Mapping the development of China's data protection law: Major actors,core values,and shifting power relations

This Article seeks to map the possible paths of the development of China's data protection law by examining the changing power relations among three major actors - the State, digital enterprises and the public in the context of China's booming data-driven economy. We argue that focusing on different core values, these three major actors are the key driving forces shaping China's data protection regime. Their dynamic and multidimensional power relations have been casting the development of China's data protection law with various uncertainties. When persuing different, yet not always conflicting values, these three major actors may both cooperate and compete with each other. Based on our careful analysis of the shifting power relations, we identify and assess three possible paths of the development of China's data protection law. We are much concerned that the proposed comprehensive data protection law might be a new attempt of the State to win legitimacy abroad, while actually trying to reinforce massive surveillance besides economic goals. We argue that a modest alternative may be that this law might show some genuine efforts for protecting data privacy, but still with poor enforcement. Last, we argue that the most desirable development would be that this law could provide basic but meaningful and effective protection for data privacy, and lay a good foundation for further development.     

We All Make Mistakes: A ‘Duty of Virtue’ Theory of Restitutionary Liability for Mistaken Payments

In contrast to the moral foundations of contract, tort, and the law of property, which are generally regarded as elements of Kantian ‘right’, the liability to return the value of mistaken payments is, it is argued, an example of the law's enforcing a duty of virtue, the legalisation of the duty of beneficence in a way similar (though not identical) to how the law might instantiate a duty of easy rescue. Accordingly, one of Birks's most cherished theses – that the law of unjust enrichment represents a distinctive element of private law – can be made out: it is distinctive in having an entirely different normative source: in virtue, not in right. But this result comes at a cost: (1) a legal system could function more or less justly without such a liability; (2) Birks's thesis that liability for mistaken payment is the archetype or paradigmatic case of liability for unjust enrichment would have to be abandoned; and (3) we would have to recognise that the ground of this liability is policy‐motivated.     

Labour Constitutions and Occupational Communities: Social Norms and Legal Norms at Work

This paper considers the interaction of legal norms and social norms in the regulation of work and working relations, observing that, with the contraction of collective bargaining, this is a matter that no longer attracts the attention that it deserves. Drawing upon two concepts from sociology – Max Weber's ‘labour constitution’ and Seymour Martin Lipset's ‘occupational community’ – it focuses on possibilities for the emergence, within groups of workers, of shared normative beliefs concerning ‘industrial justice’ (Selznick); for collective solidarity and agency; for the transformation of shared beliefs into legally binding norms; and for the enforcement of those norms. If labour law is currently in ‘crisis’, then a promising route out of the crisis, we argue, is for the law to recover its procedural focus, facilitating and encouraging these processes.     

Bodily Integrity,Embodiment, and the Regulation of Parental Choice

In this article we develop a new model of bodily integrity that we designate ‘embodied integrity’. We deploy it to argue that non‐therapeutic interventions on children should be considered within a decision‐making framework that prioritizes embodied integrity. This would counter the excessive decision‐making power that law currently accords to parents, protecting the child's immediate and future interests. Focusing on legal responses to genital cutting, we suggest that current legal understandings of bodily integrity are impoverished and problematic. By contrast, adoption of an ‘embodied integrity’ model carves out a space for children's rights, while avoiding these negative consequences. We propose that embodied integrity should trump competing values in any best‐interests assessment where a non‐therapeutic intervention is requested. Drawing on Drucilla Cornell and Joel Feinberg's theories we argue that protecting a child's embodied integrity is essential to guarantee his/her right to make future embodied choices and become a fully individuated person.     

Enter the quagmire – the complicated relationship between data protection law and consumer protection law

This article examines the complex relationship between consumer protection law and data protection law, particularly within the EU's online environment, and highlights the problems that stem from this complexity. It suggests that, while there are significant similarities between their respective sources, tools and purposes, there are also arguable differences between consumer protection law and data protection law. One such arguable difference is found in that, while consumer protection law can be seen to merely set a floor in its pursuit of a sufficiently high level of consumer protection, data protection law – due to its clearly articulated dual purposes of (a) protecting individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and (b) providing for the free movement of such data – sets both a floor and a ceiling.Having discussed the relationship between consumer protection law and data protection law in more detail, the argument is made that it seems possible to conclude that the balance struck in the Data Protection Directive, and soon in the General Data Protection Regulation, places limitations on consumer protection law. The implications of this conclusion are then examined briefly in the context of some matters currently coming before the CJEU and the contours of a framework are presented, addressing situations where a data protection-based liability claim is pursued against a third-party non-controller under consumer protection law.     

