Precommitment stategies [sic] for disposition of frozen embryos

The question of whether to enforce agreements to implant frozen embryos after divorce has become a major concern for the 300 clinics and thousands of couples who use infertility services every year. Although courts in New York and Tennessee support enforcement, recent decisions by appellate courts in Massachusetts and New Jersey have refused to enforce such agreements on the ground that courts should not force people to reproduce. This article analyzes conflicts over enforcement of agreements for disposition of frozen embryos in terms of the precommitment strategies that persons use to plan their lives. It shows that refusal to enforce contracts for frozen embryos is unfair to the parties who relied on them in undertaking invasive infertility treatments, and possibly unconstitutional. It also addresses the extent to which precommitments for rearing rights and duties in resulting children should be enforced, if agreements to implant embryos are recognized.     

“I WANT MY MOMMIES”: THE CRY FOR MINI‐DOMAS TO RECOGNIZE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN OF SAME‐SEX COUPLES*

In child custody cases, courts will look to the best interests of a child to maintain visitation/custody rights only with the child's biological parent, not third parties. However, with a same‐sex couple, it is inevitable that one parent will not be the biological parent. Thus, when that parent is in a mini‐DOMA state, where same‐sex couples from non‐mini‐DOMA states do not have to be recognized, that parent will be viewed as a third party and lose all visitation/custody rights if the couple separates. This note advocates that mini‐DOMAs allow both the biological and nonbiological parents of a same‐sex couple to have visitation/custody rights of their children if it would be in the best interest of the children to do so.     

Confidentiality and Privilege for Family and Child Protection Mediation: A Roadmap for Navigating the Innovation,Inconsistency and Confusion

This article will identify the inconsistency and confusion in mediation regarding the definition of mediation, the role of the mediator, and the difference between mediation confidentiality and privilege. Further, it will discuss the confusion and inconsistency in the protection of mediation communication, specifically regarding the definition of mediation communication, the time frame for protected communication, waiver of the protections and exceptions to protected mediation communication. It will provide a roadmap and fact pattern for determining whether mediation communications are protected and if so, the protection they are afforded. Lastly, it will offer recommendations so parties, professionals and the courts may better understand and reap the benefits of mediation.     

Conundrums with penumbras: the right to privacy encompasses non-gamete providers who create preembryos with the intent to become parents

To date, five state high courts have resolved disputes over frozen preembryos. These disputes arose during divorce proceedings between couples who had previously used assisted reproduction and cryopreserved excess preembryos. In each case, one spouse wished to have the preembryos destroyed, while the other wanted to be able to use or donate them in the future. The parties in these cases invoked the constitutional right to privacy to argue for dispositional control over the preembryos; two of the five cases were resolved by relying on this right. The constitutional right to privacy protects intimate decisions involving procreation, marriage, and family life. However, when couples use donated sperm or ova to create preembryos, a unique circumstance arises: one spouse--the gamete provider--is genetically related to the preembryos and the other is not. If courts resolve frozen preembryo disputes that involve non-gamete providers based on the constitutional right to privacy, they should find that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the interests of both gamete and non-gamete providers. Individuals who create preembryos with the intent to become a parent have made an intimate decision involving procreation, marriage, and family life that falls squarely within the the right to privacy. In such cases, the couple together made the decision to create a family through the use of assisted reproduction, and the preembryos would not exist but for that joint decision. Therefore, gamete and non-gamete providers should be afforded equal constitutional protection in disputes over frozen preembryos.     

释明的理论逻辑

释明有时会使案件结果发生逆转,所以必须有逻辑可循。释明不得背离保护权利、维护实质正义的释明主旨和其他正当目的,不能超出当事人主张的事实和已呈现的事实。此为释明的目的边界和事实边界。时效制度与释明制度之主旨相悖,所以不能就时效释明。在事实边界内,法官应进行一切合目的的释明,包括对当事人未主张的权利和重要事实的释明,原告的请求额不足时也应释明。法官就事实无法形成心证时应告知当事人追加证据。遵循逻辑的释明不会使法官丧失中立性。辩论主义并非绝对不可突破,也不能以尊重处分权为名漠视权利之丧失。     

