King Canute and the 'Problem' of Structure and Agency: On Times, Tides and Heresthetics

The story of King Canute (Cnut) is well known. Indeed, in perhaps its most familiar form it exists as an oral historical tradition passed from generation to generation. In this almost legendary account, King Canute is depicted as an arrogant ruler, so confident as to his own omnipotence that he takes on the forces of nature, pitting his own powers against those of the rising tide – his wet robes paying testament to his powerlessness in the face of potent material forces and to the triumph of (natural) structures over (human) agency. Or so it might seem. In this article I suggest that even in this, the simplest depiction of the story of Canute, the relationship between structure and agency is more complex and involved than it appears. This complexity is only accentuated if we turn from the legend to the historical evidence. Moreover, by reflecting on Canute's practical negotiation of the 'problem' of structure and agency we can not only gain an interesting political analytical purchase on a seemingly familiar tale, but we can also generate a series of valuable and more general insights into our understanding of the structure–agency relationship. In particular, the (various) stories of King Canute and the waves alert us to the need: (1) to maintain a clear distinction between the empirical and the ontological; (2) to resist the temptation to attempt an empirical adjudication of ontological issues (or, indeed, an ontological adjudication of empirical issues); (3) to differentiate clearly between the capacities of agents with respect to material/physical structures on the one hand, and social/political structures on the other; (4) to acknowledge the significance of unintended consequences; (5) to attend to the 'performative' dimensions of agency; and (6) to recognise the dangers inherent in an overly instrumental view of actors' motivations and intentions.     

Structure and Process: Examining the Interaction between Bureaucratic Organization and Analytical Requirements

Attempts by politicians to control bureaucratic decisions include both structural (how is the agency making the decision organized?) and procedural (what rules must they follow when making the decision?). But how do these two modes of influence interact? This article examines the interaction between bureaucratic structure and one procedural control, the requirement that agencies conduct an analysis of their decisions prior to their issuance. I look at this interaction in the context of two types of analysis, cost‐benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment. I interview 16 individuals in each field and draw from their experiences of conducting and reviewing more than a thousand analyses. The conduct of analysis is affected by where analysts are placed in agencies. In particular, independence of analysts has a trade‐off. The more independent analysts are, the more likely they can challenge preferred decisions in their agency. But independent analysts are brought into decisions later and their independence may limit their long‐term impacts on agency culture. Despite this trade‐off, analysts expressed a clear preference for independence. The interaction between different controls of bureaucratic behavior is a potentially fruitful line for further research.     

Gubernatorial Transition in Florida: A Look at How Politics, Budgeting, and Policy Analysis Interface

This article details the use of policy-focused transition teams during Florida's most recent gubernatorial transition. In a marked shift from the past, the most recent transition separated the appointments and policy advisory functions. The inseparable nature of politics, budgeting, and policy analysis are demonstrated via: (1) an analysis of the transition budget; (2) a detailed look at team structures and their role in agency performance evaluation; (3) a calculation of the fiscal and policy impacts of team recommendations; (4) post-session assessments of the governor's first legislative agenda; and (5) post-transition interviews with key participants.     

Information Technology and Organizational Morphology: The Case of the Korean Central Government

This study explores the effects of information technology (IT) in terms of longitudinal changes in organizational structures at the central government level. Interestingly, although IT has increased the ratio of middle managers to subordinates, the number of middle managers has not changed radically and, in some cases, has steadily increased, while the proportion of lower‐level employees has decreased. Contrary to the belief in a pyramid structure, the actual form of an agency looks like a rocket. The analysis shows that IT effects on the agency’s morphology differ according to the core technology of the agency. However, these effects seem to be constrained by the rigidity of the Korean government in terms of organizational management. This article proposes that agency autonomy in fitting the organizational structure to the real work situation is a necessary condition for seeing the full effects of e‐government.     

