"Out With The Old, In With The New": The New Federalism, Intergovernmental Coordination, and Executive Order 12372

An important New Federalism initiative of the Reagan administrationhas been the effort to ease the burdens of intergovernmentalregulation, and in particular to alter the system of intergovernmentalcoordination. The issuance in 1982 of Executive Order 12372,to replace OMB Circular A-95, triggered spirited controversyand intensive negotiations among major institutional actorsin intergovernmental coordination. The year 1983 ended withseveral key issues largely settled, but with other questions(e.g., the continuing role of OMB, and a number of proceduralconcerns) still unresolved.     

Using the "F" Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse

Indonesia cast off Dutch-imposed federalism in favor of a unitarystate. Soeharto's centralization made federalism taboo in theNew Order. In the current reform period, however, the conceptis re-emerging, but federalism has yet to be discussed in anopen, inclusive, and balanced manner. Decentralization policyis focused on the district, neglecting the political demandsof the larger province. This policy is accompanied by a confusedand misleading official discourse that is consistent with theideology of power retention and maintenance of patrimonial governance.As a result of greater democratization of the polity, federalismis slowly entering official discourse. Although its prospectsin the short term remain dim, support may grow for federal principleswithin Indonesia's unitary structure.     

Corporatism and Regional Economic Policies in the Federal Republic of Germany: The "Meso" Politics of Industrial Adjustment

This article examines corporatist theory (business, labor, governmentinteraction) in the context of regional governments and economicpolicy in the Federal Republic of Germany. West German regionalgovernments, far more than the federal government, have actedto shape industrial adjustment and enhance international competitiveness.Corporatist theory is analyzed in the context of its evolutionfrom a macro to a meso variant, which attempts to address sector-andregion-specific forms of economic dislocation. The new meso-corporatistapproach is found insufficient because it looks only at privateinterests and neglects the regional politics of industrial adjustment.The very different "meso-political" patterns of adjustment areexamined here in a synthetic review of recent research on economicpolicymaking in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and North-RhineWestphalia. Meso-corporatism may still prove useful theoretically,but only if it includes the role of regional governments.     

Federalism and The Politics of Tobacco

Late in 1998, the United States acquired a new regime of tobaccocontrol engineered by the states' attorneys general. Nearlyall of them had filed lawsuits against the major cigarette manufacturers,allegedly with the aim of recouping Medicaid costs attributableto smoking. Despite latent differences of culture and interestin regard to tobacco control, all of the states eventually joinedin settlements with the industry that exacted large paymentsand restricted the industry's advertising and marketing practices.This article explains how it was possible for many differentpolities to agree on the settlement terms, and asks what thecase shows about the impact of federalism on tobacco policymaking.It concludes that tobacco policymaking in the 30 years priorto the lawsuits (1964–1994) was more consonant with constitutionalprinciples and not ineffective in achieving control.     

Madison on the Meaning of the "General Welfare," the "Purpose" of Enumerated Powers, and the "Definition" of Constitutional Government

According to James Madison, "the most important and fundamentalquestion" he ever addressed was the meaning of and relationbetween the general welfare clause and the enumeration of particularpowers. This question is the most "fundamental" because theanswer determines the very "idea" or "nature" of the U.S. Constitution.Commentators virtually agree on the answer Madison proposedand defended in Federalist 41, namely, that the general welfareclause is neither a statement of ends nor a substantive grantof power. It is a mere "synonym" for the enumeration of particularpowers, which are limited and wholly define its content. Fromthis answer, it follows that the primary meaning of the nationaldimension of the federal Constitution is limited government,understood as a government with a limited number of powers ormeans. The thesis of this essay, however, is that, contraryto the commentators' claims, Madison argued that the clausewas a substantive grant of power for the generally stated endand that the primary purpose of the ensuing enumeration wasto define more particularly the ends alluded to by the phrase"general welfare." Hence, the meaning of the general constitutionalgovernment in the American federal system is a government orientedto a limited number of limited ends.     

Jefferson and Executive Power: Revisionism and the "Revolution of 1800"

Thomas Jefferson's varied and divergent statements concerningthe nature and extent of executive power seem to defy interpretation.Evidence can be gathered to support the proposition that Jeffersonwas a determined foe of Hamilton's conception of the chief executiveor that he was an active partisan of that view. The argumentof this article is that as opportunities arose, Jefferson setout to revise the public understanding of the formal powersof the president and, in so doing, moved away from his earlierposition on the extent of those powers. Jefferson's purposewas to check what he perceived to be the dangerous "monarchic"designs of the Federalists and, in turn, reinvigorate the republicanspirit of the regime. At the same time, Jefferson did not discardhis appreciation for the necessity of resorting at times toan enlarged executive authority. How Jefferson set about tobalance these elements in his revised conception of the presidencyraises in a direct fashion key questions about the role of executivepower in a popular government dedicated to the rule of law.     

"Soft" Concepts and "Hard" Data: A Research Review of Elazar's Political Culture

This introduction suggests that research on Daniel J. Elazar'sconcept of political culture falls into several genres. Theseare origins, political theory, cultural attributes of the politicalsystem, the policy process, policy outputs, and attitudes incitizens and elites. Research illustrating these genres is analyzedand further research needs are pointed out. The genres may becategorized by David Easton 's heuristic of system analysis.These concepts frame comments on the contributors' articles.     

The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era

During the period of the Bush Presidency, the federal governmentproceeded to centralize and nationalize policy in major areasformerly controlled by states and localities. The extensionof federal goals and standards to such areas as education testing,sales tax collection, emergency management, infrastructure,and elections administration were among the areas of significantmandates and preemptions. The continuation of policy centralizationin areas under a conservative and unified political regime showshow strong and deep the roots are for centralizing policy actionsin our intergovernmental system.     