Governance,Proceduralisation and Justice: Some Challenges to the Legal Paradigm

In 1989, Rudolf Wiethöltner alleged that we are witnessing a ‘failure of law’ in terms of its obligation to achieve ‘just law’. This paradox at the very heart of law – in essence, the impossibility of the realisation of legal justice twinned with the law's inability to cease trying to attain this goal – has been accommodated to a degree by the utilisation of a proceduralist paradigm that relies upon the contingency of governance, but this is now coming under renewed scrutiny. This article will put forward three arguments in this respect. The first section will argue that the turn to governance and the resultant procedural paradigm are both consequences of the ‘failure of law'; the second will point to the inherent weaknesses of the procedural paradigm that can be said to stem from this very failure; while the third will discuss some of the challenges issued to those still reliant upon the legal paradigm.     

The ‘Reasonable Man’, his Nineteenth‐century ‘Siblings’, and their Legacy

The reasonable man is the best known, but not the only, legal construct to be born into the nineteenth‐century common law. This article introduces the man's siblings – including those from the areas of trust law, criminal law, contract law, and intellectual property law (both patents and trademarks). The fact that some of these ‘men’ changed the law is not controversial; this research further highlights that while several of these came to life in that century, only some had a significant role into the twentieth century. Those that did are tied to the foundations of our society through their role in facilitating innovation and consumer protection. The argument is that it was the constructs’ nature and their capacity to accommodate public policy issues that enabled the vitality of the ‘reasonable person ‘ (negligence) and the ‘person skilled in the art’ (patents).     

Seeking Shelter in Personal Insolvency Law: Recession,Eviction, and Bankruptcy's Social Safety Net

Many legal systems understand consumer insolvency laws as social insurance, providing relief and a ‘fresh start’ to over‐indebted households who fall through gaps in the social safety net. Personal insolvency law in England and Wales in practice functions similarly, but in terms of legal principle and policy is ambivalent – sometimes emphasizing household debt relief, other times creditor wealth maximization. This article assesses, in the context of novel debt problems brought to prominence by recession and austerity, the extent to which the law has embraced personal insolvency's social insurance function. The discussion is framed particularly by the escalating United Kingdom housing crisis and the case of Places for People v. Sharples concerning consumer bankruptcy's (non)protection of debtors from eviction. The analysis illustrates how tensions between conceptual understandings and personal insolvency law's practical operation undermine the law's ability to fulfil its potential to produce positive policy responses to contemporary socio‐economic challenges.     

Technological Protections in Copyright Law: Is More Legal Protection Needed?

Providing legal protection against the 'hacking' of technological locks used to protect copyrighted works recently has been the subject of an international treaty (the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty), a European Community Directive (the Information Society Directive) and major copyright legislation in the USA (the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). By making hacking illegal, these legal protections fortify the technological protections employed by copyright owners to reduce infringement of their works. While copyright owners may use technological protections to compensate for the increased infringement potential in a digital world, technological protections can also be used to obtain far greater protection than the law would otherwise grant the copyright owner. In this article, Professor Loren argues that attention needs to be shifted from providing legal protection for technological protections, to providing legal protections against the overzealous use of these technological protections by content providers. She argues that laws should be enacted, and perhaps even treaties should be signed, that would prohibit the use of technological protections to impermissibly invade certain use rights recognized by a country's copyright laws.     

