Does collusive advertising facilitate collusive pricing? Evidence from experimental duopolies

This article analyzes experimentally whether the degree of collusion for one dimension of duopolists?? interactions influences the degree of collusion for another dimension. More precisely, I will explore whether a high degree of collusion for advertisement expenditures facilitates tacit price collusion. Two environments are tested, in which the size of the spillover between advertising expenditures is varied. The results indicate that both degrees of collusion are correlated: a high degree of collusion on advertising functions as a signalling device triggering a significantly higher degree of price collusion by the opponent. Thus advertising expenditures seem to be a useful indicator for market regulators to detect non-competitive pricing.     

PATENT HOLDUP AND OLIGOPSONISTIC COLLUSION IN STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS

Current controversies over patent policy place standard-settingorganizations (SSOs) on a collision course with antitrust law.Recent theoretical research conjectures that, in an SSO, patentowners can "hold up" patent users in the sense of demandinghigh royalties for a patented input after the SSO has adoptedthe patented technology as an industry standard and manufacturerswithin the SSO have incurred sunk costs to design end productsthat incorporate that standard. Consistent with this conjecture,actual SSOs have recently sought no-action letters from theAntitrust Division for a variety of amendments to SSO rulesthat would require or request, at the time a standard is underconsideration, the ex ante disclosure by the patent owner ofthe maximum royalty that the patent owner would charge underthe regime of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing.This price information—which is characterized as the "cost"of the patented input—would, under at least one recentSSO rule modification, be a permissible topic for potentialusers of the patent to discuss when deciding whether to selectit in lieu of some alternative standard. This exchange of informationamong horizontal competitors would occur ostensibly becausethe cost of the patented technology had been characterized assimply one more technical attribute of the standard to be set,albeit an important technical attribute. The Antitrust Divisionand the Federal Trade Commission have jointly stated that suchdiscussion, by prospective buyers who are competitors in thedownstream market, of the price of a patented invention thatmight become part of an industry standard should be subjectto antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason rather than therule of per se illegality. The rationale that the antitrustagencies offer for applying the rule of reason to such conductis that such horizontal collaboration might avert patent holdup.The Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) similarly endorsedthe view that rule-of-reason analysis is appropriate for exante discussion of royalty terms by competing buyers of patentedtechnology. This rule-of-reason approach, however, is problematicbecause it conflicts with both the body of economic researchon bidder collusion and with the antitrust jurisprudence oninformation exchange and facilitation of collusion. Put differently,because of their concern over the possibility of patent holdup,the U.S. antitrust agencies and the AMC in effect have indicatedthat they may be willing in at least some circumstances to forgoenforcement actions against practices that facilitate oligopsonisticcollusion by encouraging the ex ante exchange of informationamong competitors concerning the price to be paid for a patentedinput as an implicit condition of those competitors' endorsementof that particular patented technology for adoption in the industrystandard. However, neither the proponents of these SSO policiesnor the antitrust agencies and the AMC have offered any theoreticalor empirical foundation for their implicit assumption that theexpected social cost of patent holdup exceeds the expected socialcost of oligopsonistic collusion. This conclusion does not changeeven if one conjectures that such collusion will benefit consumersby enabling licensees to pass through royalty reductions intheir pricing of the downstream product incorporating the patentedtechnology. Proper economic evaluation of the plausibility ofthe pass-through conjecture will require information about thecalculation of royalty payments; the demand and supply elasticitiesfacing the licensees; and the structure of any industries furtherdownstream between the manufacturer and the final consumer.Consequently, the magnitude of this effect will likely be amatter of empirical dispute in every case. Moreover, such ajustification for tolerating horizontal price fixing finds nosupport in antitrust jurisprudence. Given the analytical andfactual uncertainty over whether patent holdup is a seriousproblem, it is foreseeable that antitrust questions of firstimpression will arise and affect a wide range of high-technologyindustries that rely on SSOs. However, there is no indicationthat scholars and policy makers have seriously considered whetheroligopsonistic collusion in SSOs is a larger problem than patentholdup.     

