Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?

This article questions whether those outside law should take law seriously as an intellectual discipline capable of contributing to the development of epistemological thinking in the natural and social sciences. The discipline is approached from a diachronic and synchronic position with emphasis on the civil law tradition. It will be shown that the governing paradigm in legal studies has always been the 'authority paradigm', which results in law being closer to theology than to the social sciences. Its principal actors (judges) make assertions free from the normal constraints of scientific method; accordingly, the idea of a 'legal science' (imported into the common law tradition after 1846) must be treated with great caution. It is not a science dedicated to enquiring about the nature of the physical world, society or social relations. Its epistemological development remains trapped in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: thus, as a discipline, law has little to offer other social sciences.     

我的学术之路与中国社会科学的发展——在受聘西南政法大学名誉教授晚会上的致辞

2004年3月22日,西南政法大学聘任邓正来先生为其名誉教授。受聘仪式上,邓正来先生作了题为《我的学术之路与中国社会科学的发展》的精彩演讲。邓正来先生的即兴演讲已经不能仅仅被理解为一般的致辞,相信每位从事社会科学研究的学者对其学术意义都会形成共识。该演讲实际是按“西南法学论坛”的形式进行,所以“坛规”设置了佳宾点评。需要说明的是,龙宗智校长和付子堂副校长代表学校所作的颁发聘书讲话实际上是在邓正来先生的演讲之前,但为了方便起见,均置于讲演之后。但龙宗智校长的另一部分点评又是在邓正来先生的演讲之后所作的,所以分为两段。     

Legalist Fictions and the Problem of Scientific Legitimation

The author analyzes fictions of legal positivist philosophy and their role in the scientific legitimation of modern law and political domination. The original function of legalist fictions was the establishment of legal science, which would be autonomous and independent of other social sciences and public morality. In the second half of the 20th century, legal positivist philosophy has nevertheless adopted the fiction of the just law as its scientific legitimation fiction and incorporated moral and political discourse into legal science, again.
Legal positivism and its critiques within the discourse of the sociology of law and critical legal science keep the image of a hierarchical and centralized legitimation of law. Paradoxically, current legal philosophy and theory searching for a universally valid legitimation scheme is full of many different legitimations and reveals their growing plurality and the impossibility of establishing one sovereign legitimation scheme in the current social, theoretical and political condition.     

试论经济法中的定性分析与定量分析

“定性与定量结合”一直是自然科学研究强调的重点方法 ,近代社会科学研究也强调了这一重要原则。但当前经济法学这个社会科学领域 ,对定性研究还存在许多认识上的误区 ,同时在定量研究方面也存在着很大的不足。本文从《反不正当竞争法》入手 ,引出现行经济立法的缺陷 ,并分析经济法中定性分析与定量分析的可行性 ,最后从经济立法方面具体阐述定性分析与定量分析的有机结合。     

Christian Wolff on Subsidiarity, the Division of Labor, and Social Welfare

In more than one way Christian Wolff (1679-1754) has provided the grammar for modern social sciences in general, but economics in particular. Next to his path-breaking contributions to philosophy and international law, which are generally recognized, he has also pioneered the social sciences and provided the notions with which modern economics is still largely working. This is important also for modern law and economics research, since Wolff conceived of both law and economics still largely as one discipline and therefore was able to integrate naturally what has today to be integrated conscientiously, and with effort.     

A Contribution to the Question of the Methodology of Jurisprudence

The CPSU Program poses to the social sciences, including Marxist jurisprudence, a task of vast historical importance: that of continuously improving the elaboration of the scientific principles of guidance to social development. Successful solution of this problem depends, to a considerable degree, upon the status of methodology, the completeness and accuracy with which the techniques and tools of research and of cognition of phenomena in the field of public law are defined. In this connection, what is most important today, when all the necessary conditions have been established for creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory, is to uproot completely the consequences of the personality cult in the field of social science and to restore and further develop the Leninist techniques in science. (1)     

Recent developments in German health law

Health law provides the regulatory constitution for the medical and healthcare system. It covers individual medical treatment as well as public healthcare provision and is insofar medical law as well as social security law (statutory health insurance law). The medical and health sciences (public health sciences) are the main complementary disciplines of health law. This article gives an account of some representative developments in both fields which have taken place in the last three years.     

