Understanding voluntary program performance: Introducing the diffusion network perspective

Voluntary programs have rapidly become a means for the public, private, and third sectors to regulate and govern complex societal problems. Following the rapid and widespread emergence of these programs, scholars have been active in mapping, exploring, and interrogating their design and performance. Considerable advances have been made in describing program design and context conditions, and the actors involved in the voluntary program that relate to program performance. Less is known, however, about how these conditions affect program performance. Starting with one of the dominant theories on voluntary programs, the club theory perspective, this article seeks to understand how different program design conditions interact to affect the performance of 26 voluntary programs for low carbon building and city development in Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States. Applying qualitative comparative analysis, the study finds that the club theory perspective has limited explanatory power for this specific set of cases. Iterative rounds of analysis indicate that a diffusion network perspective is the best complementary perspective for explaining the performance of this set of programs. The article concludes that, in situations of a non‐homogeneous market of voluntary program participants, a focus on the programs’ diffusion networks helps to explain their performance. This has implications for the design and implementation of such programs.     

Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations

This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals. I argue that lobbying success is a function of how well finance is able to speak with a unified voice. Building on existing studies, I examine industry unity as explicit preference alignment between actors but also in terms of actors abstaining from stating preferences. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policymakers about issue saliency and industry support. Using a novel dataset derived from document coding and interviews, I examine the impact of industry unity on lobbying success in shaping six financial regulatory proposals in the context of the European Union. My findings show that lobbying success is partially contingent on the extent to which finance is united behind a common position. Critically, however, lobbying success is also related to the nature of that position, whether supporting the proposal or whether in favor of strengthening or weakening regulatory stringency.     

Free riding in voluntary environmental programs: The case of the U.S. EPA WasteWise program

Voluntary Environmental Programs (VPs) involving industry and regulatory agencies have emerged as the promise of the future in environmental policy circles. Although the number of these agreements is increasing in OECD countries, there are still concerns about their effectiveness; in particular that “free-riding” behavior may be difficult to avoid within VPs. Free riding occurs when one firm benefits from the actions of another without sharing the costs. Free-riding behavior may undermine the credibility of VPs and therefore their viability. Our paper focuses on understanding the factors that favor or hamper free-riding behavior in VPs. Our analysis is based on the case of the WasteWise program that was established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to reduce municipal solid waste.     

Participation rationales,regulatory enforcement,and compliance motivations in a voluntary program context

This article extends the study of regulatory compliance motivations from “traditional” regulatory settings to a government-sponsored voluntary one. We argue that the rationale(s) which motivate participants to engage a voluntary program likely shape which motivations drive them toward (or away from) program compliance. Our study examines the possible influence of program participation rationales alongside that of regulatory agents' enforcement styles and strategies. Leveraging a national survey of certified United States Department of Agriculture organic producers, we find that the more a producer pursues organic certification to increase profits, the more likely they are to report deterrent fears as an important compliance motivation. In contrast, the more a producer becomes certified to support the organic movement, the more heavily they weigh a personal sense of duty to comply. We discuss the implications of these, and other, study findings for compliance motivations theory and voluntary program integrity.     

Limited government: An incoherent concept

Advocates of limited government argue that the role of government should be limited to preventing the use of coercion in exchanges and stopping people from harming others. They believe that government should not seek to change the distribution of wealth from that arising through voluntary exchange nor to influence the preferences people hold. But this view proves to be self-contradictory or incoherent. In order to define coercion and permissible harm, governments must make enormous numbers of determinations about how people are entitled to behave. These determinations, in addition to demanding extensive government activity, will also have important effects on the distribution of wealth and the preferences people hold.     

Understanding Public Sector Ethics: Beyond Agency Theory in Canada's Sponsorship Scandal

ABSTRACT

Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged.     

Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success

The rent-seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats, election campaigns, industrial disputes, lawsuits, and sibling rivalries. In the rent-seeking literature, each party's success p_i (which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won) has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments. Alternatively, however, p_i may instead be a function of the difference between the parties' commitments to the contest. The Contest Success Function (CSF) for the difference from is a logistic curve in which, as is consistent with military experience, increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments. A crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two-sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a Cournot equilibrium. In contrast, both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties' resource commitments.In preparing successive drafts of this paper I have benefited from suggestions and comments from Michele Boldrin, Avinash Dixit, Arye L. Hillman, David Hirshleifer, Eric S. Maskin, David Levine, Eric Rasmusen, John G. Riley, Russell Roberts, and Leo K. Simon.     

Signaling virtue: voluntary accountability programs among nonprofit organizations

This article examines the structure of nonprofit voluntary accountability and standard-setting programs, arguing that these programs can be understood as collective action institutions designed to address information asymmetries between nonprofits and their stakeholders. Club theory and the economics of certification suggest that such programs have the potential to provide a signal of quality by setting high standards and fees and rigorously verifying compliance. Such mechanisms can signal quality because higher participation costs may allow only high-quality organizations to join. The article examines the implications of signaling theory using an original dataset on the structure of 32 nonprofit accountability programs across the globe. While many programs set high standards for compliance, the key distinction between strong and weak programs is the use of disclosure or verification mechanisms to enforce compliance. Contrary to theoretical expectations, compliance standards and verification do not appear to be substitutes in creating stronger voluntary programs.

Citizens' voluntary governing boards: Waiting for the quorum

In complex societies formal power, legitimacy, and responsibility are typically allocated to councils, or governing boards. This is an old strand in American political culture, strengthened by the growth of private not-for-profit organizations and concern for citizens' representation. It is also a growing trend in Great Britain, West Germany, and other modern societies. Such boards are often taken for granted; we think we understand them, hence the value of investigating the obvious. In this essay they are examined with respect to their external and internal relations (or structure), their problems and performance (or processes), and the blurred nature of their authority in an interpenetrated society where public and private interests are inextricably intertwined. Illustrations are derived from the author's research in the governance of labor union locals, municipal governments and reform movements, urban renewal efforts, community mental health centers, and private hospital governing boards.This paper is based in part on research supported by The National Center for Health Services Research, Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Government Grant No. R01-HS-03238-02.     

From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods

It has traditionally been assumed that the socially available amount X of a public good is the simple sum of the separate amounts x _i produced by the i = 1, ..., I members of the community. But there are many other possibilities of practical importance. Among them are: (i) Weakest-link rule, where the socially available amount is the minimum of the quantities individually provided, and (ii) Best-shot rule, where the socially available amount is the maximum of the individual quantities. The former tends to arise in linear situations, where each individual has a veto on the total to be provided (e.g., if each is responsible for one link of a chain); the latter tends to arise when there is a single prize of overwhelming importance for the community, with any individual's effort having a chance of securing the prize. In comparison with the standard Summation formula of ordinary public-good theory, it is shown that underprovision of the public good tends to considerably moderated when the Weakest-link function is applicable, but aggravated when the Best-shot function is applicable. In time of disaster, where the survival of the community may depend upon each person's doing his duty, the conditions for applicability of the Weakest-link rule are approximated. This circumstance explains the historical observation that disaster conditions tend to elicit an extraordinary amount of unselfish behavior.     

Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism

Numerous laboratory experiments have investigated the performance of several processes for providing public goods through voluntary contributions. This research has been able to identify features of the institution or environment which are reliably likely to produce outcomes “close” to the free riding outcome or “substantially” greater than the pessimistic prediction of standard models. One such feature is the “marginal per-capita return” (MPCR) from the public good. Various authors have altered MPCR between groups or for an entire group at the same time. The experiments reported here address a different question, “What would happen if, within a group, some persons faced a ‘high’ MPCR while others faced a ‘low’ MPCR?”     

