The effects of complainant age and expert psychological testimony in a simulated child sexual abuse trial

Mock jurors viewed a videotape of a simulated child sexual abuse trial and then deliberated to a unanimous verdict. The complainant was described as either a 13- or 17-year-old female child. Jurors voted to convict more often when the younger complainant was seen, and the younger complainant was rated as more credible than the older complainant. Female jurors voted the defendant guilty more often and rated the complainant as being more credible than male jurors. Jurors voted to convict more often and rated the defendant as less credible when expert psychological testimony was specific to the case than when they were presented with either general expert testimony or no expert testimony. Jurors who saw a psychological expert testify became less accepting of child sexual abuse misconceptions than those in the no expert control condition. The implications of these findings are discussed.Millbrook Correctional Centre     

The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors' Reasoning Skills

The effect of jury deliberation on jurors' reasoning skill in a murder trial was examined. Specifically, the effect of deliberating on reasoning competence (as defined by Kuhn, Weinstock and Flaton, 1994) was explored. One hundred and four participants viewed a videotaped murder trial and either deliberated in 12-person juries or ruminated on the case individually. Among those assigned to juries, half had their reasoning skill assessed prior to deliberations, while the others were tested after deliberating. Jurors in the individual rumination condition were assessed after they had the opportunity to reflect on the case alone. As hypothesized, post-group-deliberation jurors were more likely to discount both the selected verdict and alternative theories and incorporate judgmental supporting statements than were the other mock jurors. However, the mock jurors did not differ with regard to making statements that supported alternative verdicts or including judgmental statements that discounted their chosen verdict. In terms of Kuhn's reasoning continuum from satisficing (low level) to theory–evidence coordination (high level), there is some evidence that post-group-deliberation jurors may be closer to the high end than predeliberation jurors or post-individual-rumination jurors in some aspects of the task, but not in others.     

Battered women who kill

This study assesses acquital rates using mock jurors in cases involving a battered woman charged with killing her husband. The simulated trial format was based on actual courtroom proceedings including witness cross-examination and jury deliberation proceedings. The type of plea entered was varied and reflected either self-defense, automatism, or a hypothetical plea of psychological self-defense. The severity of abuse incurred by the defendant was also varied along with expert testimony. Jurors more frequently found the defendant not guilty when a plea of automatism was entered compared to a plea of self-defense. The frequency of acquittals following a plea of psychological self-defense resulted in more acquittals than the self-defense plea but significantly fewer than the automatism plea. The likelihood of acquittal increased under conditions of severe abuse as opposed to moderate abuse. Expert witness testimony was observed to influence verdicts during juror deliberations.     

Jurors'Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message

Jurors are laypersons with no specific expert knowledge, yet they are routinely placed in situations in which they need to critically evaluate complex expert testimony. This paper examines jurors'reactions to experts who testify in civil trials and the factors jurors identify as important to expert credibility. Based on in-depth qualitative analyses of interviews with 55 jurors in 7 civil trials, we develop a comprehensive model of the key factors jurors incorporate into the process of evaluating expert witnesses and their testimony. Contrary to the frequent criticism that jurors primarily evaluate expert evidence in terms of its subjective characteristics, the results of our study indicate that jurors consider both the messenger and the message in the course of evaluating the expert's credibility.     

The effects of judicial admonitions on hearsay evidence

Using a simulated civil case, this experiment investigated whether mock jurors: (a) are able to disregard hearsay evidence when admonished to do so, (b) experience psychological reactance and "backfire effects" in proportion to the strength of judicial admonition instructing them to disregard hearsay evidence, and (c) are able to recognize and disregard hearsay evidence without judicial instructions. Results indicate that jurors were unable to disregard inadmissible hearsay testimony in some legal decisions regardless of whether there were judicial instructions to do so. Jurors exhibited backfire effects paying more attention to inadmissible hearsay evidence when they were strongly instructed to disregard it. More specifically, juror backfire effects were evident in both their confidence in their liability verdicts and in their punitive damage awards. The legal and policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

Hearsay Versus Children's Testimony: Effects of Truthful and Deceptive Statements on Jurors’ Decisions