Autopoietic Law and the 'Epistemic Trap': A Case Study of Adoption and Contact

This paper examines autopoietic theory with reference to functionally differentiated social sub-systems, particularly law, science, and politics. It sets out to 'test' the practical relevance of autopoietic theory in relation to ongoing debates about post-adoption contact and personal identity issues. Law has resisted social scientific pressure to regulate post-adoption contact in the context of a social policy approach, which emphasizes the relationship between identity development and genealogical continuity. I argue that law's response to this pressure relates to the particular nature of adoption as this is expressed through legislation and case law. Law's refusal to intervene in post-adoption contact reflects its self-referential operations and its attempts to avoid epistemic entrapment by a social scientific discourse. Applying autopoietic theory to law's practical operations in adoption clarifies its explanatory value, provides a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between law, politics, and social science and indicates areas that require theoretical refinement.     

Epistemological Perspectives in Legal Theory

Abstract The authors deal with several important epistemological problems in legal theory. The Nineteenth century background is analyzed from the emergence of legal science freed from the constraints of natural law and built on the model of the empirical sciences. The authors show how this science of law has been influenced by the social sciences and trends in ideological criticism throughout the Twentieth century. The epistemological question central to legal science is tackled, i.e., what kind of “epistemological break” should there be with regard to the object studied? To answer this question, the authors plead for the adoption of a “moderate external point of view” which bears in mind lawyers' “internal point of view.”     

Critical Rationalism: The Problem of Method in Social Sciences and Law*

Abstract. The author characterizes the model of rationality devised by critical rationalism in opposition to the classic model of rationality and as an alternative to this. He illustrates and criticizes the trichotomous theory of knowledge which, going back to Max Scheler, is received in a secularized version by Habermas and Apel, also under the influence of the hermeneutic tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer and of the so-called “critical theory” of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. The author criticizes historicism as it expects to be an alternative to naturalism and not to make use of the method based on scientific laws. The author proposes as an example of technological social science the model developed in economics starting from Adam Smith. With regard to legal theories, natural law is rejected because of its sociomorphic cosmology. It is proposed that legal science as social technology has two parts. One part aims at efficient interpretations of valid law (for the space-time region concerned) and a second part aims at the construction of efficient norms for the modification of valid law by legislation     

The Commonality Between Economics and Law

The development of law and economics is a success story in the expansion of economics into other social sciences since the 1960s. The success has been attributed to the fact that economics offers a powerful set of analytical tools with a forceful theory of human behavior. But if this is the only reason, then the move of economics into other social sciences such as political science and sociology should have been equally successful. This, however, has not been true, and the discrepancy calls for an explanation. The commonalities between economics and law in both subject matter and analytical approach provide a more convincing explanation; some of the difficulties faced by the legal economists can also be explained by an appreciation of the commonalites between economics and law.     

