Leadership change, legitimacy, and party transition in China

Using Max Weber’s theory of legitimacy and transition, this article suggests that the biggest challenge for China’s new leadership is to transform the Communist Party into an institutionalized ruling party. After analyzing the scenarios of democratization, legitimation, decay, or repression, resulting from the interactions between public contention and the ruling elite, this article argues that the CCP has accomplished the transition from a revolutionary to a reformist party but is now somewhere between claiming to “govern for the people” and “hanging on to power.” To become an institutionalized ruling party, the CCP needs to curtail official corruption and control its membership growth. There are, however, some serious political and personal limitations that China’s new leaders will have to overcome. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Yale University in 1988 and 1992 respectively. He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard University, research fellow at the Salzburg Seminar in Austria, and a visiting senior fellow at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore. His research interests include Chinese political institutions and leadership changes, theories of international relations, Taiwan-Strait relations, and U.S.-China relations. He is the author ofParty vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge University Press, 1997). The author wishes to thank John Watt, Joshua Forrest and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the draft version of this article.     

Hu Jintao and the CCP’s ideology: A historical perspective

The role of ideology in Chinese politics has experienced dramatic changes in the past six decades. Mao Zedong had tremendous power over the political institutions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During the Cultural Revolution, he mobilized the masses against the Party’s institutions in the name of Mao Zedong Thought. Deng Xiaoping significantly downplayed the role of ideology in politics by trying to avoid theoretical debates. Jiang Zemin invented a new thought, “Three Represents,” yet the thought was detached from his name when it was enshrined in the CCP Constitution. Most recently, as a result of the political succession at the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP, Jiang is no longer the most authoritative interpreter of the thought. Now it is Hu Jintao, new General Secretary of the CCP, who has become the official interpreter of the thought. He offered a new interpretation in his July 1^st speech on the “Three Represents” in 2003. It seems that ideology is no longer a personal trademark. It has become an asset of the Party and been institutionalized under Hu Jintao because Hu has become the legitimate interpreter of the Party’s ideology as the General Secretary of the Party. He will be the inaugural Joe and Teresa Long Endowed Chair in the Social Sciences at Tarleton State University in Stephenville, Texas in the Spring Semester of 2005. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He is the author ofChinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949 (Sharpe, 2002). The author wishes to thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments on the earlier drafts of this article, Stephine Corso, Nancy Hearst, and Fong Ruey-Jay for their research assistance, and Jessica Loon and Stephine Corso for their editorial assistance.     

To Build A “Harmonious World”: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South

This study attempts to answer a new but important question in China’s foreign policy— how Beijing has wielded its soft power to construct its ideal of international order in the age of China’s rise. Before empirical analyses, this study tries to set up a conceptual framework on the relations between the idea of “harmonious world” and China’s soft power wielding in its rising process. Within this framework, this study examines a rising China’s foreign policies towards three targeted regions in the global south—Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. On the one hand, due to Beijing’s carefully-designed and soft power-based foreign policies, the global south has become an increasingly harmonious environment for Beijing to cultivate a favorable national image, exert its political influence on regional affairs, benefit its own domestic economic developments, etc. On the other hand, some problems such as the so-called “China’s New Colonialism” and the increased vigilance from the other powers have already began to challenge Beijing’s harmony in those regions. Sheng Ding is assistant professor of political science at Bloomsburg University. He received both his masters and doctoral degrees from Rutgers. His research interests include soft power in international relations; transnational identity in globalization; information technology and world politics; politics in Pacific Asia; Chinese politics and foreign policy; U.S.-China relations, etc. His research articles have been published by Pacific Affairs, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics and East Asia: An International Quarterly. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on the draft of the paper.     

Two Diasporas: Overseas Chinese and Non-resident Indians in Their Homelands’ Political Economy

This paper, through a comparative study of the roles Chinese and Indian diasporas in the United States play in the political economy of their respective homelands, explores the relationship between the diaspora and homeland development and how this dynamic relationship contributes to economic growth and foreign relations of the homelands. The author argues that the roles of Indian and Chinese diasporas in their respective homelands’ development consistently reflect, and are heavily influenced by, their homelands’ economic development strategies as well as political history and culture. The author also argues that the impact of the diaspora on the foreign relations of their homelands is conditional upon the state of bilateral relations between their homeland and the country of residence. This study raises issues for future research, such as the relationship between the diaspora and regime type of the homeland. The author concludes by suggesting that since activities of overseas Chinese and non-resident Indians provide a unique perspective in the comparative study of Chinese and Indian political economy, the two diasporas warrant more scholarly and policy attention. Zhiqun Zhu, Ph.D. is currently Assistant Professor and Chair of International Political Economy and Diplomacy at the University of Bridgeport, Connecticut. He is the author of US-China Relations in the 21 ^st Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). His research and teaching interests include international political economy, East Asian politics, and US-China relations. He wishes to thank panelists at the 102^nd annual conference of the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia for their helpful comments. He also wants to acknowledge Dr. Dave Benjamin’s useful suggestions and editorial assistance.     

