Terrorism

Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, War Without End: The Terrorists ‐ an Intelligence Dossier (London: Harrap, 1986). Pp.279. £9.95.

James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986). Pp.293. £12.95.

Benjamin Netanyahu (ed.) Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986). Pp.254. $18.95.     

Elections and government spending

It is widely believed that electoral pressures cause legislators to favor government spending programs. This electoral theory of spending is shown to encompass two core hypotheses: (1) the electoral consequences hypothesis, which states that support for spending programs improves the representative's electoral showing; and (2) the legislator insecurity hypothesis, which states that greater electoral insecurity leads representatives to be more in favor of spending programs. A test of these ideas using spending scores for U.S. representatives in 1986 finds that neither hypothesis is supported by the data.     

Terrorism and systems terror

In this paper we discuss the censorship of political statements sympathetic to terrorism as an instance of what Lyotard calls ‘terror’. Our claim is that the traditional approach to questions of censorship of ‘subversive’ politics only captures part of the story; what is at stake is not merely the censorship but at a deeper level, the withdrawal of the possibility to challenge the censorship. This two-tier logic of silencing is what we explore with the help of Lyotard's earlier and later work, first by relying on his analysis of ‘terror’ in the framework of ‘agonistics’, then of ‘terror’ as différend'.     

Risk Sensitivity and Terrorism

One enduring question about terrorism is why individuals choose to join terrorist groups. Past studies have shown that terrorists are not always poor, and they can in fact come from more privileged groups in society. Risk sensitivity and prospect theory are approaches that can help explain some of the anomalies. They suggest that two types of group are likely to supply members for terrorist organizations in disproportionate numbers. One group consists of those who face a loss of status or position due to ongoing changes in society. A second group consists of those who have an opportunity to gain a major advance in status or position. Both groups are thus more likely or more willing to take risks such as joining dissident terrorists – either to maintain their position or to improve it. An analysis of the situation of Palestinian nationalists, nationalists in Northern Ireland and the Tamils in Sri Lanka provides support for the idea that sensitivity to risk can be an important factor in explaining the willingness of individuals to join terrorist groups.     

Highway Security and Terrorism

This article presents an overview of highway transportation security before and after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the context of hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation. It is primarily focused on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulation of motor carrier transportation of hazmat and post-9/11 efforts to prevent acquisition by terrorists of certain classes of hazmat. In the context of homeland security, motor carrier transportation of hazmat is receiving heightened attention. It should be cautioned, the article highlights a limited number of activities at the federal level only to provide the reader with a sense of ongoing government and industry activities to improve transportation security.     

Explaining welfare spending

Welfare expenditures are difficult to explain within a pure public choice-framework. In this article, I shall argue that the difficulties may be resolved by assuming that the main purpose of welfare schemes is to provide the electorate — in their capacity of different risk categories — with insurance against various social risks, rather than to redistribute economic resources towards weak and destitute groups in society. This solution not only explains the scope of existing welfare arrangements, but may also hold the key to an explanation as to how public welfare policies change and evolve across time.     

Terrorism and affinity of nations

Public Choice - This article investigates whether a country’s political proximity to the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom exposes the country to terrorist attacks. We...     

Poverty spending and the poverty gap

This paper examines two questions basic to welfare policy: (1) whether the amount of poverty-related transfers is sufficient to fill the poverty gap, and (2) which families actually get benefits and how much of their income deficit is filled by those benefits. Transfers are sufficient: the post-Social Security poverty gap is $74 billion while poverty-related programs total $198 billion. Further, 86% of current income-conditioned benefits go to the pretransfer poor and 89% of those are used to alleviate poverty (fill the poverty gap). Thus, if a substantial fraction of total Federal and State expenditures on poverty-related programs could be targeted more toward the poor, the poverty gap can be eliminated. The current programs, however, would have to be changed substantially to achieve the necessary retargeting.     

Legislative term limits and state spending

Supporters of legislative term limits often claim that they will lower state spending levels. Using fiscal data from 48 states from 1977 to 2001, this paper finds little support for this assertion. Instead, this analysis finds that states with term limits have higher spending levels than states without term limits. These results suggest that term limits give legislators greater incentives to deviate from socially optimal fiscal policy by altering the legislative environment in which such policy is formulated.     

Public sector unions and public spending

This study examines the influence of public sector unions on the expansion of the public sector. Based on public goods theory, our paper models how unions influence the supply of and demand for public sector activities. On the demand side, public sector unions are special interests which advocate public sector expansion to policy makers; on the supply side, they exert pressure to maintain and expand monopoly powers. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between public sector unionism and public spending.     

Distributive spending and presidential partisan politics

Public Choice - Do Republican and Democratic presidents vary in their geographic allocations of federal spending? Recent scholarship suggests that US presidents provide more federal outlays to...     

Party system nationalisation and social spending

Party systems diverge in their levels of nationalisation. While in some countries parties obtain similar levels of electoral support in all districts, in others parties get very asymmetric electoral shares across districts. The distributive consequences of this have been seldom studied. The argument tested here is that when political parties have nationalised electorates they have stronger incentives to provide social policies that spread benefits all over the territory. This argument is tested in 22 OECD democracies for the period 1980?2006. The results show that, regardless of the electoral system in place, there is a positive relation between party system nationalisation and social spending.     

How Terrorism Upsets Liberty

As terrorism increasingly penetrates Western democracies, liberals and libertarians are obliged to ask themselves whether contending with it justifies restricting civil liberty and, if so, to what extent. Neither personal security nor individual liberty is ever fully realised – both are a matter of degree – and they are often perceived as being at odds with each other. Hence it has been suggested that we reconsider the existing trade-off between them, or reassess their 'rate of exchange'. While such questions are sometimes raised by left-leaning liberals, they are in fact particularly acute for liberals on the right, or libertarians, who would normally resist any increase in government intervention. Right-wingers who advocate 'hands off' policies on all other occasions now call for an increase in government intervention as regards security measures. Many left-liberals, on the other hand, are reluctant to concede any further power to the state in order to combat terrorism.