Personal and Political Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda

The majority of scholarly research on Rwanda currently focuses on determining the causes of and participation in the genocide. In this paper, we explore a variety of questions that have come to the forefront in post-genocide Rwanda. In particular, we are concerned with the prospects for peace and justice in the aftermath of the gross abuses of human rights that occurred and, to that end, we consider the potential uses and limits of restorative justice initiatives in the process of healing and reconciliation in Rwanda. We argue that restorative justice initiatives have moved the country closer toward reconciliation than retributive measures, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. That said, we also suggest that the Rwandan government, despite claims that it seeks to achieve reconciliation, has not shown a serious commitment to healing the wounds that persist between either individual Rwandans or the groups that they comprise. In the end, then, we make a case for the importance of pairing a comprehensive search for justice in Rwanda with a commitment to truth-telling and accountability by the victims and perpetrators of the genocide, as well as by current government officials.     

Crime and punishment in Rwanda

In 1994 Rwanda was devastated by genocide that killed hundreds of thousands of people and destroyed the country’s infrastructure. The credibility of the criminal justice system was questioned following the genocide because it had failed to stop the slaughter and may have contributed to it. In order to address these concerns, Rwanda rebuilt its criminal justice system in light of its history and troubled past. The success of the reestablishment may be debated but there can be no question that Rwanda had a tabula rasa with which to form an effective criminal justice system. Examining the law details the ideals of the criminal justice system as established post-genocide. These ideals exemplify the democratic process. Examining current events allows for a practical assessment of the success of the new system. In both theory and practice the country’s criminal justice system has changed drastically since 1994.     

Revisiting Disclosure Obligations at the ICTR and its Implications for the Rights of the Accused

Disclosure obligations are an important and contentious topicin the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda jurisprudencethat directly implicates the right of the accused to a fairtrial. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda jurisprudencehas historically favoured disclosure of witness statements underRule 66(A)(ii); however, the possibility of disclosure underRule 68 should also be considered. Due to the practical difficultyfor the defence to obtain witness statements that may be materialto its case, the author argues that the Tribunal should reconsiderthe jurisprudence on the topic of disclosure to work towardsa more equitable disclosure regime under Rule 68.     

Human rights violations and genocide in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The massacres that took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 1996 and 2003 have posed an interesting challenge to the global community, specifically to its more powerful members. Ironically, the Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda enjoys international recognition and benefits based on the genocide, Rwanda suffered in 1994, but continues to deny the same benefit to Hutus as they were accused of leading a counter-genocide campaign then in the DRC. While the people of the DRC, as well as human rights activists, call for justice for all who were affected, the government of Rwanda, strongly backed by a number of powerful international powers, opposed attempts by the international community to pin charges of genocide perpetrated by its army in the DRC on it. Because of the clear negation of the genocide report by the Rwandan government, the nature of human rights, human rights violations, and genocide criteria proposed and defended by key members of the international community in relation to the mass killings in the DRC are examined.     

The Security Council in the Face of Genocide

The genocide in Rwanda will define for our generation the failureto intervene in the face of mass human rights abuses. The UNSecurity Council (the Council) was intimately involved in thisterrible event, with the decisions it took from October 1993,when a peacekeeping mission was created for Rwanda, having adecisive effect on what happened. This article details the crucialmeetings held by the Council in secret and informal sessionsand describes how a serious assessment of the situation in Rwandawas simply missing. It shows how the peacekeepers of the Council'smission to Rwanda were abandoned during the genocide and howthe efforts of these UN personnel to ease the suffering of theRwandan people were ignored by the Great Powers.     

论卢旺达国际刑事法庭的管辖权

卢旺达国际刑事法庭的管辖权包括五类:其属地管辖权涵盖卢旺达及其邻国;其属人管辖权限于自然人;其属事管辖权包含种族灭绝罪、反人道罪和战争罪;其属时管辖权仅限于1994年度发生的犯罪,遭到卢旺达政府的批评;其并行管辖权和优先管辖权则与前南斯拉夫国际刑事法庭规定的同名管辖权有着质的区别。     

The UN Inadequacies

The author describes the results of the UN Independent Inquiryon the Genocide in Rwanda, which he headed. The internationalcommunity's reluctance to commit itself and its resources tothe UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR or UN Mission),coupled with the inadequacy of UNAMIR's initial mandate, areidentified as the crucial reasons for the Mission's failings.These weaknesses led to the failure of the UN forces on theground to respond effectively to the genocide and inhibitedtheir ability to protect civilians and UN staffers. The authordetails the failures both of the UN Mission in Rwanda and ofthe leadership in New York, with unflinching exactitude, drawingimportant lessons to help ensure that another such breakdownof the UN system during a time of crisis does not happen again.     

The Rwandan diaspora in Canada and the United States: reconciliation and justice

Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, many Rwandans fled and a modest diaspora was established throughout Canada and the United States. Diaspora are subject to many of the same concerns regarding justice and reconciliation as those who remain in Rwanda. This research focused primarily on how this diaspora attempted to achieve justice and reconciliation, if institutional mechanisms (gacaca) in Rwanda had a residual effect, and if they created any specific mechanism to facilitate justice and reconciliation among themselves. In-person and telephone interviews were conducted with eight members of the diaspora in the United States and Canada between May 2015 and March 2016.