A note on collusion and resale price maintenance

This paper advances a new, anti-collusive, explanation of resale price maintenance. By imposing a price floor, an upstream firm increases the non-cooperative profits of downstream firms and makes collusion relatively less profitable. As a result, collusion may be destabilized and the price floor enables a manufacturer to prevent collusive behavior among downstream firms. This finding contrasts with the popular view that resale price maintenance fosters collusion.     

The Parliamentary Enquiry on Fraud in the Dutch Construction Industry Collusion as Concept Between Corruption and State-Corporate Crime

In December 2002 the final report of the Royal Commission concerning Irregularities in the Dutch Construction Industry was published. The broadcasting of the public hearings in the months before was breaking news. It proved the whole sector participated in illegal practices, ranging from fraud, unjustified subsidies and license issuance to real bribery and money or favours to individual politicians or higher-ranking public servants; from undercutting the market, monopolisation and forcing up prices, to selective control by partial inspectorates. In his article the author, an advisor to the Commission, summarises the mayor types of irregularities the report reveals with special interest in the network dimension they had in common. The Commission spoke about collusion as the key problem. Collusion can be described as secret agreement for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose, especially to defeat the course of law. Theoretically this concept can have many faces. In this parliamentary enquiry it was illustrated in three ways: as anti-trust illegalities, as a kind of governmental crime, and as kind of corruption. The report showed a long-lasting structural interrelation between these three types with a special role for the twining between collusion and corruption. Corruption research often mentions collusion as a cause, condition or explanation of corruption. But rarely is that argument illustrated in detail. This article seeks to do so. Especially when corruption is hard to grasp in modern society, a solution could be to take collusion as ‘a network offence’ more seriously. The collusion subsystems revealed hereare relatively stable networks, invulnerable to individualised anti-corruption legislation. The author pleads for stricter rules governing state-corporate interrelationships, more severe control on network abuses, and the introduction of minimum standards for public contracting as proposed by Transparency International.     

试论对价格跟随行为的反垄断法规制

价格跟随行为,也叫价格领导制,一般出现在寡占市场中。反垄断法并不禁止寡占企业基于寡占的相互依赖性而采取的有意识的平行行为;但在信息不完全的情况下,寡占企业的价格跟随行为会导致企业间协调彼此的定价,从而可能构成协同行为。证明价格跟随行为构成协同行为的关键,是证明企业间合意的存在。由于证明合意的直接证据很难取得,应通过允许使用间接证据、适用事实推定制度等方式进行灵活认定。     

Registered cartels in Austria: an overview

Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country’s EU accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (J Political Econ 72:44–61, 1964). Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialization cartels divide markets, and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylized facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustain collusion.     

Tacit collusion and liability rules

This paper demonstrates that the likelihood of tacit collusion in a given oligopolistic industry may depend on the kind of liability rule applied to the industry. We study typical settings for the analysis of product liability and environmental liability. For the latter, it is established that tacit collusion is more likely under strict liability than under negligence. However, the two liability rules are equivalent with regard to their effects on tacit collusion in the model pertaining to product liability. This context-dependent impact on tacit collusion can be traced back to a difference in the shape of firms’ cost functions.     

Network subversion: The contrasting effects of multiple networks on bribery in South Korea

This paper is based on the premise that corrupt uses of public, civic networks ostensibly built and legitimated for their altruistic purposes can be a source of network subversion and corruption. Open, public, civic networks of South Korea seem to be systemic and organizational facilitators of criminality instead of assumptions of criminality being related only to closed, criminal cultures or anomie. We test whether increasing participation in the major social networks of Korean civic life – networks based on geography (common ancestral hometown), family (extended kinship), and education (alumni) – are associated with increasing penchants for self-admitted criminal collusion, in this case, bribery. We argue that due to relational association or within-network favoritism the increase in multiple networks per individual generates increasing social capital of access, information, and trust which may be subverted toward some form of private criminal collusion.     

