Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966–1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

British Foreign Policy,the Financial Elite,and the Nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, 1934–1945

The analysis examines the role of British financial institutions, namely the Bank of England and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB], in the making of British policy towards Turkey. The nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, a port operator purchased in 1907 by the British and French governments, serves as a case study through which business–state relations, the role of finance in the conduct of international relations, and the impact of perceptions on policy decisions are explored. In this case, the financial elite’s role was minimal during most of the period considered, becoming more important in the final war years in a framework of the Anglo–Turkish debt restructuring negotiations of 1944. Significantly, the CFB, rather than the Bank, represented the British government in the negotiations. There exists an abundance of evidence of the divergent views between Whitehall and the financial elite about Turkey’s trustworthiness as a debtor and a signatory to treaties. The British government’s perceptions were much more positive than those of the financial elite. This difference stemmed from the different interests involved: Whitehall sought to secure Turkey’s collaboration in the increasingly unstable global security environment while the Bank and the CFB were more concerned with investor and bondholder interests and attempted to avoid further financial losses.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967-1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966-1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

Greek-Turkish Rapprochement under New Democracy

New Democracy's victory in the March 2004 Greek elections immediately raised questions about the continued development of the process of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, begun five years earlier in 1999. However, concerns were misplaced. The incoming administration made it clear that it intended to maintain the policy of détente. Like the previous PASOK government, it sought to minimise the role of Cyprus as a factor in bilateral relations and continued to support Turkey's membership of the European Union. The differences that have arisen between New Democracy and PASOK appear to be more a result of the differing styles of George Papandreou and Petros Molyviatis, the two foreign ministers, than of any significant disparity in basic foreign policy principles.     

Keeping Cyprus off the agenda: British and American relations at the United Nations, 1954-58

From 1954 to 1958, the Greek government sought to raise the issue of self-determination for Cyprus at the United Nations as a means of pressing for the union of the island with the Greek state - enosis. The British government's objective was to ensure if possible that Cyprus was not debated using the legal argument that it was a domestic issue in which the UN had no rights. The British accepted, however, that other political and strategic arguments would be needed to defeat the Greeks and looked to the US government to support them in the UN forums. This article examines the positions of the British and Americans governments and shows the difficulties which the issue created for both in the UN in the period.     

Keeping Cyprus off the agenda: British and American relations at the United Nations, 1954–58

From 1954 to 1958, the Greek government sought to raise the issue of self‐determination for Cyprus at the United Nations as a means of pressing for the union of the island with the Greek state ‐ enosis. The British government's objective was to ensure if possible that Cyprus was not debated using the legal argument that it was a domestic issue in which the UN had no rights. The British accepted, however, that other political and strategic arguments would be needed to defeat the Greeks and looked to the US government to support them in the UN forums. This article examines the positions of the British and Americans governments and shows the difficulties which the issue created for both in the UN in the period.     

Shipowners,ports and diplomats: the political economy of Greece’s relations with China

The paper analyses Greece’s relations with China and highlights the crucial role of specific business interests in strengthening bilateral ties. Greek–Chinese political contacts, as well as trade, investment and touristic flows, have significantly increased in the last decade. The concession of the Piraeus port to the Chinese company COSCO was the major turning point for the relationship. The paper notes a strong influence of shipowning interests in Greece’s foreign policy decision-making system which has conditioned the development of Greek–Chinese relations.     

From Commitment to Independence: Greek Foreign Policy and the Western Alliance

This paper examines the troubled relationship between Greece and the western alliance following the collapse of the military regime in Athens and the invasion of Cyprus. U.S. Congressional reports and the Greek parliamentary proceeding reveal the geopolitical significance of Greece to the western alliance and the frustration of the government in Athens regarding its foreign policy objectives. The Greeks might have questioned the benefits of being part of an alliance; however, it is evident that Greece's diplomatic isolation compelled her leadership to strengthen her links with the western camp. Hence, the present study assesses the attitude of the Greek government toward the Atlantic alliance and the US over the issues of NATO membership and the military installations in Greece and challenges the notion of “independence,” or else the need for detachment from the western alliance.     

