Research in Context: Measuring Value Change

Abramson and Inglehart find a significant trend toward postmaterialist values in Western Europe, which they argue is largely driven by the gradual processes of generational replacement. Clarke, Dutt, and Rapkin argue that this trend is a methodological artifact of the wording of Inglehart's four-item measure of materialist/ postmaterialist values. They claim that because this battery does not include a question about unemployment, in periods of high unemployment respondents tend to choose postmaterialist goals. The long-term trend toward postmaterialism in Western Europe, they argue, results from rising levels of unemployment during the past two decades. Abramson and Inglehart point out that increases in inflation have a short-term impact on decreasing postmaterialism, but maintain that the positive relationship between unemployment and postmaterialism is spurious. As this analysis shows, Clarke, Dutt, and Rapkin find a positive relationship between unemployment and postmaterialism by building a model that has little theoretical justification and that is not robust to changes in specification. As this analysis demonstrates, unemployment is actually linked with support for materialist goals, and the trend toward post-materialism is robust in the face of alternative time frames, models, and specifications. The weight of the evidence demonstrates that the long-term trend toward postmaterialism in Western Europe is driven by generational replacement.     

No Values—New Values? Youth and Postmaterialism1

This article deals with the postmatenalist hypothesis, originally formulated by Ronald Inglehart The hypothesis, stating that new generations in Western societies are moving more and more towards postmatenalist value orientations, is questioned on the grounds that the materialisl / postmaterialist dichotomy may he too rigid to capture the complexity of people's value orientations, and that the value conceptualization may hold a rather limited relevance for young people in present-day Western societies. A reconstruction of the materialist / postmaterialist value conceptualization is earned out and empirical results from two Swedish national studies, supporting the author's questioning of the original hypothesis, are presented.     

Value orientation, left-right placement and voting

Abstract. In this article we try to disentangle the constraints between traditional lines of political polarization (left-right placement) and newer distinctions (materialist/postmaterialist values) among mass publics. It is shown that voting or party preference is most clearly related to the left-right placement of the respondents. However, this placement is directly and strongly dependent on the materialist/postmaterialist orientation, while background variables like education, income and age are linked to voting via this value orientation. The materialist/postmaterialist orientation appears to be the present-day interpretation of the dominant political conflict in advanced industrial society. Although alignments and orientations count for a substantive part of the variance in voting, the power of these models to predict the actual vote of people turns out to be rather poor.     

Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies

Using hierarchical linear models fitted to data from the World Values Survey and national statistics for 35 countries, this article builds on the postmaterialist thesis by assessing the impact of economic inequality across and within nations on attitudes toward homosexuality. It provides evidence that tolerance tends to decline as national income inequality rises. For professionals and managers, the results also support the postmaterialist argument that economic development leads to more tolerant attitudes. On the other hand, attitudes of the working class are generally less tolerant, and contrary to expectations of the postmaterialist thesis, are seemingly unaffected by economic development. In other words, economic development influences attitudes only for those who benefit most. These findings have political implications, suggesting that state policies that have the goal of economic growth but fail to consider economic inequality may contribute to intolerant social and political values, an attribute widely considered detrimental for the health of democracy.     

Unravelling the ‘devolution paradox’: Citizen preferences for self-rule and for shared rule

Recent survey research has revealed a ‘devolution paradox’: some citizens who favour stronger regional governments inconsistently desire policy uniformity across regions and state-wide intervention in policy provision. It is argued and empirically shown that preferences for regional authority can be broken down into preferences for self-rule – that is, for autonomy for the region – and for shared rule – that is, for collaboration between regional and national governments. Drawing upon the International Constitutional Values Survey, which includes 4,930 respondents from 142 regions in eight countries, it is also shown that preferences for self-rule and shared rule have different impacts. Preferences for self-rule translate into a preference for regional reform that strengthens regional autonomy, whereas preferences for shared rule drive preferences for fiscal transfers from richer to poorer regions. These results are important because they can explain why citizens who are in favour of more regional authority may support an apparently ‘paradoxical’ set of policy outcomes.     

