Political Action Committee Spending and Senate roll call voting

This paper addresses how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior of U.S. Senators. Using a theoretical framework which draws broadly on the voting literature, we develop models that explain Senatorial voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. Testing both models we find weak support for a Downs-Black view of voting participation in the first model. The second model supports the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending. We find that PACs have a positive effect on voting participation. The conjecture remains whether PACs change voting outcomes, but it is clear that they buy voting participation.     

Robust satisficing voting: why are uncertain voters biased towards sincerity?

The modern theory of voting usually regards voters as expected utility maximizers. This implies that voters define subjective probabilities and utilities for different outcomes of the elections. In real life, these probabilities and utilities are often highly uncertain, so a robust choice, immune to erroneous assumptions, may be preferred. We show that a voter aiming to satisfice his expected utility, rather than maximize it, may present a bias for sincere voting, as opposed to strategic voting. This may explain previous results which show that strategic voting is not as prevalent as would be expected if all voters were expected utility maximizers.     

The stability of international coalitions in United Nations voting from 1946 to 1973

The stability of outcomes under democratic decision-making is a significant issue in public choice. Several factors might make U.N. voting blocs less stable than blocs in national legislatures. Nevertheless, the data suggest that from 1946 to 1973 United Nations voting blocs were relatively stable. Nations that leave their blocs tend to vote with nearby blocs rather than making large ideological shifts, and tend to return to their old blocs. There does not appear to be cycles in United Nations voting blocs. Furthermore, the blocs can be ranked on a stable single-dimensioned continuum, lending further evidence that United Nations voting blocs are stable.     

On expressive voting: Evidence from the 1988 U.S. presidential election

People turn out to cast their votes simply because they want to ``cheer'' or ``boo'' their favored or unfavored candidates. This expressive voting behavior is in marked contrast to the instrumental voting behavior, i.e., people vote because they perceive voting as a means of achieving a particular election outcome. In this paper we report an econometric study on voting behavior that uses data from the 1988 American National Election Study. The results reveal that the ``cheering'' and ``booing'' effects are statistically significant, and that they exert substantial influence on bothturnout and voter choice. We also obtain evidence against theproposition that people turn out to vote because they considerthemselves to be potentially decisive with regard to the electionoutcome.     

Sequential vote choice: Applying a consideration set model of heterogeneous decision processes

This article analyzes the relative effects of a classic set of long-term and short-term determinants of party choice by treating voters' decision processes as a two-stage heterogeneous process. Departing from a consideration set model of voting behavior (CSM), we use panel data collected in Sweden in 2014 to analyze which voters considered voting for more than one party. To evaluate the CSM approach we estimate the relative effects of long-term and short-term determinants, for different parts of the electorate and at different stages of the decision process.Results confirm that the choice process for the ‘considering kind’ of voters is influenced by another mix of long-term and short-determinants than stable and party identified voters. Findings suggest that continued analyses of multi-stage decision making may bring new insights into electoral behavior. We argue that the core ideas of CSM – the sequential decision-making process and heterogeneity in the impact of long-term and short-term determinants – are generally applicable for analyses of voting behavior.     

Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence

A stylized model of three parties choosing an amendment agenda and voting over three policy alternatives is analyzed. The analysis yields a classification of five types of voters: random, sincere, strategic, risk-averse, and EUS (expected utility sophisticated) proposed by Enelow (J. Polit. 43:1062–1089, 1981). Laboratory experiments suggest that the choice of agendas can be partially explained by the sincere voting model (26% of voters) and strategic voting model (47% of voters), even when players’ preferences are common knowledge. Risk-aversion may explain choices of up to 56% of the voters. Finally, the EUS voting model explains up to 73% of the observed voting behavior.     

Cracking the whip: spatial voting with party discipline and voter polarization

The spatial voting theory literature has generally focused on either parties or candidates as the unit of analysis and ignored strategic interactions between them. I study a game theoretic spatial model of elections with many heterogeneous constituencies in which both party and candidate behavior are modeled. Parties choose a platform and a ‘whip rate,’ representing the proportion of final policy that will be made by the party, as opposed to by the successful candidates. Candidates are office-motivated and can choose both a platform and a level of advertising in order to defeat their opponent. It is shown that the introduction of whipping as a choice variable can cause party platforms to diverge and that parties will whip on some but not all issues, reflecting the empirical reality of parties influencing rather than determining policy outcomes exclusively. Further, parties respond to sharper voter polarization by reducing the power of the whip as well as distinguishing their platforms from one another, while more voter uncertainty has the opposite effect. Other real-world phenomena, including ‘safe seats’ and legislators voting with their party even when unwhipped, are also shown to be predicted by the model.     