Great Powers,Counter Secession,and Non-Recognition: Britain and the 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”

The role of Great Powers in processes of secession and recognition has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent years. This analysis examines how Britain rallied international opposition to the November 1983 unilateral declaration of independence [UDI] of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” [TRNC]. The British Government tried hard to prevent the UDI. Once it occurred, Britain led efforts to condemn the move. It resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, which declared the TRNC illegal and called on states not to recognise it. As well as exploring the diplomacy behind the counter-secession efforts, this examination also answers a long-standing question as to whether any countries aside from Turkey ever recognised the TRNC. It also challenges the widely held view amongst Greek Cypriots that Britain invariably supports the Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus Problem.     

Attempting to Revise the Treaty of Lausanne: Greek Foreign Policy and Italy during the Pangalos Dictatorship, 1925–1926

In June 1925, General Theodoros Pangalos imposed his dictatorship on Greece. During his 14-month rule, he set as one of his basic foreign policy goals the revision of the territorial settlement imposed on Greece and Turkey by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Wanting to secure Eastern Thrace and possibly even part of Western Asia Minor for Greece, Pangalos sought the backing of at least one Great Power with interests in the region, in this case Italy, as its dictator, Benito Mussolini, remained equally hostile and aggressive toward Turkey. Pangalos tried to reach an understanding with Mussolini concerning the possibility of joint Greco–Italian action against Turkey. The first signs of closer co-operation came in early July 1925 when the Italian under-secretary of foreign affairs, Dino Grandi, visited Athens for discussions with Pangalos. However, a more important initiative involved the official visit of two Greek ministers—Loukas Kanakaris-Roufos, the foreign minister, and Anastasios Tavoularis, the transport minister—to Rome in early March 1926. They met with Mussolini who, because of British pressure, now seemed reluctant about Pangalos’ ambitious plans for joint action against Turkey. The Greek leader’s hopes to revise Lausanne ended.     

Conversations in Istanbul: An interview with Bulent Ecevit

Turkey, a strategically located but often unappreciated ally of the West, receives inadequate attention in Western media. It has served as a crucial element of Western defense during the cold war and is a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. The following interview with former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit examines the Turkish perspective on important Turkish foreign and domestic issues, specifically focusing on: Arab‐Israeli conflict, Turkish‐Greek dispute over Cyprus, Turkish relations with the Arabs, Turkish relations with the United States and West European countries, Arab relations with the West, and internal Turkish political affairs.     

“A Very Great Clerk”: Sir Ronald Campbell and the Fall Of France, May-June 1940

Sir Ronald H. Campbell was the first British ambassador during the Second World War to manage a key bilateral relationship with a wartime ally. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Campbell's Embassy was transformed from a diplomatic reporting post into a frontline base that had to brief London not only on the political situation in France but also on strategic military matters. However, the British ambassador would constantly struggle to register his authority in the overall management of the Franco-British relationship, and more often than not, was bypassed by Whitehall departments, special advisors and senior ministers. Campbell only found himself in a more pivotal role as communications between the British and French Governments disintegrated and the latter moved to Bordeaux. It then fell upon Campbell to make some of the most dramatic decisions in twentieth century Franco-British history.     

“A Very Great Clerk”: Sir Ronald Campbell and the Fall Of France,May–June 1940 1

Sir Ronald H. Campbell was the first British ambassador during the Second World War to manage a key bilateral relationship with a wartime ally. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Campbell's Embassy was transformed from a diplomatic reporting post into a frontline base that had to brief London not only on the political situation in France but also on strategic military matters. However, the British ambassador would constantly struggle to register his authority in the overall management of the Franco-British relationship, and more often than not, was bypassed by Whitehall departments, special advisors and senior ministers. Campbell only found himself in a more pivotal role as communications between the British and French Governments disintegrated and the latter moved to Bordeaux. It then fell upon Campbell to make some of the most dramatic decisions in twentieth century Franco-British history.     