Theorizing power in transition studies: the role of creativity and novel practices in structural change

An important theoretical challenge for theorizing about power dynamics in societal transitions is the transformation of power itself. In this respect, it is especially puzzling how agency at the level of novel practices can extend beyond the habitual, how it can draw on structures and destructure at the same time and in doing so, how it might emerge both as a creative and a destructive force. This article addresses this puzzle by scrutinizing and refining multi-level conceptions of power in the field of transitions studies. In the first part, it explores one specific multi-level framework by Grin and Van Tatenhove in a longitudinal case study of wind energy projects in Denmark and establishes that it has four conceptual short-comings—relating to (1) temporality; (2) relationality; (3) materiality; and (4) creativity—that this article claims to overcome in the second part. In order to so, it draws on several practice theories for an extended framework that enables the unpacking of the interplay between creativity and transition processes.     

Assortative Mating on Ideology Could Operate Through Olfactory Cues

Mates appear to assort on political attitudes more than any other social, behavioral, or physical trait, besides religion. Yet the process by which ideologically similar mates end up together remains ambiguous. Mates do not appear to consciously select one another based on ideology, nor does similarity result from convergence. Recently, several lines of inquiry have converged on the finding that olfactory processes have an important role in both political ideology and mate selection. Here we integrate extant studies of attraction, ideology, and olfaction and explore the possibility that assortation on political attitudes may result, in part, from greater attraction to the scent of those with shared ideology. We conduct a study in which individuals evaluated the body odor of unknown others, observing that individuals are more attracted to their ideological concomitants.     

The agency role of the physician in Ireland,Britain, and the USA

The USA and Britain have medical care delivery and financing systems which are polar opposites. The Irish system incorporates important features of both. Using original household survey data of medical care utilization in Ireland, and published data and studies of the USA and Britain, the effect of the incentive structures in the three systems on physician behavior, especially on the so-called agency role, is examined. We conclude that the incentive structure is of the utmost importance to policy makers concerned with health costs and economic rationality of medical care systems.     

Structural Power—A Contradiction in Terms?

The idea that capital possesses structural power over the state is of growing importance. Yet the theoretical literature on power has argued that this concept is either a contradiction in terms or is conceptually redundant. This paper seeks to show that a coherent distinction can be made between structural power, non-structural power, and structural constraints. These distinctions are based upon a concept of human agency which draws attention to the peculiar pasts of those individuals occupying the same type of structural position. It is argued that these distinctions are both widely applicable and 'empirically' relevant.     

Reforms, lobbies and welfare: A common agency approach

Citizens with heterogeneous tastes delegate to policy makers the authority to choose public policies. They may try to influence legislators in various ways. In this paper we assume that monetary lobbying and direct threats are the only instruments private individuals can use to influence the legislator. We model the relationship between the citizens and a single policy maker as a common agency game. Lobbies offer a policy and a payment according to a truthful contribution schedule, and the government takes the policy decision. In the truthful equilibrium, the government implements the social surplus maximizing policy. Introducing also direct threats, we find that, as far as both groups have an instrument to influence the legislator, the efficiency result is robust. We also show that when the lobby groups have asymmetric interests and political power, not all groups necessarily participate in the auction. In particular it turns out that one-lobby or non-lobby equilibria may arise, and those equilibria are also efficient.     

The role of agency in cleavage formation

Abstract.  Through the analysis of Hungarian politics, this article demonstrates how parties become embedded in the social, cognitive and emotive structures of societies. The role of agency in cleavage formation is addressed, with a special emphasis on the mechanism through which political parties structure their environments. Next to the popularization of conflict perceptions and the consolidation of camp identities, the development of a more elaborate and segmented organizational structure is identified as an integral part of the process of cleavage formation. Such a structure enables parties to forge coalitions among previously separate social groupings and combine group interests into packages large enough to overcome institutional thresholds of power. The findings indicate that parties are potentially able to cross cleavage lines, re-structure relations within the party system and create new associations between party preferences, socio-structural categories and attitudes. Furthermore, parties seem to be able to alter the relationships between psychologically rooted attitudes and social categories. The study also shows, however, that deep-seated socio-cultural divides limit the power of agency even in new democracies.     

