Is Rule by Majorities Special?

One way of making decisions is for political associates or their representatives to vote on each issue separately in accordance with the majority principle and then take the cumulative outcomes of such majority decision making to define the collective choice for public policy. We call such a system one of majorities rule. Thought of in spatial terms, majorities rule is equivalent to the principle of making decisions according to the issue-by-issue median of voter preferences. If popular control and political equality are core democratic values, they can be rendered as requirements on a collective choice rule, involving resoluteness, anonymity, strategy-proofness and responsiveness. These requirements entail that the collective decision rule be a percentile method. If we then add a requirement of impartiality, as exhibited in a collective choice rule which would be chosen behind a veil of ignorance, then the issue-by-issue median is uniquely identified as a fair rule. Hence, majorities rule is special. Some objections to this line of reasoning are considered.     

Optimal voting rules under uncertainty

The theory of ‘constitutional’ choice of voting rules developed by Buchanan and Tullock is an extended to an explicit decision-theoretic form. Voters in the ‘constitutional’ position choose what they believe will be their optimal share or majority rule for making social decisions, by maximizing their individual expected utility from the anticipated social decisions, under conditions of uncertainty. The rule that maximizes expected social benefits depends upon (1) the expected distribution and intensity of preferences on future issues, and (2) the decisionmaking procedures and costs. ‘Decisionmaking’ and ‘external’ costs are shown to be interrelated. Following this analysis, failure to pass laws imposes ‘external’ costs in the same way that passing them does, so that the optimal majority may be lower when desirable laws are viewed as changing over time. Decisionmaking costs depend upon the way in which voters are persuaded to support or oppose bills, upon the distribution of preferences on bills, and on vote-trading possibilities. If vote-trading is almost costless, a wide range of decision rules has nearly equal social benefits. Finally, the model is used to discuss optimal voting rules for several decisionmaking bodies.     

Escaping the joint‐decision trap: Repetition and Sectoral politics in the European union

Decision making in the European Union has been argued to present a ‘joint‐decision trap’, in which the ability of national actors to block decisions unilaterally produces decision making by the lowest common denominator. While this outcome is apparent in some decision situations it is far from a general outcome. The division of decisions into functional specialities and the continuing nature of the policy debates limits the capacity of ‘high politics’ to hinder decision making. Further, there are ways in which a policy entrepreneur can structure decisions to eliminate this sub‐optimal outcome.     

Do Group Decision Rules Affect Trust? A Laboratory Experiment on Group Decision Rules and Trust

Enhanced participation has been prescribed as the way forward for improving democratic decision making while generating positive attributes like trust. Yet we do not know the extent to which rules affect the outcome of decision making. This article investigates how different group decision rules affect group trust by testing three ideal types of decision rules (i.e., a Unilateral rule, a Representative rule and a ‘Non‐rule’) in a laboratory experiment. The article shows significant differences between the three decision rules on trust after deliberation. Interestingly, however, it finds that the Representative rule yields more trust than the Non‐rule and also significantly more trust than the Unilateral rule, when analysing the results at group level. These findings challenge the theoretical understanding by, for example, deliberative normative theorists that more inclusive, consensual and non‐hierarchical decision‐making procedures enhance trust vis‐à‐vis other more hierarchical decision‐making procedures.     

When Does Transparency Generate Legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context‐Bound Relationship

We analyze the main rationale for public administrations and political institutions for supplying transparency, namely, that it generates legitimacy for these institutions. First, we discuss different theories of decision making from which plausible causal mechanisms that may drive a link between transparency and legitimacy may be derived. We find that the common notion of a straightforward positive correlation is naïve and that transparency reforms are rather unpredictable phenomena. Second, we test the effect of transparency on procedure acceptance using vignette experiments of representative decision making in schools. We find that transparency can indeed generate legitimacy. Interestingly, however, the form need not be “fishbowl transparency,” with full openness of the decision‐making process. Decision makers may improve their legitimacy simply by justifying carefully afterward the decisions taken behind closed doors. Only when behavior close to a deliberative democratic ideal was displayed did openness of the process generate more legitimacy than closed‐door decision making with postdecisional justifications.     