The Impact of Electoral Reform: "Open Elections" and the Louisiana Party System

This article examines effects of the "open-elections" law passedby the Louisiana legislature in 1975. The law eliminated traditionalclosed party primaries, creating instead, an open-electionssystem that requires all candidates, regardless of party affiliation,to appear on the same ballot. By and large, the new system hasnot had a significant effect on party competition, party success,or voter turnout in Louisiana.     

The Institutional Basis of Secessionist Politics: Federalism and Secession in the United States

According to the literature on secession, the most importantdeterminant of secessionist sentiment is a high level of grievanceexperienced by the would-be secessionist group. However, therationale behind using secession (as opposed to another strategy)as a grievance-amelioration strategy remains almost completelyunexplained. This article contends that the institutional settingin which political conflict and grievance are experienced playsa crucial role in whether secession is conceived of as a viableoption. This contention is tested by examining the institutionalenvironment of federalism and the role it played in secessionin the United States in 1860 and 1861. The United States wasuniquely vulnerable to secessionist pressures—as are allfederal states, potentially—because of institutional structuresthat gave constituent states a high level of institutional authorityand capacity; this, in turn, contributed to a discourse of states'rights that included the contested right to secede.     

"Europe of the Regions" and the Federalization of Europe

There is a close connection between regionalism, federalism,and the movement to create a united federal Europe. The recentmovement to create a "Europe of the Regions" is one expressionof these connections. However, there are many kinds of regions,and certain forms of regional policy that may not necessarilybe an expression of either regionalism or European federalism.It might be said, nevertheless, that a "Europe of the Regions"is emerging in the weaker sense that, in today s Europe, significantchanges are taking place in the nature and functions of thenation-state. These changes are providing new opportunitiesfor regions to become more important policy actors in a widerEuropean context. The nation-state, however, is unlikely todisappear.     

Intergovernmental Relations and the Advocacy Coalition Framework: The Operation of Federalism in Denver Water Politics

The relationship between intergovernmental relations and theformulation and implementation of public policies is not wellunderstood by scholars. Borrowing from the advocacy coalitionframework, this study contends that public policies reflectthe strategic choices of federal, state, and local actors operatingwithin policy subsystems. The success of various governmentalpolicy strategies is dependent on the autonomy of each actorand the level of policy fragmentation within the subsystem.These variables are defined, operationalized, and examined withinthe context of intergovernmental relations in Denver water politics.     

Second Thoughts on Europe's "Third Level": The European Union's Committee of the Regions

The Maastricht Treaty provided for a consultative Committeeof the Regions to bring the European Union's "third level" intothe deliberation of legislation. It began to operate in early1994. This article assesses its creation and recent activityagainst the expectations and demands that were expressed atthe outset, looking in turn at the representative, advisory,and symbolic functions the new body can perform. What emergesis a largely symbolic body that suffers from entrenched internaldivisions and functional overreach in the absence of any realinfluence on the Union's policymaking process. The danger isa downward spiral of progressive obscurity and the frustrationof its members' aspirations.     

"Europe with the Regions": Channels of Regional Representation in the European Union

One of the most important consequences of European integrationis the multiplication of extra-national channels for subnationalpolitical activity. Territorial relations are being transformed:national slates are losing control over important areas of decisionmaking, a variety of new channels have been created for regionalmobilization, and subnational governmentsare engaged in innovative,transnational, patterns of interaction. Regions, however, donot engage in these activities equally. There is no congruencein the political role of cities, municipalities, and regionsin the European Union. On the contrary, there are enormous differencesinthe level of organization, financial resources, politicalautonomy, and political influence of subnational governmentsacross Europe. The result is the unfolding of common threadsof change against a background of persisting variation.     

"Conquered Provinces"? The Voting Rights Act and State Power

Congress will soon review key provisions of the Voting RightsAct (VRA). A perennial concern has been the act's effect onfederalism. In 1982, Congress amended the VRA both to preventdiscriminatory electoral outcomes and to enhance minority politicalpower. Since the 1990s, the Supreme Court has adjudicated theVRA in a way that limits states' use of race to protect thatpower. An informal alliance has since emerged between Congress,the Justice Department, states, and minority voters againstwhat they view as a retrogressive voting rights jurisprudence.This article will argue that Congress should restore state autonomyto use race as a remedial factor when districting by reaffirmingthe spirit and intent of the 1982 amendments.     

The Politics of Indian Gaming: Tribe/State Relations and American Federalism

Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988,gambling on reservations has become a multibillion dollar industry.The act, however, has led to jurisdictional conflicts betweentribes and states. These conflicts are redefining the positionand role of Indian tribes in American federalism. As the tribeshave gained autonomy, states have lost jurisdictional powerand control. The federal government has become the arbiter inthe disputes and, as such, has continued to maintain its positionof supremacy and power over both tribes and states.     

The Color of Devolution: Race, Federalism, and the Politics of Social Control

In this article, we seek to advance scholarship on the origins and consequences of policy devolution by analyzing state decisions to give local authorities control over welfare policy. The first part of our analysis explores the political forces that systematically influence state decisions to cede policy control to lower-level jurisdictions. In this context, we propose a general Racial Classification Model of how race influences social policy choice. Our findings support this model as well as social control perspectives on welfare provision. Building on these results, we then show how modest but consistent racial effects on policy choices concatenate to produce large disparities in the overall policy regimes that racial groups encounter in the federal system. The empirical findings illuminate the fundamental role that federalism plays in the production of contemporary racial disparities and in the recent turn toward neoliberal and paternalist policies in American poverty governance.