Crashing the Party: An Experimental Investigation of Strategic Voting in Primary Elections

The effect of primary formats on voting behavior and candidatefortune has been the topic of recent political, academic andlegal arguments. We address these debates by examining voterbehavior and election outcomes across primary systems in thelaboratory. While we find the rate of strategic voting isgenerally low, the rate varies across primary formats and thepotential impact on election outcomes differs fromconventional perceptions. Results suggest that more openprimary systems generate more strategic voting, but contraryto conventional wisdom, more open systems do not necessarilylead to more moderate election winners.     

Political knowledge about electoral rules: Comparing mixed member proportional systems in Germany and New Zealand

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral systems are considered by some to be “the best of both worlds” because they combine single member district representation with proportional outcomes. Critics, however, maintain that such systems cause voter confusion leading some voters to cast misinformed votes. Survey data from Germany and New Zealand are used to investigate voter's political knowledge of the electoral system and their voting behavior. The findings suggest that knowledge about the electoral system is similar in New Zealand and in Germany. Although some may very well find the system complex, there is no evidence to suggest that a lack of knowledge about the electoral system influences voting behavior. The results undermine the claims made by skeptics who fear that misunderstanding threatens the legitimacy of electoral outcomes.     

Patience as the rational foundation of sociotropic voting

Economic voting is one of the most important mechanisms on explaining voting behavior and on establishing the democratic accountability. However, people tend to use perceived national economic condition on evaluating the incumbent, which is known as sociotropic voting, instead of their pocketbook. Previous studies suggest both altruism and self-interested future expectation may help explain this seemingly irrational behavior, but empirical works have not yet found convincing evidence to prove or disprove the self-interested motivation. This article suggests that patience makes people discount less on the potential future influence of the current national economic change; if self-interest drives sociotropic voting, patient voters would be more sociotropic. Consistent with the hypothesis, individual-level data from 2014 Comparative Congressional Election Survey shows that patient voters rely more on the perceived national economic change to evaluate the incumbent and make vote choice. Limited evidence of the linkage between impatience and pocketbook voting among non-partisans, and on the country-level is also provided.     

Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis

An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that "clarity of responsibility" within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the "clarity of responsibility" argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance.     

Electoral registration and the control of votes: The case of Chile

We investigate how the employment relationship may lead employers to control the voting behavior and to induce the electoral registration of their workers. Forced registration and the control of votes become feasible when voting behavior is observable, as in open ballot elections. Workers whose vote is controlled are more likely to be registered as compared to other eligible voters, increasing their impact on electoral outcomes. Increasing the secrecy of the vote (for instance with the adoption of a secret ballot) significantly reduces the control of votes. Electoral registration, however, remains biased as long as the probability of voting behavior disclosure induces less ideologically motivated voters to comply with the political preference of the employer. We provide empirical support for the predictions of the model examining the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958.     

Voter turnout and candidate choice: A merged theory

An alternative approach to the explanation of voting behavior is offered, suggesting that the starting point of electoral decision making is individuals' recall of their behavior in the last similar situation. Whether or not this recall is accurate is irrelevant in our model, since the voters' reasoning proceeds from their belief about their earlier behavior, whether or not it is correct. Using this approach we are able to treat voting from a unified perspective, rather than adopting the current stance of treating the turnout decision as separate from and preceding the candidate choice decision.     