Inferiority of restricted majority decision rules

The case in which a group of decision makers appoints a committee to choose between two symmetrical alternatives by a simple majority vote, namely restricted majority decision rule, is one member of the set of weighted majority decision rules. It is shown that for any group of decision makers one of the restricted majority decision rules is always the worst of all weighted majority decision rules. This inferiority exists both in terms of the efficiency and in terms of effectiveness of the decision rule. The importance of this finding should be kept in mind when deciding the size of the committee because a seemingly irrelevant change in the number of decision makers may result in the inferior rule, instead of the optimal rule, being used. Moreover, because of the widespread use of restricted majority decision rules and the relatively small number of such rules, the probability of the inferior rule being used is relatively high.     

Public Management Decision Making: Effects of Decision Content

One obvious aspect of public management decisions and decision making has largely escaped attention—decision content. We examine the effects of decision content by asking the following questions for budget cutback and information technology decisions: How does content affect the time required for decision making? How does content affect who participates? How does content affect the decision criteria employed? How does content affect the information quality used in the decision-making process and red tape? The results suggest that information technology and budget cutback decisions differ in important ways. For information technology decisions, cost-effectiveness is not a significant criterion, average decision time is much longer, and decisions are generally viewed as permanent and stable. For cutback decisions, cost-effectiveness is a significant criterion, decisions are made much more quickly, and they are viewed as unstable and changeable. Surprisingly, decision content does not appear to affect the number of participants.     

ON IRON CAGES AND SUBOPTIMAL CHOICES: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF ISOMORPHISM IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

This study integrates experimental and qualitative data from a sample of public employees to investigate the micro-foundations of the isomorphic pressures that may lead to suboptimal decision making in the context of public administration. When asked to choose between two equally performing systems, subjects in our sample were inclined to favor the alternative that was encouraged by either a coercive, a mimetic, or a normative pressure. Participants tended to give in to isomorphic pressures, even when informed that the encouraged option was inferior. However, letting subjects autonomously infer the inferiority of the encouraged option from numerical data—rather than through an explicit textual prompt—proved effective in neutralizing the risk of sub-optimal decisions under isomorphic pressures. A consequent qualitative inquiry revealed that trust in the recommending institution or group, speculation about alternative performance dimensions, and compatibility with existing standards were the main drivers of suboptimal decision making.     

Between Autonomy and Interdependence: The Challenges of Shared Rule after the Scottish Referendum

Drawing on the distinction between self‐rule and shared rule in multilevel states, this article argues that shared rule has been the neglected element of the UK devolution settlement. The ability of the devolved administrations to participate in, and influence, national decision making through shared rule mechanisms is very limited. The article argues that the lack of shared rule is especially problematic in light of the increasing complexity of the Scottish devolution settlement in the wake of the Scotland Act 2012 and the Smith commission report. Smith, in particular, seems set to increase both the power of the Scottish Parliament and its dependence on UK policy decisions in the areas of tax, welfare and the economy. Creating a more robust intergovernmental system which could manage these new interdependencies will be a significant challenge, and yet, without such a system, the new settlement will be difficult to sustain.     

Participation quorums in costly meetings

Meetings of shareholders, societies, and clubs often require a minimal participation quorum. In the absence of a quorum, no valid decisions can be made; thus, decisions are postponed to a later meeting. This paper examines the effect of such quorum constraints on both individual behavior and collective outcomes in a model of costly meetings. We show that when a binding quorum constraint delivers an immediate decision, it also induces a welfare loss with respect to the outcome that prevails when no quorum applies, potentially including policy distortions. When the quorum requirement is high and causes the decision to be postponed, the number of participants in the (second) meeting may decrease with respect to the zero-quorum rule.     

