The springtime of French intelligence

Dominique Prieur (avec Jean‐Marie Pontaut), Agent secrète (Paris: Fayard 1995). Pp.248. Ff110. ISBN 2–213–59277–2.

Paul Paillote (entretiens avec Alain‐Gilles Minella), L'homme des services secrets (Paris: Julliard 1995). Pp.323. Ff129. ISBN 2–260–01341–4.

Claude Silberzahn (avec Jean Guisnel), Au coeur du secret, 1.500 jours aux commandes de la DGSE. 1989–1993 (Paris: Fayard 1995). Pp.330. Ff120. ISBN 22–13–59311–6.     

The British experience with intelligence accountability

This article assesses the British experience with intelligence accountability through an analysis of the principal mechanism that exists to provide for it – the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. It discusses the context within which oversight proposals emerged, the debate surrounding the nature of the new oversight body, and assesses the performance of the Committee over the first decade of its existence. It concludes that while the Committee has secured some important advances with regard to the accountability of the intelligence and security services, there are nevertheless significant limitations and weaknesses, many of which were evident in the Committee's 2003 investigation and report into pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD. In this context, the debate as to whether the oversight body should have select committee status, discussed at length in the article, remains highly relevant.     

The use and abuse of medical intelligence

When a leader suffers from a diminished ability to formulate high quality judgments and decisions, international peace and security may be compromised. Systematic use of medical intelligence on foreign leaders can provide early warning to American leaders about the potential for destabilization in particular regimes where leaders are gravely ill. This information remains particularly important in less democratic governments, where power and decision making remain concentrated in the hands of very few, or even one man, or where an entire governmental structure appears unstable. This paper examines the impact of medical illness in foreign leaders in four cases in American foreign policy: the Shah of Iran; Ferdinand Marcos; Tancredo Neves; and Boris Yeltsin.     

The future of the intelligence analysis task

Abstract

Information technology will have a significant impact on the intelligence analysis workflow, skills, and organization in the next couple of decades. In future, instead of ingesting information themselves, analysts will use a range of information tools to add value to data. Future analysts will need less knowledge of subject matter, and more general reasoning skills. The future task will involve more creativity, and less focus on detail, than today.     

Competitive intelligence and national intelligence estimates

National Intelligence Estimates are consensus-driven intelligence products. Yet there is considerable evidence supporting the use of competitive intelligence at every level of activity, including the presentation of finished products to consumers. We examine NIEs from two important periods in US foreign policy: the buildup in Vietnam and Gorbachev's reforms. We find in both cases alternate viewpoints were not presented in the US IC's premier intelligence product when such views could have made a difference. Consistent with contemporary findings in cognitive psychology, we argue the manner in which NIEs are structured and presented should be reformed to offer better decision support.     

The Liddell diaries and British intelligence history

This article discusses the wartime diaries of Guy Liddell of MI5. It argues that they are a crucial source for the study of wartime intelligence history, not only in respect of MI5 but also of other British secret agencies, particularly MI6 and SOE. Written in an accessible style, the diaries cast much new light on personalities, events, discussions and decisions both on operational matters and on questions of high policy, including relations with foreign intelligence services, debate on postwar intelligence priority and organization, and ministerial involvement in intelligence and security issues. In their breadth of coverage and information, their treatment of opinions and personalities, their abundance of detail and their fresh and unguarded prose, they are far more interesting, more accurate and more authoritative than either the various in-house MI5 section histories which have been opened to research in recent years, or the Hinsley Simkins volume of the official history of British intelligence. They are as significant a source for intelligence history as are the Cadogan diaries for the study of British foreign policy between 1939 and 1945. The article also points to inconsistencies in redaction throughout the diaries, and to other questions arising from the appearance of this crucial source.     

Iraq: The Mother of all intelligence failures

The most important American intelligence failure in Iraq was the widespread belief among top administration officials that Saddam could be overthrown at little cost and successfully replaced by a pro-American regime. We trace the causes of these and related intelligence failures to the administration's hubris. It led the Secretary of Defense and Vice President – the men most responsible for the Iraq decisions – to formulate unrealistic expectations about America's ability to impose its will in the Middle East and to rig the feedback networks in the military and intelligence communities to provide them with confirming estimates while downplaying discrepant information.