公众意见在裁判结构中的地位

从裁判依据的类型分析,公众意见只能作为一种事实依据,参与个案裁判。在常规案件中,公众意见作为一种准用的辅助性依据,可以通过弱的裁量成为合理化判决结论的说明性事实。在遇有法律漏洞的疑难案件中,与社会性主张相一致的公众意见,如果耦合法律体系中的法律原则或基本权利规范,可以籍由强的裁量充当个案推理的运作性依据,成为非常情形中正当化个案规则创制的立法性事实。在日趋多元化和复杂化的转型中国,法律系统必须在稳定性和灵活性、普遍正义和个案正义之间寻求一种平衡;判断公众意见的个案裁判地位,同样需在辅助性依据或运作性依据、说明性事实或立法性事实之间寻求一种平衡。     

康德法哲学的权利伦理视域与法治理想

康德围绕解决“一个普遍法治的公民社会如何可能”这一法哲学问题,通过权利的普遍原则论证了权利的道德哲学基础、权利对于道德的优先性以及一个公民社会的私人权利原则是如何可能的;通过法治的理想社会原则论证了人的两重性、法治国原则以及一个永久和平的伦理的世界共同体是如何可能的。康德法哲学的古典自由主义传统、自然法思想、宪政理念和法治理想对后世产生了深远的影响。     

Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

“需要国家干预说”的法哲学分析

“需要国家干预说”是 20世纪中国经济法学最重要的学说之一。有限理性假设、国家适度干预、经济民主、社会公平、经济法治是其基本的法哲学叙事立场。国家是干预需要的满足者,“需要”是通过干预重建经济自由秩序的法律理由。国家超越市场利益关系对经济进行干预调节,国家干预由此构成经济法的基本哲学范畴与法理标志。经济宪政哲学是国家干预经济的法哲学进路,通过经济民主机制设定的干预才能避免经济专制,国家与社会成员共同分享经济权力才能保障干预的社会性与民主性,干预的达成并非一定为了公共,公共中的个体主义是结成公共的价值指引。     

经济法之政府干预的宪政解读

宪政之于经济法的法治要求,意味着国家干预经济的一切活动都应当有相应的法律依据,国家干预经济的行为应该受到制约。经济宪政是以保障基本权利为基础、以社会本位为核心价值的宪政理念。为了实现政府干预的宪政目标,应限制行政权力,要求政府干预遵循法治化的进程,以确保宪政经济权利并接受违宪审查。     

How Reflective and Critical Norm-Usage Paves the Way to the Public Power of Judgement

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Neil MacCormick’s conception of norm-usage makes it necessary to address the concept of the public power of judgement as the key concept for understanding the democratic legitimization of current law. Therefore, firstly I analyse MacCormick’s conception of norm-usage, secondly I demonstrate that it leads to the idea of the institutionalisation of judgemental–interpretative practice, and thirdly, I show that the latter paves the way to the public power of judgement. Finally, I argue that this power needs to be elaborated in terms of competencies which are broader than legal skills and legal reasoning, and, further, that these competencies condition the use of both legal skills and reasoning. Importantly, MacCormick’s contribution to understanding the public power of judgement—when further developed—may indicate the profound role of comprehending the proper significance of law in a democratic polity and its relationship to the citizenry.

     

The Ethics of Legalism

Abstract. "Legalism" is defined as requiring that all matters of legal regulation and controversy ought so far as possible to be conducted in accordance with predetermined rules of considerable generality and clarity. Thus there may be moral limits on governments which ban them from acting on the substantive moral merits of situations with which they have to deal. This is most important in public law, but also applies in private law, e.g., in cases involving property. Hume, Kant, and Hayek are examined in respect of their case for legalism; Alexy and Finnis also reviewed. Autonomy is the foundation for legalism, and justifies "ethical positivism," in T. Campbell's phrase. Critical legal studies (Unger, Kelman, Kennedy et al.) however challenge legalism's premises. But the "critical" arguments against reification merely raise, they do not settle, the issue about the politics of legalism and the desirability of legal dogmatics. With all faults, legalism is a prerequisite of free government.     

Health professional-patient confidentiality: does the law really matter?