Researchers and courts are focusing increasing attention on the reliability of children's out-of-court statements, especially in relation to trials of child sexual abuse. The main goal of this study was to investigate the effects of presentation of children's out-of-court statements (e.g., hearsay) on jurors' perceptions of witness credibility and defendant guilt, and on jurors' abilities to reach the truth. Child participants experienced either a mock crime or were coached to say they experienced the crime when in fact they had not. During elaborate mock trials involving community member jurors, children's testimony was presented either: (1) live, (2) on videotape, or (3) via a social worker. Analyses revealed that testimony format directly influenced jurors' perceptions of child and social worker credibility (e.g., children were perceived as less likely to provide false statements if they testified live) as well as jurors' sympathy toward the child, all of which then predicted jurors' confidence in defendant guilt. Jurors had difficulty discerning accurate from deceptive child statements regardless of testimony format. Implications for psychology and the legal system are discussed.     

Comparing the effectiveness of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Henderson</Emphasis> instructions and expert testimony: Which safeguard improves jurors’ evaluations of eyewitness evidence?

Objectives

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently determined that jurors may not be able to effectively evaluate eyewitness evidence on their own. As a result, the Court proposed the use of judicial instructions to assist jurors (called Henderson instructions) and suggested the implementation of these instructions would reduce the need for expert testimony. We tested the efficacy of these instructions compared to alternative instructions and expert testimony.

Methods

We utilized a mock trial paradigm, randomly assigning 452 participants to 1 of 20 videotaped trial conditions that varied the quality of eyewitness evidence (both witnessing and identification conditions) and the type of safeguard presented during the mock trial.

Results

Jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions on their own. Jurors were more likely to convict when identification conditions were good and less likely when identification conditions were poor. This relationship was mediated by eyewitness credibility ratings. Expert testimony resulted in skepticism by reducing the likelihood that jurors would convict regardless of the quality of witnessing and identification conditions. No variation of the instructions influenced verdicts.

Conclusions

While jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions on their own, we observed no such effect for the quality of witnessing conditions, even with the aid of instructions and/or expert testimony. Both Henderson instructions and expert testimony may be insufficient for assisting jurors to effectively evaluate problematic witnessing conditions. Future research should examine the use of alternative safeguards.

     

Complex scientific testimony: How do jurors make decisions?

Critics of the civil jury system question whether jurors can adequately evaluate complex expert testimony. Based on current models of research in persuasion, we hypothesized that when expert testimony is complex, factors other than content will influence persuasion. Participants, serving as mock jurors, watched a videotaped trial in which two scientists provided evidence on whether PCBs could have caused a plaintiff's illness. The complexity of the expert's testimony and the strength of the expert's credentials were varied in a 2×2 factorial design. After watching the videotape, mock jurors rendered a verdict and completed a number of attitude measures related to the trial. Overall, consistent with our prediction, we found that jurors were more persuaded by a highly expert witness than by a less expert witness, but only when the testimony was highly complex. When the testimony was less complex, jurors relied primarily on the content of that testimony, and witness credentials had little impact on the persuasiveness of the message.     

Impact of hypnotic testimony on the jury

In the past decade, the forensic use of hypnosis to enhance the memories of victims, witnesses, and defendants has sharply increased. A great deal of controversy surrounds this issue. Some commentators argue that testimony derived from hypnosis should not be allowed as evidence because of its inherent unreliability and the unduly powerful impact it may have on a jury. In the present research, we used a jury simulation technique to study the impact that a hypnotically refreshed witness has upon jurors' decision making. A major finding is that jurors view hypnotic testimony with a certain amount of skepticism. In some respects, its impact is comparable to that of testimony based on delayed recall, and rarely does it have the impact of testimony from an immediate report. In addition, jurors' judgments about hypnotically refreshed testimony affected the way they evaluated other evidence at trial: Jurors who learned that a prosecution witness had been hypnotized were less believing ofother prosecution witnesses than were jurors not exposed to hypnotic testimony. The forensic application of these findings is discussed.This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program. We thank Jane Goodman, Doug Leber, Bonnie Sawnson, Russ Wade, Karen Guest, Jonna Barsanti, Don Kline, Elaine Sullivan, and David Kuykendall for their help at various stages of the project.     