Explaining politics: An empirical test of competing value measures

Abstract.  Values have long played a major role both in the analysis of political culture and as an explanatory concept relating to human attitudes and action: in fact, their scientific significance depends crucially on their explanatory function. After more than three decades of debate about the rise of postmaterialism and Inglehart's particular value measure, this rationale appears at times to be lost. This article examines the crucial issue of value's potential to explain political phenomena. How much can the postmaterialism-materialism instrument explain? Are there alternative operationalisations of values that have greater utility? The empirical analysis, based upon a representative survey conducted in Germany in 1992, leads to the surprisingly unambiguous result that among different value measures, Inglehart's variant explains the least.     

Political culture,postmaterial values,and the new environmental paradigm: A comparative analysis of Canada and the United States

This study investigates the relationship between postmaterial values and the New Environmental Paradigm in Canada (Ontario) and the United States (Michigan). Based on survey data collected among both citizens and environmental activists, it is evident that among both Canadian and American respondents of both citizen and activist type the two value dimensions are similarly multidimensional and separate. Rather than reflecting a single larger dimension of value orientation, as claimed by some, it is clear that the Inglehart postmaterialist value measure and the Dunlap and Van Liere NEP index are separate constructs in the thinking of the Canadians and Americans surveyed. While these findings were parallel in the Canadian and American settings, a number of cross-national differences in how these values influence attitudes and behaviors are reported. In general, these findings underscore the need to continue to focus on variations in the cultural context of citizen responses to postindustrial change.     

Partisanship in a Social Setting

No factor appears more powerful in explaining how individuals evaluate political information and form political preferences than partisanship. Yet, virtually all work on the effects of partisanship on preference formation neglects the crucial role of social settings. In this study, I examine how social settings can fundamentally change the influence of partisanship on preferences. I demonstrate that, in fact, social settings exert an independent influence over preference formation—one that is even larger than the influence of partisan ambivalence. The central implication of these findings is that, going forward, we cannot fully explore how citizens apply their partisanship in evaluating political information without also accounting for the social settings in which individuals find themselves.     

Dominant Party Strategy and Democratization

How do incumbent parties strategize against challengers when a new partisan cleavage cuts across the incumbent's electoral coalition? This article argues that a two‐dimensional extension of Riker's anticoordination thesis conflicts with Downsian extensions. It shows that when voters coordinate on a single challenger based on their shared preference on a cross‐cutting cleavage, a vote‐maximizing incumbent party should move away from the challenger on the primary dimension of competition, even at the risk of abandoning the center. The article develops this hypothesis with reference to dominant parties in competitive authoritarian regimes where challenger parties constantly attempt “heresthetical” moves by mobilizing regime issues into the partisan debate, and it tests the predictions with an original sample survey of national leaders of Mexico's Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI). It also spells out the implications of the findings for dominant party survivability in democratic transitions and, more broadly, for incumbents' spatial strategies in the face of new partisan cleavages.     

Voter‐weighted environmental preferences

This article examines the political economy of preferences with respect to the environment using a new stated preference survey that presents the first benefit values for national water quality levels. The mean valuation greatly exceeds the median value, as the distribution of valuations is highly skewed. The study couples the survey valuations with unique and extensive information on respondent voting patterns. Preferences of registered voters are similar to the preferences of the population at large, but median voters value water quality more than nonvoters. The strongest contrast related to voter‐weighted preferences is among voters for different candidates, as those who voted for Gore in the 2000 presidential election have the highest environmental values. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Nonseparable Preferences, Measurement Error, and Unstable Survey Responses

A person has nonseparable preferences when her preference onan issue depends on the outcome of other issues. A model ofsurvey responses in which preferences are measured with errorimplies that responses will change depending on the order ofquestions and vary over time when respondents have nonseparablepreferences. Results from two survey experiments confirm thatchanges in survey responses due to question order are explainedby nonseparable preferences but not by the respondent's levelof political information, partisanship, or ideology.     