The 2001 “spy” plane incident revisited: the Chinese perspective

The 2001 “spy” plane incident was probably the most serious military incident in Sino-American relations since the 1970s, and it generated a crisis in the already brittle relationship since the new Bush administration came into office. This article attempts to revisit this incident from the Chinese perspective and provides some insight into the understanding of the Chinese foreign policy behavior and position on Sino-American relations. It presents the respective arguments concerning the responsibilities of the incident, explores the Chinese historical memory of US hegemonic behavior, and examines the Chinese perspective and attitude towards the incident and their causes through a study of the reactions of the Chinese government and the Chinese people to the incident.¹ He is the founding editor of theHong Kong Journal of Social Sciences and theJournal of Comparative Asian Development. He is also Guest Lecturer at the School of Government, Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, China. The author wishes to thank anonymous reveiwers for their helpful comments made on earlier drafts of this paper.     

The Logic of Comparative Politics and the Development of Political Science in China

This article attempts to discuss the debate about “indigenizing political science in China” from the logic of comparative politics. The author believes that the phrase “indigenizing political science in China” is misleading at best and destructive to political science development in China at worst. The logic of comparative politics is the same as other comparative social sciences: namely, it is the process of replacing proper names and treating tempo and spatial factors as potential variables contributing to the explanation of political phenomena. As social scientists, we should not be content in using “local Chinese conditions” or “special Chinese cultural factors” to explain political behavior and phenomena in China. Instead, we should decompose the “special Chinese conditions” and “cultural factors” for the deeper meaning of these conditions and factors so that we can conceptualize and elevate these conditions and factors to a theoretical level. In short, the author favors making political science study in China more scientific and argues that the future of political science studies in China lies in replacing the proper name “China” or “Chinese”.     

Political legitimacy and china’s transition

This study reveals a distinctive Chinese cognitive model of political legitimacy, and analyzes how political leaders in Beijing have maintained its legitimacy through cultivating different elements of this traditional model. The central argument developed in this study is that so far the government in Beijing has shown remarkable adaptability to a changing political environment. However, the transition towards a market economy has redefined the meanings of the century-old cognitive model. Consequently, the existing system of legitimization is being seriously challenged. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Brandies University. His recent articles appeared onAsian Survey, Modern China Studies, Twenty First Century (Hong Kong), andAmerican Review of China Studies. The author wishes to thank for the helpful comments made on earlier drafts of this paper by Yang Zhong, A. Jack Waskey, He Li, Jim Stevenson, John Hebestreet, Tang Wei, and anonymous reviewers.     

Can it start small, but end big? expanding social assistance in South Africa

Generating heated politics in South Africa is a proposal to introduce a universal basic income grant, known as “BIG”. The “gaps” in the existing system of social assistance grants have caught the attention of activists and politicians across the political spectrum. Most concur on the need to expand the system, but the issue of how its “gaps” should be closed is a matter of great political divergence. To cast light on the significance of these debates, I show how the system's “gaps” are more complicated than measurements of poverty and inequality may suggest. Following the social and economic relations that develop around social grants, my analysis foregrounds a tension in the existing assistance system. Social grants provide a critical source of income for recipients and their kin, assisting them to confront the challenging realities of current labor market conditions. At the same time, social grants act as conduits for historical forces to articulate with local conditions and reshape relationships between citizens, the state, and the market. This tension points to the ambiguity of the BIG proposal and of its potential to engender a larger transformation. My research in South Africa was supported by grants from the Human Rights Program and the Richter Fund at the University of Chicago. I would like to thank the South Africans I interviewed at welfare offices and legal advice centers about the social assistance system and the experience of receiving grants. I also thank Makhotso Pholosi, Tebogo Segale, Pumi Yeni, the staff at the Legal Resources Centre in Pretoria, and my advisors, Jean Comaroff and Jennifer Cole. A version of this paper was presented at the 2002 conference of the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network and I thank the members of the panel on the South African Basic Income Proposal for their input.     

