THE EFFECT OF THE CHILD-CARE CREDIT ON LOW-AND MIDDLE-INCOME TAXPAYERS' PURCHASES OF CHILD CARE

The child‐ and dependent‐care credit in the Internal Revenue Code is intended to encourage the consumption of commercial day‐care services. This research finds, through econometric analysis of tax returns from 1983 and 1987, that reducing child care's after‐tax price increases child‐care consumption by low‐ and middle‐income taxpayers who purchase commercial child‐care services.     

Is There a “Singles Tax”? The Relative Income Tax Treatment of Single Households

The existence of a "marriage tax," in which many married couples pay more taxes when married than their combined taxes as single individuals, is well known. However, largely lost in the attention devoted to married taxpayers is the treatment of single taxpayers. This article examines the relative tax treatment of single and married taxpayers. Various types of representative taxpayers are constructed, and the difference in income taxes paid by single taxpayers and married taxpayers is calculated. These calculations show that there is a "singles tax"; that is, a single individual typically pays a greater income tax liability than a married couple with identical income, especially when the main transfer programs are considered.     

Who Gains from Charitable Tax Credit Programs? The Arizona Model

The Bush administration and some states have promoted charitable tax credits as a way to increase private charitable giving, to support antipoverty programs, and to allow taxpayers to directly determine the utility and effectiveness of nonprofit services. Looking at Arizona's charitable tax credit program, this study assesses the strengths and limitations of this policy approach. Although charitable giving increased during the first two years of the program (1998 and 1999), tax returns from 2000 suggest it may be difficult to sustain these gains in a weak economy. Larger and better-known nonprofits and taxpayers who itemize their returns are the primary beneficiaries of the program. The program may put small but well-run organizations at a competitive disadvantage, weaken accountability in the sector, and pose administrative challenges to state departments of revenue. This analysis suggests that tax credits are not a panacea for the funding needs of nonprofits.     

The convergence of fiscal regimes and the decline of the Tiebout effect

A measure of waste from the competitive rent-seeking activity of special interest groups in federal, state and local budgets was calculated over the period 1900–88. This period in U.S. fiscal history is characterized by constitutional changes that have made for more transparency in governmental fiscal activities and for greater diffusion of taxes. The XVI Amendment to the Constitution created the progressive individual income tax (the corporate income tax was judged to be an excise tax in 1909 and passed the test of constitutionality). High marginal tax rates are a justification for a high average level of taxation. The Full Employment Act of 1946 insitutionalized government deficits as a means of meeting a political objective. As a result, opportunities for rent-seeking through budgetary reallocations rose in the United States. In the first two decades of the 20th century, waste at all levels of government represented about 10 percent of incremental national output. Today, waste is three times that amount.The transparency and diffusion of taxes are highest at the federal level and least at the local level. Rent-seeking through budgetary reallocation has followed the public purse. One explanation for the observed centralization of government in the 20th century may be that opportunities to concentrate benefits and diffuse taxes are highest at the federal level.     

The Tax That Failed: The VAT in Niger

The value-added tax (VAT) requires considerable sophistication on the part of both the taxpayers and the tax authorities in order to function effectively; not all countries meet this criteria. After Niger implemented the VAT in 1986, instead of realizing an increase in tax revenue it witnessed a decline, creating a major budget crisis. This article discusses why the VAT was an inappropriate choice for Niger, analyzes the reasons for the decline in tax revenue, and proposes alternative policies consistent with the administrative capacity of the Niger government and the existing socioeconomic environment.     

The effect of recent tax changes on taxable income: Evidence from a new panel of tax returns

This paper estimates the elasticity of taxable income to the net‐of‐tax share using a panel of tax returns that follows a random sample of taxpayers from 1999 to 2005, spanning the EGTRRA 2001 and JGTRRA 2003 tax changes. Results suggest that the elasticity of taxable income to the current year's net‐of‐tax share lies between 0.3 and 0.4 overall, and that the elasticity of a broader measure of income falls between 0.1 and 0.2 overall, with substantially higher elasticities for taxpayers reporting income in excess of $500,000. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

State Income Tax Treatment of the Elderly

The state and local tax treatment of the elderly varies significantly from state to state. In this article, we analyze the differences in effective tax rates for the state personal income tax for elderly versus non-elderly taxpayers. We find that in a majority of states, the average effective tax rate facing the elderly is significantly lower than that of non-elderly taxpayers. The consequences of this tax rate difference may impact long-term state income tax revenues as the elderly population continues to grow.     