南非法院对涉外离婚案件管辖权的确定

在1979年的《离婚法》实施前,南非法院主要根据普通法规则来确定对涉外离婚案件的管辖权,即由当事人的住所地法院对离婚诉讼行使管辖。在《离婚法》实施后,根据该法,南非法院可以根据任一方当事人的住所地或通常居所地为由来对涉外离婚诉讼行使管辖。     

论英美法系国家判例法的查明和适用

我国学者和法官对是否应该适用英美法系国家的判例法有不同认识,也没有探讨判例法的具体查明途径及适用方法。本文认为:不管判例法是不是我国国际私法的法律渊源,当我国的冲突规范指定适用外国的判例法时,我国法院应该适用外国的判例法;在此情况下,查明外国的判例法是法官和当事人的共同义务;法院应该采取多种方法,包括我国司法解释规定的五种途径以外的其他方法查明外国的判例法。适用外国的判例法一般就是采用类比方法或者区分辨别方法适用判例中确定的法律规则(Ratio);而且,如果当事人对英美法系国家判例法规则达成了一致,我国法院可以直接适用该判例法规则,不需要通过其他查明途径。     

无独立请求权第三人的诉讼地位

无独立请求权第三人是诉讼当事人。我国民事诉讼法关于无独立请求权第三人的立法规定存在着内在冲突,在理论和实务上产生了诸多令人困惑的问题,立法应明确无独立请求权第三人的诉讼当事人地位。当事人申请参加是无独立请求权第三人参加诉讼的适当方式,法院依职权追加和通知无独立请求权第三人参加诉讼,是超越司法被动性原则的体现,立法上应取消这一规定。     

Cohabitation,Registration, and Reliance: Creating A Comprehensive and Just Scheme for Protecting the Interests of Couples' Real Relationships

This paper argues that courts and legislatures should recognize and protect adult relationships other than marriage, in two ways. First, couples in committed, cohabitating relationships should be protected when their relationship dissolves—even if they are not formally married. The law in this area is currently inconsistent and confusing, and should be cleaned up to reflect the reality of the lives of committed couples in need of legal protection. Second, all states should establish a registration scheme along the lines of Colorado's designated beneficiary law, which allows couples to flexibly design their legal relationship. This status should include specific arrangements about the ownership of property over the course of a long relationship, and should also be expanded to allow people to enter into more than one such relationship at a time, as long as the rights and obligations are not inconsistent. Given the number of couples operating outside of traditional marriage today, these two reforms will increase certainty of legal outcome and better protect the reliance interests of those in committed relationships.     

Party autonomy in the choice of law under Indian and Australian private international law: some reciprocal lessons

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic will affect the performance of several contracts and is likely to increase the number of disputes before the courts. In agreements with a foreign element, the adjudication of the rights and liabilities will depend on the applicable law. Most legal systems have embraced the doctrine of party autonomy and, accordingly, permit the parties to expressly select the law to govern the disputes that arise from international contracts. India and Australia are no exception to this trend. In general, the courts in both the commonwealth countries have reported having been influenced by judicial practices of one another to develop their own law. Despite their common law roots, the interpretations attached to the doctrine of party autonomy in the choice of law have varied in some respects in these countries. The paper analyses the judicial trends on the subject and demonstrates the role that party autonomy will play in resolving international disputes where the performance has been affected by the eventualities such as the COVID-19 pandemic in India and Australia. The paper delves into the manner in which the courts in India and Australia may offer reciprocal lessons to each another to revolutionise to interpret the doctrine of party autonomy in the choice of law.     

Litigation by patients as third party beneficiaries of payor-provider contracts

"No third party beneficiaries" clauses, if drafted with care, can offer some measure of protection to providers. Although courts may give minimal weight to "boilerplate" clauses in determining contractual intent, a more detailed and substantive clause may be more persuasive. In drafting such clauses, however, care should be taken to clearly state the specific intentions of the parties, including the scope and purposes of the contract, the identity of the intended beneficiaries, and the classes of persons that are to be excluded as beneficiaries (e.g., HMO enrollees).     

