A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789–1992

We hypothesize that Supreme Court justices will consider the likely ideological disposition of their successor in their decision to retire or remain on the Court. Furthermore, because a justice's decision to remain on the Court places him or her at risk of dying in office, it is necessary to consider a model of both voluntary and involuntary vacancies. Our study examines three broad classes of factors influential to Supreme Court vacancies: personal considerations, institutional context, and political influences. We assess the factors that affect the probability of a vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court due to mortality and retirement at the individual level from 1789 to 1992, using a competing risk duration model and incorporating time-varying covariates. We find significant differences in the hazards of vacancy due to these two causes, and a number of factors are shown to influence the probability of a vacancy, including a general propensity to retire near the beginning of presidents' second terms. However, we find little evidence of the influence of political factors in either retirement-or death-related vacancies, suggesting that justices who retire do not generally do so for expressly political reasons and those who die in office rarely do so as a result of holding out for a like-minded replacement.     

Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Voluntary Retirement from Danish Local Government

Why do politicians choose to retire voluntarily from a position they have been working hard to get? It is argued in this article that the institutional setting of the elected assemblies influences the direct, as well as the alternative costs and benefits of having a political career and hence the patterns of voluntary retirement. Drawing on previous research from the United States Congress, this is explored in a new empirical setting: local government in Denmark. The results show that positions at the labour market matter as private‐sector employees are more likely to retire than public‐sector employees. Furthermore, internal institutional factors matter. Holding an institutional position such as chairing a committee makes retirement less likely. Furthermore, seniority makes the councillors more likely to retire when age is controlled for – a result not found in national studies. However, councillors who reach a high‐ranking position at an early stage are not more likely to quit with seniority than those who do not reach such a position. A high personal share of votes decreases voluntary retirement. In contrast to previous findings, the ideological distance from the ruling party does not play a role. This may be due to norms of consensus in the local councils.     

Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?

Conventional arguments identify either the median justice or the opinion author as the most influential justices in shaping the content of Supreme Court opinions. We develop a model of judicial decision making that suggests that opinions are likely to reflect the views of the median justice in the majority coalition. This result derives from two features of judicial decision making that have received little attention in previous models. The first is that in deciding a case, justices must resolve a concrete dispute, and that they may have preferences over which party wins the specific case confronting them. The second is that justices who are dissatisfied with an opinion are free to write concurrences (and dissents). We demonstrate that both features undermine the bargaining power of the Court's median and shift influence towards the coalition median. An empirical analysis of concurrence behavior provides significant support for the model.     

Reassessing the “freshman effect”: The voting bloc alignment of new justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921–90

Part of the conventional wisdom about the United States Supreme Court is the presumed existence of a freshman effect, a distinct pattern of behavior thought to be associated with newly appointed justices. Among other things, freshman justices are thought to be less likely than their senior colleagues to vote with established ideological blocs on the Court. The empirical evidence for the freshman effect in voting on the Court is somewhat ambiguous, however. In order to test for a freshman effect in the voting behavior of new justices on the Supreme Court, we examined the behavior of all justices on the Court between 1921 and 1990. Voting blocs were determined from the justices' interagreement scores, using the widely employed criterion developed by Sprague (1968). We found no evidence of a freshman effect during the time frame under study. Freshman justices do not differ from their senior colleagues with respect to bloc voting. We conclude that the freshman effect hypothesis is erroneous, at least with respect to the supposed nonalignment behavior of neophyte justices.     

State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey

In 1985, state courts of last resort issued more decisions thanin any year since 1950 in which they extended rights protectionsto individuals beyond those recognized by the U.S. Supreme Courtby basing rights protections solely or independently upon stateconstitutional grounds. A survey of state high court judgesand justices reported here indicates that there has been a nationwideincrease in the number of individual rights cases litigatedunder state constitutions since 1980. Significant-to-moderateincreases, however, were more likely to be reported by justicesfrom the Northeast and West, from states having a moralisticpolitical culture, and from courts whose members are appointedby the governor and/or legislature. State constitutional rightsclaims are more likely to be raised in criminal than noncriminalcases, though in both types of cases and in most states, stateconstitutional rights claims are raised less frequently thanfederal constitutional rights claims. Majorities of judges andjustices favor the ideas of teaching state constitutional lawin law schools and of testing for knowledge of state constitutionallaw on bar examinations.     

