Condorcet Polling

For a single-winner multi-candidate election, it is broadly accepted that the Condorcet candidate (if one exists) should win. Voting systems do not always elect the Condorcet winner. Public opinion polls are not generally designed to try to identify a Condorcet candidate. They could easily be constructed to do so, however. The resulting process may be called Condorcet polling, for which various designs are presented herein. Information from Condorcet polling may enable some voters, under a plurality or runoff system, to bring about an outcome they prefer by voting strategically for the Condorcet candidate when they would not otherwise do so.     

The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern

‘Condorcet cycles’ (or ‘paradoxes of cyclical majorities’) are an empirically rare phenomenon. A referendum in the Swiss canton of Bern on 28 November 2004 presents a rare occurrence. This study presents a new multi-option referendum procedure that makes Condorcet cycles visible, and it argues that in this case, the paradox might have resulted from strategic voting patterns.     

Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem

We describe and compare the experiences of academic exclusion of Alexander Del Mar, J.A. Hobson, and Gordon Tullock. While aspects of the circumstances differed, a common element was academic exclusion because of challenges to mainstream views. Alexander Del Mar, J.A. Hobson, and Gordon Tullock were in due course recognized for the originality and merit of their contributions, although each incurred personal costs because of the exclusion by the academic elites of their time. Our study takes us into the role of ideologically based prejudice in judgment of the worthiness of economic ideas.     

Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited

A strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is an alternative, x, that a majority of voters rank higher than z, for every other alternative, z. A weak Condorcet winner (WCW) is an alternative, y, that no majority of voters rank below any other alternative, z, but is not a SCW. There has been some confusion in the voting/social choice literature as to whether particular voting rules that are SCW-consistent are also WCW-consistent. The purpose of this paper is to revisit this issue, clear up the confusion that has developed, and determine whether three additional SCW-consistent voting rules—that as far as we know have not been investigated to date regarding their possible WCW consistency—are indeed WCW-consistent.     

Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors

Public Choice - We analyze a model of binary choice by a committee, when information is hard and pre-voting deliberation is allowed. Each member has, independently of the others, a positive...     

Condorcet: Communication/Science/Democracy

Abstract

Condorcet's arguments concerning the dependence of unhindered scientific development on the presence of democratic conditions still sounds relevant today, because they are based on specific and complex considerations concerning the character of the social enterprise of science that articulates problems that still continue. The implicit dispute between Condorcet and Rousseau is also the first great historical example of the conflict between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, which accompanies the history of modernity, as an unresolved and indeed irresolvable opposition that belongs to the prehistory of our own confusions and quandaries concerning the relations between culture, science, politics and society.     

改善民生是保障社会和谐的重中之重

党的十八大提出,加强社会建设要以保障和改善民生为重点。这充分体现了我党对社会建设特别是民生问题的高度重视。从建设中国特色社会主义的现实目标出发,科学分析了保障和改善民生的重要性、必要性,指出保障和改善民生与建设中国特色社会主义的内在一致性,同时从深入贯彻落实科学发展观的视角探讨了保障和改善民生的原则和途径,为建设社会主义和谐社会提供了理论支持和实践参考。     

Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules

In this paper, I study elections where voters are strategic. I find that the commonly used voting rules, such as Plurality Rule, Majority Rule, Approval Voting, and Single Transferable Vote, do not always select the Condorcet Winner and suffer from multiple equilibria. Multi-stage voting rules offer a way to get around this problem. I introduce two voting rules—Multi-Stage Runoff and the Nominate-Two Rule—that select the Condorcet Winner as the unique equilibrium outcome under mild conditions. I show that a third class of voting rules—Binary Voting Trees—also select the Condorcet Winner.     

An elementary proof of the conditions for a generalized Condorcet paradox

We give an elementary proof of the relationship between the possibility of a generalized majority rule cycle and the number of voters, V, the number of alternatives, A, and the number required for a majority, M.     

缺乏理论创新是阻碍苏联改革的一个重要原因

本文考察三个问题:一是缺乏理论创新对苏联经济体制改革的阻碍作用;二是苏联长期坚持产品经济观和批判“市场社会主义”而导致历次改革失败所造成的严重经济后果;三是对中国今后在推进理论创新方面提出的几点思考。     

A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions

This essay evaluates six single-winner, multicandidate electoral systems with respect to their tendency to choose Condorcet candidates. To this end I calibrate a logistic multiple regression model from Monte Carlo simulations, based on a multivariate normal spatial model, in which I vary the number of candidates, number of dimensions, correlation structure, and relative dispersion of candidates and voters. I investigate additional spatial-model variations by comparing further simulation results with predictions of the basic statistical model. The results suggest that for many electoral systems, Condorcet efficiency would increase with perceptual uncertainty of candidates' positions and would be low in a polarized society. Of the voting systems studied, approval voting and the Coombs systems appear least sensitive to variations in assumptions.     

城乡教育差距是造成收入差距的重要因素

目前,我国基尼系数越来越大,其中重要方面就是城乡居民收入差距拉大。城乡教育差距是造成收入差距的重要因素。     

An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate

Social choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon, especially in large groups of decision-makers. However, empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real-world examples of such, and none in large electorates. This paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of Danish voters' preferred prime minister, using pair-wise comparisons. This result is compared with those of a similar poll, but by using different voting methods, each resulting in different choices. The example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions.     

How important is information format? An experimental study of home energy audit programs

Among alternative regulatory responses, information provision programs are receiving increasing attention despite the decidedly mixed evidence about their effectiveness. This paper provides detailed experimental evidence to demonstrate that for one important example of an information program, the use of energy audits to stimulate residential energy conservation, the effectiveness of the program is highly sensitive to the information processing behavior of the users of the information. Simple changes in the format of the information provided to homeowners produced marked improvements in the efficiency of consumer choices. The study illustrates Stern's conclusion in a recent issue of this journal that laboratory experimentation provides a useful alternative to model-based analysis of natural experiments, especially for policy design issues involving information acquisition and processing. The paper also offers conclusions about improving the effectiveness of home energy audits, as well as the entire class of information provision programs.