Soviet industrial espionage against American military technology and the US response, 1930–1945

Between 1930 and 1945, the Soviet Union played a significant role in American domestic affairs. Although its agents’ infiltration of social movements and government agencies is well known, their parallel and highly successful practice of espionage against American industrial and military technology is less familiar. Washington officials were aware of Soviet spying, but mired in the Depression and then preoccupied with war, they mounted only a limited response, reflecting a political culture that did not emphasize active counterintelligence efforts. As a result, early Cold War revelations of unmistakable Soviet espionage shocked Americans, polarizing the Soviet‐American relationship and introducing a zealous domestic security apparatus.     

Protest Actions against the European Union, 1992–2007

In spite of the enormous amount of attention devoted to the process of European integration, the study of protest actions that take the European Union as their target is only incipient and suffers from a lack of up-to-date systematic information. This research note presents new data on protests in the member states which, directly or indirectly, targeted the Union between 1992 and 2007. These data show that the increase in protest mobilisation anticipated by previous scholars has not taken place and that the advances in formal European integration have not been matched by any corresponding increase in protests targeting the EU.     

The World Federation of Scientific Workers,a case study of a Soviet Front Organisation: 1946–1964*

This article examines the topic of the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) during its period of greatest activity, between 1946 and 1964. The WFSW was the only Soviet Front Organisation to be both founded in, and run from, the UK; and was a subject of intense interest for British intelligence during the early years of the Cold War. In particular, this article seeks to demonstrate how the Federation’s fortunes reflected those of the broader international ‘Peace’ movement, whilst simultaneously examining the reasons behind Whitehall’s interest in the group, and how this changed over time.     

No room at the inn: American responses to Australian immigration policies, 1946–54

ABSTRACT

After the Second World War, Australia introduced a new immigration policy based on the concept of ‘populate or perish’. Through the International Refugee Organization (IRO), 170,000 DPs migrated to Australia between 1947 and 1950, funded by the United Nations and the Australian government. Jews were largely excluded from this programme and the Minister for Immigration even prohibited the IRO from continuing to support the migration to Australia, based on family reunion, of individual Jewish survivors. In addition, the Australian government introduced other discriminatory policies that ensured that Jews remained only 0.5 per cent of the overall population. Based on archival research in the files of the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society and the American Joint Distribution Committee, Rutland and Encel analyse the entrenched racism in Australian society that contributed to these policies, and the reactions of the American Jewish leadership to them.     

American intelligence and the Soviet ICBM build‐up: Another look

Abstract

Since the events of 9/11 the terms ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ have entered the daily lexicon to a greater extent than ever before. News media report on changes to national threat assessments, commenting when the threat level rises from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Substantial’, in the case of the United Kingdom. The British government recently released a document that provided details of the issues that pose the highest risk to the national infrastructure. All of these are based, so we are told, on the work of the national intelligence agencies. But what are these indicators actually telling us and what is the relationship between threat assessments and risk assessments? These are both important questions because important decisions are made as a result of changes in these assessments. National defence and security planning is based upon perceived threats and risks. An entire risk management industry has grown up in the business world that covers everything from health and safety to financial risk. It is not only governments and businesses that base decisions on these indicators, but individuals as well. Tourists planning holidays in Europe were alarmed when the British, French and German governments increased their threat levels in response to intelligence that suggested that an attack against tourist sites in their respective capitals was imminent. Some will have changed their plans and travelled elsewhere, to the detriment of the tourist industry, while others will have chosen to defy the terrorists and travel anyway – potentially placing themselves in harm's way. With so much at stake, both nationally and individually, it is therefore important that we understand the difference between a ‘threat’ and a ‘risk’ and, as scholars of intelligence, the role that intelligence plays in assessing them.     

Strategic Disorder,the Office of Policy Coordination and the Inauguration of US Political Warfare against the Soviet Bloc, 1948–50

This article examines the inauguration of US political warfare operations against the Soviet bloc, 1948–50. It builds on diplomatic and military historiography of US Cold War foreign policy, and engages with more recent scholarship of the ‘covert’ and unconventional confrontation between east and west. Two key interrelated themes are explored. The failure of Truman's policymakers, particularly the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, to devise a coherent strategy to wage political warfare against communist regimes was fundamental to its ultimate failure. Also, the disordered US government bureaucracy further impaired and strategically dislocated the application and overall success of political warfare operations by the Office of Policy Coordination.     

The control of visual representation: American art policy in occupied Germany, 1945–1949

The development of the fine arts in post-war West Germany was influenced by the Office of Military Government for Germany, US (OMGUS). In mid-1946, a small group of OMGUS officers proposed the development of a fine arts policy aimed at neutralizing the Soviet cultural offensive. They were also interested in overcoming the cultural isolationism inherited from the Third Reich, and in strengthening the link between Western Germany and the democratic West. In 1947 the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Branch (MFA&A) of OMGUS began to develop an active fine arts policy. Its officers organized art exhibitions, provided exhibition space, established art contests, invited international speakers to lecture on art, created art appreciation groups, purchased work by German artists, channeled funds to German artists, and connected German artists with American museums, universities, and art patrons. Formal and informal, overt and covert networks were established to develop German-American artistic relations in the context of a cultural policy emphasizing collaboration.     