Putting the Economy First: or Does Postmodernization Really Matter?

In recent years, there has been a strong tendency for the politicians of Western nations to make issues of economic policy making their first priority. Emerging evidence from the economics discipline, which shows a close association between subjective well-being and other macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and inflation, suggests that this priority ordering of politicians may well be one which is functional from an electoral viewpoint. However, recent research by Ronald Inglehart on the development of 'postmaterialist' values challenges the continuing electoral relevance of an economics-first approach to policy making by suggesting that, in advanced societies, mass publics are exercised more by quality of life concerns than by issues of economic affluence. Here we use Eurobarometer data for 12 EU nations to explore the nature of the linkage between economic policy outcomes and levels of popular satisfaction in both economically advanced and less advanced societies. Our findings suggest that affluence is not the only economic determinant of subjective well-being in these countries and that, contrary to Inglehart's thesis, the growth of the economy impacts on subjective well-being in rich and poor nations alike.     

Moderat bevorzugt, extrem gewählt. Zum Zusammenhang von Präferenz und Wahlentscheidung in räumlichen Modellen sachfragenorientierten Wählens

This article demonstrates, on the basis of survey data from the 2005 German national election, that voters often systematically choose more extreme parties than warranted by their own preferences. Estimation of Grofman’s (1985) spatial discounting model reveals that party preference and vote decision follow different utility functions. Preferences turn out to be purely proximity driven, i. e. voters prefer parties with positions close to their own. Moving from preference to the vote of the top-ranked alternative, a devaluation of party positions and a significant shift in voter utility towards more extreme parties is observed. These results show that voter behaviour may change, even though voter preferences remain unchanged. Results also suggest that the remarkable success of FDP and Linke in the 2005 election is more likely due to shifting behaviour by moderate voters rather than to sweeping changes in the German electorate’s preferences toward welfare policy.     

Postmaterialism and electoral choice before and after German unification

This article examines the implications of German unification for the relationship between postmaterial values and voters’ party preference. Based on longitudinal data covering 1983 through to 1995, the article argues and shows empirically that, in the post‐communist context: economic, immigration, and security issues became more salient to voters, while postmaterial issues, such as environmentalism are reduced in salience; as a result, the proportion of materialists increased sharply while the proportion of postmaterialists decreased substantially; which affects the competitive position of parties. In particular, while the CDU/CSU is in a favourable position to address materialist issues without upsetting a delicate balance between materialist and postmaterialist constituencies, the SPD faces a strategic quandary in trying to satisfy both types of constituencies. These developments at least temporarily reduce the effect of postmaterialism on voters’ partisanship. Against this backdrop, we assess the continuous relevance of postmaterialism for the future of electoral politics in Germany.     

The prohibition-repeal amendments: A natural experiment in interest group influence

The pattern of state support for Prohibition (18th Amendment, 1919) and Repeal (21st Amendment, 1933) is analyzed and compared. This comparison is important because Prohibition is the only amendment ever to be repealed. The main thesis is that there was no wholesale change in preferences of citizens. Instead, producer interests failed to mobilize effectively in 1919, and the coupling of moral and economic arguments that worked in 1919 broke apart in 1933. Regression analysis is conducted on state legislatures (for Prohibition) and state referenda on convention delegates (for Repeal), so states are observations in the cross-sectional regression analysis. The results broadly support the main thesis.     

