Explaining collective action with rational models

We note the failure of a rational egoist model of human behavior to generate successful predictions of important economic and political behaviors including collective action. Alternative models are presented that combine rational, utility-maximizing features with concerns about collective welfare. The performance of these models in explaining contributing behavior in an experimentally-induced public goods game is compared to the performance of a rational egoist and collective welfare model. The results indicate that a model in which subjects are presumed to trade off benefits to self with benefits to others provides a better explanation of actual contributing behavior than either the rational egoist or collective welfare models, but still explains only a small amount of the individual variance in contributing behavior.The Institute for Political Economy, Utah State University provided important financial support for this study. Donald Cundy, Alan Huston, Joe Oppenheimer, John Orbell, and Randy Simmons provided valuable comments on earlier drafts.     

Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems

Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the concept of “polycentric” political systems and the demonstration that solutions to common-pool resource problems may be solved voluntarily by rational individuals, even in situations that resemble Prisoners’ Dilemmas. The program, however, pays little attention to how individuals’ ability to exit may affect the interaction in Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situations, for worse or better. We argue why this is a worthwhile consideration and survey results from public choice and game theory.     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an anarchic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the ??big-man?? in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members?? contributions to collective output and the payments from the big-man to these members seemingly look like reciprocal behavior, even though they are driven by narrowly selfish preferences.     

Non-redundant groups,the assurance game and the origins of collective action

To discuss the origins of collective action this paper introduces the concept of the non-redundant group (n-group) of persons such that the contributions of all are needed, if outsiders do not contribute, to obtain the collective good. The paper shows that the members of an “n-group” face the structure of payoffs of the Assurance Game, and therefore, under certain conditions, will pursue collective action. The paper analyzes the situations where one or several “n-groups” exist and discusses the conditions under which an individual could know that he is an “essential member” of the relevant “n-group”.     

Equilibria in multi-party systems

This paper deals with equilibria in multi-party systems, not excluding systems with two parties. The model has a one-dimensional policy space for the positions of parties and voters. Furthermore it assumes an arbitrary continuous density of voters, voters vote for the nearest party, and parties try to maximize the number of votes. Sufficient and necessary conditions for equilibria are given, and from these conditions it is deduced that for systems with a large number of parties equilibria are rare, unless the density of voters is uniform.     

Satisfaction with democracy and collective action problems: the case of the environment

Whether a country is able effectively to address collective action problems is a critical test of its ability to fulfill the demands of its citizens to their satisfaction. We study one particularly important collective action problem: the environment. Using a large panel dataset covering 25 years for some countries, we find that, overall, citizens of European countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if (a) more environmental policies are in place and if (b) expenditures on the environment are higher, but environmental taxes are lower. The relation between environmental policy and life satisfaction is not as pronounced. The evidence for the effect of environmental quality on both satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction is not very clear, although we find evidence that citizens value personal mobility (in terms of having a car) highly, but view the presence of trucks as unpleasant. We also document that parents, younger citizens, and those with high levels of educational attainment tend to care more about environmental issues than do non-parents, older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling.     

Local government and urban protest in Colombia

This article examines how urban conflict in Colombia is highlighting important features of local government in that country. Four interrelated questions are asked: (a) What is the role of local government in the provision of public goods and services in urban communities? (b) To what extent has local government been the target of urban community protest? (c) Has local government taken on a petitioner role by being a participant in urban community protest? (d) Does urban protest threaten the system of political domination of which local government is an integral part? The article points to certain key features of local government in Colombia that may be built upon in order to create a more progressive, democratic and community-based system of local government. There are, however, powerful political constraints on this occurring.     

The paradox of collective action: Linking interest aggregation and interest articulation in EU legislative lobbying

Olson's logic of collective action predicts that business interest associations face fewer collective action problems than citizen action groups. This article challenges this assumption by arguing that forming an organization comes with different collective action problems than voicing a joint policy position. This leads us to examine an important paradox: Citizen groups face challenges in establishing themselves as organizations but find it relatively easy to position themselves on policy issues, whereas the reverse is true for business associations. We study this paradox empirically based on interviews with spokespersons of interest organizations active in the European Union and find support for our hypotheses. Our findings demonstrate that citizen groups position themselves on policy issues more easily than business interests and that this competitive advantage is amplified when policy issues attract the attention of the media.     

Policy making and collective action: Defining coalitions within the advocacy coalition framework

Research on policy communities, policy networks, and advocacy coalitions represents the most recent effort by policy scholars in North America and Europe to meaningfully describe and explain the complex, dynamic policy making processes of modern societies. While work in this tradition has been extraordinarily productive, issues of collective action have not been carefully addressed. Focusing on the advocacy coalitions (AC) framework developed by Sabatier (1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) as an example of a productive research program within the policy network tradition, this article (1) examines the potential of the AC framework, with its emphasis on beliefs, policy learning, and preference formation, to provide richer explanations of policy making processes than frameworks grounded exclusively in instrumental rationality; (2) suggests that paradoxically, however, the AC framework can more fully realize its potential by admitting the explanations of collective action from frameworks based on instrumental rationality; (3) incorporates within the AC framework accounts of how coalitions form and maintain themselves over time and of the types of strategies coalitions are likely to adopt to pursue their policy goals; and (4) derives falsifiable collective action hypotheses that can be empirically tested to determine whether incorporating theories of collective action within the AC framework represents a positive, rather than a degenerative, expansion of the AC framework.     

Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all

A review of the theory and evidence on corporate governance indicates several related themes. First, corporate governance is multidimensional. Second, corporate governance is an endogenous response to a firm’s economic environment. Third, the role of different governance mechanisms varies across industries. New analysis of a sample of 1235 US corporations from 40 different industries in the year 2000 confirms the empirical regularities reported in prior research. The central policy implication of the prior research and new supporting evidence is that one size does not fit all in corporate governance.     

Politics and the organization of collective action: The case of Nigeria, 1960–1975

The case of Nigeria provides support for an organizational conception of collective action. Such a conception rests on the notion that collective events—riots, demonstrations, strikes, marches, and violent confrontations—are the accompanying manifestations of routine politics and are instigated by many of the same organizations that sponsor nonviolent, ordinary political and economic activity. It is argued that collective action is organized action; its vehicles are mainly preexisting organizations that determine the location and timing of collective action, select the forms of contention, articulate the issues, and choose the targets of collective protest. It is further argued that insofar as a society's organizational base determines the shape of collective action, then political policies that affect the society's organizational composition will have a corresponding effect on the shape of collective action. That is, policies of organizational repression and facilitation will decrease or increase associated forms of collective action.     

Trust in elites and protest orientation: An integrative approach

The consensus based hypothesis that trust in political authorities is a major determinant of system stability has received less empirical support in the protest literature than its theoretical appeal once promised. We propose a major revision of the leadership-trust approach—one which integrates the conflict and consensus approaches by considering both public trust in established elites and public trust in challenging elites. Recognizing the importance of opposition leadership, we reason that thedifference between these two types of trust, which we conceptualize astrust differential, should explain protest orientation better than other trust-variable alternatives. The new trust differential variable suggests a distinctive typology of trust orientations which predict the degree of protest endorsement somewhat differently than the traditional authority-trust model. Using survey data collected in Madison, Wisconsin, in 1973, we test the integrative differential approach against and controlling for its classic competitors and find it to be a more powerful, independent predictor of protest orientation.This paper draws on findings and insights from papers that we presented at the American Sociological Association meeting, San Francisco, September 1978, and at the annual Western Social Science Association meeting, Denver, April 1978.