To Disclose or not to Disclose? That is the Question in Collaborative Law

Collaborative Law (CL) is a dispute resolution process increasingly used in family law and divorce designed to encourage problem solving negotiations by parties represented by counsel. Many states have adapted legislation to authorize and facilitate CL and thousands of lawyers have been trained in the CL process. CL lawyers and participants sign a Participation Agreement in which they agree that the lawyers will be disqualified if the CL process terminates without settlement. They also promise full and voluntary disclosure of information. The extent of the obligation of disclosure is, however, unclear. Through analysis of an extended hypothetical divorce settlement negotiation, this article advocates that CL lawyers and clients should assume an obligation to disclose material facts without a request from the other side. Traditional legal ethics, based on an adversarial framework, requires only disclosure of information when requested by another party. In addition, in traditional legal ethics, a lawyer cannot disclose information obtained in the course of the lawyer‐client relationship without the client's consent even if material to the negotiation. Some authority regulating CL, however, suggests that CL participants and counsel should disclose material information without a specific request even if a client does not want the information disclosed. In that situation, the CL lawyer should encourage the client to disclose the information but if the client refuses to do so, withdraw from the representation. This Article reviews the arguments for and against an obligation of affirmative disclosure in CL. It suggests that affirmative disclosure obligations should be the subject of discussion between CL participants and lawyers and that CL Participation Agreements should be drafted to establish a clear obligation. Finally, this article identifies key areas for further discussion and research on CL disclosure obligations.     

Medical Malpractice Appeals in a Civil Law System: Do Administrative and Civil Courts Award Noneconomic Damages Differently?

How do courts award noneconomic damages? Does it matter if the state is the defendant? This article addresses these questions in the context of medical malpractice appeals to the Spanish Supreme Court. Moreover, this study provides the first empirical analysis of the quantification of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases in administrative courts, where the state is the defendant, and in civil courts. This separation of jurisdictions is a common feature in civil law tradition countries. Yet, critics of this separation in general, and specialized courts in particular, argue that parties might be subject to different treatments and that similar cases might reach different outcomes, namely in terms of the quantification of damages. A consistent result of this paper is that no significant differences between noneconomic damages in civil and administrative appeals were found. The separation of jurisdictions does not necessarily imply that courts reach different outcomes, even when the state is the defendant. Citizens should not refrain from bringing their claims forward against the state, a more powerful party. In the current era of increasing juridification and judicialization of modern life (Ginsburg 2009; Hirschl 2006; Hirschl 2011), it is crucial for society that citizens and other parties litigating with the state are not disadvantageously treated.     

Applications of economic analysis to marital law: concerning a proposal to reform the discretionary approach to the division of marital assets in England and Wales

In this paper, I apply the economic analysis of law to examine recent proposals in England and Wales for the reform of the law affecting financial settlement after divorce. The starting point is an examination of the wide discretion currently afforded to the courts and the impact this has on incentives for divorcing parties and their legal representatives. Two specific reforming measures have been proposed to reduce this judicial discretion. First, a mathematical formula, such as a rebuttable presumption to divide equally the whole pool of assets upon divorce—a form of community property—could be used. It would be applied in the absence of agreement between the parties dividing assets, as in many countries in continental Europe. Second, legal enforceability could be accorded to prenuptial agreements, again after a continental pattern. Broadly, I conclude that changing to community property and enforceable agreements should be welfare improving but would need to be forward looking and applied to marriages, rather than divorces.     

QUESTIONS ABOUT FAMILY COURT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT

Increasingly, family courts are seeking ways to focus limited resources on cases that require the most intervention, tailor court responses and dispute methods to each case, and account for the real differences among domestic violence cases. One of the means to that end may be the triaging or screening of cases. This article raises a number of questions about screening and urges that they be addressed by courts and communities that are considering whether and how to design a screening protocol. Issues include: How should we define domestic violence for the purposes of screening? Who should carry out the screening? How can we maximize the likelihood that we will fully assess the context of the violence in each case? How should we assess the risks or dangers inherent in the parties’ situation? How should a screening effort account for changing circumstances as a case proceeds through the courts? How can information gathered in a screening effort improperly impact subsequent decisions of the court?     