Competition and R&D cooperation with universities and competitors

This paper analyses the relationship between competitive environment and R&D cooperation with universities and competitors. Our simple model suggests that cooperation creates benefits in terms of synergies but also induces costs due to spillovers. Since the value of these synergies and spillovers depends on the competitive pressure, cooperation propensity depends on the competitive environment. Differentiating between the dimensions of competition, we hypothesize that university cooperation corresponds to quality competition, while horizontal cooperation relates to price competition. Furthermore, we predict that a higher number of competitors reduces the incentives for horizontal cooperation as it diminishes the gains from “collusion”. We test these hypotheses using Swiss firm-level panel data that allows us to control for simultaneity of cooperation decisions and endogeneity of competition. Our empirical analysis supports the relevance of distinguishing between competition dimensions and cooperation partners, respectively. We find that price competition has an influence on university cooperation in the form of an inverted U. Quality competition only has an influence on university cooperation and the relationship shows a U-form. Moreover, we see that the number of principal competitors reduces cooperation between competitors.     

非财产损害赔偿之一般理论

非财产损害赔偿可以用金钱来赔偿,有不同学者对其正当性用事后的功能性补偿、事前威慑以及受害人事前保险的理论来说明,但是上述理论各自有其缺陷,尤其是在实际操作过程中,即赔偿额的算定中,并不能发挥相应的作用,从而难以为实践所采用。相反,价目表通过集体估价确定各种非财产性损害的价格,同时不排斥个案情况,是较为合理且操作性较强的确定损害赔偿额的方式。     

Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels

This paper considers enhancements of a comparatively new method to detect cartels, the System of Cartel Markers (SCM), introduced by Blanckenburg and Geist (Int Adv Econ Res 15(4):421–436, 2009). The aim of SCM is to find illegal collusion on legal markets with observable market data. It uses expected behavior patterns such as low level of capacity utilization, slackness of price adjustments to exogenous shocks, excess rates of return, nearly constant capacities, less price changes and lower variance of capacity growth rate. However, the testing of cost efficiency is lacking so far. Following Leibenstein’s (Am Econ Rev 56:392–415, 1966) X-inefficiency theory, we assume that cartel members face lower competition and hence, tend to be less cost efficient. Therefore, we enhance SCM and use cost efficiency as a further marker in order to detect cartels. We apply SCM to the German cement cartel and find empirical support for some markers. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.     

Dominance in the Tetra Pak Case: An Empirical Approach

The 1991 decision of the European Commission on the Tetra Pak case was based on information which seemed to prove the firm's anti-competitive behavior. The Tetra Pak case is investigated here focusing on the meaning of multimarket dominance, using empirical techniques. We find that a more rigorous analysis of the data available would not confirm the Commission's assertions. That is, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the Commission was right to relate Tetra Pak's dominance in the aseptic sector to its market power in the non-aseptic sector. Our results suggest a general framework for the analysis of abusive transfer of market power across vertically or/and horizontally related markets.     

Further notes on information,corruption, and optimal law enforcement

We consider two important notes on optimal law enforcement with corruption. First, we analyze the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers. Second, our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not necessarily maximal. We achieve this result by coupling the criminal sanction for the underlying offense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on offenders. A higher criminal sanction for the underlying offense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). Thus, the government could reduce this sanction, save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence). We are grateful to Mitch Polinsky and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.     

An ice cream war: Bundling,tying, and foreclosure

Ice cream markets in Europe are characterized by vertical restraints of varying degrees of restrictiveness. Mars, an entrant to the market, sought to establish in a court action and in a complaint to the European Union Commission that the dominant incumbent, Unilever, had acted with the object and effect of foreclosing the market in Ireland by bundling the price of ice cream and freezer services and restricting retailers to stocking Unilever product alone in freezers supplied by them. This article applies a model of bundling, tying, and foreclosure developed by M.D. Whinston to demonstrate that it would not have been rational for Unilever to attempt to foreclose the market by means of these restrictions and therefore that the Commission was not justified in obliging Unilever to accept the changes imposed on it.With apologies to William Boyd.     