What Explains Agency Heads’ Length of Tenure? Testing Managerial Background,Performance, and Political Environment Effects

There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular influences, in turn, depends on the prospective destination of the agency head: elsewhere in the public sector, the private sector, or retirement. The authors estimate survival models of agency heads’ tenure using panel data on British central government executive agencies from 1989 to 2012. Findings suggest that chief executives of poorly performing agencies are encouraged to retire sooner. There is no evidence that a change in political control increases the risk of any form of exit, suggesting that political pressure to leave is not substantial for this type of official. Outsiders—agency heads recruited from outside central government—are relatively difficult to retain for a longer time, such that potential shortfalls in suitable managers caused by retirements in an aging workforce may be difficult to make up by appointing from this source.     

Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers

Abstract. Delegation from cabinet to ministers is complicated because the cabinet consists of the same ministers that are supposed to act as its agents. In the extreme case ministers are completely autonomous within their portfolio. This paper argues that the resulting potential for agency loss is limited, but not negated, by both hierarchy and collective decision–making in cabinet, or by establishing direct delegation relationships between legislative committees or political parties and ministers, bypassing the government. Appointments to ministerial office are the prevailing exception to ministerial autonomy. To the extent that ministerial preferences are not stable and exogenous, screening before appointments is an ineffective control, and ministerial identification with departmental interests is the most probable source of agency loss.     

INTERVENOR FUNDING AT THE FTC: BIOPSY OR AUTOPSY?

Intervenor funding, an innovative method for encouraging public participation in government rule-making, is examined by focusing on the experience of the Federal Trade Commission. The paper reviews the program's goals, the arguments of critics, and the perceptions of individuals and groups who applied for intervenor funding. The program's effects on both agency decision-making and on the applicants themselves are evaluated.     

Help-seeking from public authorities: Who arrives at the agency door?

For ordinary citizens, political life is increasingly characterized by a request for a check, not a trip to the polls. Yet for all their frequency, very little is known about help-seeking encounters. This article asks the question “Who gets to the agency door?” or, more formally, “How do individuals decide to apply for public social benefits or services, and what does that decision signify?” Three topics are explored. The first defines help-seeking as a type of political participation. The second conceptualizes the process by which individuals decide to seek help from public social agencies. The third presents an agenda for research and action on the politics of help-seeking.     

A Capacity for Central Coordination: The Case of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

For the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) the year 1987 can now be seen as pivotal in marking a clear end to a period of transition in coordinating structures in the Australian Public Service (APS) that had lasted roughly 20 years. The abolition in 1987 of the Public Service Board, formerly a powerful coordinating agency, is the most obvious marker of the change. The PSB's departure left the Secretary of PM&C with a role that is now often described as ‘head of the public service’. More broadly, the 1987 changes to the machinery of government both formalised and enabled a sea‐change in PM&C's role. Before 1987 a large policy initiation and development project would usually have been considered as beyond PM&C's scope. Since then, extensive and direct policy development work by PM&C has become common. The continuing debates have been over whether PM&C actually delivers in these roles (an empirical question) and how far it should play them (a normative issue). In this article we itemise the capacity, both continuing and developing, which PM&C has to support policy development. Traditional coordination mechanisms are an important part of this armoury and PM&C has long experience of most of them. However policy initiation and development calls for other tools which PM&C has had to develop over the past few decades. There is scope for conflict between the coordination and initiation/development roles. Understanding how a central agency like PM&C carries out each of them and balances the two can potentially contribute to debates on organisational design. We also address the normative issue: whether the growth of prime ministerial impact is a result of an increase in public service support or a cause of its increase ( Walter and Strangio 2007 ) and whether it should be restrained. We accept that the new developments give prime ministers the capacity to oversee policy arenas where once they could not, but regard this as a consequence as much of demand from above as of ambition within the department.     