(Let's) playing by the rules: A choice of law rule for communication of copyright material from video games to the public,through Let's Plays

Several proposals have been made regarding a choice of law rule for ‘ubiquitous infringements’ (the unauthorised dissemination of copyright material online) but none have been implemented by national courts, which continue to struggle with the issue of what law determines whether ubiquitous infringements have occurred. This article explores fresh solutions to that issue, focusing on the scenario where copyright material from video games is communicated to the public, through its inclusion in Let's Plays (playthroughs of video games streamed from platforms like YouTube), or where such use of that material, under the terms of a license, is contemplated. In this scenario, the issue of infringement should be governed by the law of the place of the video game developer's incorporation, as a proxy for laws qualifying as the lex loci protectionis (law of the country where protection is sought (Fawcett & Torremans (2011)), abbreviated as the LLP). Where any party can prove specific differences between the law of the place of the developer's incorporation and a law qualifying as the LLP (called State A's law for ease of reference), in aspects essential for deciding whether infringement has occurred, the forum court must issue separate rulings as to whether (i) the claimant's copyrights under State A's laws have been infringed; and (ii) the claimant's copyrights under laws besides those of State A have been infringed. Courts should also adopt, as a mandatory rule of their domestic law, a rule precluding de facto infringements of copyrights in video games and/or their constituent elements from giving rise to liability for infringement.     

Governing ghostbots

This article discusses the legal implications of a novel phenomenon, namely, digital reincarnations of deceased persons, sometimes known as post-mortem avatars, deepfakes, replicas, holographs, or chatbots. To elide these multiple names, we use the term 'ghostbots'. The piece is an early attempt to discuss the potential social and individual harms, roughly grouped around notions of privacy (including post-mortem privacy), property, personal data and reputation, arising from ghostbots, how they are regulated and whether they need to be adequately regulated further. For reasons of space and focus, the article does not deal with copyright implications, fraud, consumer protection, tort, product liability, and pornography laws, including the non-consensual use of intimate images (‘revenge porn’). This paper focuses on law, although we fully acknowledge and refer to the role of philosophy and ethics in this domain.We canvas two interesting legal developments with implications for ghostbots, namely, the proposed EU Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act and the 2021 New York law amending publicity rights to protect the rights of celebrities whose personality is used in post-mortem ‘replicas’. The latter especially evidences a remarkable shift from the norm we have chronicled in previous articles of no respect for post-mortem privacy to a growing recognition that personality rights do need protection post-mortem in a world where pop stars and actors are routinely re-created using AI. While the legislative motivation here may still be primarily to protect economic interests, we argue it also shows a concern for dignitary and privacy interests.Given the apparent concern for the appropriation of personality post-mortem, possibly in defiance or ignorance of what the deceased would have wished, we propose an early solution to regulate the rise of ghostbots, namely an enforceable ‘do not bot me’ clause in analogue or digital wills.     

Data protection law beyond identifiability? Atmospheric profiles,nudging and the Stratumseind Living Lab

The deployment of pervasive information and communication technologies (ICTs) within smart city initiatives transforms cities into extraordinary apparatuses of data capture. ICTs such as smart cameras, sound sensors and lighting technology are trying to infer and affect persons’ interests, preferences, emotional states, and behaviour. It should be no surprise then that contemporary legal and policy debates on privacy in smart cities are dominated by a debate focused on data and, therefore, on data protection law. In other words, data protection law is the go-to legal framework to regulate data processing activities within smart cities and similar initiatives. While this may seem obvious, a number of important hurdles might prevent data protection law to be (successfully) applied to such initiatives. In this contribution, we examine one such hurdle: whether the data processed in the context of smart cities actually qualifies as personal data, thus falling within the scope of data protection law. This question is explored not only through a theoretical discussion but also by taking an illustrative example of a smart city-type initiative – the Stratumseind 2.0 project and its living lab in the Netherlands (the Stratumseind Living Lab; SLL). Our analysis shows that the requirement of ‘identifiability’ might be difficult to satisfy in the SLL and similar initiatives. This is so for two main reasons. First, a large amount of the data at stake do not qualify as personal data, at least at first blush. Most of it relates to the environment, such as, data about the weather, air quality, sound and crowding levels, rather than to identified or even likely identifiable individuals. This is connected to the second reason, according to which, the aim of many smart city initiatives (including the SLL) is not to identify and target specific individuals but to manage or nudge them as a multiplicity – a combination of the environment, persons and all of their interactions. This is done by trying to affect the ‘atmosphere’ on the street. We thus argue that a novel type of profiling operations is at stake; rather than relying on individual or group profiling, the SLL and similar initiatives rely upon what we have called ‘atmospheric profiling’. We conclude that it remains highly uncertain, whether smart city initiatives like the SLL actually process personal data. Yet, they still pose risks for a wide variety of rights and freedoms, which data protection law is meant to protect, and a need for regulation remains.     