The Promise and Pitfalls of Consensus Decision Making in School Management

School/Community‐Based Management (SCBM) advocates insisted that changing the bureaucratic structure of governance, moving from top‐down decision making to a shared decision making at the local level, would revolutionize schools and result in higher student achievement. Many schools have struggled with shared decision‐making processes. This article examines one high school's attempt to implement a dress code using consensus‐based decision‐making. Organizations that strive to make decisions by consensus should be aware of the pitfalls that may occur and work to address them if they arise.     

“Tell It Like It Is”: Decision Making,Groupthink, and Decisiveness among U.S. Federal Subcabinet Executives

In addition to difficulties gathering and evaluating complete information, cognitive limitations and biases preclude individuals from making fully value‐maximizing choices when making decisions. It has been suggested that, done properly, involving advisors can compensate for individual‐level limitations. However, the “groupthink” tradition has highlighted ways group‐aided decision making can fail to live up to its potential. Out of this literature has emerged a paradigm Janis calls “vigilant problem‐solving.” For this article, we interviewed 20 heads of subcabinet‐level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking questions about how they made important decisions. Ten were nominated by “good‐government” experts, 10 chosen at random. We wanted to see whether there were differences in how members of those two groups made decisions, specifically, to what extent executives in the two categories used a “vigilant” process. We found, however, that similarities between the two groups overwhelmed differences: As best as we were able to measure, decision making by U.S. subcabinet executives tracks vigilant decision making recommendations fairly closely. The similarity reflects a common style of senior‐level decision making, which we theorize grows out of government bureaucracy's methodical culture. We did, however, develop evidence for a difference between outstanding executives and others on another dimension of decision making style. Outstanding executives valued decision making decisiveness—“bias for action”—more than the comparison group. Perhaps, then, what distinguishes outstanding executives from others is not vigilance but decisiveness. Contrary to the implications of the groupthink literature, the danger in government may be “paralysis by analysis” as much or more than groupthink.     

Teaching Judicial Politics Through a Supreme Court Simulation

Abstract

This article describes various iterations of a Supreme Court simulation that we developed for undergraduate political science classes. We address when simulations should be used to introduce a topic to students, and when simulations should be used to develop students’ understanding of a topic after introducing it. In the simulations, we played the role of attorneys delivering oral arguments before the Supreme Court, while students played the role of Supreme Court justices. Students questioned attorneys, deliberated in groups, voted on the merits of the case, and explained their decisions. We varied when the simulation was conducted, with one class doing the simulation before a lesson on judicial decision making and two classes doing the simulation following a lesson on judicial decision making. We evaluate the simulation by using results from student questionnaires that assessed the students' interest in judicial politics, their knowledge of the Supreme Court, and their understanding of judicial decision making. We find that the simulation most effectively accomplished the intended learning outcomes when the simulation was conducted after a lesson on decision making in the Supreme Court, rather than before the lesson. In addition, our results demonstrate that the simulation increased students’ interest in the Supreme Court and their desire to learn more about the institution. Our results have implications for political scientists aiming to enhance student learning through simulations.     

Big decisions and a culture of decisionmaking

“Big” decisions are defined as discontinuous, abrupt, and unique, in contrast to “little” decisions, which are marginal, commensurable, and additive. We can model big decisions, as well as a wider range of little decisions, if we enlarge our notion of decisionmaking to include legal interpretation, rites-of-passage ritual and conversion experience, heroic leadership, critical judgment of works of literature and art, and entrepreneurship. These models are exemplary of a more encompassing “culture of decisionmaking,” involving six practices: marginalism, untouchableness, gaps, action, judgment, and entrepreneurship. Although big decisions may often be reduced to sets of little decisions, when a decision is treated as big it becomes a powerful mode of initiation, commitment, and justification of a project.     

