历史与逻辑：司法审查的制度化机理

司法审查的理念和制度要素发轫于立法机关制定的法律要服从更高的法律以及权力要受到法律制约的历史性观念。这种制约观念经过漫长的历史演化成为一种意识形态并获得了法治理念的形式，其后与一定的社会政治条件相互作用，并通过制度要素的整合构成人类法治文明的制度基石。司法审查的制度化要素主要有：理性的司法主体是司法审查制度的主体要素；审查程序的司法化是司法审查的程序制度要素；各种形式的高级法是司法审查及其权能的依据；通过司法解释审查行政行为和立法行为的合宪性，是司法审查的内容要素；司法审查的国际化和全球化导致它的价值理念和制度安排突破民族国家的界限，成为人类法治文明生长的共同趋势和必然选择。我国建构司法审查制度要结合司法审查的司法性和政治性特质，形成宪法法院和普通法院相结合的审查制度框架。     

政治问题理论的衰落与重构

政治问题作为可推翻的"自然推定",属于可诉性理论的阻却事由要件。其理论发轫于联邦党人对宪法"特定条款"的阐述。为了应对将政治问题理论区分为经典形式与审慎形式所带来的司法操作性难题,布伦南大法官通过描述政治问题的六个特征,构建了政治问题的确认标准。然而,法院在适用政治问题确认标准的过程中所形成的政治问题理论的循环悖论,以及学界对政治问题理论存在合理性的质疑使得其经典形式出现变异、审慎形式日渐消亡。在激励相容理论基础上重构政治问题理论,可以尝试化解学界对政治问题免于司法审查理论基础的种种非议。     

Subsidiarity and 'Arguability': the European Court of Human Rights' Case Law on Judicial Review in Asylum Cases

The European Court of Human Rights’ case law on judicialreview in asylum cases is not entirely consistent. However,it can be interpreted as consistent if two presumptions areaccepted. First, that, as the Court's role should be subsidiaryto that of domestic courts, domestic judicial review shouldat least be of the same quality and substance as the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights’ review. Secondly, that the Courtdistinguishes between arguable and non-arguable cases not justin the context of Article 13 ECHR and of the admissibility ofapplications, but that this distinction is central to its entirecase law about the asylum procedure. This analysis results ina coherent doctrine on deadlines for submitting evidence, theburden of proof, the intensity of judicial review, and suspensiveeffect. If the Court understands its case law in this way, itcan prevent it from becoming, in some respects, a court of firstinstance.     

Judicial Conversations With Children in Parenting Disputes: The Views Of Australian Judges

In an article in the last issue of this Journal, we reportedon a study of parents' and children's views about whether theywould like judges to talk with children in chambers. This articlereports on a related study of the views of Australian judgesconcerning the issue. It explores the reasons that judges gavefor being opposed to or cautiously in favour of having conversationswith children before and after making their decisions. On thebasis of these views, and the views of the parents and childrendiscussed in the earlier article, we propose guidelines on whenand how judges should engage in ‘conversations’with children in chambers if they consider it appropriate todo so.     

Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Work/Family Policy in France: From State Familialism to State Feminism?

When one looks at the policies that target the relationshipbetween work and family (here labelled ‘work/family policies’),contradictory views come from France. On the one hand, the staterecognition of family interests is very strong, and was initiallyrooted in familialism, an ideology that promotes the familyas an institution, and has often played against women’srights. On the other hand, women’s – and especiallymothers’ – labour force participation has alwaysbeen relatively high compared to other western countries. Toaccount for this ‘French paradox’, this paper putswork/family policies into historical perspective, in order toanalyse them as a mix of policies coming from various publicpolicy institutions (work, education, family). While state familialismhas always been strong in France, it has been challenged andshattered by several social and political trends since the 1960s.Among these is the development of ‘state feminism’,with the creation of governmental bodies endowed with the formalmission of furthering women’s rights. Based on an empiricalstudy of these institutions, this paper shows how they reframedwork/family policy in terms of a policy of equality in employment.     