International Economic Criminal Law

This inquiry explores the question of transnational companies’ criminal liability for international crimes, reviewing the current state of research in the field of international economic criminal law, a discipline that hitherto has received only scant analysis. Following some preliminary conceptual remarks (I.), the forms of corporate participation in such crimes (II.) and the supranational and national practice since Nuremberg are presented. This practice reveals a clear trend towards corporate liability, albeit represented by leading company staff. For this reason, and because legal persons (companies) ultimately act through natural persons (their staff), their liability (IV.) cannot be convincingly established on a purely collective basis – in the sense of a pure organisation model (IV. 4.1.) – but only on the basis of the attribution model, namely as a derivative corporate liability based upon supervisory or organisational culpability (IV.4.2.). The attribution model’s individual approach – or, to use procedural terms, the individualistic “trigger” for the prosecution of companies – finally brings us to the well-known forms of criminal participation (V.), with liability for complicity in particular coming into question. All in all, the essay concludes (VI.), we should not expect too much of (international) criminal corporate liability. Here, as in many other areas, criminal law can only have a (limited) preventive effect as part of a holistic approach.     

Dissolving privacy,one merger at a time: Competition,data and third party tracking

Amid growing concern about the use and abuse of personal data over the last decade, there is an emerging suggestion that regulators may need to turn their attention towards the concentrations of power deriving from large-scale data accumulation. No longer the preserve of data protection or privacy law, personal data is receiving attention within competition and antitrust law. Recent mergers and acquisitions between large digital technology platforms have raised important questions about how these different areas intersect and how they can complement one another in order to protect consumer welfare while ensuring competitive markets.This paper draws attention to one particularly complicated kind of digital data-intensive industry: that of third party tracking, in which a firm does not (only or primarily) collect and process personal data of its own customers or users, but rather data from the users of other ‘first party’ services. Mergers and acquisitions between firms active in the third party tracking industry raise unique challenges for privacy and fundamental rights which are often missed in regulatory decisions and academic discussions of data and market concentration. In this paper, we combine empirical and normative insights to shed light on the role of competition regulators in addressing the specific challenges of mergers and acquisitions in the third party tracking industry. After critically assessing some of the US and EU case law in this area, we argue that a bolder approach is needed; one that engages in a pluralist analysis of economic and noneconomic concerns about concentrations of power and control over data.     

Plays,Performances and Power Struggles – Examining Copyright's ‘Integrity’ in the Field of Theatre

This article explores the notion of ‘integrity’ under copyright law by analysing examples of 'integrity‐based objections' in the field of theatre. These objections typically involve playwrights objecting to changes being made to their copyright works by other parties, such as directors and actors. This analysis is deepened by the use of two concepts from the field of art theory – ‘aura’, as put forward by Walter Benjamin, and ‘trajectory’, as outlined by Bruno Latour and Adam Lowe. Finally, to shed further light on the issues raised, the work of Pierre Bourdieu is used to present new empirical research recently undertaken by the author in the field of UK theatre. This research demonstrates that ‘power struggles’ are a common feature of theatrical collaboration; that copyright is deeply implicated in the way such power struggles are conceived; and moreover, that resolving these power struggles successfully – including taking account of ‘integrity‐based objections’ – is crucial to theatrical practice.     

The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law

It is well understood that the exchange of information between horizontal competitors can violate competition law provisions in both the European Union (EU) and the United States, namely, article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law concerning interfirm information exchange, substantial differences remain. In this article, we make a normative argument for the U.S. antitrust regime's approach, on the basis that the United States’ approach to information exchange is likely to be more efficient than the relevant approach under the EU competition regime. Using economic theories of harm concerning information exchange to understand the imposition of liability in relation to “stand-alone” instances of information exchange, we argue that such liability must be grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule. We characterize this rule as a form of ex ante regulation and explain why it has no ex post counterpart in antitrust law. In contrast to the U.S. antitrust regime, we argue that the implementation of such a rule pursuant to EU competition law leads to higher error costs without a significant reduction in regulatory costs. As a majority of jurisdictions have competition law regimes that resemble EU competition law more closely than U.S. antitrust law, our thesis has important implications for competition regimes around the world.     

