analysis of the political speech-true threat cases that apply Watts, this study identifies and assesses three distinct modes of analysis that lower courts use to distinguish political speech from true threats. They are: (1) criteria-based analysis; (2) ad hoc balancing; and (3) a form of balancing referred to herein as “line-crossing analysis.” This study concludes that criteria-based analysis is the most prominent mode used by lower courts. As applied to new media and political participation, criteria-based analysis risks unduly restricting valuable political speech.     

经济法规的合宪性审查标准——基于对美国联邦最高法院判例的考察

对法律文件的违宪审查是我国合宪性审查体系的重要组成部分。在美国的违宪审查实践中,针对法律所涉及的内容,分别存在着合理审查、中等审查和严格审查等不同的审查标准。对于经济领域的法律,一般采用合理审查标准,但近年来在涉及言论自由的经济领域,其审查标准往往会提高。在我国的合宪性审查制度中,如果法院在个案审判中发现法律存在违宪嫌疑时,可以建立向最高人民法院移送的机制,并通过听证程序进行充分论证以决定是否向全国人大常委会提出合宪性审查请求。在审查中,对于我国的经济法律不宜直接采用合理审查标准,而应提高审查标准。     

个人信息的双重属性与行为主义规制

个人信息的法律保护依赖于公法对个人信息的定位。在公法与公法理论上,有两种看待个人信息的观点。一种观点认为个人信息权是一种基本权利,个人信息应当受到法律的确权保护;另一种观点则将个人信息视为他人言论自由的对象,个人信息的自由获取与使用受到法律保护。但这两种观点都无法从整体上理解个人信息,个人信息权的观点忽视了个人信息的自由流通属性与公共属性,而个人信息作为言论自由对象的观点则忽视了个人信息背后的多重权益。个人信息兼具个体属性与社会流通属性,应当确立一种"个人信息相关权益被保护权"。从个人信息的双重属性出发,个人信息保护应当在具体场景中确立个人信息收集与利用行为的合理边界。基于场景的行为主义规制更为符合个人信息保护的根本特征,也将为中国的个人信息保护提供一条超越欧美的中国道路。     

基本权利的规范领域和保护程度对我国宪法第35条和第41条的规范比较

基本权利的规范领域和保护程度之间存在反比关系：规范领域愈宽，保护程度愈低；规范领域愈窄，保护程度愈高。我国宪法第35条规定的言论自由，其规范领域宽于宪法第41条规定的监督权，因此宪法对监督权的保护程度高于对言论自由的保护。基本权利对公权力裁量余地的限制，随着所涉及基本权利的不同而有所差异：公权力对言论自由的限制，需要提出充分的理由；对受保护程度更高的监督权的限制，需要提出更强有力的理由。宪法对监督权的高程度保护，体现了制宪者对民主监督的期盼和对民主建设的信心。     

Libertad de expresión y discurso homofóbico en méxico: ¿es correcta la teoría constitucional de la suprema corte?

The article discusses a recent decision by the Mexican Supreme Court whereby damage resulting from the use of discriminatory language may in certain cases appropriately counterweight freedom of speech. The ruling expresses thesis at three different levels, all of them relevant from the viewpoint of constitutional theory. First, it expresses a vision of the kind of exercise the Court should deploy when reviewing sentences in amparo: it is a maximizing vision that the author considers to be fundamentally correct. At a second and third level, with different degrees of specificity, it proposes a particular constitutional reading for the revision of the case at hand. On this count and given the relevant historic-constitutional context, the article celebrates the Court's willingness to counterweight free speech with antidiscrimination-based considerations, though in terms of the sub-rules of decision used to pin down the general reading it identifies both successes and failures.     

Adventures in the Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Absence of Independent First Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes

Copyright law, for most of its history, has been exempt from the requirements of the First Amendment free speech and press clauses. As copyright law has expanded in scope and duration, scholars have begun to raise questions about its First Amendment immunity. This essay examines the fundamental conflict between copyright doctrine and the First Amendment. Although courts have been quick to dismiss the application of free speech standards to copyright disputes, the proper relationship between these two areas of the law is less than clear. The essay explores the current understanding of the intersection of free speech and copyright, largely derived from the work of Professor Melville Nimmer. It analyzes the difficulties with two specific doctrines by which the Supreme Court of the United States has justified copyright's free speech immunity – the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine – then concludes by offering a new approach to applying the First Amendment to copyright law in a more robust manner.     