论法官现代化:专业化、职业化和同质化——兼谈中国法官队伍的现代化问题

法官队伍的现代化是实现法治的基本条件之一。现代法治国家的法官队伍以专业化、职业化和同质化为基本特征。我国法官队伍因受观念和体制的制约而与法治发展的要求相去甚远。未来我们应积极汲取国外有益经验 ,从贯彻司法独立入手 ,改革现有的法官培养管理体制 ,以便加速法官队伍的现代化 ,推动中国的法治进程     

反对司法审查的核心理由

本文清楚地阐述了反对立法的司法审查的核心理由,适些理由是在特殊宪法体系下,封特殊决策和司法审查出现的历史的简洁讨论中得出的。本文批判司法审查基于两个基础：第一,文章主张没有理由认为由司法审查保护权利能比由民主的立法机关做得更好。第二,本文认为,除了产生的结果外,司法审查是民主但不正当的。然而,反对司法审查的理由也不是绝对或者无条件的。在本文中,这些理由以若干条件为前提,包括假定社会有着运作良好的民主机构,社会申的大部分公民认真对待权利（即使他们可能并不赞同他们拥有的权利）。文章末尾则讨论这些前提条件丧失时会出现的情形。     

司法审查与维护宪法权威

在解决立法冲突和认定法律、法规的有效或无效方面,我国采用的是上级立法机关审查和行政审查,而不是司法审查。这种审查机制的问题在于以下两个方面:第一,由制定法律的机关进行审查,下级立法是否无效上级立法机关说了算,缺乏监督;第二,审查的标准通常是自己制定的法律或立法机关自己确立的标准,不能维护宪法的权威。我国应确立以宪法为最高标准的法律审查制度,并且,不能由制定法律的机关进行审查;否则,无法保证审查的客观性和公正性。     

Waldron, Waluchow and the Merits of Constitutionalism

In this article, I critically evaluate the positions of ProfessorsJeremy Waldron and W.J. Waluchow on the right-based merits ofentrenched constitutions and strong judicial review. I supportWaluchow in arguing that (i) prohibitions on the constitutionalentrenchment of rights and resultant prohibitions of strongjudicial review may be only superficially fair or democratic,since fair procedure alone can neither eliminate pre-existinginequalities nor ultimately take the autonomy vital to self-governanceseriously (whether individual or collective). Secondly, (ii)if deep dissensus fails to exist on all substantive mattersof rights, the constitutional entrenchment of rights combinedwith strong judicial review can indeed be achieved fairly. Ithen propose that (iii) the anti-constitutionalist concern aboutbeing governed by the ‘dead hand of the past’ isself-refuting, for the alternative is simply another constrainton autonomy. While this is largely consistent with Waluchow'sposition vis-à-vis Waldron's majoritarianism, I end byexpressing serious concerns regarding whether the common law(and the ‘constitutional morality’ that Waluchowclaims can be derived from it) can act as a sufficiently robustbasis for the protection of liberal and egalitarian rights.     

Constitutional judicial review and political insurance

Considering constitutional judicial review of policy, the power of courts to annul legislation, as a political insurance mechanism to protect against losses from adverse election outcomes, the paper analyzes three questions: First, under what circumstances a political ruler, who wins an election and the right to propose measures of policy, subjects those measures to the checking powers of an independent judiciary. Second, the net expected gains of a political ruler from granting binary choice to the reviewing judiciary rather than open choice. Third, the equilibrium degree of policy review power granted to the judiciary. Differences in the policy preferences of competing politicians, the judiciary and the status quo, the probability of winning an election and the probability that the judiciary confirms legislation passed by the incumbent emerge as the main determinants of judicial review and its political independence.     

Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case

Under what circumstances do courts act in ways that challenge the political hegemony of the military in countries with weak democratic institutions? This article addresses this question by focusing on a critical case of judicial activism in Turkey. It argues that lower courts unexpectedly can be centers of judicial activism that contributes to expansion of civil liberties and restrictions on arbitrary state power when the high judiciary supports the political status quo. This is because lower courts provide greater access to legal mobilization pursued by civil society actors. At the same time, judicial activism in lower courts is sustainable only when political power is distributed among elites with conflicting interests, and the civilian government offers support and protection to activist members of the judiciary.     

Judicial Review Without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review

This article addresses an issue overlooked in most of the literatureon judicial review: the legitimacy of judicial review of a constitution'sfederal and structural provisions. Debates about the legitimacyof judicial review—at least as conducted throughout theCommonwealth—are usually focussed on rights. These debatesappear to assume that the power of courts like the AustralianHigh Court and the Canadian Supreme Court to interpret and enforcefederal and structural provisions is unproblematic. This articletests that assumption and concludes that those who hold democracy-basedobjections to constitutional rights should seriously reconsider,and perhaps oppose, federal and structural judicial review aswell.     