Resolving China’s Island Disputes: A Two-Level Game Analysis

Although territorial disputes have been much studied, the application of “two-level game” analysis in peace research and conflict resolution is still relatively unexplored. In this essay, I seek to use the analytical propositions derived from this “two-level game” bargaining framework to explain the success, failure, or partial resolution of sovereignty negotiations over China’s island claims to the disputed islands of the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Amur/Ussuri rivers, and South China Sea. This essay will focus on the interaction between governments and domestic nationalist groups, the role of institutions, and the strategies of negotiators to explain the development of the territorial disputes. I will evaluate how different political and social preferences, historical memories, economic priorities, side payments, and institutional constraints affect inter-state bargaining behavior and relations between the government and different segments of society. Basically, I am interested in finding out what significant roles national, sub-national and transnational actors can and do play in aggravating, minimizing, terminating or preventing conflicts over island claims involving China. Dr. Chien-peng Chung is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Sociology of Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He is the author of Domestic Politics, International Bargaining, and China’s Territorial Disputes (London & New York: Routledge, 2004).     

Taiwan’s power reconfiguration and its impact on cross-strait relations

This paper explores Taiwan’s power reconfiguration resulted from the 2000 presidential election and its implication for the perplexed cross-Strait Strait relations. It looks back at Taiwan’s party transformations on the part of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) over the past decade, discusses several important factors directly related to the victory of the DPP, and analyzes Taipei’s post-election political arrangements and conciliatory gestures toward Beijing. The paper concludes that given the political disparity between mainland China and Taiwan as well as the transitory nature of Taipei’s new government, Beijing will continue its “wait and see” policy toward Taipei, hence the chance for political dialogue between the two sides is slim in the foreseeable future. He served as President of the Association of Chinese Political Studies from 1998 to 1999. He writes on Chinese politics and cross-Taiwan Strait relations. Most recently, he co-edited Transition toward the Post-Deng China (forthcoming in 2001) and Prospects for Cross-Taiwan Strait Developments (2000). He received a Ph.D. in political science from Pennsylvania State University (1997). Gang Lin is Program Associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. This article reflects the author’s personal viewpoints only.     

China’s Harmonious World: Beyond Cultural Interpretations

A culture “specter” is haunting the ongoing discourse regarding China’s declared policy of “peaceful rise” for a “harmonious world.” While some Western scholars “cherry-pick” “evidence” of China’s aggressiveness from Confucius legacies, the same cultural heritage is heavily tapped by many Chinese scholars to interpret the current policy of striving for internal and external harmony. Both seem to ignore, though to different degrees, the historically specific political environment, within which the cultural elements function and interact with other socio-political variables. China’s current pursuit of harmony is possible and desirable only at a time when China is able to achieve sustained sociopolitical stability (30 years) in the past 160 years and after its protracted encounter and experiment with Western liberalism, Marxism and capitalism. Although it has not explicitly rejected any of these Western ideologies, China has tested the limits of all of them—hence China’s search for its own identity and policy alternatives at the onset of the new millennium. It is toward a more historical and holistic explanation that this paper constructs the political space and historical trajectory of China’s search for modernity and for itself in the past two centuries and into the future. Yu Bin is Professor of Political Science and Director of East Asian Studies at Wittenberg University, Ohio, USA; Senior Fellow at Shanghai Institute of American Studies; analyst on Russian-China relations for Pacific Forum (CSIS) in Honolulu, Hawaii; and former president of Association of Chinese Political Studies (1992-94). Yu is the author and co-author of several books including the most recent ones: The Government of China (Stockton, NJ.: OTTN Publishing, 2006); Power of the moment: America and the world after 9-11 [Shunjian de Liliang: 9-11 Hou de Meiguo Yu Shijie] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2002); and Mao’s Generals Remember Korean (The University Press of Kansas, 2001). He has published more than 60 articles in journals including World Politics, Strategic Review, Asian Survey, International Politics Quarterly (Beijing), The China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, International Journal of Korean Studies, Harvard International Review, Comparative Connections, etc.     

Leadership transition and Chinese foreign polic

This essay examines the nature of China’s leadership transition, contending perspectives on Chinese foreign policy, and new foreign policy orientation. By examining leadership transition and new policy development, this essay demonstrates change and continuity in Chinese foreign policy. For analyzing new policy orientation, the following points require special attention. First, the fundamental goal of Chinese foreign policy is to create a peaceful environment for socioeconomic development. Second, “do not seek enemy” has become an essential part of China’s foreign policy. Third, pragmatism and professionalism are becoming key features of Beijing’s diplomacy. Finally, China’s new leaders are facing enormous domestic and international challenges. They must learn to balance domestic and international concerns in order to achieve peace and development. He is the author ofStates and Markets: Comparing Japan and Russia, co-author ofAmerican Foreign Policy and U.S.-China Relations, and co-editor ofNew Directions in Chinese Politics for the New Millennium. He has recently editedChinese Foreign Policy in Transition (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, forthcoming). The author would like to express his appreciation to William Dorrill, He Li, Lucian W. Pye, Wei Tang, Zhiqun Zhu, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association in August 2003.     