Corporate criminal liability and optimal firm behavior: internal monitoring versus managerial incentives

Legislation addressing corporate criminal liability has been the subject of worldwide debate ever since the financial scandals of the early 2000s. Under current regimes, firms must observe such compliance requirements as internal monitoring mechanisms, the purpose of which is inducing firms to detect the wrongful conduct of their agents. We develop an analytical framework for identifying when, and to what extent, firms may find it beneficial to adopt these regulatory devices. We conclude that more productive firms, those operating in sectors with more market power, and firms whose managers have more opportunities for criminal activity are more likely to prevent wrongful conduct—either through monitoring or the payment of efficiency wages. When the potential returns to illegal activities are high or the firm is large, internal monitoring is probably the optimal strategy of crime prevention; in contrast, smaller firms typically proceed by paying efficiency wages (or ignoring crime). This paper also analyzes the role of the State’s legal capacity as well as the effects of interactions between the structure of reputational losses and the firm’s market power.     

The Liability Rule,Proprietary Remedies and Body Parts

Sometimes courts and commentators disavow a proprietary approach to excised body parts in the belief that non-proprietary remedies are adequate to the task. A belief of this sort, this type of conceptual resistance to the application of property law to body parts, is allegedly captured in the compendious expression known as the liability rule. Moore v Regents of the University of California clearly illustrates this type of opposition. Some recent scholarship has also tried to ground this sort of exclusive non-proprietary approach to body parts in the liability rule component of the analytical framework developed by Calabresi and Melamed. This piece interrogates the idea that nonproprietary causes of action should exclusively furnish the applicable theory of liability in relation to body parts; it suggests an understanding of the theoretical framework of Calabresi and Melamed which facilitates a proprietary approach to body parts along with current non-proprietary approaches. I argue that property, liability and inalienability rules basically serve the same purpose (protection of an entitlement in the nature of a property interest) and that the difference amongst them is one of degree rather than nature; also, none of the triad applies separately and independently of one another. Thus, I suggest that the liability rule is not essentially non-proprietary and could be used to protect a proprietary entitlement. I tested my understanding of Calabresi and Melamed’s framework against a case that involved damaged kidney in order to show the difference the framework, as conceived by me, could make to the remedial fortunes of a claimant in body parts’ litigation.     

John R. Commons and Max Weber: The Foundations of an Economic Sociology of Law

This article underlines contemporary economic sociology's lack of interest – until recently – in legal phenomena, unlike the close attention paid by two historic figures in ‘economic sociology’, Max Weber and John R. Commons, to the relationships between law and economy. It argues that to grasp fully the importance of the legal dimension in socio‐economic analysis, we must return to their foundational insights. However, they particularly stress differences between Weber and Commons as to the unity or heterogeneity of law and the economy, the role of ethics, the search for an all‐encompassing approach in the construction of ideal‐types, the various forms of constraint that characterize law (whether psychological, economic, or physical), and the distinction between state law and non‐state law. The latter element is why the authors argue that due consideration for legal plurality should be a central thread in any sociological analysis of the interplay between law and the economy.     

The Indirect Influence of Politics on Tort Liability of Public Authorities in English Law

The scope of negligence liability of public authorities in English law has undergone significant changes in the Post‐World War II period, first expanding and then, from the mid‐1980s, retracting. This article tries to explain why this happened not by focusing, as is common in most commentary on this area of law, on changing doctrinal “tests,” but rather by tying it to changes in the background political ideology. My main contention is that political change has brought about a change in the law, but that it did so by affecting the scope of the political domain, and by implication, also the scope of the legal one. More specifically, I argue that Britain's Post‐War consensus on the welfare state has enabled the courts to expand state liability in accordance with emerging notions of the welfare state without seeming to take the law into controversial territory. When Thatcher came to power, the welfare state was no longer in consensus, thus making further development of legal doctrines on welfarist lines appear politically contentious. The courts therefore reverted back to older doctrines that seemed less politically charged in the new political atmosphere of the 1980s.