Development policy and the democratic peace in Sub-Saharan Africa

The contention that ‘democracies do not ?ght one another’ has gained widespread acceptance in the discipline of international relations, as well as among policymakers and international institutions. In the post-Cold War era, this contention has formed part of the justi?cation for making development assistance conditional on democratic reforms in recipient countries. This article explores the democratic peace thesis in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, and argues that the relationship between peace and democracy is much more complex than commonly allowed for in conventional liberal analyses. Contemporary development policies that are intended to promote peace, democracy and stability are frequently implicated in the production and continuation of con?ict. Accordingly, the article contends that many of Africa’s conflicts and so-called ‘failed states’ are best understood in light of policies inspired, in part, by the principles of the democratic peace thesis. The argument is illustrated with reference to four countries on the African continent: Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia.     

美国与拉美民粹主义的主要区别与左右分野

民粹主义在美国和拉美地区具有不同的发生和发展史。与在拉美不同,民粹主义在美国起源时间较早,但发生频率较低,持续时间较短,彼此关联性不强,影响程度较弱,激进程度较轻。特朗普式的民粹主义在很大程度上体现了美国民粹主义的“拉美化”倾向。民粹主义在美国和拉美有很明显的左右分野,左翼民粹主义在拉美长期占据主流,右翼民粹主义在美国则是主要形式。在与何种类型的左右翼结合、是否与民族主义结盟、集权程度等多个方面,这两个地区的左右翼民粹主义也存在较大差别。目前,美国和拉美的左右翼民粹主义正在同时崛起。特朗普的民粹主义可谓集美国的左右翼民粹,尤其是极右翼民粹主义之大成。民粹主义说到底是民主政治的民粹化,源于大众民主政治的内生问题。美拉民粹主义的重要差异,主要来自两个地区不同的政治文化传统和选举民主机制,以及民主体制不同性质和程度的政治衰败。美拉民粹主义左右分野的背后,实质上是公民的基本权利保障不彰所致。具体而言,是自由议程与平等议程之间的张力以及由此导致的社会主要矛盾的不同。因此,必须认真对待左右翼民粹主义,加强制度建设,提高国家治理能力,同时还应积极参与全球治理。     

Preventing protectionism: International institutions and trade policy

This paper examines the role of international institutions in preventing the rise of protectionism. We analyze states?? choices in trade policy during the current global economic crisis, a situation likely to exacerbate uncertainty in the conduct of commercial relations and to push countries toward ??beggar-thy-neighbor?? trade policies. The main argument of the paper is that the numerous international institutions present in the international system during the current economic crisis serve as conveyors of information and mechanisms of commitment and socialization. They mitigate the uncertainty problem that prevails in prisoner??s dilemma settings such as trade. Economic international organizations increase the flow of information about the preferences and behaviors of its members. Non-economic organizations also have a role to play as social environments that encourage cooperation. Specialized international institutions devoted to trade, such as the WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), not only provide monitoring and enforcement functions but also lock in commitments to liberal trade through legal obligations that make defections costly. We test our argument using a dataset of trade policies during the current economic crisis and of membership in international organizations. The paper finds strong support for the role of international institutions as commitment and socialization mechanisms in preventing the rise of protectionism.     

The Inter-American Democratic Charter and Governmental Legitimacy in the International Relations of the Western Hemisphere

The adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter by the Organization of American States in 2001 proclaiming the right to democracy in the western hemisphere was hailed by many as a landmark development. Since then, however, constitutionally dubious transitions of democratically elected governments were attempted or took place in Venezuela, Haiti, and Ecuador. This paper examines whether the Charter can and should serve as the institutional guarantor of democratic legitimacy in the Americas. Its conclusions are skeptical. As an external instrument, the Charter is bound to have limited impact when government control or authority is subjected to significant domestic disruptions. The Charter's limitations do not lie with the document itself; rather they are inherent in the structure of the international states system. But the Charter's normative basis would be problematic even if these structural limitations did not exist. Taking its cue from the classical liberal approach to international relations, the paper argues that democracy must ultimately be the choice and responsibility of those who live within its bounds, and not of outside governments or institutions.     

Global Reordering and China’s Rise: Adoption,Adaptation and Reform

Abstract

While much of the debate over the implications of China’s rise tends to dichotomise around either status quo or revisionist predictions, the reality seems to lie somewhere in between. In broad terms, China has embraced multilateral forms of cooperation and governance. This does not mean, however, that it is satisfied with the distribution of power in many international institutions, or some of the norms and principles that underpin them. This has resulted in a reformist position, with China increasingly willing to offer its own supplementary alternatives. China’s rise has also provided an important economic alternative to dealing with the West, and considerably undermined the ability of others to establish their preferences and world views. China’s lack of commitment to democracy and the external promotion of human rights remains a key reason why some analysts remain unconvinced about the long-term ambitions of an illiberal actor in a global liberal order.     