欧美宪法社会学比较透视

宪法社会学是关于宪法的社会学研究,是宪法学与社会学交叉融合的产物,旨在发现人类政治生活中的真实规则。在欧洲和北美,宪法社会学已经形成了多元化的学术传统。其中,德国的宪法社会学侧重于从政治与历史的角度切入,偏好史论结合,思辨色彩浓厚。法国的宪法社会学具有客观的、旁观者的叙事风格。英国的宪法社会学打上了判例法或不成文宪法的痕迹,致力于素描一部活生生的宪法,仿佛人类学家的调查报告。美国虽然承袭了英国的判例法制度,但美国的宪法社会学透出强烈的现实主义意味,宪法背后的经济关系、利益格局得到了凸显。梳理欧美宪法社会学的学术传统,比较欧美各国宪法社会学的不同旨趣,有助于为当代中国宪法社会学的稳步发展提供理论与方法论上的启示。     

Merging law and ethics: Discourse legal theory and freedom of expression in Hurley

This article, analyzing and building on the work of Jürgen Habermas, demonstrates how discourse legal theory disavows a separation between law and ethics. The article suggests that discourse theory puts forward a more political theory of law that promotes the normative goal of creating a more just society through discursive practices. A critique of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurley v. Irish‐American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston shows how the Court overvalued the private function of speech and undervalued its public, discursive function. The article argues that discourse theory provides a more protective access standard for disempowered groups, especially when public fora are used for the expression of ideas.     

Originalism 2.0 Meets the First Amendment: The “New Originalism,” Interpretive Methodology,and Freedom of Expression

Constitutional originalism emerged as a legal and political movement in the last quarter of the twentieth century largely as a conservative reaction to perceived excesses of the Supreme Court of the United States. Early originalist attempts to formulate a coherent constitutional methodology were met with stinging criticism from many scholars. In recent years, a group of constitutional scholars has championed a different approach under the rubric “the New Originalism.” One of the key methodological innovations of New Originalism has been to reject the search for the intentions of the framer or ratifiers of constitutional provisions and instead seek to identify the “original public meaning” of such provisions. This article explores New Originalism in the context of the First Amendment speech and press clauses. The article also analyzes originalist opinions by Supreme Court justices to determine if New Originalism is affecting how the justices approach First Amendment interpretation.     

Regulating for responsibility: reputation and social media

The framework brought forward by the United Kingdom's Defamation Act 2013 underlines a traditional hierarchy of expression in which news media are viewed as high-level speech. Although of a different form, social media are a dominant means of expression. The current study explores the rationale for a more robust and forceful discussion of responsibility in speech on social media platforms. The underlying premise here is that speech should be viewed as a qualified good and that a more appropriate paradigm is one found in the phrase ‘freedom to participate’.     

Facebook Threats: the Missed Opportunities of Elonis V. United States

When the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction of a man who posted vile, threatening messages on Facebook, it concluded that the federal law used to prosecute him lacked the necessary level of intent. In effect, the Court stopped there, saying it was “not necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.” In considering the Court's adoption of judicial minimalism in Elonis v. United States, this article suggests that, even within that framework, there existed chances to explore relevant issues. This included advancing a better understanding of the seriousness of cyber threats. In spite of embracing the importance of context in evaluating this and other cases, the Court rejected the opportunity to provide important perspective. Proscribing true threats does not compromise free speech values; it enhances them. The ideas of free speech and civilized speech can coexist.,     

The right of publicity in the digital age – Doctrinal tensions, common law theories and proposals for solutions

In the fall of 2007, a federal appeals court ruled that the use of the names and records of Major League Baseball players without license or permission by an Internet fantasy sports website was protected speech and trumped the property rights of the players. The ruling by the U.S. federal appeals court in CBC v. MLBAM marks the latest skirmish in the long-simmering tension between the scope of the “Right of Publicity,” a common-law based doctrine that has expanded over the last half-century and the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. This issue of where free speech ends and proprietary protection begins is the subject of a long line of cases – with conflicting rulings, different doctrines and a haphazard state-by-state approach. With the evolution of the Internet as a marketing and commerce tool, the economic implications of digital rights have increased the problem. This article tracks the development of the right of publicity tort, discusses the leading cases and proposes solutions.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">United States v Stevens</Emphasis>: Gnawing Away at Freedom of Speech or Paving the Way for Animal Rights?