Black's Theory on the Behavior of Law Revisited IV: the Behavior of Qing Law

Black's theory on The Behavior of Law (1976) predicts and explains the behavior of law with five social variables: stratification, morphology, culture, organization, and social control. This research project tested one aspect of Black's theory—the relationship between law and culture—with historical data from the Qianlong reign (1736–1796) in the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) of China. The research question posed was whether and to what extent the cultured people in Qing-China were subjected to a different and more favorable judicial process in speech crime prosecution cases? Two hypotheses were tested: (1) The judicial process was compromised in favor of the cultured. (2) The emperor and the officials were more involved and invested more judicial resources in the processing of cultured cases.The testing of Black's theory was achieved by the analysis of 68 speech crime case files from emperor Qianlong's reign for evidence of favorable treatment of the cultured. The testing was conducted with the cultural status of the speech crime defendants as an independent variable, seriousness of crime as a control variable, and the Qing judicial process as a dependent variable. The concept of law was operationalized as Confucian ethics, emperor's justice policy, Qing law, and judicial practices. The concept of culture was operationalized as education-official standing, i.e., the cultured being officials, gentry, and scholars and the less/non-cultured being students, commoners and eccentrics.The findings of this research show that the cultured were afforded a more protective judicial process. Specifically, the judicial process was compromised in favor of the cultured and the emperor and officials devoted more judicial resources (time and effort) in the processing and disposition of the cultured cases. The findings provided for a first confirmation of Black's theory of law in China, i.e., that the cultured people were treated to more law in the Qing courts.     

Does Empirical Legal Studies Shed more Heat than Light? The Case of Civil Damage Awards

Empirical investigation of legal systems is emerging as a leading trend in both the social sciences and the legal academy in the early twenty‐first century. Law reviews are now filled with studies reporting empirical data. Because empirical investigation of law commonly seeks to inform contentious social and political debates, however, its research often fuels more debate than it resolves. Partisans on both sides of contentious issues now cite the same body of research to support their reform efforts. However, social science research on law is not a useless undertaking, as it can sharpen debate. But the hope that the new empirical legal studies movement will become a neutral source of information for policy makers is unlikely to be realized.     

LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: IS THERE ANY THERE THERE?

Despite tremendous growth in the field, there have been many challenges to law and the behavioral sciences. The most colorful expression is Abel's charge that "questions and answers have begun to sound a comfortable, but rather boring 'clackity-clack.'" On one hand, the achievements of the field cannot be ignored by those who want to think about law seriously. On the other hand, all approaches to the field are flawed and are likely to remain that way. Help in solving the problems of the field might come from a thorough interdisciplinary approach, calling on the contributions of all social sciences while recognizing the limitations of each; knowledge of a minimum amount of law and legal method, but with full awareness of how legal thought may distort definitions of problems; and knowledge of the questions posed by broader social theories in light of an empirical refining of their large explanations.     

The Evolutionary Game‐Theoretic Foundations of Law

Interdisciplinary work in the law often starts and stops with the social sciences. To produce a complete understanding of how law, evolutionary game‐theoretic insights must, however, supplement these more standard social scientific methods. To illustrate, this article critically examines The Force of Law by Frederick Schauer and The Expressive Powers of Law by Richard McAdams. Combining the methods of analytic jurisprudence and social psychology, Schauer clarifies the need for a philosophically respectable and empirically well‐grounded account of the ubiquity of legal sanctions. Drawing primarily on economic and social psychological paradigms, McAdams highlights law's potential to alter human behavior through expressions that coordinate. Still, these contributions generate further puzzles about how law works, which can be addressed using evolutionary game‐theoretic resources. Drawing on these resources, this article argues that legal sanctions are ubiquitous to law not only because they can motivate legal compliance, as Schauer suggests, but also because they provide the general evolutionary stability conditions for intrinsic legal motivation. In reaction to McAdams, this article argues that law's expressive powers can function to coordinate human behavior only because humans are naturally and culturally evolved to share a prior background agreement in forms of life. Evolutionary game‐theoretic resources can thus be used to develop a unified framework from within which to understand some of the complex interrelationships between legal sanctions, intrinsic legal motivation, and law's coordinating power. Going forward, interdisciplinary studies of how law works should include greater syntheses of contemporary insights from evolutionary game theory.     