Race,ethnicity, and social change: The democratization of middle‐class crime*

Since the mid‐1970s, the percentage of non‐White people convicted of white‐collar type crimes in the federal judicial system has been growing steadily. In 2015, non‐Whites accounted for more than half of all convictions for certain white‐collar type crimes, but the increase in non‐White participation has not occurred evenly across all race and ethnic groups. Asians and Latinos have increased their participation in white‐collar crime more so than Blacks. Using data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the U.S. Census, we investigate whether the differential increase among race and ethnic groups in white‐collar type crimes can be explained by their differential increase in middle‐class occupations. The findings have implications for opportunity, cultural, and race‐centered perspectives on crime, as well as institutional anomie theory, and they suggest that low‐level white‐collar crimes are being democratized along lines of race and ethnicity.     

Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football

We discuss the effects of three different transfer fee systems in European football on contract lengths, wages, profits, education incentives and the number of talents being educated. The different regimes, being used until the Bosman judgement of 1995, currently in use, and recently proposed by the European Commission differ with respect to the transfer fee an initial club must accept in case of a transfer depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. In particular, we argue that due to its averse effects on investment incentives, the Commission should refrain from its Suggestion of abolishing freely negotiable transfer fees. Our analysis also sheds some light on the issue under which circumstances binding long-term contracts should be allowed in general labor law.     

Transfer pricing manipulation—an answer from Papua New Guinea

This article reproduces much of a recent report on transfer price manipulation prepared by the Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, (Transfer Pricing Manipulation Report No 12, November 1981). It is considered appropriate to publish this material here, given the clarity of the report and the importance of this abuse on the economies of countries, particularly in the developing world.     

Maladaptation of regulation to hybrid organizational forms

This paper argues that standard regulatory policies might be inadequate and may even introduce perverse effects when applied to hybrid organizational forms. Using the case of the “certifying system” adopted for several French agricultural products as a benchmark for the discussion, with particular insights provided by the label chicken case, the paper emphasizes the tight coordination process required by the characteristics of the transactions at stake as well as by the necessity to send adequate signals to consumers. However, unadapted regulations tend to misinterpret the resulting contractual arrangement as collusion. This interpretation is challenged here: The form adopted achieves a high degree of efficiency and reduces transaction costs without reducing competition. We conclude that a new approach to regulations may be required, combining two criteria: contestability and remediability.     

Insurance Law Reform by Degrees: Late Payment and Insurable Interest

Over the last 11 years, the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission have worked on a joint project to modernise the law of insurance contracts. Due to the size of the project, the Law Commissions proceeded in phases and separated out specific issues for legislative reform. Their proposals have already resulted in the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 and the Insurance Act 2015 which brought about significant changes for consumer and non‐consumer insureds and insurers alike. This paper examines two further areas of reform: the introduction of an implied term about payment of insurance claims by insurers within a reasonable time and a statutory restatement of the doctrine of insurable interest. It considers the old and new substantive law and provides an insight into the reform process.     

金融凭证诈骗罪疑难问题探析

金融凭证指银行及银行类金融机构依法办理银行业务所使用的结算凭证;伪造、变造的金融凭证除形式要件虚假之外还包括有权制作人或无权制作人违法制作不实内容、形式要件真实的金融凭证。"使用"只指直接兑现金融凭证记载的财产权利,不包括用其质押、展示等间接使用。使用作废金融凭证或只是冒用他人真实有效的金融凭证诈骗不构成金融凭证诈骗罪。采盗窃、抢劫、抢夺等手段获真实有效金融凭证冒用取财以其手段行为定侵犯财产罪。内外勾结利用职务之便使用伪造、变造的金融凭证取财应以主犯人身份构成的罪名定性。