British cultural diplomacy and the cold war: 1946-61

Why was Britain so reluctant to use the tools of cultural diplomacy for the cold war? First, the habits of administration and the effects of war encouraged a compartmentalization of effort. There was no obvious point at which to construct an overview or a strategy which could match the Soviet enterprise. Second, the dissolution of the empire exposed the racism and ethnic tensions which had existed in both the United Kingdom and its colonies. Policymakers appeared to be pursuing incompatible objectives. They found it difficult to think about post-colonial influence except in terms of a policy for the Commonwealth, but also to construct such a line of action. The insubstantiality of cultural diplomacy is part of the trauma of losing great power status. Arab nationalism was the major force which prompted government into action on cultural affairs. Commitments were made before the military operations in Suez.     

The British consulate-general in Hanoi, 1954-73

Traditionally, there has been a rigid distinction made between British consular and diplomatic missions abroad: the former is concerned largely with trade, visas and the more mundane tasks of foreign representation, while the latter deals with the glamorous political world of interstate relationships at the highest level. As a general rule of thumb this may be true, but in accepting unequivocally this notion one overlooks those instances where a significant political role has been played by consulates. This article examines one such instance and in doing so raises questions relating to diplomatic and consular relations, disguised embassies, political reporting and the importance of experienced onsite personnel.     

Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance.     

Israel's entry to Africa, 1956-61

From 1956 to 1961, Israel established a presence in Africa that constituted a remarkable diplomatic achievement. When the Gold Coast became Ghana in March 1957, Israel's consulate in Accra became its first embassy in Africa. Israel experienced its first serious setback in Africa in January 1961, when Ghana, Guinea and Mali signed an anti-Israel declaration at the Casablanca conference. This initiative of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser condemned Israel as 'an instrument in the service of imperialism'. Yet while Israel feared it had lost what it had achieved in sub-Saharan Africa since 1957, the toll was primarily psychological, for the Israelis had, by 1961, achieved their main objective in Africa.     

British and Italian Imperial Rivalry in the Mediterranean, 1912-14: The Case of Egypt

Although it is known that serious imperial rivalry between Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean only began in the Fascist period, this article argues that Italian expansionism had already begun to pose a threat to British interests in the Mediterranean in 1912 following Italy's colonization of Libya. While the Italian state was still militarily and financially weak at this time, an Italian private financial institution, the Banco di Roma, engaged in a number of ventures in Egypt that led to complications in state-to-state relations. The article shows that the seeds of Anglo-Italian antagonism were sown in the hostile climate of the Egyptian-Libyan border through a series of incidents in the period between 1912 and 1914.     

The Danzig Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918-1920

Among the many and often bitter territorial disputes following the collapse of Germany and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe — to mention only the questions of Vilna, Memel, Teschen, or Lemberg — the problem of the Polish sea access was particularly explosive and became the most vexing territorial problem of the whole conference. This paper examines the question of Danzig and the lower Vistula within the context of contradicting Polish, German and Western, mainly British ambitions and preferences. The author shows that the proclamation of the Free City of Danzig and the creation of the Polish Corridor, dividing Germany into two parts, was a compromise not liked in Warsaw and Berlin and one the British, always fearing fatal repercussions to future stability, only considered to be the lesser choice of evils.     

The British official mind and the Lausanne conference, 1922-23

From the collapse of the Ottoman empire in 1918 until the Lausanne Conference in 1923 Britain attempted to establish itself as the dominant power in the Aegean, largely in order to control its strengths. This would see the British occupation of Constantinople, the collapse of Allied cooperation, the Chanak crisis, and the final resolution at Lausanne.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

Alternatives to the Resident Embassy: Intra-EU Diplomatic Networks in the Twenty-first Century

Increasingly integrated in a common political entity, the European Union’s member states are exploring new avenues to shape and maintain their mutual relations. This analysis describes three alternatives to the traditional resident embassy by which ministries of foreign affairs within the EU attempt to maintain diplomatic networks. The models discussed are secondments within member states’ capitals, visiting ambassadors, and co-location and co-operation. In other words, with regard to different modes of representation, member states can consider diving in, stepping back, or pooling and sharing. These developments shed light on the ways in which the diplomatic machineries of the member states are trying to adapt to the demands of a “post-Westphalian” environment such as that of the EU.     

Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44

The combat capability of 2nd British Army during the Normandy campaign has been much deprecated. This article tries to shed new light on these criticisms by examining three neglected aspects of the army's preparations for the campaign. It examines how the army was created from formations drawn from both Home Forces and 8th Army; it explores how its formations were trained in Britain before D-Day; it considers how senior commanders were selected to lead the army; and finally it demonstrates how athese issues had a significant influence on the combat capability of British troops in Normandy.     

Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44

Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helping the powers to agree. Great power consensus broke down when Britain and France imposed a peace settlement on the Dutch in 1832. Yet the Belgian case—like Iraq's 1991 expulsion from Kuwait—shows that collective security can sometimes succeed against cross-border aggression.     

The virtues of specialization: British and American diplomatic reporting on Russia, 1921-39

While important changes were made to the organization of the British diplomatic establishment in the years after 1918, most senior officials remained committed to the ethos of the 'generalist'. In the United States, by contrast, significant efforts were made to inculcate the virtues of professionalism and specialization among members of the Foreign Service. This paper examines the way in which members of the American and British diplomatic establishments monitored developments in the USSR during the interwar years. It concludes that US diplomats were no better than their British counterparts at interpreting developments in Soviet Russia, despite the fact that they were generally better trained to carry out their duties.