Confidentiality is often tested in the health professional-patient relationship, particularly given that both the law and ethics permit disclosure of confidential information in the public interest. This column outlines the results of an Australian Research Council project indicating that mental health professionals may place more weight on their ethical responsibilities relating to confidentiality than what the law requires. The outcomes of the project, which used both questionnaires and focus group discussions, suggests that there is some confusion as to legal requirements in this area and that many mental health professionals rely on ethical frameworks to justify disclosure even where there is no legal requirement to do so. It is suggested that ethics training for health professionals should be of primary importance to ensure responsible decision-making in this area.     

Justificatory Liberalism and Same‐Sex Marriage

Supporters of Justificatory Liberalism (JL)—such as John Rawls and Gerard Gaus—typically maintain that the state may not coerce its citizens on matters of constitutional essentials unless it can provide public justification that the coerced citizens would be irrational in rejecting. The state, in other words, may not coerce citizens whose rejection of the coercion is based on their reasonable comprehensive doctrines (i.e., worldviews). Proponents of the legal recognition of same‐sex marriage (SSM) usually offer some version of JL as the most fundmental reason why laws that recognize marriage only if it is a union between one man and one woman are unjust. In this article I argue that the application of JL in support of legal recognition of SSM does not succeed because the issue under scrutiny—the nature of marriage—is deeply embedded in, and in most cases integral to, many (if not most) citizens’ reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Thus, I argue that because of the effects and consequences of the legal recognition of SSM, it results (or will result) in a violation of JL against dissenting citizens.     

论民事检察监督的范围

在检察机关的各项职权中,行使最"杂"的莫过于民事检察权了。民事检察的范围,从现行法律的规定看仅是"生效的判决和部分裁定";从检察机关的宪法地位考察包括任何公权力机关对民事法律的适用范围;从法理上评析:检察监督职能的发挥必须规范在与其他国家机关的关系上,行使代表公共利益的国家公权力机关不正确实施国家民事法律,构成了民事检察监督的事实原因。民事检察权力运用是否正确依存于民事审判权力。民事检察监督的范围:在对象上,是代表公共利益的机关(包括事业单位和企业);在内容上,应当围绕民事法律在公权力机关的实施;在阶段上,包括诉前、诉中和诉后的任何阶段。     

实然与应然——法律伦理之可能

法律伦理及法律伦理学是否可能取决于从法律伦理行为事实能否推导出法律伦理行为应该。然而,单纯从行为事实是推不出行为应该的,只有通过法律目的判断以及法律伦理行为事实和法律目的之关系判断才能从法律伦理行为事实如何推导出法律伦理行为应该如何。法律伦理行为之应该经由人们的实践活动可以变为现实,其具体保障在于法律伦理良心、法律伦理名誉及底线法律伦理的法律化。     

Law against the Rule of Law: Assaulting Democracy

This article examines how authoritarian contenders use law to advance an agenda geared to exclusive state power in light of a paradigmatic case: the National Socialists’ takeover of the German state apparatus in spring 1933. This case highlights two ways in which an office holder is able to expand his power in an authoritarian fashion through legal dispositions. A conjunctural use of law for authoritarian purposes draws on legal statutes to undercut the political capacity of opponents and competitors, hollow out institutional checks, and crucially hamper civil freedoms. Taking advantage of constitutional provisions that make institutional subversion from within possible (‘constitutional Trojan horses’), a structural use of legal statutes reorders the power structure by reallocating decisional rights. In both cases, law serves as a weapon against the rule of law. These considerations raise the question of the standards by which we are to judge the legality of such acts. Contemporary instances of democratic backsliding are cases in point.     

法学教育中的法律伦理教育问题研究

从法律的内在价值要求、我国法治建设中存在的问题,提出法律伦理教育是我国法学教育不可或缺的重要组成部分.法律伦理包括蕴含在法律制度中的制度伦理与法律职业者在职业活动中的法律行为伦理即职业道德两部分.法律伦理教育的目标就是要把学生培养成为具有健全的法律伦理人格,有助于法律终极目标实现的"社会医生".这一目标的实现有赖于法学教育理念的重构和法学教学方法的转变.目前,开展法律伦理教育面临的障碍主要有思想认识上的偏颇,社会"道德滑坡"的大环境以及法律国家主义的影响等.     