民事判决中的证据失权:案例与分析

以证据失权为核心的举证时限是《证据规定》设立的一项新制度,也是其实施过程中遇到最大阻力的一项制度。我国法院的审判实务表明,在《证据规定》颁布之初,一些法院对逾期举证采取严格的失权措施,但随着时间的推移,法院对证据失权采取了越来越慎重的态度。当逾期举证的当事人并无故意或重大过失时;或会造成一方当事人实体权益的重大损失时;或会使裁判结果与实体公正严重冲突时,即使按照《证据规定》应当失权,法院也会做出不失权的选择。     

Electoral Rules and Legislative Parties in the Ukrainian Rada

Critics of Ukraine's single‐member district majoritarian and mixed‐member majoritarian electoral systems argue that they undermined the efficiency of the Supreme Rada by permitting nonpartisan single‐member district deputies to enter the legislature in large numbers. Such deputies changed parties and ignored party positions. This article argues that the effect of the differences in how legislators are elected is dependent upon whether legislators are partisans. The statistical analysis of party switching and party cohesion in the Rada from 1998 to 2002 shows that nonpartisan single‐member district deputies were the most likely to switch parties and the least cohesive.     

A note on burdens of proof in civil litigation

It has been widely believed that who bears the burden of proof significantly affects the incentives of the legal parties. In particular, Hay and Spier (J Legal Stud 26:413–431, 1997) argues that if legal parties have a commonly accessible body of evidence (perfectly correlated pieces of evidence), the party who bears the burden of proof will present the evidence if and only if the evidence supports his position, while the other party (without the burden) will refrain from presenting it regardless of whether the evidence supports his position. In this paper, I claim that the result will be dramatically changed if the pieces of evidence that each party possesses are not perfectly correlated. I show that each party will present the evidence that supports his position whenever available, regardless of the burden of proof assignment. This implies that allocating the burden of proof does not matter in terms of information elicitation.     

Splitting the Difference: Modeling Appellate Court Decisions with Mixed Outcomes

In rendering a decision in a particular case, judges are not limited to finding simply for the appellant or for the respondent. Rather, in many cases, they have the option to find for the former on one or more issues and for the latter on one or more other issues. By thus “splitting the difference,” judges can render a judgment that favors both litigants to some degree. What accounts for such mixed outcomes? Several theoretical perspectives provide potential explanations for this phenomenon. First, Galanter (1974) suggests that litigants with greater resources will achieve more favorable outcomes in the courts. Where two high‐resource, repeat‐player litigants meet in the appeals courts, these more sophisticated and successful parties may be able to persuade the court to render decisions with mixed outcomes that at least partially favor each party. Second, split outcomes may result from strategic interactions among the appeals court judges on the decisionmaking panel. Where majority opinion writers seek to accommodate other judges on the panel, split outcomes have the potential to serve as an inducement for more ideologically extreme judges to join the majority opinion. Finally, Shapiro and Stone Sweet ( Stone Sweet 2000; Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002 ) propose that courts will sometimes split the difference in order to enhance their legitimacy (and ultimately enhance compliance by losing parties). For example, in highly salient cases, where noncompliance would more clearly threaten court legitimacy, judges may be more likely to split the difference in order to mollify even the losing party. We develop an empirical model of mixed outcomes to test these propositions using data available from the U. S. Courts of Appeals Database and find evidence supportive of all three theoretical perspectives.     

第三人利益合同的变更和解除

建立第三人利益合同制度是完善我国合同法的迫切需要.其中一个重要的问题就是当事人是否可以像在两人合同中一样协议变更或解除第三人利益合同.在没有第三人同意的情况下,当事人行使变更权和解除权虽不应当完全否认,但是必须受到限制.具体标准取决于建立第三人利益合同制度的宗旨和该合同的特征.作为一般法规范的第三人利益合同的变更和解除制度将与我国现行合同法律法规共存,形成完整的体系.并在实践中按照特别法优于一般法的原则予以适用.