Who is responsible for what? Clarity of responsibilities in multilevel states: The case of Spain

There is a theoretical disagreement between the classical normative positive view on decentralisation, which states that the fragmentation of power shifts policy more closely into line with citizens' preferences, and a more recent critical view that states that decentralisation blurs attribution of responsibility. This disagreement can only be resolved by refining the understanding of specific institutional designs. The theoretical claim in this article is that the relation between multilevel governance and clarity of responsibilities is contingent upon the type of decentralisation in place. To test this proposition, individual data from an asymmetrically decentralised system – the Spanish State of Autonomies – are used. Results show that the relationship between decentralisation and clarity of responsibility has a u‐shape. Responsibility attribution is clearer in regions with high and low levels of decentralisation, where one level of government clearly predominates over the other, than in regions with a more intertwined distribution of powers.     

The Impact of Political Factors on Local Government Decentralisation

ABSTRACT

The process of local decentralisation of public services delivery has attracted research attention because of the wide range of factors that induce governments to make this decision. Nonetheless, most such studies have focused on economic and financial aspects, ignoring the impact of political factors. The scarce previous research about political factors is the motivation for this study. We used panel data models based on 153 Spanish municipalities with populations over 50,000 for the period 1999–2007. The process of decentralisation is disaggregated according to the legal form of the entities: corporations and foundations. Our results show that more corporatisation processes are carried out in environments where political competition is lower and the party in power enjoyed greater support in the last elections. Additionally, decentralisation processes usually take place in the years immediately following elections, especially through foundations. Furthermore, both forms of decentralisation are more likely to be initiated by right-wing politicians.     

Potential impacts of Indonesia's fiscal decentralisation reform on urban and regional development: Towards a new pattern of spatial disparity

Indonesia has now entered a new phase of decentralisation. Two basic elements in the new policy are wider regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation. The latter is essentially expenditure-based in character, rather than revenue-based, within which a different approach to intergovernmental transfers between local and central government is emerging. The new general allocation fund and revenue-sharing system may have reduced vertical fiscal disparities, but it has tended to increase intercity and interregional disparities.     

Decentralisation and corruption: evidence from drinking water sector

This article presents empirical findings regarding the relationship between decentralisation of provision of water supply and corruption in provision of services. The current policy advice from the international agencies of aiming for decentralisation as an end in itself is questioned. The conventional wisdom that decentralisation brings management closer to the service recipients and is therefore likely to reduce corruption is also disputed. Drawing on a large database from two large Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the interaction between various actors is analysed. We find that the level of corruption in water supply agencies run by local governments is higher than that in the agencies run by the regional government. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.     

The limits of decentralisation: Legislative careers and territorial representation in Spain

Scholars of decentralisation in comparative perspective have argued that these reforms should lead to a ‘territorialisation of politics’. For the party system and the legislature this means that subnational interests will increasingly influence rules and practices as well as positions on policy choice. This study tests this proposition in Spain, which has undergone extensive decentralisation during its democratic history (1977–present). By examining the career trajectories of deputies in the ruling lower house, the study finds little evidence that decentralisation expanded the influence of subnational representatives within the party system or the parliament of democratic Spain. This was true despite the growing cohort of deputies with subnational experience in the Congreso, the ability of subnational party offices to recruit and place candidates on electoral lists, and the increasing importance of regional issues in national elections.     

Policy networks,politics and decentralisation policies in Ghana

Policy‐making is a political process involving a network of actors with varied interests. This article uses policy network as an analytical framework to understand the politics of decentralisation policy‐making in Ghana from the perspective of interactions among interest groups. The article is based on a research study, which utilised semi‐structured interviews and documentary sources in its data collection. It argues that the lack of progress in decentralisation in Ghana can be explained by the politics surrounding government–interest group relations. The article also provides evidence to indicate how varied interests represented within the decentralisation policy networks affected politics and in turn influenced decentralisation policy‐making and outcomes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Governance by Proxy: A Comparative Policy Analysis of the Mainstreaming of Immigrant Integration Governance

Abstract

This paper assesses mainstreaming as a governance strategy that potentially addresses the call for a more integral governance response to wicked policy problems. Our comparative qualitative policy analysis of the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance contributes to the governance and mainstreaming literature by emphasizing the importance of strong horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms and the distinction between universal and proxy targeting in mainstreaming. Although policy programmes indeed seem to broaden to a universal mainstreamed approach, in practice they often operate by “proxy”. Furthermore, horizontal coordination structures tend to be weak or not in place at all, again obstructing the embedding of immigrant integration as a mainstreamed cross-cutting governance issue.     

