Bandwagon effects in British elections, 1885–1910

This article investigates possible bandwagons in actual elections rather than the usual opinion poll data. Until 1918, British general elections were staggered over a fortnight or more. We use the eight general elections between 1885 and 1910 to investigate whether there was a general bandwagon or underdog effect as the election progressed. We find that any bandwagon effect was in favor of the party which eventually won the election, not the party gaining seats compared with last time. We also find that a typical election featured an initial bandwagon effect which peaked about halfway through the election and then declined. Its decline appears to be due both to declining enthusiasm for the leading party and to later polls occurring in places where voters were less prone to get on a bandwagon in the first place. The weakening of the bandwagon was correlated to distance of the constituency from London, although it revived to some extent in Scotland.     

Partisanship & nationalization in American elections: Evidence from presidential,senatorial, & gubernatorial elections in the U.S. counties, 1872–2020

Scholars argue that contemporary American elections are pronounced in their degree of partisanship and nationalization. While much of this work largely uncovers a heightened degree of nationalization in contemporary elections, little is known about how far back these patterns generalize. Given the limited availability of American electoral data, this work also generally focuses on a single office or during a certain segment of the post-war period since 1946. Moreover, this work largely focuses on states as salient units of analysis, masking potential variation found in U.S. counties, the smallest geographical unit constituting panel observations over time and across elections. In this note, we leverage a novel dataset of county-level election returns for President, U.S. Senate, and Governor, to specify a model assessing whether American elections are more nationalized and partisan than during any other period since the Civil War. We find evidence that presidential and Senate elections are more partisan today than any period since the Civil War, while gubernatorial elections are as partisan today as they were during the late 1800s. Our findings have implications for contemporary-based theories explaining the rise of partisanship in American elections and demonstrates the utility of county-level data in assessing electoral changes in America.     

Do voters prefer educated candidates? How candidate education influences vote choice in congressional elections

Previous research shows that democracies are more likely to produce educated politicians, but is this because voters prefer educated representatives or because of other features of the democratic process? Education may serve as a signal of candidate quality to voters or it may simply be associated with other factors, such as access to campaign funds, that help candidates win elections. We address this puzzle by analyzing head-to-head matches between candidates in US House elections from 2002 to 2012 along with a conjoint experiment. We find evidence that candidates with higher levels of education win more votes than candidates with lower levels of education, even after we account for standard indicators of candidate quality and campaign spending. This education premium not only garners more votes, but it also translates into higher probabilities of winning. The experimental results and sensitivity analyses show that it is unlikely that these results are explained by a hidden confound. The experiment also illuminates that the education premium flows from perceptions of candidate qualification and ability to pursue respondent interests.     

The Urban–Rural Gulf in American Political Behavior

Political Behavior - Urban–rural differences in partisan political loyalty are as familiar in the United States as they are in other countries. In this paper, we examine Gallup survey data...     

Can hybrid regimes foster constituencies? Ethnic minorities in Georgian elections, 1992–2012

Do ethnic minorities in postcommunist regimes vote in systematic ways? This paper examines ethnic minority voting in Georgian elections from 1992 to 2012, examining the causes for ethnic minorities' high electoral turnout and ruling party support. Although some argue that electoral fraud is the explanatory cause, other interests, such as experience of poverty and party electoral strategy, help explain minority electoral behaviour. This paper uses statistical methods to examine electoral fraud, as well as OLS regression to investigate the role of socio-economic factors such as urban density or poverty on ethnic minority voting behaviour. The paper also draws from in-country field research to investigate the party strategies and programs in ethnic minority areas during the 2008 parliamentary election.     

The incumbency advantage in second-order PR elections: Evidence from the Irish context, 1942–2019

Do candidates in local elections benefit from an incumbency advantage? And which factors moderate the strength of this incumbency bonus? Analyzing seven decades of Irish local elections (1942–2019) conducted under proportional representation through the single transferable vote, we reassess and extend the mixed evidence on the incumbency advantage under proportional representation and in second-order elections. By applying the Regression Discontinuity Design, we find that the incumbency advantage is at least as strong in Irish local as in general elections, which are conducted under the identical electoral system. We also show that marginally elected candidates in local elections have much higher reelection probabilities when they do not face a high-quality candidate in their local electoral area after getting elected. The findings point to the importance of name recognition as a major driver of the incumbency advantage in local elections.     

Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections

Using a new database of French municipalities that covers 821 towns and two elections (2001 and 2008), we examine how the budget structure, degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent. We take into account the institutional details of the two-round structure of the electoral process created by French electoral rules (dual ballot under plurality rules). We show that in the first round of the electoral process, spending on equipment (including infrastructures) can influence the voter, and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent’s score. In the second round, the incumbent’s vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect. We show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense. The results suggest that the determinants of each round’s outcome in a two-round electoral process are different.     

Empowering local government or just passing the austerity buck? The changing balance of central and local government in welfare provision in England 2008–2015

This paper asks two questions: first, how did the balance of decision-making between central and local government in welfare policy in England change between 2010 and 2015? Second, to what extent has that led to divergence in the extent and manner of such provision? It finds significant areas of policy where local flexibility has been increased (such as council tax benefit, crisis loans, and funding for specialist housing), either through a change in the tier of government responsible, or ‘unringfencing’ of grants allowing local authorities greater discretion in whether to deliver particular services, although in other important areas decisions on welfare remain firmly centralized. It also concludes that in areas where responsibility has been localized, divergence has been immediate and substantial. Localization may well reduce entitlements where local authorities enjoy a financial reward for so doing and political costs are low.     

The second European elections: 14–17 June 1984

Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe. Edited by William E. Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas. London: Croom Helm, 1977. Pp. 444. £9.95.

Policy Making in the European Communities. Edited by H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb. London: Wiley, 1977. Pp. xiv+341. £10.50.

La Politique Militaire de la Ve République. By Lothar Ruehl. Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques No. 193), 1976. Pp. xi+130. Fr. 76.

Fascism. By Martin Kitchen, London: Macmillan, 1976. Pp. xi+106. £2.95.

Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich: Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft. By Timothy W. Mason. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977. Pp. 374, DM. 19,80.

Writers and Politics in Modern France. (1909–1961). By J. E. Flower. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977. Pp. vii+78. £1.50.

Le discours communiste. By Dominique Labbe. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977. Pp. 205. Frs. 80.

Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership. Edited by David Landes. Critical Choices for Americans, Vol. VIII. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books (D. C. Heath), 1977. Pp. xix+406. £12.50.

The Jekyll and Hyde Years: Politics and Economic Policy since 1964. By Michael Stewart. London: Dent, 1977. Pp. 272. £8.50.

From Summit to Council: Evolution in the EEC. By Annette Morgan. London: Chatham House‐PEP, 1976. Pp. 75. £1.50.

The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration. By Loukas Tsoukalis. London: Allen and Unwin, 1977. Pp. 192. £8.50.

National Attitudes and the Financing of Industry. By Yao‐Su Hu. London: Chatham House—PEP, 1975. Pp. v+71. £3.00.

The Deferential Worker: A study of farm workers in East Anglia. By Howard Newby. London: Allen Lane, 1977. Pp. 462; £9.00.

The European Policy of the SPD. By Juliet Lodge, Sage Research Paper, Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 5, 1977 $3.00.

Der Rechtsstatus des Landes Berlin. Eine Untersuchung nach dem Viermachte‐Abkommen vom 3. September 1971. By Ernst R. Zivier, Berlin: Berlin‐Verlag, 3rd. ed., 1977. Pp. 399 (incl. Dokumentation); DM 36.

Die DDR zwischen Ost und West von 1961 bis 1976. By Peter C. Ludz. Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1977. Pp. 367; DM 19,80.     

Local electoral rights for non-French residents? A case-study analysis of British candidates and councillors in French municipal elections

The French Constitution restricts local electoral rights to French nationals and EU citizens. Third country nationals have long been excluded from suffrage as France has maintained a stronghold on nationality and republican values. Academics have called for expansive and liberal citizenships that would allocate political rights to all non-citizen residents, independent of nationality. This paper argues that Brexit and cessation of Britons’ electoral rights present a pivotal moment to discuss expansive citizenship and alien suffrage. Taking a bottom-up approach, the paper presents actual experiences of Britons as candidates and councillors in French municipalities. It demonstrates the importance of residency, representation, participation and inclusion, rather than nationality at the local level to underpin claims for expanding electoral rights. These findings foreground an empirical case for further promotion of theoretical ideas that propose expansive citizenship based on effective residency rather than nationality. Consideration is also given to third country nationals.     

