Building the firm's political (lobbying) strategy

• In this paper, we present a framework for building a firm's issue‐specific lobbying strategy. We argue that there are five critical elements of a lobbying strategy and that the major choices concerning political lobbying strategy relate to these elements. The five elements, and the primary strategic choices concerning these elements are: (1) the choice of the level and type of inclusiveness of the strategy; (2) the choice of the form, or forms, of argument to be used in persuading relevant target constituencies; (3) the choice of jurisdictional venue to be addressed; (4) the choice of organizational target that will be engaged and (5) the choice of delivery mode—that is, whether political strategies should be implemented directly by firm managers or outsourced to professional suppliers of these services. We explain these elements in detail. However, in order to engage in a lobbying strategy on a specific issue, the firm must first be able to identify relevant government actions and understand their profitability impact. We show how the strategic logic can be generated by an augmented version of Porter's ‘five forces’ (5F) model (Porter, 1980 ) that explicitly recognizes the role of government—‘six forces’ analysis.

Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Small firm membership in national trade associations

• Business associations play a significant role in private–public interactions by aggregating company interests and relating these to political decision makers. Associations are particularly important for smaller firms, which generally do not have the resources to pursue political strategies independently. This paper discusses the question of what the motives are for small and medium‐sized firms to maintain their membership in national trade associations at a time when the European business environment is undergoing profound changes. Using the example of the Netherlands, it is argued that associational membership is determined foremost by political considerations. The implication of this conclusion is that national business associations continue to perform an important function in mediating business–government relations. Despite the internationalization of public decision making, these organizations remain important intermediaries for corporate public affairs.
• 1 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

International political marketing: a case study of United States soft power and public diplomacy

• Political marketing can be categorized with three aspects: the election campaign as the origin of political marketing, the permanent campaign as a governing tool and international political marketing (IPM) which covers the areas of public diplomacy, marketing of nations, international political communication, national image, soft power and the cross‐cultural studies of political marketing. IPM and the application of soft power have been practiced by nation‐states throughout the modern history of international relations starting with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Nation‐states promote the image of their country worldwide through public diplomacy, exchange mutual interests in their bilateral or multilateral relation with other countries, lobby for their national interests in international organizations and apply cultural and political communication strategies internationally to build up their soft power. In modern international relations, nation‐states achieve their foreign policy goals by applying both hard power and soft power. Public diplomacy as part of IPM is a method in the creation of soft power, as well as, in the application of soft power.
• This paper starts with the definitional and conceptual review of political marketing. For the first time in publication, it establishes a theoretical model which provides a framework of the three aspects of political marketing, that is electoral political marketing (EPM), governmental political marketing (GPM) and IPM. This model covers all the main political exchanges among six inter‐related components in the three pairs of political exchange process, that is candidates and party versus voters and interest groups in EPM ; governments, leaders and public servants versus citizens and interest groups in GPM, including political public relations and lobbying which have been categorized as the third aspect of political marketing in some related studies; and governments, interest group and activists versus international organizations and foreign subjects in IPM. This study further develops a model of IPM, which covers its strategy and marketing mix on the secondary level of the general political marketing model, and then, the third level model of international political choice behaviour based the theory of political choice behaviour in EPM. This paper continues to review the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy and defines their relation with IPM.
• It then reports a case study on the soft power and public diplomacy of the United States from the perspectives of applying IPM and soft power. Under the framework of IPM, it looks at the traditional principles of US foreign policy, that is Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, and the application of US soft power in the Iraq War since 2003. The paper advances the argument that generally all nation states apply IPM to increase their soft power. The decline of US soft power is caused mainly by its foreign policy. The unilateralism Jacksonians and realism Hamiltonians have a historical trend to emphasize hard power while neglecting soft power. Numerous reports and studies have been conducted on the pros and cons of US foreign policy in the Iraq War, which are not the focus of this paper. From the aspect of IPM, this paper studies the case of US soft power and public diplomacy, and their effects in the Iraq War. It attempts to exam the application of US public diplomacy with the key concept of political exchange, political choice behaviour, the long‐term approach and the non‐government operation principles of public diplomacy which is a part of IPM. The case study confirms the relations among IPM, soft power and public diplomacy and finds that lessons can be learned from these practices of IPM. The paper concludes that there is a great demand for research both at a theoretical as well as practical level for IPM and soft power. It calls for further study on this subject.

Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lobbying by Law Firms: A Study of Lobbying by National Law Firms in Canberra1

This article examines the way in which national law firms lobby the federal government from their Canberra offices. It is based on extensive interviews with lobbyists from those law firms, other commercial lobbyists in Canberra and legal professional bodies. The article begins by establishing the unique nature of law firm lobbying. In particular, it looks at the technical skills law firm lobbyists possess, their access to specialist legal knowledge and their preference for administrative, over political, lobbying. The development of law firm lobbying is then discussed. This centres around changes to the legal profession, federal business laws and federal government decision-making. The article concludes by suggesting that law firm lobbying both reflects and stimulates changes in government decision-making and will grow in importance as the legal profession in Canberra grows.     

Learning from the Philippine occupation: nation‐building and institutional development in Iraq and other high security risk nations

Outcomes of armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate that the U.S. has been unprepared to fully address problems related to establishing social and economic stability, security and governance in the aftermath of war. This is unfortunate, given that U.S. policy makers' nation‐building efforts to achieve stability, security and good governance in these nations do not reflect what they should already have learnt about organisational and institutional development from past experiences providing significant development assistance to highly unstable nations. Based on the analysis rendered in this article, ‘smart practice’ development administration in such nations comprises the following key points that link nation building to institutional/organisational development:

• Nation building (creating new national sovereignty) is different from, and harder than, building government capacity (creating or strengthening institutions and organisations).
• Given that building government capacity typically requires years of patient assistance and financing, it is better to build on existing indigenous institutions like the civil service and military.
• The time and expense of development assistance to high security risk nations means that it is advisable to establish a multi‐lateral development assistance plan and a multi‐national, multi‐institutional framework for financing development to pay for all that is necessary over a long period of time (i.e. 20–50 years).
• Policy makers should emphasise social stability and stable economic growth under self‐governance to prevent actual or perceived economic exploitation.
• Policy makers' diplomatic efforts should secure accommodation of various stakeholders sufficient to permit compromise leading to formation of an independent government.
• Where occupation appears necessary to achieve security and stability, policy makers should allocate enough troops and money to do the job, and accurately assess and report all costs of military occupation and nation building.
• Once occupation has occurred, policy makers should not withdraw military support in a way that would increase the likelihood of civil war.
• Premature withdrawal of security, economic and political support prior to the point where high security risk nations are capable of governing themselves will cause a power vacuum, and may result in fragmented regional leadership by warlords. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

     

Institutional influences on business power: how ‘privileged’ is the Business Council of Australia?

• This paper explores the institutional and political dynamics of the Business Council of Australia (BCA), a unique form of big business association which relies on the active involvement of its one hundred or so CEO members. The paper argues that associations such as the BCA confront a range of serious institutional problems in their attempts to wield political power, or more modestly perhaps, policy influence. First, they confront a disconnect between ‘structural’ and ‘instrumentalist’ articulations of business power. The key source of business power resides in business control over the economy and the investment process, a form of power wielded at the company level not at the level of business associations. When engaged in instrumentalist or overt forms of political activism, the BCA also confronts serious collective action problems. It is also argued that the influence of the BCA seems to have declined over time and that this can partly be traced back to declining CEO commitment rooted in changing institutional and structural dynamics in the corporate world.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Autonomy or Privilege? Lobbying Intensity of Local Business Associations in China

This article examines the relationship between the state and society in contemporary China by analyzing the lobbying behavior of business associations. Particularly, it asks whether and how autonomy and/or privileged access exert/s influence on their lobbying frequency. A formal model is developed that focuses on the trade-off between lobbying intensity and the private provision of collective goods. The hypotheses are tested against the original survey data from Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces. The research finds that self-established associations lobby less, and those with consultant status assigned by the government lobby the government more often. In contrast, the impact of “autonomy” in a narrow sense is weaker than is commonly claimed in the Chinese lobbying literature.     

Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism

This paper develops a signaling model of corporate lobbying in democratic capitalist societies to analyze the conditions that lead to a powerful political position of business. Proceeding from the traditional dichotomy of structural economic determinants versus business' political action, our model predicts the conditions under which elected political decisionmakers modify their policy pledges to accommodate business' political preferences, or override business' lobbying messages and honor their pledges. Our results show that the structural power of business over public policy is contingent on two variables: the size of reputation costs of business in relation to its material costs of lobbying; and the ratio of the policymaker's reputation constraints from policy commitments and campaign pledges to the electoral costs arising from adverse effects of policy. We evaluate our model using case studies of business lobbying on environmental and financial services regulation in Britain and Germany.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Pluralism,corporatism and perception of corruption

When people know who is influencing the elected politicians and they may ‘put the rascals out’ in case they feel that the incumbents are corrupt, ceteris paribus, their perception of the level of corruption should not be affected by lobbying. If on the other hand people are not sure which or how many actors are influencing public policy and they are not able to hold the government truly accountable as interest group influence is constant with different governments, people will be more likely to perceive the government as corrupted. The former system is a characteristic of corporatism and the latter of pluralism. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that interest groups with resources such as business groups or firms in pluralist systems are more influential than groups with few resources. Thus, people may perceive pluralist policy‐making system as more corrupt than corporatist policy‐making system where fewer visible actors have more or less equal weight in the policy‐making process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The lobbyist with ‘balls of iron and a spine of steel’: why Ireland needs lobbying reform