The excessive costs of creative finance: Growing inefficiencies in the production of low‐income housing

Abstract

The paper examines creative finance as a means of low‐income housing production and preservation. The low‐income tax credit has evolved as the main federal housing production program in recent years. But this evolution can only be understood as a last resort. The inefficiencies of this approach outweigh any advantages. High transaction costs, inappropriate targeting of benefits, and insufficient monitoring are among the problems. Recent changes in the tax credit may actually cost the government more. Furthermore, current policy in fact creates the same time bombs now exploding in the prepayment projects. Current proposals for housing reform and revitalization have positive features, but are either underfunded or still rely on creative finance. What is needed is a direct one‐ or two‐step low‐income production program.     

Fiscal Exchange and Tax Compliance: Evidence From a Field Experiment

Behavioral interventions appealing to taxpayers’ reciprocity often leave tax compliance unaffected. We provide evidence that a “fiscal exchange nudge” increased tax compliance in a setting where one might not expect it: crisis-ridden Argentina. In a randomized controlled trial with over 20,000 taxpayers, a tax bill visually celebrating realized public works benefiting children increased payment rates of tax delinquents by about 20 percent, or almost 40 percent when the bills were delivered in person. Without the appeal, the new bill design generated significantly fewer payments. Changes in the design of the tax bill also increased arrears cancellation. We estimate the ratio of marginal revenues to costs for the fiscal exchange bill to be 18. The factors we associate with the unexpectedly positive impacts are consistent with strengthening an affective response. We find persistent effects of the experiment two years later. The results suggest that communities have more scope to increase tax revenues through non-threatening interventions.     

THE EFFECT OF RECENT TAX CHANGES ON TAXABLE INCOME: CORRECTION AND UPDATE

This article is a Commentary on Bradley T. Heim ( 2009 ), The effect of recent tax changes on taxable income: Evidence from a new panel of tax returns,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28, 147–163. doi: 10.1002/pam.20406 . This note provides corrected estimates of the elasticity of taxable income to the net of tax share using a panel of tax returns that follows a random sample of taxpayers from 1999 to 2005, spanning the EGTRRA 2001 and JGTRRA 2003 tax changes. Two errors were corrected: the specification of income splines, and the subtraction of capital gains income from the dependent variable. Though the original results are largely robust to the first change, they are not robust to the second. The corrected estimates suggest that the elasticity of taxable income to the current year's net of tax share is small and statistically insignificantly different from zero.     

The "common sense" of the nonprofit hospital tax exemption: a policy analysis.

Although rarely discussed prior to the 1985 Utah Supreme Court ruling against Intermountain Health Care Inc., the question of whether to grant tax exemptions to nonprofit hospitals is currently being debated by federal, state, and local legislators, and by the courts. Changes to current policy seem likely. This policy analysis: (1) presents the historical and legal background; (2) examines the economic, political, and organizational implications of current tax-exemption policy; and (3) offers three alternatives to this current policy. The analysis indicates that the current policy provides little incentive for nonprofit hospitals to make contributions of charity care. Of the alternatives, eliminating the exemption is not politically feasible at this time; regulating hospital operations and outputs portends an implementation nightmare; and tying tax subsidy levels to output levels of charity care--perhaps the strongest and most efficient incentive--would require an unlikely political consensus on what constitute valid and reliable measures of charity care. If there is a movement toward subsidies, then linking subsidy amounts to levels of charity care will depend on whether policy analysts can design satisfactory empirical measures. With the advent of universal health coverage, the demand for charity care will decrease. The problem for tax-exempt hospitals will then become justifying the exemption by demonstrating the extent to which they generate community benefits at no or reduced cost to society.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.     