The Relationship between Politics and Administration: The Importance of Contingency Factors,Formal Structure,Demography, and Time

The article starts with the notion that the relationship between the political and the administrative sphere should be viewed as a variable, opening up for the possibility that it may vary among contexts, formal structures, demographics, and over time. Studying the interaction between politicians and administrators in 30 Norwegian municipalities, data indicate that the interaction between the spheres is mainly a function of the position politicians and administrators have within the formal structure. More importantly, the effect of the formal structure is strengthened over time. This indicates that election may work as a “shock” to the political and administrative system, weakening the effect of the formal structure. Over time, this formal structure is rebuilt, and thus strengthens its effects on the relationship. Implications and limitations of the findings are discussed.     

Agency, Structure, and Social Chance as Cross-Disciplinary Concepts

It is appropriate that social scientists should develop explicit conceptualisations of agency, structure and social chance, these being three major dimensions of social and political life. The agency–structure debate, which refers to theoretical and ontological issues that tend not to be explicitly discussed by political scientists, is an important interdisciplinary starting point for conceptual and empirical work involving collaboration between political scientists and sociologists. Following a theoretical review of agency, structure and chance, it is argued that empirical research concerned with the study of politics and policy – indeed, social scientific research on any topic – should employ an ontology and methodology that focuses on the dynamics of interaction between agency, structure and social chance.     

Questioning Kaufman: How Cross‐Level Political Coalitions Interact with Organizational Structure

Herbert Kaufman's The Forest Ranger is considered a landmark study of how organizations can be structured to elicit compliance from field officials, yet there have been few attempts to validate Kaufman's claims. The author argues that the outcomes observed by Kaufman resulted from interplay between organizational structure and political context—a variable that Kaufman ignored. This argument is supported by case studies of two agencies with structures similar to Kaufman's U.S. Forest Service but poorer outcomes: the same agency today and India's forest departments. Both differences in organizational structure and poorer outcomes are found to be the result of political context. Specifically, coalitions assembled around agencies use the implementation process to shape outcomes in ways that could not be accomplished solely through changing laws or formal administrative structure. This points to the importance of building supportive field‐level coalitions to complement administrative reforms.     

Becoming Liberal,Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding

Abstract

It has become clear that the liberal international institutions and ‘corridors of power’ have so far failed to deliver on their promise of a liberal peace for all. Liberal peacebuilding has often offered resources to an elaborate structuration of sometimes predatory elites – international and local – but not to the general populations of these multiple states. Institutions have been created, but the reach of liberal politics has had little impact – other than in basic security and in rhetorical, rights oriented terms – on the everyday life of populations. The local is commonly deployed to depict a homogenous and disorderly Other, whose needs and aspirations do not conform to liberal standards. Claims that moves toward the everyday have already been made disguise the limited ambitions of liberal statebuilders to enable a real improvement in local agency. In the midst of all of this the real everyday needs and lives of individuals have become obscured. This essay briefly suggests some theoretical responses, via the concepts of the ‘everyday’ and ‘empathy’. These offer the possibility of placing the social contract back within the heart of post-conflict states, or of allowing a new, post-liberal, politics which is more locally ‘authentic’, resonant and agential, to emerge.     

Toleration,Skepticism, and Blasphemy: John Locke,Jonas Proast,and Charlie Hebdo

As the recent Charlie Hebdo, Copenhagen café, and Garland, Texas, shootings show, religion has recently reemerged as a source of violence within liberal democracies, particularly in those instances where cases of alleged blasphemy are involved. Although toleration arose, within the liberal tradition, as a means of dealing with such conflict, some individuals, possessed of devout religious belief, when confronted with beliefs or practices profoundly at odds with their faith, cannot conceive of toleration as a possibility. In such situations, the demand that these individuals tolerate that to which their faith is at odds is likely to run up against a more personal and, for its adherents, eternal agenda. This article considers a way in which those with devout religious beliefs might tolerate that which is profoundly at odds with their faith, thereby providing a means to avoid violent outcomes such as those in the “extreme cases” above.