The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy

Two images of populism are well-established: it is either labelled as a pathological political phenomenon, or it is regarded as the most authentic form of political representation. In this article I argue that it is more fruitful to categorize populism as an ambivalence that, depending on the case, may constitute a threat to or a corrective for democracy. Unfolding my argument, I offer a roadmap for the understanding of the diverse and usually conflicting approaches to studying the relation between populism and democracy. In particular, three main approaches are identified and discussed: the liberal, the radical and the minimal. I stress that the latter is the most promising of them for the study of the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy. In fact, the minimal approach does not imply a specific concept of democracy, and facilitates the undertaking of cross-regional comparisons. This helps to recognize that populism interacts differently with the two dimensions of democracy that Robert Dahl distinguished: while populism might well represent a democratic corrective in terms of inclusiveness, it also might become a democratic threat concerning public contestation.     

Caste and democratization in postcolonial India: an ethnographic examination of lower caste politics in Bihar

This article examines the case of lower-caste politics in the populous north Indian state of Bihar in order to show the ways in which the liberal democratic model fails to capture the realities of democracy in postcolonial India. In order to explain the rise of lower-caste politics, I examine the ways in which relationships between state institutions, caste networks and locally dominant groups shape contemporary political possibilities, necessitating a re-evaluation of the relationship between liberalism and democracy in India. With state institutions being unable to effectively enforce rights, a caste-based notion of popular sovereignty became dominant – as an idea (the lower-caste majority should rule) and as the everyday rough-and-tumble of an electoral politics that ultimately revolves around the force of numbers. It is inadequate, and actually unhelpful, to simply point out the obvious fact that the enforcement of rights is routinely and systematically undermined in practice and to call for more effective implementation. In fact, I argue that effective implementation in places such as Bihar could only be possible through a radical restructuring of local power that can only come from below, through democratic practice itself.     

The liberal democratic response to terrorism

This article examines some of the key principles that should guide a liberal democratic state's response to terrorism, if it responds in a manner which is effective and consistent with its own principles. The author proceeds by examining four areas where the tension between democratic acceptability and effectiveness is seen to be greatest. A model of counter‐terrorism consistent with liberal democratic norms is then proposed.     

Dynamics of peace and democratization. The Aceh lessons

The viability of the thesis that liberalization and democracy foster peace, security and development is at stake. The main critique is that more liberties and elections lead to more conflict and abuses of power. There are three principal responses to this critique. The liberal argument calls for improving the democratic institutions; the institutions first thesis prioritizes strengthening the rule of law and state capacity over democracy; whilst the transformation argument proposes using fledgling democracy to foster gradually more favourable relations of power and popular capacity towards more substantial democracy. This article analyses the relevance of these theses to the remarkable dynamics of peace-building in Aceh, from the introduction of Indonesian democracy in 1998, the impact of the tsunami in 2004 and the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 to the general elections in 2009. The study concludes that the liberal argument is congruous with the democratic opportunities for peace, while the institutions first and the transformation arguments give prominence to the dynamics that made peace-building possible but also difficult. While the institutions first argument responds to these difficulties by resorting to power sharing, the transformation thesis proposes more citizen participation coupled with interest and issue group representation.     

Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do Democracies Spend Less?

In this paper, we evaluate the liberal claim that democratic states devote fewer resources to their militaries. Low military spending is thought to avert conflict spirals and release more resources to fund domestic programs. While prominent in many liberal international relations theories, most notably in Immanuel Kant's, this proposition has received little empirical scrutiny. Using several indicators of military resource allocation and data on a wide range of states since 1816, we find empirical support for the liberal argument, although regime type is not necessarily the strongest influence on military resource allocation.     