Strategic Considerations and Judicial Review: The Case of Workers' Compensation Laws in the American States

Whether state supreme court justices votesincerely or strategically depends upon:(1) justices' sincere preferences; (2)ideological differences between a justiceand other state actors, which affect the willingness of actors tosanction justices; and (3) institutionalrules and political settings, which affect the ability of otheractors to retaliate against justices forobjectionable decisions. Since institutional rules do notvary for the U.S. Supreme Court but do forthe 50 states, state supreme court cases are thebest site for testing conditions underwhich justices are likely to vote strategically. Moreover,amendment of state constitutions isrelatively easy, which permits systematic examination of theextent to which strategic behavior manifests in judicialreview cases. Using data on docketing anddecisions on workers' compensation laws for1970–1993, this research offers a broaderunderstanding of strategic behavior byjudges.     

The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion,the Separation of Powers,and the U.S. Supreme Court's Fear of Nonimplementation

Numerous studies have found that elite and popular preferences influence decision making on the U.S. Supreme Court; yet, uncertainty remains about when, how, and why the Court is constrained by external pressure. I argue the justices are constrained, at least in part, because they fear nonimplementation of their decisions. I test this theory by utilizing a recent study of judicial power, which finds the Court enjoys greater implementation power in “vertical” cases (those involving criminal and civil liability) than in “lateral” cases (all others; e.g., those involving schools or government agencies). I find that Court constraint is strongest in important lateral cases—those cases in which implementation depends on support from nonjudicial actors. My findings suggest that Supreme Court constraint is driven by the justices' fear of nonimplementation and is, therefore, dependent on institutional context.     

PRESIDENTIAL POLICY PREFERENCES AND SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT SUCCESS

Presidential appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court are major constitutional events. Few studies assess whether this political process benefits presidents with appointment opportunities. This article estimates the policy success of presidents since Eisenhower in appointing favorable justices on the racial equality issues. Previous research uses the president's party affiliation as an indirect measure of presidential preferences. This research examines the president's policy stance more directly by using presidential public statements on racial equality issues. An issue specific measure of presidential preferences shows that presidents have been more successful in appointing like-minded justices than reliance on presidential party would suggest. Regression estimates of the justices aggregate voting record on racial equality cases are robust even in light of other controls. The implications for democratic theory and future research are discussed.     

Supreme Court Justices’ Economic Behaviour: A Multilevel Model Analysis

Supreme Court justices are overlooked, but important, national policy‐making players who render final and consequential decisions in cases on economic conflicts. The research question asks what forces explain the decisional behaviour of Supreme Court justices in economic rights cases between a private and a public party. Theoretically, the decisional behaviour of an individual justice is a function of his or her notion as to what makes ‘good’ law, pursued in a cultural‐collegial setting that is oriented by majoritarian requirements, while constrained by the legal nature of the case being considered. Empirically, all economic decisions made by Norwegian Supreme Court justices in five‐justice panels from 1963 to 2012 are analyzed. Our multilevel model demonstrates that individual, collegial and case‐level forces all contribute to explain the justices’ votes. These results suggest that case‐related dynamics, such as who the plaintiff is or the amount of disagreement between justices, matter, but also that ideology – via appointment mechanisms – matters when a nation's high court justices decide economic cases. Understanding the foundational assumptions and the institutional procedures is vital when transporting judicial behaviour models across polities.     

The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting

This study employs the first systematic, empirical analysis that relies on archival data to examine whether the separation of powers influences justices' agenda votes. It spatially models how justices set the Court's agenda under a sincere approach as well as an SOP approach and compares the competing expectations derived therefrom. The results suggest that legislative and executive preferences fail to influence justices' votes. Across every model tested, the data show justices uninfluenced by the separation of powers. These results provide a strong rejoinder to SOP models, since the Court's agenda stage is the most likely stage of the decision‐making process to show signs of an SOP effect.     

Reported reasons retired workers left their last job: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

About a third of all new retired-worker beneficiaries who had stopped work reported that the main reason they left their last job was a desire to retire. The existence of health problems was the next most frequently given reason, and it was reported by about a fourth of the group. These responses were made to questions in the 1982 New Beneficiary Survey, conducted by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in October-December 1982. Recently retired workers not only said they wished to retire, but more of them began receiving benefits at age 62 than at older ages; by age 65 most were beneficiaries. Forty-five percent of the men and almost 54 percent of the women had already left their last job at the time they received their first benefit. Married women in particular had not only stopped work but frequently had left their last job more than 3 years before they received their first benefit check.     

Towards an Integrated Model of the U.S. Supreme Court's Federalism Decision Making

Disputes involving the boundaries of state versus federal powermake up a substantial portion of the U.S. Supreme Court's docketand have undergone extensive analysis. Yet, the conventionalwisdom regarding the justices’ choices in these casesis that they are highly inconsistent. I argue that this is primarilya function of the failure of scholars to develop a comprehensivemodel of the justices’ federalism decision making. Toremedy this, I introduce an integrated model of the individualjustices’ choices in these cases, which is then subjectedto empirical testing in the Rehnquist Court era (1986–2004).I explore a host of determinants of the justices’ decisionmaking, including attitudinal, institutional, legal, and personalattributes, as well as the role of organized interests in theCourt. The findings reveal that the choices justices make inthese cases are not as discordant as most commentators suggest.Rather, they are relatively predictable through the applicationof an integrated model of judicial choice.     