Determinants of success in African local governments: An overview

A potentially useful method for determining how to design viable and competent local government systems is to examine local authorities that function effectively. This paper synthesizes the major findings of seven case studies of ‘successful’ local governments in Sub-saharan Africa, highlighting the principal factors contributing to their success and exploring ways in which they could further improve their performance. The determinants of success identified in the studies include: location in an area with an adequate economic base; well-defined responsibilities in a satisfactory legal framework; capacity to mobilize sufficient resources; supportive central government activities; and appropriate management practices, including development of productive internal and external relations and satisfactory responsiveness to constituents. All of these factors are considered to be necessary, but none is independently sufficient to guarantee success, which is a multidimensional and cumulative process of achievement.     

A social-ecological approach to voluntary environmental initiatives: the case of nature-based tourism

This paper addresses the role of voluntary environmental initiatives by the tourism industry to alleviate social dilemmas for the management of natural resources. The objective is to explore whether previous findings on the determinants of voluntary action in the management of common-pool resources (CPR) also apply to a sector, such as tourism, where non-extractive uses are dominant. The paper applies the social-ecological systems framework recently developed by Ostrom (Science, 325, 419–422, 2009) to analyze qualitative data from meta-analyses of successful voluntary environmental initiatives in tourism. Results show that the determinants of voluntary action in tourism are partially consistent with previous research on CPR, finding relevant the presence of leadership, norms of behavior among members of the voluntary initiatives, shared mental modes, salience of the resource for users, and substantial productivity of the resource system in the likelihood of self-organization. However, other variables that have been shown to be relevant in non-tourism CPR situations are not supported by this analysis, such as: most variables regarding the ecological system (its size, predictability, and the mobility of its derived resource units) as well as the number of users and supportive collective choice rules that enable users to craft and enforce some of their own rules. The implications of this partial mismatch in findings are not straightforward. The paper presents a set of research questions that open a path for further research.     

Broad-appeal agendas: Issue diversity and the centre-right's electoral success

Extant research has focused on the consequences of positional issue shifts that parties associate with their campaigns. Less attention has been paid to the consequences of the breadth of these issue agendas, which we demonstrate is a fruitful avenue for future research. Our analysis compares the effects of “appealing broadly” when employed by mainstream-left and mainstream-right parties and argues that centre-right parties can gain votes by employing this strategy. In contrast, we show that this “broad appeal” strategy is not successful for the mainstream-left in advanced parliamentary democracies. Additional analysis suggests that when controlling for issue diversity, position or salience shifts are not significant predictors of electoral support for centre-right parties. These findings contribute to the literature on party competition, issue competition and ownership, and the advantaged position of contemporary centre-right parties.     

International institutions and the framing of domestic policies: The Kyoto Protocol and Canada's response to climate change

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol establishes an international institutional framework for domestic responses to climate change that links emission targets for developed countries to international market mechanisms. Although these flexible mechanisms allow developed countries some leeway in how they meet their commitments to reduce greenhouse gases, the protocol also establishes a normative framework that directs domestic policy responses along certain paths. Applying insights from sociological institutionalism and constructivism in international relations, this article argues first, that the climate change regime reflects and further institutionalizes the prevailing international normative structure in the environmental issue area, characterized as liberal environmentalism. Second, these norms, as embodied in the climate change regime, have enabled and constrained climate change policy development in Canada, one of the worlds largest emitters of greenhouse gases per capita. International norms can shape or redefine domestic interests, enable policies in conformity with those norms, and create normative pressures for change by linking with extant domestic and foreign policy norms. Uncovering this international institutional-domestic policy interaction resolves the paradox of Canada's promotion of commitments and mechanisms consistent with its domestic interests and institutional constraints, but eventual commitment to action well beyond what those constraints dictate. This commitment continues despite Kyoto's uncertain future. The findings also point to lacunae in the literature on regime compliance and effectiveness more broadly, especially its dominant rationalist variant.