The housing system of the former Soviet Union: Why do the soviets need housing markets?

Abstract

The administrative‐command system that had been in full force in the Soviet Union between 1927 and 1990 had its own logic and internal consistency. It is now common knowledge that this economic system has flaws that led to a deepening secular decline over the past three decades. Because of ideological reasons, and an inadequate economic understanding of the capacity of their system to be liberalized, many reformers sought a third way between central planning and markets. The consensus today is that there is no third way. Among the former Soviet republics, Russia has just embarked on market‐oriented reforms and is facing a difficult and unstable transition because central planning mechanisms have ceased to function, but markets are not yet in place. This transition is particularly problematic for housing, which is a very severely distorted economic sector.

The international evidence on market economies that has accumulated over the past 20 years shows that, when housing sector distortions exist, they are predominantly found on the supply side. In socialist economies, however, housing is part of the compensation provided by enterprises and other employers. As a result housing suffers from demand‐side distortions in addition to the supply‐side problems caused by the absence of land markets, vague property rights, and burdensome urban regulations. The housing sector is already so large and distorted in these highly urban economies that overall economic reforms cannot succeed without housing reforms. In addition to presenting an overview of Soviet housing, this paper provides comparative evidence indicating that, among all the distorted socialist housing systems, Russia's probably is the most impaired. The basic elements of a market‐oriented strategy to improve housing are briefly presented.     

Democratic Electoral Systems around the world, 1946–2011

This research note describes an update to Golder's (2005)Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset. We extend the temporal scope of the original dataset by including all legislative and presidential elections that took place in democratic states from 2001 to 2011. In addition to significantly expanding the size of the DES dataset, we offer a simplified classification scheme for electoral systems. We also provide more detailed information about all democratic elections since 1946, including the dates for each round of elections as well as the rules used in different electoral tiers. A brief temporal and geographic overview of the data is presented.     

Creating a commonwealth intelligence culture: the view from Central Africa 1945–1965

This article examines attempts by the British intelligence community to improve the security arrangements of members of both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Commonwealth in the post-war era. The process was regarded not only as a means of countering Communist subversion and protecting Britain's key relationship with the United States, but also as a way of entrenching British influence, particularly in countries nearing independence. The result of this process was a complex network of intelligence contacts reaching across the Commonwealth. Viewing this network from the perspective of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB), the intelligence organization of the Central African Federation, the article suggests that it offered both opportunities and dangers. It provided a potential channel for covert diplomacy. Yet it also threatened to undermine the credibility of Commonwealth intelligence chiefs whose links with the United Kingdom were perceived as being excessively close.     

Eyes of the underground: Jewish insurgent intelligence in Palestine, 1945–47

This article represents an attempt to fill in some gaps in the historiography of Israeli ingelligence. It describes the origins and development of Jewish insurgent intelligence organizations and their operations against the British in Palestine, 1945–47. The essay presents a picture of rudimentary but effective intelligence serivces that made a significant, if not decisive, contribution to the armed struggle against the Briitsh. It examines critically some mysteries and myths surrounding Jewish intelligence in that conflict. By examining insurgent intelligence from the ‘bottom up’ ‐ against a government ‐ the article suggests there is a whole new ‘missing dimension’ of intelligence studies that bears scholarly attention.     

Britain and the Missile Gap: British Estimates on the Soviet Ballistic Missile Threat, 1957–61

Between 1957 and 1961, American National Intelligence Estimates overestimated the Soviets’ capabilities to produce and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, creating the ‘missile gap’ controversy. This article examines the contemporaneous estimates of British intelligence on the Soviet ballistic missile program, which were based upon very similar, if not the same, raw intelligence. It demonstrates that British estimates of the Soviet ICBM program were more accurate. However, this success did not continue in the analysis of the medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile (M/IRBM) threat, which was relatively poor for most of the period. It concludes that the reasons for this lie in the different assumptions held by intelligence analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, and a degree of conservatism in both intelligence establishments.     

Calling the tune? the CIA,the British left and the Cold War, 1945–1960

During the early Cold War period the United States Government covertly engaged in a variety of attempts to influence the politics of the British left. American ‘labor diplomats’ strove to fortify anti-communist elements in the trade unions; left-wing literary intellectuals were the target of the CIA's campaign in the ‘Cultural Cold War’; Labour Party politicians became involved in CIA-sponsored ventures designed to promote greater European and Atlantic unity. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the US ‘called the tune’ of the British left. Such a verdict overlooks internal problems in the American campaign and underestimates the complexity — and ingenuity — of the British response.