• In common with most other nations, Ireland currently has no statutory regulation of lobbying activities. Equally, and also in common with many countries, lobbying regulation is becoming a more prominent subject of political debate. This paper considers the pervasive context of political corruption and scandal highlighted by one lobbyist now in jail, analyses various suggestions for lobbying regulation which have been proposed, and concludes with a potential reform agenda. The opportunity exists for Ireland to take a lead in producing a comprehensive and meaningful regulatory regime—genuine and principled reform, rather than a muddled compromise.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The changing politics of lobbying: private sector organizations in Mexico

This article analyzes how the relations between Mexico's private sector, particularly that of business power groups and interest groups, and the political elite changed as a result of processes of neo-liberalization and democratization from the early 1980s through the presidency of Vicente Fox (2000–2006). The analysis provides several insights into Mexico's developing interest group system during these years and particularly that of business interests. On the one hand, the changes increased political pluralism, the number of groups operating, and their lobbying options and helped move Mexico toward liberal democracy. On the other hand, with its major resources and political connections, big business was able to maintain, in fact enhance, its political status, whereas small business was less politically successful. Moreover, many old political practices used by big business to influence government persist as well as skepticism among the public regarding democratic institutions. As a consequence, this article argues that despite the new developments in political advocacy, the continuation of traditional political practices presents obstacles to the development of interest group activity resulting in a plutocratic element to Mexico's emerging democracy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transparency in government communication

• Basic to a successful democracy is the existence of a public informed about government actions. This requires government information to be open and accessible to the public. This study sought to understand how communicators in government value and practice transparency. Constant comparative thematic analysis of 18 semi‐structured interviews of government communicators revealed a transparency model for government communication. This paper outlines that model and identifies practices and structures that promote transparent communication practices.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The determinants of corporate political strategy in Chinese transition

• Corporate political strategy (CPS) formulation in Chinese transition is an area with little empirical work. We fill this gap validly and the primary focus of this study is to examine the firm‐ and industry‐level factors influencing Chinese firms' political strategy choice. Empirical support is found for the taxonomy of corporate political strategies in Chinese transition—that is direct participation strategy, financial incentive strategy, prolocutor strategy, institution innovation strategy, government association strategy and government involvement strategy. The results indicate that there is no consistently significant firm‐ and industry‐level predictor of all six political strategies and we explore what determinants are related to each specific decision independently. We also verify the random effects of industry‐level variables and our hypotheses are tested through using general evaluation equations (GEEs). Our study aims to be helpful to point managers toward both industrial environments and internal resources to consider when making appropriate political strategy choices and thus improve Chinese firms' strategy management level. Some implications of findings are also discussed finally.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate interests and public affairs: organised business–government relations in EU member states

The internationalisation of economic and political affairs changes the way in which business interests are brought to bear on public policy. This is a global phenomenon but can, in particular, be observed in Europe. The construction of the European Union, the development of the Single Market and the build‐up of the policy institutions to go with it, together change business–government relations profoundly. This paper answers the question of how organised business interests relate to government agencies and political institutions. By using the example of trade associations in the Netherlands and Germany, the paper shows that, despite the internationalisation of public affairs in Europe, the national political level remains strategically important for the representation of business interests. The paper thus argues that changes in European business–government relations are institutionally embedded at both the European and the national level. The implication for future research is that much of the dynamics of economic and political internationalisation materialises within the domestic arrangements of interest politics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Corporate interests and public affairs: organised business–government relations in EU member states

The internationalisation of economic and political affairs changes the way in which business interests are brought to bear on public policy. This is a global phenomenon but can, in particular, be observed in Europe. The construction of the European Union, the development of the Single Market and the build‐up of the policy institutions to go with it, together change business–government relations profoundly. This paper answers the question of how organised business interests relate to government agencies and political institutions. By using the example of trade associations in the Netherlands and Germany, the paper shows that, despite the internationalisation of public affairs in Europe, the national political level remains strategically important for the representation of business interests. The paper thus argues that changes in European business–government relations are institutionally embedded at both the European and the national level. The implication for future research is that much of the dynamics of economic and political internationalisation materialises within the domestic arrangements of interest politics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Legitimacy through targeted transparency? Regulatory effectiveness and sustainability of lobbying regulation in the European Union

Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency‐based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency‐based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation‐level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.