The “Role” of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy: A Reactive Model of Nationalism & Conflict

A growing literature has sought to address the question of Chinese nationalism, and particularly whether or not its rise over the last decade could make China more prone to international conflict. Yet these discussions have often not been well grounded in either theories of nationalism or international relations (IR) theory. This paper will seek to fill this gap by using a constructivist approach to examine how nationalism is constituted by the interaction of states. By doing so, it will be argued that Chinese nationalism can best be understood as a reactive response to international events rather than domestic political manipulation. Michael Alan Brittingham is a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at McDaniel College. He has previously taught at the University of Louisville. In 2005, he completed his dissertation entitled, “Reactive Nationalism and Its Prospects for Conflict: The Taiwan Issue, Sino-US Relations, & the ‘Role’ of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy” in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. His current research interests include international relations theory, Chinese foreign policy, and nationalism.     

Religious policies in post-totalitarian China: Maintaining political monopoly over a reviving society

In the post-Mao era China’s society and religion are both becoming increasingly pluralistic. State policies toward religion are also evolving. Views of state-society relations as “totalitarian” exaggerate the state’s control; the civil-society approach overestimates society’s autonomy. This paper explains the state’s religious policies in terms of a “post-totalitarian” frame of reference. Religious organizations and the Communist Party share a reliance on ideology and organization to operate and survive, making them potential rivals. As a shrewd monopolist of organizational and ideological instruments, the state seeks to reduce the threat posed by religion, adopting differentiated strategies toward them as they revive. The state co-opts, tolerates, deters, restricts, or suppresses different religions or sects, according to each specific religion’s organizational strength, doctrine, and compliance with state authority. The state is thus able to prevent the rise of large, independent, and organized religious groups while leaving considerable space for religious activity. Dr. H. H. Lai is a faculty member the National University of Singapore who has researched on China’s state-society relations. The author would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their comments and Mr. Kelly for his thorough and helpful copy editing.     

Foreign trade and investment in Guangxi: A comparative analysis

Guangxi’s geographical location in the Southwest region of mainland China has resulted in its delay of economic modernization until 1992, compared to those coastal provinces in the southeast. In order to stimulate its economic development, Guangxi has to enhance its foreign trade, including border trade, with neighboring countries and to introduce and utilize foreign direct investment from abroad for its infrastructures and manufactures. In analyzing the case of Guangxi, this paper tries to make a comparison between Guangxi on the one hand and Guangdong and Yunnan on the other, and then to find the different patterns in the process of their economic development in terms of their structures of foreign trade and foreign direct investment. This paper also addresses the issue of central-local relations by explaining the disruption of a planned economy in mainland China and the decline of central government in regulating local economic activities. She received her MA degree from The City University of New York. Her major research interest is in provincial and regional economic development in mainland China. Currently she is working on a project of state-owned enterprises in mainland China. Her recent publications include “The Pattern of Guangdong’s Foreign Trade: An Analysis,” Mainland China Studies, Vol.41, no.2 (February 1998) and “Regional Economic Integration and Yunnan’s Foreign Trade,” Mainland China Studies, Vol.41, no. 5 (May 1998).     

Citizens’ Perceptions of Governance in Rural and Urban China

This article presents three main findings from a purposive stratified survey of urban and rural residents. First, Chinese citizens “disaggregate” the state with high levels of satisfaction for Central government that fall dramatically as government gets closer to the people. Satisfaction levels are noticeably lower for those in rural China. Second, attitudes about the way policy is implemented by local governments raise concerns. Irrespective of place of residence, respondents feel that when implementing policy local officials and governments are mainly concerned with their own interests, are more receptive to the views of their superiors rather than those of ordinary people, favor those with money, and are formalistic in implementing policy rather than dealing with actual problems. Third, the areas of work that citizens would really like government to concentrate on are job creation and providing basic guarantees to protect against the shocks of the transition to a market economy. Tony Saich is the Daewoo Professor of International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Director of the Harvard University Asia Center. His recent research focuses on the development of social policy in China, particularly on the provision of public goods by local governments. His publications include Governance and Politics of China by Palgrave and edited volumes on Financial Sector Reform in China (with Yasheng Huang and Edward Steinfeld) and AIDS and Social Policy in China (with Joan Kaufman and Arthur Kleinman both by Harvard University Asia Center. He would like to thank Edward Cunningham for his great help in preparing this article. He also wants to thank Victor Yuan (Horizon Market Research Company) for his tremendous help in designing the survey and implementing it. In addition, I would like to thank Anita Chan, Martin King Whyte and two anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Rivalry between Taiwan and the PRC in Latin America