Structure and Process: Examining the Interaction between Bureaucratic Organization and Analytical Requirements

Attempts by politicians to control bureaucratic decisions include both structural (how is the agency making the decision organized?) and procedural (what rules must they follow when making the decision?). But how do these two modes of influence interact? This article examines the interaction between bureaucratic structure and one procedural control, the requirement that agencies conduct an analysis of their decisions prior to their issuance. I look at this interaction in the context of two types of analysis, cost‐benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment. I interview 16 individuals in each field and draw from their experiences of conducting and reviewing more than a thousand analyses. The conduct of analysis is affected by where analysts are placed in agencies. In particular, independence of analysts has a trade‐off. The more independent analysts are, the more likely they can challenge preferred decisions in their agency. But independent analysts are brought into decisions later and their independence may limit their long‐term impacts on agency culture. Despite this trade‐off, analysts expressed a clear preference for independence. The interaction between different controls of bureaucratic behavior is a potentially fruitful line for further research.     

Information Aggregation and Optimal Structure of the Executive

We model two aspects of executives in parliamentary democracies: Decision‐making authority is assigned to individuals, and private information is aggregated through communication. When information is relevant to all policies and communication is private, all decisions should be centralized to a single politician. A government that holds cabinet meetings, where information is made available to all decision makers, outperforms one where communication is private: A multimember cabinet can be optimal; it need not be single peaked around the most moderate politician or ideologically connected. Centralization is nonmonotonic in the degree of ideological divergence. In a large cabinet, all power should be given to the most moderate politician. Even when uncertainty is policy specific and a single politician is informed on each policy, power should never be fully decentralized. Our model provides a justification for centralized authority and cabinet meetings that enhance the quality of policy.     

Collective decision making and the limits on the organization's size

This essay clarifies the relationship between the technology of organizational decision making and the limits on the size of the group of decision makers within the organization. Viewing the number and quality of decision makers, and the time required for decision making as inputs in the production of collective decisions, we show that there exist generic organizational forces that offset the incentive to unlimited expansion of the organization. Even in a long run competitive environment with perfect markets for managers, unlimited duplication of the firm may not be economically feasible. We first analyze in a general setting and then illustrate in two stylized examples, the interplay between individual decisional quality, time required for an individual decision, direct and indirect costs of decision making, and the optimal number of decision makers (for example, management size).We are indebted to an anonymous referee of this journal and to P. Aranson for their very helpful comments and suggestions.     

“I Won't Back Down?” Complexity and Courage in Government Executive Decision Making

Senior government executives make many difficult decisions, but research suggests that individual cognitive limitations and the pathologies of “groupthink” impede their ability to make value‐maximizing choices. From this literature has emerged a normative model that Irving Janis calls “vigilant problem solving,” a process intended for the most complex decisions. To explore its use by senior public officials, the authors interviewed 20 heads of subcabinet‐level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking how they made their most difficult decisions. The initial focus was on whether they employed a vigilant approach to making decisions that were informationally, technically, or politically complex. Most executives identified their single most‐difficult decision as one that required courage; they often made such courageous decisions after personal reflection and/or consultation with a small number of trusted advisors rather in ways that could be described as vigilant. The different approaches for making complex decisions, compared with those involving courage, are discussed and a contingency model of effective executive decision making is proposed that requires leaders (and their advisors) to be “ambidextrous” in their approach.     

All Male Panels? Representation and Democratic Legitimacy

What does women's presence in political decision‐making bodies signal to citizens? Do these signals differ based on the body's policy decisions? And do women and men respond to women's presence similarly? Though scholars have demonstrated the substantive and symbolic benefits of women's representation, little work has examined how women's presence affects citizens' perceptions of democratic legitimacy. We test the relationship between representation and legitimacy beliefs through survey experiments on a nationally representative sample of U.S. citizens. First, we find that women's equal presence legitimizes decisions that go against women's interests. We show suggestive evidence that this effect is particularly pronounced among men, who tend to hold less certain views on women's rights. Second, across decision outcomes and issue areas, women's equal presence legitimizes decision‐making processes and confers institutional trust and acquiescence. These findings add new theoretical insights into how, when, and for whom inclusive representation increases perceptions of democratic legitimacy.