Political competition

Nomination: In search of the 'big:rsquo; model of political competition by Michael Laver, p.179
Reflections: Coalition politics and representative democracy by Norman Schofield, p.183     

Political competition

Abstract Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.     

Rent seeking and market competition

This paper emphasizes that political behavior of interest groups is a result of economic calculation, and therefore is affected by the market conditions under which they operate. We develop a two-stage game to link political and market decision-making. We find that if unproductive rent-seekingdirectly contributes to rent-seekers' market operations, then their lobbying efforts will be excessive if the number of outsiders is relatively large, restrained if it is relatively small. If rent-seekingdirectly impairs rent-seekers' market operations, the above described behavior will be reversed. The analysis also reveals that as wasteful rent-seeking may increase rent-seeker's production cost, market competition shifts production from now less efficient rent-seekers to their non-rent-seeking rivals. Welfare gains from this shift may overshadow the direct waste of influence activities.     

Communication and competition in environmental studies

College-bound students and graduate students interested in environmental studies and environmental science have hundreds of programs to choose from, and potential suitors in the academy are eager to be noticed. This article considers how purveyors of environment-related degree programs and majors use branding and other communication strategies as they compete for students and other coveted resources. Departmental and degree nomenclature is examined so as to discern how academic institutions respond to changing intellectual fashions and popular interest in environmental affairs. This analysis is aided by Harold D. Lasswell’s insights into the politics of communication.     

Campaign finance reform and electoral competition

Using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002, this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races. This is reflected in several dimensions. Conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins. The regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office. And they increase the probability that incumbents win re-election. Campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent.     

Competence and ambiguity in electoral competition

The level of competence that voters attribute to different candidates is an important determinant of election results. In addition, it is observed that some candidates tend to be more ambiguous in their campaigns regarding future plans, while others commit to specific policies. We offer a model where politicians who vary in their level of competence compete by making costly campaign declarations. We show that a separating equilibrium exists in which the ambiguity of a candidate’s campaign declaration reveals her level of competence. The model explains how politicians may use an “issue”-based campaign to create a competent image, and provides an additional explanation for different levels of campaign ambiguity.     

Electoral competition and the welfare state

The article investigates how parties compete over the welfare state by emphasising specific welfare state issues. The core argument is that two issue-specific factors determine how much parties emphasise individual welfare state issues: the character of policy problems related to the policy issues and the type of social risks involved. To test the argument, a new large-N dataset is employed, with election manifestos from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The dataset contains information on how much parties have talked about health care, education, and labour market protection in national elections since 1980. With the data at hand, it is possible to provide the first systematic investigation of how parties compete for votes over the welfare state. The approach here is able to explain the empirical fact that health care is consistently receiving increased attention everywhere, while particularly labour market protection has witnessed a decline in attention.     

Cooperation and competition in public welfare policies

Present public welfare policies and various proposals for reforming them do not often exploit the advantages of cooperation between otherwise competing altruists. The article examines this principle from a number of perspectives. It shows first how the advantages of the existing cooperative payments structure could be lost in some widely-publicized welfare reform proposals, and it makes a suggestion for retaining these advantages. The article next shows how the same principle could be used to improve existing incentives for private giving. Finally, it uses the same logic to rationalize newly evolving notions of sharing responsibility between governments and the recipients themselves.     

A note on seniority and political competition

Seniority conveys political power to legislators despite the fact that all legislators have equally valuable voting power. What prevents a coalition of junior members from exercising their political power to form a coalition and claim an equal share of the power by eliminating the benefits of seniority? Several models explain how valuable services are supplied by senior members, so the returns to seniority may be looked at as compensation for their services. This still does not explain why the providers of those services should be chosen based on seniority rather than on some other criterion.Seniority is used because it provides benefits to every member of the legislature. Legislators want to be reelected, and regardless of the seniority level of an individual in the legislature, the incumbent will always have more seniority when running for reelection than the challenger. Since voters benefit from being represented by more senior representatives, the seniority system enhances the reelection chances of even the most junior representative.     

浅谈经济竞争中机会均等的公平竞争原则

市场经济是以竞争机制作为资源配置和利益分配功能的经济运行机制,但这种竞争必须是机会均等的公平竞争。为进一步完善竞争性市场经济体制,必须贯彻经济竞争中机会均等的公平竞争原则。为此,必须赋予各类经济主体平等参与市场竞争的主体资格,同时给予所有经济主体参与市场竞争的平等待遇。唯其如此,才能实现经济竞争中内蕴的优化资源配置、提高经济效率的目的。