Latin America and the Caribbean have been a major battleground of the “foreign policy war” between Taiwan and the PRC over international legitimacy, and recognition. This paper analyzes the growing rivalry between China and Taiwan and its implications. The first part of the paper examines the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean for both Beijing and Taipei. The second section explores political aspects of their involvement in the region. The third part assesses how Beijing and Taipei use economic diplomacy to meet their diplomatic objectives in Latin America. The fourth section examines the implications of the increasing rivalry between Taipei and Beijing in the region. This study is supported by a Fulbright scholarship and a faculty development grant from Merrimack College. The views in the paper are entirely mine and should not be ascribed to the institutions acknowledged above. I would like to express my appreciation to Wang Hsiu-chi at Tamkang University in Taiwan who provided me with excellent facilities during my field trip to Taiwan. Author would like to thank Curtis Martin, Lowell Dittmer, Xiaogang Deng, Antonio Hsiang, Tchen Tchiang, Baohui Zhang, Baogang Guo, Guoli Liu, Ping Li, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the International Symposium on National Identity and the Future Cross-Strait Relations, University of Macau, in December, 2004.     

Politicization as a strategy for recognition and enforcement of human rights in Kenya

Drawing from recent advocacy efforts on the right to education in Kenya, this article argues that linking human rights to local political struggles is a useful way of ensuring their realization. Human rights are legal and moral but their realization is a political project. The form that this project takes will differ from context to context. While paying due regard to the remarkable contribution of international human rights regimes and transnational advocacy of the last fifty years in providing the world with a powerful legal and moral vocabulary of rights, this article suggests that this vocabulary risks losing its edge unless those working in the field of human rights recognize the necessity of local politics. The article examines the activities of the Kenyan human rights movement and its strategic linking of access to basic education with repression of political freedoms. I would like to thank participants at the May 9–10, 2003 “Rights in Africa” conference at North-wester University, Illinois, for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Enigma of all enigmas: Capitalist takeover? Assessment of the post-mao economic transformation

Post-Mao’s economic reforms have led many China analysts to observe that post-Mao China has been moving toward capitalism or “capitalist takeover” has occurred in post-Mao China. This observation has a significant implication both for the US foreign economic policy and in the study of regime change in post-Mao China. The purpose of this article is to revisit and reassess the economic transformation in post-Mao China to obtain a holistic understanding of the central reality in post-Mao China on the one side, while on the other to rebut the assertion of “capitalist takeover” in post-Mao China. Through a systematic survey of party documents, policy statements, leaders’ speeches, official newspapers and magazines, general academic studies on the post-Mao reform in English and in Chinese, this article examines the post-Mao economic transformation along the three key empirical dimensions in terms of systemic change: the existence of capitalist elements, the ownership structure, and the role of the market in the Chinese economy. The findings based on fresh empirical evidence suggest that China has not made any significant change from communism toward capitalism in any of those fields despite the considerable change made in the past 20 years. Sujian Guo was a former policy analyst at the Party Central Committee during 1987–1991. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, writing a dissertation entitled “The Totalitarian Model Revisited: Assessing the Post-Mao Regime Change.” His areas of specialization are Comparative Politics, International Relations and Political Methodology. His research interests have focused on comparative communist and post-communist studies, democratic transition/democratization, regime change in post-Mao China, China/Asian politics. His publications include numerous articles in some of the above areas. His most recent articles appeared inCommunist and Post-Communist Studies, Issues & Studies, andJournal of Northeast Asian Studies.     

Elite politics and the fourth generation of chinese leadership

The personnel reshuffle at the 16^th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is widely regarded as the first smooth and peaceful transition of power in the Party’s history. Some China observers have even argued that China’s political succession has been institutionalized. While this paper recognizes that the Congress may provide the most obvious manifestation of the institutionalization of political succession, this does not necessarily mean that the informal nature of politics is no longer important. Instead, the paper contends that Chinese political succession continues to be dictated by the rule of man although institutionalization may have conditioned such a process. Jiang Zemin has succeeded in securing a legacy for himself with his “Three Represents” theory and in putting his own men in key positions of the Party and government. All these present challenges to Hu Jintao, Jiang’s successor. Although not new to politics, Hu would have to tread cautiously if he is to succeed in consolidating power. The authors are grateful to the two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on the paper.