Interregional relations and legitimacy in global governance: the EU in ASEM

This article explores the ramifications of the European Union’s (EU) internal legitimacy debate for its external relations. It applies the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a case study to examine the EU’s attempts to promote legitimacy in global governance, more specifically in interregional institutions. The article’s theoretical framework draws from the EU’s legitimacy debate. It identifies three key sources of legitimacy, namely, (i) input legitimacy or democratic control and accountability, (ii) output legitimacy or performance and achievement of core purposes, and (iii) the degree of common identity as externalised through collective representation and the articulation of shared norms and values. The empirical analysis thereafter leads to three observations. First, the EU’s presence has contributed to an increased democratic involvement by ASEM’s different stakeholders including parliaments and civil society. Second, purely from an institutional legitimacy perspective ASEM achieves its purpose as a forum to ‘constructively engage’ with Asian countries and address issues relating to global governance. Third, ASEM reveals the EU’s dual identity as an intergovernmental grouping and an organisation with a gradually increasing capacity of collective representation. However, the advancement of the EU’s normative objectives through ASEM has been problematic, leading to a more interest-based and pragmatic policy path. The article concludes that the EU’s legitimacy debate has had a bearing on relations with Asia and, in particular, with ASEM. Importantly, and given the EU’s setbacks, some elements of the ‘EU’s way’ have proven successful in promoting democratic notions of legitimacy beyond the state.     

Russia’s Neorevisionist Challenge to the Liberal International Order

Abstract

A conventional opinion is that Russia is trying to destroy the liberal international order. Russia indeed defies it, but also justifies its foreign policy with the liberal order’s normative frameworks and reproaches the West for not standing up to these norms. Moreover, Moscow does not present any alternative vision. Russia complains about the internal contradictions of the liberal order: sovereignty vs. intervention, pluralism vs. universality, US hegemony vs. equality and democracy, although it also exploits these contradictions. In fact Russia demands an adjustment of the liberal order rather than its eradication and should, therefore, be classified as a neorevisionist power. Two elements underlie Russia’s at times aggressive foreign policy conduct. The first one, its feeling of being ill-accommodated in the present order, predefines the direction of the policy. The second, the prioritisation of foreign policy over domestic reforms, explains the intensity of Russian discontent and its occasional aggressive manifestations. Russia’s domestic consensus regarding its foreign policy, including views on the liberal international order, facilitates this aggressiveness. Three policy conclusions can be drawn: acknowledging that Russia uses the inherent contradictions of the liberal international order opens up possibilities for dialogue and an eventual overcoming of the crisis; the survival and strengthening of the liberal order depends on its embrace of all major players, including Russia, and hence, the need for some adjustments to the order itself; and finally such adjustments presuppose Russia’s readiness to shoulder responsibility for the (reformed) liberal international order.     

Of ‘witch's brews’ and scholarly communities: the dangers and promise of academic parrhesia

In a series of lectures in the early 1980s, Michel Foucault resurrected the Greek word for frankness or truth-telling—‘parrhesia’—to investigate the inter-relationships and tensions that existed between freedom, truth-telling and political power. He concluded that in order for one to ‘tell the truth’ against a powerful superior, one needs the courage to oppose a community of which the parrhesiastes (‘truth teller’) is a member. This paper uses parrhesia to investigate the practice of the international relations (IR) scholar in speaking out against his or her scholarly community. Tony Smith's 2007 book Pact with the devil is used as an example of academic-intellectual parrhesia not only to illustrate the content of a potential form of parrhesia, but to demonstrate the challenges IR scholars who wish to practise academic parrhesia face in criticizing members of their academic community. Smith's critique of democratic peace theory specifically, and liberal IR theory more generally, is particularly noteworthy considering Smith's former position as a leading liberal proponent. The paper reviews, and then supplements and extends, Smith's critique of democratic peace theory.     

Liberalism and geopolitics in EU–Russia relations: rereading the “Baltic factor”

Contrary to some expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not followed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Baltic states became known as the “troublemakers” of EU–Russia relations. This was commonly explained by their history and national identity, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as marginal. The Ukraine crisis brought a reaction of “I told you so” by the Baltic states that for many years had been warning the West about Russia’s expansionist ambitions. This article explores the ideational underpinnings of the gap between the Baltic states’ perceptions of and relations with Russia on the one hand and mainstream views in Europe on the other. It identifies liberal interdependence, democratic peace, and realist geopolitics as key ideas that have framed the EU’s and Baltic states’ perceptions of Russia. In the vein of constructivist foreign policy analysis, these ideational structures are seen to condition the EU’s and Baltic states’ interests and policies vis-à-vis Russia. An analysis of the “Baltic factor” helps to illuminate the contradictions and shortcomings in the EU’s Russia policy and review its ideational basis which is now in need of a strategic rethink.     

The European ‘Other’ in Poland’s Conservative Identity Project

Since taking office in November 2015, Poland’s conservative government has pressed for a sweeping reinterpretation of the past, and a re-envisioning of the future, of the political community. This conservative identity project idealises the allegedly fully sovereign Poland of the interwar period and repudiates the normative commitments underpinning Poland’s accession to the European Union. The worldview of the conservative government’s liberal critics, by contrast, represents a fusion of the inclusive nationalism asserted in opposition to communist rule with the affirmation of a European identity. The reawakening of historically resonant debates about the nature of Poland’s European-ness, emphasizing the centrality of the (Western) European ‘other’ in Poland’s national idea, carries significant implications for its relations within the international environment.     

