JFK's ambassadors and the cold war

The importance of sound representation abroad was plain to President J.F. Kennedy. This survey of Kennedy's diplomats is selective, confined to the three most telling cases in the Cold War drama: Moscow, New Delhi, London. The countries corresponding with these capitals shaped America's world, as chief rival, preeminent neutral and pluckiest ally. Ambassadors in distinctive posts do not constitute the whole of JFK's foreign policy, but this account do shed light on significant achievements, thereby challenging those critics who have attributed every manner of blunder to Kennedy. His diplomatic record may not have been as brilliant as court historians suggested. Yet, to JFK's credit, the practical effect of his ambassadors in three major countries was to advance US security and prestige.     

冷战后韩国的东北亚安全战略构想

自朝鲜战争结束以来,韩国安全政治中一直面临着严重的安全困境问题。韩国认为,周边强国之间的均衡关系是韩国生存与繁荣的保障。从现实情况看,韩国的力量难以同周边大国中的任何一个进行抗衡,归根结底,只有在大国间的力量取得平衡并相互制约的前提下,韩国的活动范围才能得以扩大。所以,推动东北亚多边安全机制的建立,维持当前的地区力量均衡,防止因为周边大国实力的强弱变化导致的地区秩序瓦解,对于韩国意义重大。冷战后,韩国所提出的东北亚多边安全战略构想无疑将对维持该地区长期和平发挥关键性作用,韩国也能从中获得可观的和平红利。但由于其内在缺陷,这一构想并不能一劳永逸地化解韩国长期所面临的安全困境。     

The cold peace: Russo-Western relations as a mimetic cold war

In 1989–1991 the geo-ideological contestation between two blocs was swept away, together with the ideology of civil war and its concomitant Cold War played out on the larger stage. Paradoxically, while the domestic sources of Cold War confrontation have been transcended, its external manifestations remain in the form of a ‘legacy’ geopolitical contest between the dominant hegemonic power (the United States) and a number of potential rising great powers, of which Russia is one. The post-revolutionary era is thus one of a ‘cold peace’. A cold peace is a mimetic cold war. In other words, while a cold war accepts the logic of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a cold peace reproduces the behavioural patterns of a cold war but suppresses acceptance of the logic of behaviour. A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on notions of victimhood for some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The perceived victim status of one set of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, while the ‘victory’ of the others cannot be consolidated in some sort of relatively unchallenged post-conflict order. The ‘universalism’ of the victors is now challenged by Russia's neo-revisionist policy, including not so much the defence of Westphalian notions of sovereignty but the espousal of an international system with room for multiple systems (the Schmittean pluriverse).     

British cultural diplomacy and the cold war: 1946-61

Why was Britain so reluctant to use the tools of cultural diplomacy for the cold war? First, the habits of administration and the effects of war encouraged a compartmentalization of effort. There was no obvious point at which to construct an overview or a strategy which could match the Soviet enterprise. Second, the dissolution of the empire exposed the racism and ethnic tensions which had existed in both the United Kingdom and its colonies. Policymakers appeared to be pursuing incompatible objectives. They found it difficult to think about post-colonial influence except in terms of a policy for the Commonwealth, but also to construct such a line of action. The insubstantiality of cultural diplomacy is part of the trauma of losing great power status. Arab nationalism was the major force which prompted government into action on cultural affairs. Commitments were made before the military operations in Suez.