Counterterrorism as War: Identifying the Dangers,Risks, and Opportunity Costs of U.S. Strategy Toward Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates

The U.S. war on Al Qaeda is well into its second decade—why has this particular conflict been so difficult to end? This article argues it is not due to the strategic acumen of Al Qaeda, but because of the problems intrinsic to relying on war as the framework for U.S. counterterrorism policy. The normal means of ending wars are complicated with a terrorist enemy and at odds with strategies that have historically had success at the end stages of counterterror campaigns. Continuing along the current path risks an ongoing war the United States will likely neither win nor fully end.     

Microdisarmament and Compliance Costs: An Analysis of Disarmament,Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs

Focusing on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, this article considers why some armed groups disarm and demobilize, while others refuse to do so. Previous research focused on intergroup rivalries and identified enforcement as a critical barrier. This study considers the effect of (1) war benefits and (2) intragroup dynamics and argues that distribution problems obstruct conflict resolution. Using a simple game-theoretic model, the article demonstrates that optimal programs (1) consider that combatants' cost of supporting peace varies and (2) require a mix of positive and negative incentives to motivate all ex-combatants to participate and comply with program requirements.     

Transaction Costs,Information Technologies,and the Choice of Marketplace among Farmers in Northern Ghana

Abstract

Using a transactions costs framework, we examine the impact of information and communication technologies (mobile phones and radios) use on market participation in developing country agricultural markets using a novel transaction-level data set of Ghanaian farmers. Our analysis of the choice of markets by farmers suggests that market information from a broader range of markets may not always induce farmers to sell in more distant markets; instead farmers may use broader market information to enhance their bargaining power in closer markets. Finally, we find weak evidence on the impact of using mobile phones in attracting farm gate buyers.