The Dynamics of Party Preference Change in Britain, 1991–1996

The paper examines individual-level data from the first six waves of the British Household Panel Survey, 1991–96. The analysis shows that changes in party support in this period were significantly affected by two sets of factors that have traditionally been regarded as important sources of changes in voters' political preferences: ideology and personal economic experiences. Ideological change is demonstrated to have much stronger direct effects on party preference than economic factors. However, both objective economic conditions and subjective economic perceptions are shown to have significant effects on ideological change itself, implying that economic factors also exert important indirect effects on voters' partisan preferences. These individual-level findings provide important corroboration for the results of aggregate-level studies, which have consistently found that economic factors—and in particular economic perceptions—play a major role in determining patterns of partisan support.     

Do Individuals Value Distributional Fairness? How Inequality Affects Majority Decisions

The so-called chaos theorems imply that, under most preference configurations, majority voting in n-dimensional policy spaces is theoretically unrestricted. Empirical research, however, shows an apparent stability of democratic decisions. Recent theoretical developments have emphasized social preferences as a possible explanation for overcoming majority rule’s instability problem. Hence, it is assumed that individuals not only maximize their own well-being, but also value distributional fairness. However, there is little experimental research into the influence of social preferences on majority decisions. This article presents findings from laboratory experiments on majority decisions in two-dimensional policy spaces with a systematic variation of the fairness properties of the incentive structures. The results show that distributional fairness is an important motivational factor in democratic decisions.     

Europeanization and Domestic Employment Policy Change: Conceptual and Methodological Background

The article deals with the differential domestic employment policy adaptation to the European Employment Strategy that occurred over the past years in two European countries—Italy and France. Building on the Europeanization and welfare state change literature, the contribution operationalizes the “goodness of fit” hypothesis and develops a “policy structure” approach for the analysis of domestic employment policy change. The main argument is that domestic adaptation to the European Union depends primarily on the preferences of key institutional and social actors, and not on the specific design of domestic institutions. More in general, the article not only supports the validity of the misfit hypothesis but also shows how the nature and intensity of domestic preferences do explain differential patterns of adaptation to Europe (policy transformation in the Italian case, policy adjustment in the French case) in similar conditions of policy “misfit.”     

Perceptional inequality and preferential judgements: An empirical examination of distributional axioms

There are two categories of income distribution evaluations: first, the more-or-less “value-free” perception of income inequality as a statistical dispersion; and second, the valuation of income distributions according to an explicit social welfare function which is meant to capture all of society's value judgements. These societal value judgements can be expressed in the form of preferences. Whereas the inequality perception of income distributions appeals to an observer's sober judgement, the revelation of preferences with respect to specific income distributions appeals to his or her sentiments. This paper is an empirical analysis which investigates the juxtaposition of preferences with respect to income distributions and corresponding perceptions of distributional inequality. We do this through a questionnaire in which attitudes towards various distributional axioms are tested. The source of our data is 1773 completed questionnaires collected from five German universities. Based on our data, we observe that individuals' preference orderings over the set of income distributionssubstantially deviate from their perceptions of distributional inequality. In fact, our test responses showed that even when some income distribution is judged to be more unequal than another, that distribution might be preferred, as it accords higher incomes to each individual. We hold that the preference for these greater incomes expresses a compensation for the increased degree of inequality. This explanation applies both to equiproportional and to equal fixed-sum increases in incomes, which implies a support of Paretian ethics.     

The Role of Motivation and Leadership in Public Employees’ Job Preferences: Evidence from Two Discrete Choice Experiments

Two discreet choice experiments investigated how three styles of leadership (i.e., transformational, transactional, and ethical) and three job features aimed at activating different motivational forces (i.e., public service motivation, external regulation, and intrinsic motivation) simultaneously and independently affected the job preferences of a sample of public employees. Subjects displayed a strong preference for jobs that benefit more citizens, that are more interesting, and that require working under ethical leaders rather than unethical ones. Whereas the prospect of a 5% salary increase strengthened participants’ preferences for a given position, offering a 1% salary raise did not significantly change subjects’ job choices. Furthermore, participants did not appear to have any preference for working under a transformational leader rather than a transactional leader.