The Participation Divide? Political Participation,Trust in Government,and E‐government in Australia and New Zealand

Drawing on 438 telephone interview surveys in Australia and 500 in New Zealand, we find evidence of a 'participation divide' where those participating in politics do so using a range of means, including electronic ones. Those less likely to participate in politics, are less likely to participate across all means measured. Those with higher levels of education and income and of European ethnicity are more likely to participate. We confirm the existence of the so-called 'digital divide' with those that use e-government means and those that do not, being stratified by education, ethnicity, income, gender and age. Contrary to our expectations we find that lower levels of trust in government are associated with higher levels of some types of participation, including e-government ones.     

The control of visual representation: American art policy in occupied Germany, 1945–1949

The development of the fine arts in post-war West Germany was influenced by the Office of Military Government for Germany, US (OMGUS). In mid-1946, a small group of OMGUS officers proposed the development of a fine arts policy aimed at neutralizing the Soviet cultural offensive. They were also interested in overcoming the cultural isolationism inherited from the Third Reich, and in strengthening the link between Western Germany and the democratic West. In 1947 the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Branch (MFA&A) of OMGUS began to develop an active fine arts policy. Its officers organized art exhibitions, provided exhibition space, established art contests, invited international speakers to lecture on art, created art appreciation groups, purchased work by German artists, channeled funds to German artists, and connected German artists with American museums, universities, and art patrons. Formal and informal, overt and covert networks were established to develop German-American artistic relations in the context of a cultural policy emphasizing collaboration.     

Differential turnout and party advantage in British general elections, 1964–83

Contradictory expectations exist about the effect of differential turnout on party support. This paper estimates the likely changes in party support in Britain under different levels of turnout. By applying multivariate analysis to individual-level data collected in 1964, 1974 and 1983, we argue that there is a consistent Conservative disadvantage in higher turnout, but that the corresponding Labour advantage is either slight or non-existent. The Liberals (and the Alliance in 1983) usually make a modest gain from increased turnout. While the magnitude of these changes in the vote may be small, they have the potential to determine the outcome of closely fought elections.     

Secular geographical polarization in the American South: The case of Texas, 1996–2010

This article uses fine-grained data to demonstrate that, since 1996, the State of Texas has undergone a process of ‘secular geographical polarization’ – a continuous divergence in the geographical bases of its political parties. It is suggested that this process exemplifies a new era of partisan politics in the American South. Analyses of spatial regression models show that the geographical polarization can be partially explained by a tighter link between demographic characteristics and aggregate voting patterns, but that growth in spatial clustering cannot be attributed entirely to demographics. The possibility that spatially-bounded social contexts are affecting partisan change is thus explored. Finally, the article's findings are considered in light of the growing debate about geographical polarization in the American electorate.     

Campaign spending and Senate elections, 1978–84

This paper uses a sample of recent Senate election results and estimates vote equations that show challenger spending hurts, and incumbent spending helps, incumbent re-election. While both types of spending have diminishing returns, the effects are asymmetrical. Challenger spending is more productive at lower levels of spending, but incumbents can spend greater amounts more profitably than can challengers. These results can explain why Senate incumbents spend money, why they typically outspend their challenger, and why incumbents who can outspend their challenger would tend to be against spending limits or public financing.However, the results do not explain why incumbent spending does not work in House election equations. Jacobson and others have run countless linear and quadratic specifications that persistently show perverse effects for incumbent spending. These results are not affected by the procedural problem of logging observations that have a value of zero, and pose a genuine puzzle. There are other empirical results suggesting the idea that there are basic differences in the nature of elections between the House and Senate. For example, Grier and Carlson (1988) find that state-level economic conditions have a strong effect on individual Senate elections, while Owens and Olson (1980) find that district-level economic conditions have no effect on House elections. Since I show that there are a significant number of elections where incumbent spending does matter, and that simultaneity bias may not be a tenable explanation for results where incumbent expenditures do not matter, it may be time to take a new look at the House data or to develop a testable theory that can explain persistant empirical differences in the determinants of elections in the House and Senate.