Trust in Government Among British Muslims: The Importance of Migration Status

This article engages debates about Muslim integration in Western societies by analyzing trust in government among British Muslims. A central finding of the article is that British Muslims are more likely than Christians to have high levels of trust in government. To account for these outcomes, I highlight the importance of general political satisfaction and political efficacy as opposed to the more specifically assimilation and segregation-related variables identified by the literature on minority attitudes. In addition, I posit that Muslims are more likely to have positive political attitudes because they are more likely than Christians to be migrants and migrants are more likely than natives to have optimistic evaluations of British society. I claim that these migration dynamics help account for much of the attitudinal differences between Muslims and Christians.     

Retirement and wealth

The decision to retire is related to the decision to save and to a number of other decisions, including decisions of when to claim Social Security benefits and what share of assets to hold as pensions, Social Security, and in other forms. This article explores the relationships among these various decisions and then explains why it is important to take them into account when attempting to understand the effects of changing Social Security and related policies on retirement outcomes. To understand how Social Security benefits affect retirement behavior, and the implications of changing such features as the Social Security early retirement age, the Social Security Administration and others have begun to estimate and use single-equation models of retirement. We explain why the kind of simple model they use is likely to provide a misleading guide for policy. Even if one's primary interest is in the relationship between Social Security policy and the decision to retire, it is important to incorporate other key decisions into the analysis. These simple models relate the probability of retiring to measures of changes in the value of Social Security benefits when retirement is postponed. The basic problem is that because the omitted factors are related systematically both to retirement outcomes and to the measured reward to postponing retirement, a simple retirement equation credits the effects of the omitted factors to the included measures of changes in Social Security benefits. New policies will change the relationship between retirement and the increase in the value of Social Security benefits with postponed retirement, resulting in incorrect predictions of the effects of new policies. When we fit single-equation retirement models, we find a variety of evidence that important behaviors have been omitted. These models include variables measuring the age of the respondent. These age variables suggest there is a sharp increase in the probability of retirement at age 62. This is a sign that even though the equations include measures of the increase in the value of Social Security with delayed retirement, the cause of the increased retirement behavior at age 62 has not been included in the model. In addition, the estimated effect of a variable measuring the future value of Social Security and pensions on retirement suggests that if the Social Security early retirement age were to be abolished, more people would retire earlier rather than later--a counter-intuitive prediction. There is even more direct evidence of the need for a more comprehensive model of behavior. We show that if individuals' preferences for leisure time were unrelated to their preferences for saving, then a simple retirement equation would yield an unbiased estimate of the effects of Social Security on retirement. An implication of such a model is that those who retire earlier for particular reasons would also save more for those same reasons. But when we estimate an equation with wealth accumulated through 1992 as a dependent variable, together with the simple retirement equation, we do not observe that the factors associated with earlier retirement are also associated with higher saving. These and related findings suggest that those who wish to retire earlier also have a weaker preference for saving, a relationship that is ignored in the simple model and can only be measured in a more complex model. Still other evidence also warns of internal inconsistencies in the simple retirement equations that are being estimated. Social Security incentives are often measured by the increment in the value of benefits associated with deferred retirement, but the incremental value depends on when benefits are claimed. Our findings show that those who retire completely are claiming their benefits too early to be maximizing the expected value of the benefits. Yet the measures of Social Security benefit accrual used in these retirement models often include the increase in the value of benefits from deferred claiming in their measure of the gain to deferring retirement. On the one hand, early retirees are seen not to defer benefit acceptance despite the actuarial advantage. On the other hand, later retirees are said to defer their retirement in order to gain the advantage of deferring benefit acceptance. Our empirical analysis is based on data from the first four waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey of 12,652 respondents from 7,607 households with at least one respondent who was born from 1931 to 1941. Our analysis also uses linked pension and Social Security data together with respondents' records from the HRS. We also evaluate a number of specific features of retirement models and suggest improvements. We develop a measure of the future value of pensions and Social Security--the premium value--that is not subject to a problem plaguing other measures in that it handles the accrual of benefits under defined contribution plans very well. We also introduce a new definition of retirement status that blends information on objective hours worked with subjective self-reports of retirement status. Our findings also explore the effects of Social Security incentives on partial retirement and consider the importance of incorporating partial retirement in any study of the relation of Social Security to retirement behavior.     

Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999

At the heart of attitudinal and strategic explanations of judicialbehavior is the assumption that justices have policy preferences.In this paper we employ Markov chain Monte Carlo methods tofit a Bayesian measurement model of ideal points for all justicesserving on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1953 through 1999. Weare particularly interested in determining to what extent idealpoints of justices change throughout their tenure on the Court.This is important because judicial politics scholars oftentimesinvoke preference measures that are time invariant. To investigatepreference change, we posit a dynamic item response model thatallows ideal points to change systematically over time. Additionally,we introduce Bayesian methods for fitting multivariate dynamiclinear models to political scientists. Our results suggest thatmany justices do not have temporally constant ideal points.Moreover, our ideal point estimates outperform existing measuresand explain judicial behavior quite well across civil rights,civil liberties, economics, and federalism cases.     

Does it matter whether people will know that I did not vote? The role of social norms and visibility

People behave in accordance with social norms when they feel observed or when they know their behaviour is monitored or could be disclosed. Get-Out-The-Vote experiments show that individuals are more likely to vote when told that their behaviour will be disclosed. In everyday life, however, there is much uncertainty about whether people will indeed know if one turns out to vote. I argue that fear of disapproval should only mobilize citizens to vote when they expect that their (non-)voting will be visible to others. Using original survey data from Canada, I measure expectations about whether others will vote, would disapprove if the person abstains, and will know whether they have voted or not. Furthermore, I distinguish between expectations concerning the partner, family, friends, and neighbours. Results suggest that respondents who expect others to vote are themselves more likely to vote, but I find no evidence that disapproval and visibility are related to turnout in everyday life.     

Rolling off the Tongue into the Top-of-the-Head: Explaining Language Effects on Public Opinion

Growing evidence shows that mass opinion varies by interview language, yet modest theory exists to explain this result. I propose a framework where language impacts survey response by making some political concepts more mentally accessible. I claim that concepts vary by how associated they are with certain languages, which means people are more likely to acquire a construct when it is tied to the tongue one speaks. Hence, recalling concepts from memory should be easier when the language a construct is linked to matches the tongue one interviews in, thereby intensifying people’s opinions. I test my theory by manipulating the interview language in two U.S. surveys of English/Spanish bilingual Latino adults. I generally find that language influences the accessibility of concepts. For example, subjects report higher opinion levels for concepts that are tied more to their interview language, such as American identity among English interviewees. Subjects who interview in English are also less likely to refuse completing items measuring knowledge about U.S. politics, and more likely to answer them quickly. Items reflecting constructs that are highly labile (e.g. anti-Obama affect) or very crystallized (e.g., partisanship) do not display these patterns. I then rule out that language effects are mostly mediated by a heightened sense of anxiety, anger, pride or efficacy that emerges when bilingual subjects interview in one of their languages.     

The outcome-prediction strategy in cases denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court

We investigate whether the substantial use of the outcome-prediction strategy by Supreme Court justices occurs in the petitions denied certiorari by the Court. We show with a computer simulation that [Caldeira, G.A., Wright, J.R., & Zorn, C.J.W. (1999). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15, 549–572], who modeled the missing final votes for denied petitions in order to include them in their study of the use of the outcome-prediction strategy, may have obtained spurious results. Application of the logic of conditional probabilities to the denied petitions suggests that all but those denied by the narrowest of margins are probably considered unacceptable by the justices on non-outcome-oriented grounds, and, therefore, are not subject to use of this strategy. We evaluate the pursuit of the outcome-prediction strategy in petitions that narrowly fail to be granted cert by focusing upon the petitions that are narrowly granted cert and find limited use of the strategy. We conclude that the outcome-prediction strategy probably is little used by the justices in confronting the petitions denied cert and that investigations of the use of this strategy are best confined to those petitions granted cert.     

The electoral consequences of racial fluidity

Brazilian politicians have seemingly adopted new racial identities en masse in recent years. What are the electoral consequences of asserting membership in a new racial group? In the Brazilian case, politicians who change how they racially identify themselves and secure greater access to campaign resources may become more electorally competitive. If voters learn a politician has changed their self-declared race, however, the politician’s reputation is likely to be tarnished and their chances of victory are likely to decline. Building on evidence that voters acquire greater information about election front-runners in high-profile contests than other types of politicians, I expect incumbents running for executive offices who change how they publicly identify themselves to suffer an electoral penalty. Drawing on data from local elections in Brazil, I find limited evidence that voters penalize city council candidates who adopt new racial identities. I show that incumbent mayors seeking reelection, however, receive significantly fewer votes after they assert membership in new racial groups.