法理论:历史形成、学科属性及其中国化

要破除部门法学因过度教义化形成的学科壁垒,不能走向要求法学无条件地向其他社会科学全面开放的极端,而应该深化和发展法理论研究。通过历史的梳理可以发现,科学范式的转换、传统法哲学的衰落和部门法学的内在诉求构成了法理论研究形成的背景。它发端于历史法学时期,以19世纪的法学百科全书运动为其先声,而其作为独立的法学分支学科则经历了创始、成熟和多样化三个阶段,从一开始的分析法理论逐渐发展为包括多种进路在内的宽泛领域。法理论是一门从内部观察者的视角出发,通过研究基本法律概念来致力于法律知识的一般化与体系化的关于实在法的规范学科,包括法的理论与法律科学理论两部分。它对部门法学发挥着体系构造、学说批判和知识筛选功能,构成部门法学之知识和方法的法理。当下中国的法理论研究,要在兼容并蓄的基础上与部门法学形成良性互动,提升研究的整体自洽性和一般性,加强分析法理论和社会法理论方法间的分工与合作。     

INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES’ LIABILITY FOR ONLINE ILLEGAL HATE SPEECH

Considering the prevalence of online hate speech and its harm and risks to the targeted people, democratic discourse and public security, it is necessary to combat online hate speech. For this purpose, internet intermediaries play a crucial role as new governors of online speech. However, there is no universal definition of hate speech. Rules concerning this vary in different countries depending on their social, ethical, legal and religious backgrounds. The answer to the question of who can be liable for online hate speech also varies in different countries depending on the social, cultural, history, legal and political backgrounds. The First Amendment, cyberliberalism and the priority of promoting the emerging internet industry lead to the U.S. model, which offers intermediaries wide exemptions from liability for third-party illegal content. Conversely, the Chinese model of cyberpaternalism prefers to control online content on ideological, political and national security grounds through indirect methods, whereas the European Union (EU) and most European countries, including Germany, choose the middle ground to achieve balance between restricting online illegal hate speech and the freedom of speech as well as internet innovation. It is worth noting that there is a heated discussion on whether intermediary liability exemptions are still suitable for the world today, and there is a tendency in the EU to expand intermediary liability by imposing obligation on online platforms to tackle illegal hate speech. However, these reforms are again criticized as they could lead to erosion of the EU legal framework as well as privatization of law enforcement through algorithmic tools. Those critical issues relate to the central questions of whether intermediaries should be liable for user-generated illegal hate speech at all and, if so, how should they fulfill these liabilities? Based on the analysis of the different basic standpoints of cyberliberalists and cyberpaternalists on the internet regulation as well as the arguments of proponents and opponents of the intermediary liability exemptions, especially the debates over factual impracticality and legal restraints, impact on internet innovation and the chilling effect on freedom of speech in the case that intermediaries bear liabilities for illegal third-party content, the paper argues that the arguments for intermediary liability exemptions are not any more tenable or plausible in the web 3.0 era. The outdated intermediary immunity doctrine needs to be reformed and amended. Furthermore, intermediaries are becoming the new governors of online speech and platforms now have the power to curtail online hate speech. Thus, the attention should turn to the appropriate design of legal responsibilities of intermediaries. The possible suggestions could be the following three points: Imposing liability on intermediaries for illegal hate speech requires national law and international human rights norms as the outer boundary; openness, transparency and accountability as internal constraints; balance of multi-interests and involvement of multi-stakeholders in internet governance regime.     

Rules,Institutions, Transformations. Considerations on the “Evolution of Law” Paradigm

The article's main objective is to test the merits of the evolutionary paradigm as it has been applied first to social phenomena and then more specifically to the legal domain. In a preliminary move, a set of the available concepts of law is worked out. A discussion of the idea of evolution and of its use in the social sciences follows. Functionalism and systems theory are scrutinized, with a close eye to the new doctrine of “autopoiesis.” Once an institutional and normative concept of law is agreed upon, attempts to introduce an “evolutionary” paradigm are deemed—the article contends—to be unfruitful. The article concludes that, if law needs a metaphysics, it should be one which allows for change, transformation and the emergence of the radically new. A social universe without gaps, all possible forms of which are determined from the beginning, will end up as the opposite of what we are used to considering as the practice of law.