In defense of the Articles of Confederation and the contribution mechanism as a means of government finance: A general comment on the literature

I attempt to dispel several widely-held myths regarding government finance under the Articles of Confederation, some of which were reiterated in Dougherty and Cain (1997). I defend the contribution mechanism as a method of government finance that is superior to direct taxation by the federal government, and present evidence contradicting the belief that revenue collections under the Articles were poor. A proper comparison is with alternatives at that time, such as state tax collections and the federal governments own tax collections under the new U.S. Constitution, both of which were lower than the collection rate from states under the Articles.     

Do State‐Funded Property Tax Exemptions Increase Local Government Inefficiency? An Analysis of New York State's STAR Program

This study tests the effects of a growing form of indirect state aid—state‐supported property tax exemptions—on local government efficiency. We hypothesize that larger exemptions, by lowering the effective tax price paid by local homeowners and thus their incentive to monitor efficiency, will reduce local government efficiency. We test this hypothesis by examining the introduction of New York State's large state‐subsidized property tax exemption program, which began in 1999. We find evidence that, all else constant, the exemptions have reduced efficiency in districts with larger exemptions, but the effects appear to diminish as taxpayers become accustomed to the exemptions.     

Extending the EITC to noncustodial parents: Potential impacts and design considerations

This paper examines the noncustodial parent earned income tax credit (NCP EITC), a new type of credit recently enacted in New York and Washington, D.C., and proposed by Senator Bayh and then‐Senator Obama in 2007. The NCP EITC offers an earned income tax credit to low‐income noncustodial parents who work and pay their full child support. This paper provides background information about the policy and presents national estimates of eligibility and benefits for an NCP EITC under three alternative policy scenarios. It also discusses several key design and implementation issues. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The refundable tax credit: A cubist policy analysis

A cubist policy analysis sets forth several interacting realities about a policy proposal in order to arrive at an optimum reconciliation of their demands. In relation to the proposal of a refundable tax credit, one must consider the political climate in 1984 and 1985 with respect to income taxes, the effect on families that are poor or have marginally middle-class or middle-class income, of relatively small increments or reductions of money, trends with respect to income for such families, and the manner in which established income transfer mechanisms respond and are able to respond to problems that emerge. Taking all this together, we are led to a proposal to replace the personal exemption in income taxes with a tax credit of $400 per person, reduced by 5 percent of household Adjusted Gross Income in excess of $10,000 a year. Costs and benefits and alternative designs for a refundable tax credit (including one that a taxpayer may choose or decline) are provided.     

Taxpayer Reporting Responses and the Tax Reform Act of 1986

This paper examines the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the reporting decisions of taxpayers, using microlevel information from the 1984 and 1989 Statistics of Income. We find that tax reform clearly mattered in the reporting decisions of individuals, with reporting elasticities that cluster between 0.3 and 0.7. However, our results also indicate that individuals' estimated responses vary in different ways for individuals with different income levels, in ways that differ by the types of incomes received by taxpayers, in ways that are sensitive to the estimation approach, and in ways that depend upon data adjustment methods.     

Charitable giving in the German welfare state: fiscal incentives and crowding out

There are two ways that government activities influence private charitable giving: (1) government spending on the provision of public goods may cause crowding out of private charitable contributions; and (2) tax incentives may boost private charitable giving. From a sample of German income tax returns, we estimate the elasticity of charitable giving relative to tax incentives, income, and government spending. Using censored quantile regression analysis, we derive results for different points of the underlying distribution of charitable giving. Evaluating overall treasury efficiency, the tax deductibility of charitable donations fosters enough private giving to offset foregone tax revenues.     

How much income redistribution? An?explanation based on?vote-buying and?corruption

This paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture. A?model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption. When rich voters can bribe the government, an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible. The link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data; the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model.     

Earned income credit utilization by welfare recipients: A case study of Minnesota's earned income credit program

This paper examines utilization of a state earned income credit by AFDC and TANF recipients. Although utilization percentages are increasing, we find that among TANF recipients in 1999, 45.7 percent of all households and 34.8 percent of eligible households did not receive the state earned income credit. Moreover, we find that utilization may depend upon TANF requirements and incentives, information resources, and barriers to work and filing of income tax returns. Finally, we investigate whether low utilization is because of little or no benefit from the state earned income credit and find this may be true for some with barriers or less incentive to work under TANF. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.