Interviews suggested that justice among the diaspora is inherently connected with justice in Rwanda, and participants felt that justice has not been achieved in either location. Reconciliation among the diaspora, while tied to reconciliation in Rwanda, may be its own construct. Interviews demarcated ‘thin’ reconciliation and ‘thick’ reconciliation, suggesting that ‘thin’ reconciliation exists among the diaspora, but that ‘thick’ reconciliation is rare. Discussion of gacaca was limited, as participants stated it did not address justice and reconciliation in Rwanda. Participants did not report any diaspora specific mechanism regarding attempts at justice and reconciliation.     

French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda

France is now the world's second largest armsexporter, and the largest supplier of weapons to thedeveloping world. The record of France's involvementin Rwanda from 1990 to 1994 has motivated the NGOlobby within France to subject French governmentpolicy – towards the developing world in general, andon arms supplies in particular – to unprecedentedscrutiny. Accordingly, the level and volume ofcriticism of French involvement in Rwanda resulted inthe first ever parliamentary commission to scrutiniseFrench military activity overseas, although this andother official inquiries stopped short of identifyingarms supplies as instrumental in exacerbating theRwandan crisis. A consideration ofFrench arms supplies to Rwanda can offer a template bywhich to measure the nature and degree of France'ssupport for the Habyarimana regime which planned, andthe Sindikubwabo interim government which oversaw, the1994 genocide in that country. Moreover, French armssupplies after France's own and the UN's arms embargodemonstrate how a process of unchecked militarisationmay involve the supplier as well as the supplied inillegality.     

SUBNATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF KILLING IN RWANDA*

Nearly one million people were killed in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Although scholars have theorized why this violence occurred, we know comparatively less about how it unfolded. Accordingly, this article assesses the determinants of subnational levels of killing in 142 Rwandan communes by relying on data from the Rwandan Ministry of Local Administration and Community Development, the National University of Rwanda, and the 1991 Rwandan census. Fixed effects analyses reveal that top‐down and bottom‐up factors coalesced to influence violence across Rwanda. The state orchestrated and implemented the violence, and more violence occurred near the extremist center of the country as well as where state actors met strong opposition. Local conditions also shaped the violence, however, and indicators of low community cohesion and social control are associated with comparatively more violence. When put together, a unique model is introduced that integrates state conflict theories and social control theories of crime to explain subnational killing during the genocide in Rwanda.     

Rwanda’s involvement in Eastern DRC: A criminal real options approach

This paper applies an alternative model to analyze criminal behaviour by countries based on real option models. Criminal options incorporate a richer framework than traditional cost-benefit models and allow examining the optimal timing of a crime as criminals have the possibility but not the obligation to commit a crime in the near future. From the model, we show how criminal states can actively manage their criminal options. More importantly, we show how the international community can optimally intervene pro-actively, by reducing the incentives for criminal states to execute their criminal options. These novel insights are then applied to two episodes of criminal behaviour by Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): the massive killing of Hutu refugees by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) in late 1996-early 1997 and the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources from August 1998 onwards. This article describes and assesses these activities from this real option perspective.     

Criminology and victimology of rape in context with war-like conflicts using the example of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

The topic of this article is sexual violence in context with war-like conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The fundamental categories of sexual violence in war-like conflicts are described. The authors discuss the types of sexual violence as defined in the report of the UN Commission of Experts on the war-like conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Four criminal trials were evaluated: three held before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague/Netherlands and one before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha/Tansania. The defendants were found guilty of torture, crime against humanity and genocide. Potential procedures with respect to similar crimes in current or prospective conflicts are discussed. An alternative may be the assignment of medical personnel (for example of the German Federal Armed Forces). Finally, the post-war cooperation between the Institute of Legal Medicine at the University Medical Centre of Hamburg-Eppendorf as well as the medical and government institutions in Rwanda is presented, which has been going on since 2005.     

The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?

Since his appointment in 2003, the Prosecutor of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) remains silent on the issueof prosecuting officials of the victorious Rwandan PatrioticFront (RPF). There is certainly no lack of credible reportsabout massive violations of human rights and international humanitarianlaw by the RPF both in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries,in 1994 and thereafter. The Prosecutor and the UN Security Council,despite lip service to the contrary, seem less than eager toconfront the government in Kigali. It is therefore to be fearedthat prosecutorial practice at the ICTR will follow the Nurembergparadigm. This one-sided policy may, however, have far-reachingconsequences.     