This article examines United States v. Stevens, a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, and its relation to animal law and freedom of speech issues, specifically the contention between the two, caused by the statute in question at the heart of the case. While animal rights advocates wish to frame the case through an anti-animal cruelty perspective, those seeking to protect freedom of speech have made the statute an issue of First Amendment rights. Is 18 USC § 48 an imposition on free speech or a step in the right direction towards protection of animals and promotion of their rights? It is argued here that the Supreme Court should have recognized the Stevens case as an important development in animal rights and held that the statute is narrowly tailored, based on a compelling government interest, and that the protection of animals from harm overshadows any possible speech or expression that is found in crush videos, dog fighting videos, and the like.     

Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt

In Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt the Supreme Court of the United States passed down its most important decision on abortion for just under a decade. By a majority of 5‐3, the Court ruled that two provisions in a Texas law regulating abortion on grounds of women's health were constitutionally invalid, placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of women seeking to exercise their right to abortion. This comment delineates the key ways in which the Court's application of the standard of constitutional review under Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) to the Texas provisions marks a landmark development for the protection of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe v Wade, not the least by making clear that state abortion regulations which cite ‘women's health’ justifications should not pass constitutional review where those justifications lack a credible factual basis.     

实力变迁、法律传统与美欧印中贸易政策的演进

国际经济格局的深刻变化引发了美欧印中等主要贸易体贸易政策的变化.这种变化主要体现为其外贸法、外资法和出口管制法的修改,而国际习惯法和国际经济条约对这种修改的约束有限.美欧印中的代表性国际经济法理论分别为"制度管理说"、"规范承诺说"、"贸易民主论"和"责任共担论",这些理论反映了各贸易体的国际经济法传统和理念.以这些理...     

The “Central Meaning” and Path Dependence: The Madison-Meiklejohn-Brennan Nexus

Justice William J. Brennan's opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is widely recognized for many reasons, including, as articulated by Professor Harry Kalven, that it put “the First Amendment right side up for the first time” by identifying its “central meaning.” That meaning is the constitutional protection of speech critical of government and its officials – speech vital in a self-governing democracy. Justice Brennan's approach was derived, in part, from the writings of James Madison, to whom the justice refers generously throughout the opinion, and Alexander Meiklejohn, to whom Justice Brennan gave credit only after the fact. This article examines the philosophical lineage from Madison to Meiklejohn to Brennan, and does so through the lens of path dependence, a perspective that advocates that history matters. A critique of path dependence emerges.     

经济法之政府干预的宪政解读

宪政之于经济法的法治要求,意味着国家干预经济的一切活动都应当有相应的法律依据,国家干预经济的行为应该受到制约。经济宪政是以保障基本权利为基础、以社会本位为核心价值的宪政理念。为了实现政府干预的宪政目标,应限制行政权力,要求政府干预遵循法治化的进程,以确保宪政经济权利并接受违宪审查。     

美国贸易政策制定的宪政体制论

美国贸易政策制定权力由《美国宪法》明确界定,所以开启贸易自由化的＂1934年体制＂本质上是一个宪政体制。该体制的形成是基于后危机时代重构政治平衡与摆脱经济危机的现实需要,而其变迁是围绕国会＂授权-控权或监督＂的宪政路径展开的,并由贸易保护主义力量与自由贸易主义力量之间的宪政博弈推动的。这种宪政博弈实质上是在特定历史条件下的一种贸易立法博弈,而具体表现为推动贸易自由化的＂四位一体＂制度架构。对正在积极推进贸易自由化的中国而言,这种源于宪政博弈的贸易制度创新实践可资借鉴之处主要在于两个方面,即后危机时代贸易自由化立法范式的创新和自由贸易与不公平贸易二分法的立法体例的引入。     

Reds Need Not Apply: Communism and the FCC, 1940-60

New communication technologies—particularly the Internet—have drastically complicated the problem of preserving privacy. As a result, a multitude of solutions for this increasingly complex area of the law have been put forth in recent years. This essay concludes, however, that changes in technology do not warrant altering the underlying constitutional balance that was arrived at decades ago in the tort law of privacy. The free speech limits on privacy law were imposed for good reason, and steps to protect the interest in the new online environment should not be ones that upset that careful balance.     

What is so special about [free] speech?

Legal and political philosophers (e.g., Scanlon, Schauser, etc.) typically regard speech as special in the sense that conduct that causes harm should be less subject to regulation if it involves speech than if it does not. Though speech is special in legal analysis, I argue that it should not be given comparable status in moral theory. I maintain that most limitations on state authority enacted on behalf of a moral principle of freedom of speech can be retained without supposing that speech is entitled to a degree of protection not afforded to (most) other forms of conduct. My argument questions some standard assumptions made by philosophers about the relationship between moral and legal principles.