欧洲近现代历史上宪政民主政制的生成、建构与演进

宪政民主政制与社会经济发展之间的关系,是一个值得深入进行理论探讨和实证研究的新课题。本文对西方宪政民主的起源、生成与演变史做了一个鸟瞰式的回顾,为探究宪政民主与经济发展之间的关系提供一些背景知识。在从词源和辞义上辨析了西方文字中的"constitution"以及以及与之对应的中文"宪法"和"宪政"的基本含义之后,本文对英国、法国和德国近现代宪政民主政制的生成、建构和演变史做了一些简略的历史考察,并在最后一部份对近现代欧洲历史上宪政民主政制下的法律制度的生成原因做了理论的和历史的分析。     

公平视野下的德国简化税法改革方案——基于保罗·基尔希霍夫教授税收正义理论的公法学思考

保罗·基尔希霍夫教授提出的税制改革方案主要借助取消不必要的类型化区分、确立中立法律形式下的课税表达、对婚姻和家庭的特别保护、减少例外规则以及简化税收程序等来实现税收正义。税收不仅仅是政治上的现实,其改革思路的起点恰在于税收背后的宪法理念:宪政体制下的租税国家、人格图像并函摄了基本权利主客观面向的理论基础,即对国家共同体及任务有着共同价值观的自由而有个性的人必然要求处于国家所保障的自由经济体制下的税收法律予以相匹配的规制,它具体表现为以减少纳税人税收形成可能性为目标,保障国家对个人经济成果最温和分享以及减少例外的原则。     

The place of law in a business studies curriculum

Abstract

LEGAL ETHICS are the values that inform the practice of law. This article establishes what and how Australian law schools teach about legal ethics and suggests what and how Australian law schools should teach about legal ethics.

First, the article establishes that Australian law schools tend to teach legal ethics as if it were only concerned with the law of lawyering. It also establishes that Australian law schools tend to teach legal ethics discretely over the course of one subject out of the whole undergraduate curriculum.

Secondly, this article suggests the adoption of a new approach to legal ethics as the ability to exercise legal ethical judgment. It also suggests a pervasive method of instruction that integrates issues of legal ethics and the process of legal ethical judgment into every subject in the undergraduate curriculum in combination with discrete subjects on the context and substance of the law of lawyering.     

Reason in Law

Abstract. The problem of the relationship between "reason" and "law" has two different meanings depending on whether the first or the second of the two terms is considered to be the most important one. These two different meanings are revealed in the expressions "law of reason" and "legal reason," respectively. In the first expression, "reason" is meant in its strong sense, that is, the faculty of grasping the essence of things, while in the second, "reason" is meant in a weak sense, the ability to reason (calculate, infer, discuss). "Law of reason" and "legal reason" correspond to two different moments of the legal universe, the creation and, respectively, the application of law. Strong reason is that which discovers the rules to be obeyed, while weak reason is that which applies rules to an actual case. The first is legislating reason, while the second is judging reason. The main topic of the debate from the Greeks to Kant was that of legislating reason. Nowadays, instead, scholars in the field are interested in judging reason. Historicism and positivism mark the end of faith in the existence of rules which are objectively just, and which may be recognized by human reason. By now we have learned to do without the eternal truths in the knowledge of the world. However painful it may be, we are forced to resign ourselves to do without evident truths in ethics, as well.     

Morality, Identity and "Constitutional Patriotism"

In a modern, plural society, there can be no settled agreement on the concrete legal content of a country's constitution. The idea of the constitution is nonetheless pivotal in contemporary, liberal-minded theories of political justification, such as the ones advanced by Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. Justification in these theories depends finally on "constitutional patriotism," a consciously shared sentiment arising from an ethical assessment of their country by the country's people, according to which the country credibly pursues a certain regulative political ideal for which the constitution stands.     

法治视野下的网络反腐

网络反腐法治化建设的宪政意义在于它是电子民主时代公民参政权的重要展现。参政权作为宪法及法律规定的现代社会公民享有的基本权利,在于确认和保障公民参与国家管理及社会事务的管理,监督和抑制权力滥用及其腐败。电子民主时代,网络参政拓宽了公民民主参与的渠道,公民参政权的实现变得切实可行。网络反腐法治化有利于公民参政权的落实,进而有力地推进民主监督制度的发展。网络反腐法治化的基本理念包括公众参与、规范统一、网民保护、信息公开,而建立健全网络反腐的法律制度,保护并激励网络举报人是其法治化的路径选择。     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.