Perceptions of children during a police interrogation: Guilt,confessions, and interview fairness

Abstract

Jurors are often provided with confession evidence and must determine whether the confession was true, false, coerced, or voluntary. As more juveniles are tried in adult criminal court, jurors must increasingly make these determinations about minors’ statements. In this study, mock jurors read an actual interrogation of a child suspect that included confession evidence, and then provided judgments regarding the coerciveness of the interrogation, the child's and police's knowledge and behaviors, and guilt. Child age (11 versus 14 years) and gender were manipulated and examined in relation to participant gender and pre-existing sympathy levels for juvenile offenders. Factors external to the suspect – participant gender and sympathy for juvenile offenders – interacted with child suspect factors to influence perceptions of the child, the interrogation, and guilt. When multiple factors were considered, perceptions of suspect credibility and police fairness were the strongest predictors of guilt and perceived culpability. The findings have implications for decision-making in cases involving juvenile defendants and confession evidence.     

Effects of inconsistent eyewitness statements on mock-jurors' evaluations of the eyewitness,perceptions of defendant culpability and verdicts

In attempting to discredit an eyewitness, it is a common strategy for an attorney to highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall testimony during cross-examination and encourage the jurors to infer, based on those inconsistencies, that the eyewitness's memory is faulty. An experiment was conducted to examine the effectiveness of this cross-examination strategy. Subjects viewed a simulated cross-examination and rendered judgmenets about the eyewitness and defendant. The type of inconsistent testimony was manipulated between subjects. Subjects exposed to inconsistent recall testimony about either central or peripheral details perceived the eyewitness as less credible (as evidenced by ratings on multiple dimensions) and the defendant as less culpable. Inconsistency on central details led to fewer convictions. Results point to the effectiveness of this cross-examination strategh.     

Social perception of rape victims

Since 1975, 40 states have enacted “rape shield” statustes which limit the admissibility of a rape victim's prior sexual history in court. These reforms have assumed that jurors regard prior sexual history evidence as much too probative of a victim's credibility and moral character, and that such perceptions have a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the jury decision process. The present research adopted an attributional analysis in order to examine the extent to which the types of legal reform affect social perception of the victim as well as the conviction rate in a videotaped consent defense rape trial. A large-scale jury simulation experiment was conducted with qualified jurors from the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Jurors either viewed an Improbable or Probable Likelihood of (victim) Consent version of the trial, with admission of prior sexual history evidence governed by one of three types of exclusionary rules. The results lend credence to the reformist contention that a rape victim is “on trial” along with the accused. Jurors were reluctant to convict when any testimony about prior sexual history was introduced. Moreover, jurors' close scrutiny of the victim's credibility and moral character was directly related to the conviction rate. Only the most restrictive evidentiary rule, when applied to an Improbable Consent case, curtailed the inference of victim consent, enhanced victim credibility, and increased the likelihood of conviction. Some of the legal and attributional implications of these findings were discussed.     

Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases

We presented participants with syndromal, witness credibility, or anatomically detailed doll evidence to determine (a) whether these different types of expert evidence exert differential influence on participants' judgments and (b) whether the influence of this evidence could be better explained by the relative scientific status or the probabilistic qualities of the research presented. Additionally, we investigated whether a strong or weak cross-examination of the expert would be more successful in discrediting the information provided in the expert's testimony. Findings suggest that participants are less influenced by expert testimony based on probability data (i.e., syndromal evidence) than by expert testimony based on case history data (i.e., credibility of anatomically detailed doll evidence). Participant responses did not differ as a function of the strength of the cross-examination of the expert. As expected, women were more likely to respond in a pro-prosecution direction than were men. Implications for the use of expert evidence in child sexual abuse cases are discussed.     

Some conditions maximizing eyewitness accuracy: A learning/memory analogy

Jurors continue to rely heavily on eyewitness testimony despite numerous demonstrations that it is often inaccurate. As part of the effort to provide jurors with good estimates of the accuracy of any specific testimony, a study was designed to test the proposal that eyewitness accuracy is governed by the same variables and in the same way as is retention of much simpler material in classical learning and memory paradigms. Prior exposure to the criminal (trials), arousal value of the incident (drive), and delay between prior exposure and incident, and between incident and test (inner-trial intervals) all affected eyewitness accuracy in the expected manner. Correct recognitions of the criminal in a line-up ranged from 14 percent to 86 percent, depending on the particular conditions under which the incident was observed.