Territorial Splits (Pemekaran Daerah) in Decentralising Indonesia, 2000–2012: Local Development Drivers or Hindrance?

Not many countries have experienced as fast a growth in the number of local governments as has present day Indonesia. This study examines how territorial splits under new decentralisation policy have effected local development. The paper also critically discusses what needs to change and improve in decentralisation policy to encourage local development. Territorial splits have reinforced spatial fragmentation and ‘local selfishness’, hindering rather than driving local development. Territorial splits have also been a substantial additional burden to the national budget, and have resulted in many conflicts, disputes and tensions at the local level. This paper recommends that there should be a comprehensive review into the practice of territorial splits and suggests that there is a need to make regional mergers a more attractive option for the efficient and effective provision of public services at the local level.     

Costing Constitutional Change: Estimating the Cost of Five Variations on Australia's Federal System

Australia's system of government is by far the most centralised of the four 'classic' federations, hosting extremely centralised states, exceptionally weak local governments, and little of the substantive decentralisation and subsidiarity often presumed to derive from a federal structure. Five variations on the present structure are examined to estimate the costs of improved decentralisation, including New States models as traditionally advocated, Regional States models based on the ACT combined state–local prototype, and a National–Local model comprising a strengthened national government and local governments in essentially their present form. 1 Results indicate that the Regional States or National–Local models could deliver greater decentralisation while saving over $20 billion per annum compared to the present system. Generally, the analysis suggests that coherent modelling of alternative government structures may be more feasible than previously thought.     

Competition,commercialization, and the evolution of nonprofit organizational structures

This article explores competition both in settings where nonprofits compete among themselves and where they compete with for-profits. Growing competition among nonprofits raises questions as to the impacts of this rivalry. How does competition affect nonprofit behavior and does it cause nonprofits to become more commercial in orientation? Does it alter organizational structures and does it cause nonprofits to become less focused on their charitable missions? The answers to these questions can influence public policy toward the nonprofit sector. A definition of competition is presented and Porter's five competitive forces are introduced and used to explore competition in nonprofit marketplaces. Conditions under which commercialization is likely to occur are discussed and the nature of competition is then examined in settings where nonprofits compete in mixed (for-profit/nonprofit) markets. Organizational structures from the health care industry are then used to highlight the evolving legal structures that nonprofits employ in competition with for-profits. Five policy implications of the analysis are examined and the need for additional information is highlighted.     

Decentralisation and forest management in Latin America: towards a working model

The particular characteristics of natural resources make the decentralisation of their management to elected local governments even more complex than the decentralisation of services and infrastructure. Nevertheless, natural resources are equally important to rural development concerns in the Third World. Numerous countries have begun to implement policies for some form of decentralisation involving natural resources and the environment, and many local governments are already making decisions that affect the future of local resources. This article reviews experiences with decentralisation of forest management in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Based on those experiences, it proposes a working model for more effective decentralisation strategies. The model addresses the legal structure for decentralised forest management and relevant variables that define the local decision‐making sphere, as well as key mediating factors that also affect outcomes. Most of these variables, even in the local sphere, offer important sites for policy and aid intervention. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralisation and regional cabinet size: the Spanish case (1979–2015)

This article explores under what conditions regional governments tend to have larger or smaller cabinets. The main contention is that cross-regional variation in cabinet size is partly explained by the dynamics set up by the multilevel system of government, mainly territorial decentralisation, multilevel government (in)congruence or the existence of nationally distinct regions. The hypotheses are tested with a new and original dataset built upon the Spanish case (1979–2015). Findings show that regions with more welfare state policies, especially when the region’s economic capacity is high, and nationally distinct regions tend to have bigger executives. In contrast, decentralisation in the form of basic state functions and government incongruence do not have a significant effect. Results have important implications for our understanding of sub-national territorial institutions and their interaction with decentralisation dynamics.     