The New 'Dubliners': Implementation of European Council Regulation 343/2003 (Dublin-II) by the Greek Authorities

The paper analyses a recent practice applied by the Greek asylumauthorities in the case of many asylum applicants who are returnedto Greece by another European Union Member State by virtue ofthe ‘Dublin-II’ Regulation. This practice consistsin interrupting the examination of their asylum claim on thegrounds that the applicants have arbitrarily abandoned theirplace of residence. Greek legislation provides for this actionin similar cases but was not used, up till recently, on casesof ‘Dublin’ returnees. The paper examines the reasonsthat led the Greek authorities to adopt this policy and itsfoundation in Greek asylum law and procedures, and challengesthe practice legally and politically. It argues that, in adoptingsuch a stance, Greece seems not only to go against the mainobjective of the Dublin-II Regulation (that an asylum applicationis examined once, and once only in the EU) but to contradictand undermine European Union policies on asylum, breaking theprinciple of good faith in its relations with its EU partners.In addition, it considers the possibility of similar problemsbeing repeated in other national legal orders.     

Is the latest Turkish–Greek détente promising for the future?

The main contention of this article is that the recent thaw in bilateral Greek–Turkish relations is promising yet insufficient for the future stability and cooperation in and around the Aegean Sea. To the surprise of committed observers of Turkish–Greek relations,the two countries set into motion a cooperative interaction process in the middle of 1999 and since then have succeeded in sorting out some problematical issues between them. Taking stock of this process, some observers have rushed to conclude that this process is irreversible and as long as both preserve their aspirations to further ‘Europeanize’, neither the Cyprus dispute nor the Aegean problems would remain unsolved. Either sooner or later, they would come to an everlasting settlement over these issues lest their continuation hamper their desires to become true Europeans by taking their seats around the same EU table in Brussels. However, as this article argues, there do not exist ample reasons for feeling optimistic about the future. The main reason lies in the prevalence of instrumental-strategic thinking on both shores of the Aegean Sea.     

Cyprus as the EU Anomaly

Following the failure of the 2004 UN-led referendum, the entry of a divided Cyprus into the European Union has introduced an unprecedented anomaly within the Union's system. This paper argues that this anomaly entails a complex pattern of contradictions between EU law and the European Union's political perspective on Cyprus that has weakened both EU law and the European Union's conflict-resolution capacity in regard to inter-ethnic relations in Cyprus, Cyprus–Turkish relations and EU–Turkish relations. The enquiry concludes with an exploration of EU strategies for addressing the Cyprus anomaly in a manner that realigns EU law and the European Union's peace-building capacity for the Eastern Mediterranean.     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943–45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943-45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.     

Women's political participation in Greece since the fall of the Colonels: From democratic struggle to incorporation by the party‐state?

This article examines the changing nature of women's political participation in Greece and argues that the period since 1974 has seen a shift from political participation through women's involvement in popular democratic struggles to the increasing incorporation of the women's movement by the Greek ‘party‐state’. From 1967–74 Greece lived under the repressive dictatorship of the Colonels. Yet Greece now enjoys some of the most progressive legislation in Europe in the area of equality between the sexes. Most of the demands of the Greek women's movement of the late 1970s were already translated into public policy provisions by the 1980s.

Women's issues came to be accepted on to the political agenda in Greece in part as a result of women's participation in national struggles for liberation and democracy through which they developed close links with the parties of the Left. In the short term, collaboration with the newly formed or newly liberated parties of the Left brought important rewards for the women's organizations and allowed women a voice in Greek politics for the first time. However, it is argued that collaboration has also had its costs ‐ not least of which has been the linkage of progress on women's issues with the spoils of political office.     

The View from Next Door: Greek-Turkish Relations after the Coup Attempt in Turkey

ABSTRACT

Turkey’s recent slide into authoritarianism will have implications for its close neighbours in the West. Especially Greece cannot avoid negative spill-over effects. A coalition government comprising Syriza and Independent Greeks does not have an unconstrained set of policy choices in responding to this. Maintaining effective working relations is a paramount interest but achieving this is easier in principle than in practice especially considering the issues of asylum seekers and Turkish revisionism on the Lausanne Treaty. Unlike the two parties that dominated the Greek political scene after 1974, PASOK and New Democracy, the current government has little experience navigating choppy diplomatic seas with Turkey.