Political Constitutionalism and the Question of Constitution‐Making

The debate on political constitutionalism has entirely neglected the constitution‐making dimension. This is probably due to the fact that constitution‐making usually brings with it undesirable outcomes such as the entrenchment of rights or structures. These outcomes do not respect reasonable disagreement among citizens because they violate the only fair system for settling disagreement: majority rule and equal voting rights. This article argues that political constitutionalists may regret the absence of any claim about constitution‐making. Either they are overlooking certain problems inherent to the electoral process that is supposed to tackle disagreement or, even worse, they are downplaying the entrenching effect of ordinary political processes by ignoring the redemptive properties of constituent power. In both cases, their claims undermine the political dimension of constitutionalism.     

审判中心视角下的行政诉讼制度构造

"以审判为中心"的政法政策同样适用于行政诉讼制度改革,它要求法院发挥自身司法能力和司法制度能力,有效地介入涉法行政争议之中,并藉此保护法益。在行政诉讼中,司法权与行政权之间是法律监督上的国家权力结构关系。法院优位于行政机关,法院作为独立裁判者指挥诉讼管理关系和裁判过程。以审判为中心的行政诉讼制度构造,应最大限度地发挥法院司法能力在解决行政争议上的优位角色,应完整地发挥行政诉讼法的制度能力,即发挥立法、司法解释、司法组织及指导性案例的制度功能。行政诉讼司法准入、行政机关负责人出庭应诉、诉讼管辖、庭审制度等,是否体现了"以审判为中心"的制度改革方向,主要看其是否有利于行政争议的实质解决和法益有效保护。"多元化纠纷解决机制"政策和行政行为合法性审查为中心的行政诉讼制度,影响了法院的诉讼角色和功能。回归司法权和诉讼制度本质,宜在行政争议、行政行为和法益之间构造出一致性的诉讼结构关系;宜从组织和体制改革转向程序改革,发挥行政程序和司法程序在塑造司法公正和司法效率上的作用。     

The Problem with Entrapment

In R v Looseley; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of2000) the House of Lords articulated a legal framework to govern‘entrapment’ in criminal cases. Their Lordshipsregarded the need for judicial intervention to assist entrappeddefendants as uncontroversial. This article argues that thedoctrine they set out, in fact, necessitates substantial, andlargely unarticulated, departures from principles the courtsordinarily stress as fundamental to the criminal law. In particular,entrapment doctrine determines liability for criminal acts byreference to the kind of environment inhabited by their perpetrators,a perspective the law ordinarily attempts to exclude. This articlesuggests that the anomalous treatment of entrapment can be understoodas a device to prevent the police from relocating the temptationto commit crime to environments in which they are not ordinarilyconfronted and to ensure that those from backgrounds in whichserious criminality is not usually a plausible option will escapepunishment if tempted to commit crime by the police.     

Judicial Review of Politics: The Israeli Case

In the tradition of studies questioning the impact of celebrated court rulings, this article discusses the effectiveness of the judicial review of politics conducted by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Israeli Supreme Court is generally viewed as a highly influential, almost omnipotent body. During the last two decades, the Court has intervened repeatedly in the so–called political domain, thereby progressively eroding the scope of realms considered non–justiciable. It has ventured to enter domains of 'pure' political power to review the legality of political agreements, political appointments (appointments of political allies to public positions), and political allocations (government funding to organizations affiliated with its political supporters). The prevalent perception is that these developments had a significant impact on Israeli political life. The present article challenges this view and argues that, on closer scrutiny, the influence of the Court on many of the issues reviewed here is negligible. First, many of the doctrines developed by the Court in order to review political measures proved ineffective. Usually, when the Supreme Court (acting as a High Court of Justice) engages in judicial review, it lacks the evidence needed in order to decide that administrative decisions on public appointments or public funding should be abolished because they were based on political or self–serving considerations. Second, the norms mandated by the Court hardly influence politicians' decisions in everyday life, and are applied only in contested cases. The reasons for this situation are not only legal but also socio–political. Large sections of current Israeli society support interest–group politics and do not accept the values that inspire the Court.     

Time to play Catch-Up

‘Catch Us If You Can!!!’ is the improbable nameof an Italian weblog managed by Lorenzo Litta and mastermindedby veteran IP expert Stefano Sandri. Although it is rarely possibleto measure what a blog achieves, it is usually quite feasibleto identify what it tries to do. In this instance the bloggers’objective is to raise their readers’ sensitivity towardsintellectual property rights issues and to create a greaterawareness of the parameters of protection and permitted usein a culture which places a