Endogenous economic voting: evidence from the 1997 British election

Using panel surveys conducted in Great Britain before and after the 1997 general election, we examine the relationship between voting behavior and post-election economic perceptions. Drawing on psychological theories of attitude formation, we argue that those who voted for Labour and the Liberal Democrats perceived the past state of the British economy under the Tory government more negatively than they had prior to casting their ballot in the 1997 election. Similarly, we posit that Labour supporters would view the future state of the national economy under Labour more positively than they had before the election. This indicates that, contrary to many assumptions in the economic voting literature, voting behavior influences evaluations of the economy as voters seek to reduce inconsistencies between their vote choice and evaluations of the economy by bringing their attitudes in line with the vote they cast in the election. It also means that voters’ post-election economic perceptions are, at least in part, influenced by and thus endogenous to their vote choice. This finding has two major implications: first, cross-sectional models of economic voting are likely to overestimate the effect of economic perceptions on the vote. Second, the endogeneity of economic perceptions may compromise the quality of economic voting as a mechanism for democratic accountability.     

Conceptualizing Usage in Voting Behavior for Political Marketing: An Application of Consumer Behavior

Political marketing has borrowed and adapted many terms from mainstream marketing, such as image management (segmentation, targeting, and positioning) and consumer (voter). In marketing, the terms “user” and “usage” have been established, yet their application to political marketing is less clear. This paper analyzes the feasibility and usefulness of usage in the political context. Drawing from the literature on usage, a model is developed and applied to four voting environments: Britain, Australia, Russia, and Belarus. One critical factor that emerges is the concept of choice, whereby the voter may chose to indicate their preference for one party yet be forced to use a different party as chosen by collective choice. Another issue is the potential for habitual voting behavior to limit decision making. It is concluded that usage needs to be contextualized specifically for political marketing.     

Can We Trust Recall-Data?*

About 15% of Norwegian voters report a different party than their actual choice when asked about voting at previous Storting elections. Even though this percentage is lower than in other countries, it nonetheless shows that recall-data do not give a correct picture of people's voting behavior. The political stability among voters is exaggerated. This will have consequences for the monthly political barometers on account of the weighing procedures used. This article discusses different explanations for erroneous recall; incorrect remembering on the one hand and a wish for consistent behavior on the other. The consistency model appears to be most relevant. In this connection the distinction between stable and unstable voters is important.     

Assessing the rise of issue voting in British elections since 1964

Measuring the extent to which issues determine electoral choice requires a suitable causal model that takes into account the tact that party identification may colour issue perceptions as well as being partially determined by them. In this paper several possible models are evaluated before settling on one considered to be plausible. This one shows issue-based voting choice to have increased in recent British elections, more or less in step with the decline of class voting documented in previous research. The possibility that this rise in issue voting might be a spurious concomitant of increasing milieu influences is considered and rejected. It is tentatively concluded that the rise of issue voting was due to a decline in the class structuring of British electoral choice.     

Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Existing scholarship on the voting behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges finds that their decisions are best understood as a function of law, policy preferences, and factors relating to the institutional context of the circuit court. What previous studies have failed to consider, however, is that the ability to predict circuit judge decisions can vary in substantively important ways and that judges, in different stages of their careers, may behave distinctively. This article develops a theoretical framework which conceptualizes career stage to account for variability in voting by circuit judges and tests hypotheses by modeling the error variance in a vote choice model. The findings indicate that judges are more predictable in their voting during their early and late career stages. Case characteristics and institutional features of the circuit also affect voting consistency.     

Whether one votes and how one votes

The aim of this paper is to determine if whether one votes effects the vote that is cast. Using an economic model of voting and observed voting results on nuclear power referenda, the answer is a resounding yes. Overcoming registration, turnout, and “roll off” hurdles dramatically increases the odds of voting against nuclear power. Indeed, participation swamps both economic and preference variables in the explanation of nuclear power voting outcomes. The lesson is that there is a structure to participation at the polls that should not be ignored by those interested in analyzing voting outcomes.     

Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice

According to the issue ownership theory of voting, voters identify the most credible party proponent of a particular issue and cast their ballots for that issue owner. Despite the centrality of this voter-level mechanism to ownership theories of party behavior, it has seldom been examined in the literature. We explore this model and offer a refinement to its current understanding and operationalization. Returning to the roots of ownership theory, we argue that the effect of issue ownership on vote choice is conditioned by the perceived salience of the issue in question. Through individual-level analyses of vote choice in the 1997 and 2000 Canadian federal elections, we demonstrate that issue ownership affects the voting decisions of only those individuals who think that the issue is salient.