The Major Powers on Trial

Faced with incontrovertible evidence of the most clear-cut caseof genocide possible, the international community failed todenounce the evil and to take action to stop the killings takingplace in Rwanda in 1994. Under the influence of three majorpowers—France, the United States and the United Kingdom—theUnited Nations was disabled from taking the necessary actionbecause the mass slaughter of the Tutsi people did not impingeon these powers' narrowly defined national interests. In thespecific case of France, there is evidence to show that thispower arguably aided and abetted the genocide. Yet, in contrast,these three powers were able to take decisive and quick actionwhen faced with an outraged domestic public in response to thehumanitarian crisis which unfolded from the genocide. Thereare many reasons why individuals and governments cannot bringthemselves to use the word ‘genocide’. In the caseof Rwanda, perhaps the enormity of the concept prevented thosewho were in the midst of it from recognizing it for what itactually was.     

Restorative Justice and Collective Responsibility: Lessons for and from the Rwandan Genocide

Genocide struck Rwanda in 1994. Since then, national and international trials have endeavored to promote reconciliation, deterrence, peace, justice, and human rights. This article posits a disconnect between these trials and the attainment of their avowed goals. This disconnect emerges in part from the influential agendas of international lawyers who equate selective criminal prosecution with the "rule of law" and espouse criminal prosecution as the preferred and uniform response to mass atrocity. Creating a presumption in favor of criminal prosecution has dampened the need to explore whether such trials actually are suitable for the particular afflicted society. A socio-legal analysis suggests that Rwanda is precisely a place where constructed notions of what "rule of law" ought to be are supplanting the need to implement reconstructive policies that may be best for Rwanda. In particular, the populist nature of the Rwandan genocide, coupled with the vast level of victimization, suggest that a shame-based restorative approach may be more successful in promoting reconciliation, deterrence, and peace than the guilt-based retributive approach currently in vogue. This article argues that, when the law blames occurrences of genocidal evil largely on the existence of some evil people, it obscures the fact that so many people, to varying degrees of complicity, are required for this evil to result in so many deaths.     

Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts

After many decades of impunity, Rwanda has embarked upon a courseof transitional justice committed to prosecuting all who aresuspected of involvement in the 1994 genocide. The first phase,which began in 1997 and is still continuing, targets the mostserious offenders. Some 10,000 have been tried under the system.Confronted with its limitations, Rwanda has devised a secondapproach, known as gacaca, which focuses on a lower and lessheinous level of participation in genocide, and which is inspiredby traditional models of local justice. Acting upon legislationadopted in 2001, a pilot phase convinced Rwandan justice officialsof the viability of the process throughout the country. Theinstitutions have been fine-tuned, and become fully operationalin the course of 2005. Because the pilot phase encouraged denunciation,instead of offering ‘closure’, the process has actuallyrevealed a much broader popular participation in the atrocitiesof 1994. Rwandan authorities now say the gacaca process willprosecute more than 1,000,000 suspects.     

Variables influencing victim selection in genocide

While victims of racially motivated violence may be identified through observation of morphological features, those targeted because of their ethnic, religious, or national identity are not easily recognized. This study examines how perpetrators of genocide recognize their victims. Court documents, including indictments, witness statements, and testimony from the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (FY) detail the interactions between victim and assailant. A total of 6012 decedents were included in the study; only 20.8% had been positively identified. Variables influencing victim selection in Rwanda included location, segregation, incitement, and prior relationship, while significant factors in FY were segregation, location, age/gender, and social data. Additional contributing factors in both countries included self-identification, victim behavior, linguistic or clothing evidence, and morphological features. Understanding the system of recognition used by perpetrators aids investigators tasked with establishing victim identity in such prosecutions.     

On the Sources of International Criminal Law

In their efforts to establish a quite original system of proceduraland material rules of international criminal law, by means ofthe so-called "judge-made law", the two ad hoc Tribunals forthe Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda hold a peculiar approach tothe sources of that law. The most controversial of all is theirconcept of "customary law". This paper is an attempt to clarifythe meaning and scope of these sources mainly from some aspectsof the respective rules adopted in the 1998 Rome Statute. Itis also a continuance in this author's research on the sourcesof public international law.     

Hate Speech and International Criminal Law: The Mugesera Decision by the Supreme Court of Canada

On 28 June 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a decisionin Mugesera, bringing to an end the decade-long legal saga involvinga speech made by Leon Mugesera in November 1992 in Rwanda. Whilethe decision of the Supreme Court was handed down in the contextof an immigration case, its impact will be mostly felt in therealm of criminal law, as the court embraced international jurisprudencefor the international elements of crimes against humanity. Inaddition, the decision is important for three reasons: it (i)clarified the interrelationship between international and domesticcriminal law; (ii) examined the notion of hate crime; and (iii)analysed the concept of inchoate crimes.     

The ICTR Contribution to National Reconciliation

Over a decade after the establishment of the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), an assessment of its achievementswith regard to its role in fostering reconciliation among Rwandansmust be undertaken. The ICTR's activities have provided a settingfor witnesses and victims of the genocide to testify beforejudicial authorities. However, persisting obstacles involvingthe nature of the conflict and ongoing instability in the countryhave hindered progress in efforts at national reconciliation,and addressing the issue of compensation for victims remainsinadequate. The ICTR continues to play a crucial role in sheddinglight on the atrocities and endeavouring to raise awarenessfor victims’ issues at the international level.