Book review

From the very beginning of the space age, the ability to undertake non-military activities in this new regime has been an element of foreign policy. The mirror image twins international cooperation and competition between nation states has driven many of the key decisions in the major programs undertaken by the United States, especially in the evolution of its human spaceflight initiatives. For much of the Cold War era, head-to-head competition with the Soviet Union defined the human program, especially the Apollo program to land astronauts on the Moon. In the aftermath of the Cold War foreign policy objectives still inform the delineation of policy, especially the cooperative nature of large programs such as the International Space Station. This essay explores the evolution of the place assigned international space cooperation and competition in the United States.     

From Command Economy to Hollow State? Decentralisation in Vietnam and China

In Vietnam and China, decentralisation is a by‐product, both by default and design, of the transition to a state‐managed market economy. A dual process of horizontal and vertical decentralisation is occurring simultaneously in both the economic and political arena. There is an increasingly high level of de facto political/fiscal decentralisation, much of it occurring by default as local governing units try to meet rising demand for services. This is accompanied by the marketisation and socialisation of services such as education and health. Accompanying both of these processes is a trend towards greater ‘autonomisation’ of service delivery units, including the emergence of new ‘para‐state’ entities. Most of these decentralisation processes are the by‐product of marketisation, rather than part of a process of deliberate state restructuring in pursuit of ideals of decentralised government. The cumulative effects include a significant fragmentation of the state, a high potential for informalisation and corruption, and a growing set of performance accountability problems in the delivery of public services.     

Service delivery in francophone West Africa: the challenge of balancing deconcentration and decentralisation

The article reviews the experiences with decentralisation of one West African country, Guinea, with the intent of drawing lessons and exploring approaches to assist countries in the sub‐region in rendering decentralisation—an effective means for service delivery improvements. Section II describes the West Africa context in terms of the dynamics of deconcentration–decentralisation and lays out a conceptual framework to guide the analytical assessment of countries in the sub‐region, attempting to decentralise. This framework is used in the Guinea case, described in Section III. Section IV concludes by synthesising the profile of Guinea, and positions its dominant style in relation to the proposed ideal types of decentralisation approaches. This part of the article discusses the implications of its findings for decentralisation policy and implementation, and offers some remarks on the road ahead for decentralisation in West Africa. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning from the States? Federalism and National Health Policy

In its 1993 report, the Winter Commission gave direction to the federal government in the area of health policy and Medicaid: lead, follow, or get out of the way. This article examines how the federal government responded to that advice, specifically asking what has happened in the allocation of responsibility in health policies between 1993 and 2006. In short, unlike the suggestion that there be a better‐defined direction in federal–state policy assignments in health, the ensuing years have resulted in more of the same. The authors examine what has happened, particularly focusing on vertical diffusion—where the states have acted first—and on the role of policy learning in federal decision making. They find little recognition of policy learning in recent federal health laws—even in areas in which state experience was extensive. The federal government is leading in some health policies—but it is leading without learning.     

Asymmetric federalism and economic voting

Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.     

National Competition Policy — Its Evolution and Implementation: A Study in Intergovernmental Relations

The second reading speech on the Competition Policy Reform Bill 1995 described the policy as 'the most important single development in micro-economic reform in recent years'. The speech went on to describe the vision of the Hilmer Report 'for a national competition policy in which the commonwealth, states and territories cooperated to ensure that universal and uniformly applied rules of market conduct apply to all market participants regardless of their form of ownership'. This article considers how this vision was translated into reality.     

Participation, Fragmentation and Union Response: The 1998–2000 ACT Public Sector Bargaining Round and the Workplace Relations Act

The current Australian Capital Territory (ACT) public sector workplace bargaining round lasted more than two years with most agreements involving a trade-off between low wage outcomes and protection of job security within performance improvement measures. The main focus of this paper is on government and agency experiments with bargaining structures and processes. The first was a limited and largely unsuccessful attempt in 1998 and 1999 at participative agreement making without the involvement of the key unions. The second, a selective decentralisation of bargaining to parts of a single business, was more successful: of 50 agreements, over 40 have been achieved. The procedural success of the decentralisation strategy is a significant outcome. However, the fragmentation strategy contained internal contradictions and required strong centralised policy control of bargaining agendas and outcomes, leading to delays and breeding distrust. Unions conducted effective defensive campaigns against non-union agreements and involuntary redundancies, but face their own dilemmas in finalising this round and preparing for the next.