Responding to radical populism: Chavismo in Venezuela

What are the effective ways of responding to populists, especially radical populists in government? The pessimistic answer provided by Chavismo is that little can be done; most of the negative impact of highly populist movements cannot be avoided in the short to medium term. The reasons lie not only in Venezuela's unique oil-based economy, but in the country's previous failures of democratic governance, a condition shared by many developing countries. Such failures make it likely that radical populists will receive broad popular support. This does not suggest that international actors cannot play a useful role in responding to populism. But the most viable democratic strategy is a long-term one emphasizing patient efforts by domestic opponents to reorganize themselves into programmatic, pluralist options for the future.     

Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War

While realism has recently been subjected to intense examination with regard to its theoretical coherence, liberalism—often thought to be the bookend to realism—has so far escaped such scrutiny. Liberalism is generally defined in one of two ways, each faulty. The first definition is in terms of the dependent variable as any argument that expects growing cooperation and progress in international affairs, understood as increased peace and prosperity, seizing for liberalism any independent variable found important for potentially promoting international cooperation. Second, liberalism is defined in terms of the units of analysis as any argument that disaggregates the state into smaller units. This equates liberalism with an entire level of analysis. This strategy of appropriation is inappropriate. Approaches to international relations need a core logic in order to justify the inclusion of particular independent variables or the use of a particular level of analysis. Since so many other paradigms also lay claim to those same entities, we are left wondering if anybody is not a liberal. Appropriation leads us to miss crucial distinctions between alternative explanations of the same outcomes, such as the “liberal” phenomena of the democratic peace and the transformative effects of international organizations.     

The myth of liberal peace-building

‘Liberal peace-building’ is a subject of intense debate within contemporary IR. This article contends, however, that for all the merits of much of the work on the subject, the overall terms of the debate are rooted in a series of questionable assumptions. Proponents and critics alike hold that peace-building is an essentially liberal project, over which there is a global (or Western) consensus, and which is pursued by a decentralised plurality of institutions irrespective of the particularly of war-endings. This article shows that this is misleading. Focusing on the relations between peace agreements and peace-building, it shows that peace agreements are contextually specific political arrangements, driven above all by strategic considerations of power and legitimacy, in relation to which liberal peace-building doctrines and practices are unevenly applied, instrumentalised or plain ignored—including by international actors. It argues in turn that liberal peace-building discourse overstates both the liberalism of contemporary peace interventions, and the degree of global consensus thereover, and fails to capture the enduring centrality of states, strategy and geopolitics in the making of peace. These arguments are developed with reference to a wide range of cases of post-Cold War peace interventions, though with especial focus on UN peace-building in Cambodia in the early 1990s.     

Book reviews

Liberal democratic governments may differ in both their kind and degree of democracy. However, the literature too often conflates this distinction, hindering our ability to understand what kinds of governing structures are more democratic. To clarify this issue, the article examines two prominent contemporary models of democracy: developmental liberal democracy (DLD) and protective liberal democracy (PLD). While the former takes a ‘thicker’ approach to governance than the latter, conventional wisdom holds that these systems differ only in kind rather than degree. The article tests this assumption through an empirical comparison of electoral, legislative, and information-regulating institutions in two representative cases: Sweden and the United States. The empirical findings lead us to the conclusion that developmental liberal democracies represent not only a different kind, but also a deeper degree of democracy than protective liberal democracies. The implications for democracy promotion appear substantial.     

The Forgotten Prophet: Tom Paine's Cosmopolitanism and International Relations

The recent questions about the viability of political realism highlight a need for alternative theoretical frameworks to guide international relations research. These alternatives, however, have been slow to emerge, due in part to the field's traditional neglect of political theory. In this essay I present an alternative based on a survey of Paine's international thought. Sir Michael Howard referred to Paine as the most important internationalist writer of all time, but his contributions have been largely ignored by students of international relations. Paine was a classic second image theorist who first posited how democratic governance would promote a peaceful world. Paine's works leave us with all the features of cosmopolitan thinking in international relations: Faith in reason and progress, the evils of authoritarian regimes, the democratic peace, the peaceful effect of trade, nonprovocative defense policies, open diplomacy, obsolescence of conquest, the universal respect for human rights, and the democratic propensity to engage in messianic interventionism. I conclude with a comparison of Kant and Paine where I argue that Paine is the more faithful representative of the Enlightenment for students of international relations.