The public choice of educational choice

The very small literature explaining (i) how citizens have voted in two California voucher referenda, (ii) how legislators have voted on voucher bills in the State of Florida and the US Congress, and (iii) the variation across states in charter school provisions is summarized. New empirical evidence documenting the cross-state variation in the success of voucher referenda and voucher bills is examined. Voucher bill characteristics and state characteristics play important roles. Voucher bills have been passed only in the more conservative Republican states, and almost all of the successful voucher programs have been targeted at large, struggling school districts.     

The endogenous public choice theorist

Public choice theory has effectively explored defects in collective action and political processes. However, little attention has been given to the fact that any recommendations as to how to improve the situation can only be realized on the basis of precisely those defective institutions. What turns up here can be identified as a problem of self-reference. Normative contributions by Buchanan and Hayek may serve as an example. In order to clear up the seemingly paradoxical situation, “endogenization” of the public choice theorist within an extended theory is suggested. A straight-forward extension is briefly outlined.     

The unfinished business of public choice

Over the past fifty years, the public choice research program has generated important insights into collective decision-making processes, especially as they operate within the political institutions of Europe and North America. Despite a half-century of progress, a great deal of unfinished business remains on the public choice research agenda. In the course of assessing the current state of the literature, as represented in the contributions to this special issue of Public Choice, this essay identifies some of the unanswered questions.     

The median voter model in public choice theory

The changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world. Early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter. This claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector. In the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory, but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether. The model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is. These latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model, appropriately applied.Pointing out that the model might not be valid under some circumstances in no way implies that the model is never valid. In fact, this paper has reviewed strong arguments, both empirical and theoretical, suggesting that the median voter model is a good approximation of demand aggregation in the public sector for many issues. One paper will not change the opinions of public choice theorists on the median voter model. But the argument given here is that there is a large amount of theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the median voter model as a good foundation for the development of the theory of public sector demand. Once the overly ambitious claims that have been made for the model are set aside, the median voter model is in a good position to provide a base for the development of a theory of political structure that is analogous to the theory of market structure in economics.     

The place of political science in public choice

This study examines the effects of alternative executive veto structures in a model of the budgetary process. For the model examined it is shown that the outcome of the budgetary process must be contained in the Pareto set if the executive has either no veto authority or the authority to exercise an all-or-nothing veto. When the executive has item veto authority, however, the outcome need not be contained in the Pareto set.     

Moral public choice

Public Choice should now integrate systematically considerations of ethics and justice for two kinds of reasons. First, moral principles can be implemented by self-centered individual who, however, care for others' judgments, and these others can thus have these principles implemented at no cost to themselves. Furthermore, direct moral motivations may be less negligible than it was assumed, and at any rate it may be time to focus on them. Second, the theory of justice has reached an integrated, rational maturity which makes it suitable for this purpose (whereas the “Social Choice” approach is plagued by serious problems of meaning).     

The impending transformation of public choice scholarship

I am grateful to Charles K. Rowley and Karen I. Vaughn for valuable advice on many of the issues I address here, and to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its continuing support of my scholarly efforts.     

The anti-discriminatory tradition in Virginia school public choice theory

Public Choice - This paper studies the practice of Müsadere in the Ottoman Empire. Müsadere refers to the expropriation of elites—often tax farmers or administrators—by the...     

Happiness and public choice

Measuring individual welfare using data on reported subjective well-being has made great progress. It offers a new way of confronting public choice hypotheses with field data, e.g., with respect to partisan preferences or rents in the public bureaucracy. Insights from public choice also help to assess the role of happiness measures in public policy. We emphasize that maximizing aggregate happiness as a social welfare function neglects incentive problems and political institutions while citizens are reduced to metric stations. The goal of happiness research should be to improve the nature of the processes through which individuals can express their preferences.     

The public choice of “superior” sanctions

This paper analyzes the public choice of specific forms of sanctions. Current sanctions are essentially quantity constraints (“Q-sanctions”) which are like quotas in that they might bestow benefits on certain special interest groups in the target country. Revenue sanctions (“Rsanctions”) may be able to recapture such benefits in the form of sender government revenue which could either compensate for the costs of sanctions to the sending country or finance other sanction enhancing activities aimed at the target country. Hence, R-sanctions may be “superior” to Q-Sanctions in general or on the basis of “target efficiency”. However, public choice analysis suggests that Q-sanctions will generally be chosen over R-sanctions by democratic countries.     

The public choice of non-resident college tuition levels

This paper uses a public choice framework to analyze the choice of tuition levels charged by public institutions to non-resident students. It finds that a state's relative strength in attracting both population and students lead to higher tuitions and that large numbers of private colleges and perhaps lack of job openings lead to higher tuition for non-residents as do small fiscal gains from high income newcomers. No support is found for the hypotheses that high enrollment growth or costs lead to relatively poor treatment of out-of-staters.