Flexible pensions for politicians

It may be difficult to motivate politicians in their last term. To solve this problem, we suggest a triple mechanism involving political information markets, flexible pensions, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the potential reelection chances of the politician. Pensions depend on the price in the information market and thereby motivate the politician to act in a socially optimal manner. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of flexible pensions.     

Corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in China

Monitoring institutions are usually perceived as efficient instruments for improving governance. This article evaluates the link between corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in nondemocracies. Using China as a case, I show that corruption monitoring pushes capable young elites away from seeking government positions. This effect may be driven by two possible mechanisms: economic returns and career prospects. Specifically, corruption investigations may reduce the expected economic returns for government officials, undermining capable young elite’ willingness and efforts to become government officials. In addition, corruption investigations may indicate that there are potential uncertainties and risks involved when taking on a political career, which reduce capable young elites’ desire to pursue a political career. The empirical analysis confirms these two mechanisms and provides unique evidence for the unintended negative impact of corruption monitoring institutions.     

International trade policy: Benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians

The claim that sophisticated non-operational efficiency-based arguments for intervention facilitate obfuscatory policy-induced income transfers will meet, in some quarters, the counterclaim that this is an overly cynical interpretation of politicians' policy motives. Rent-seeking can likewise be argued to be an overly cynical conception. The theory of rent-seeking would impute self-interest motives to the offer of payment for a cup of coffee.The different perceptions of policy motives are particularly evident when the debate turns to the existence of politically allocated rents. The beneficiaries of politically allocated rents have an interest in denying the existence of rents that have been allocated via the discretionary political process, and in claiming that observed transfers reflect socially warranted considerations.     

Party performance explains disagreement between politicians and their parties

Are politicians more likely to disagree with their party after an electoral defeat or during a spell in opposition? If so, are they likely to advocate a more moderate or a more radical position than their party? In order to evaluate this, the article analyses the absolute distance between candidates for parliament and their parties on the left–right dimension. The sample used consists of 5614 politicians from 11 countries (Comparative Candidate Survey). Controlling for party system differences and individual characteristics, the results demonstrate that politicians take more moderate positions than their party after an electoral defeat. Also politicians of government parties are surprisingly more likely to disagree than politicians of opposition parties. These results overlap with predictions of party position shifts and inform the discussion on how intra-party dynamics bring about changes in party position. In addition, the article finds evidence of loss aversion, and differences in the responsiveness of elite and non-elite candidates.     

A comparison of prospective and retrospective voting with heterogeneous politicians

A long-standing empirical literature has been concerned with determining whether voters vote “prospectively or “retrospectively.” Despite this interest, little is known about the consequences of one voting regime versus another. This study addresses this deficiency. We find that voter welfare can be greatly affected by the candidate selection technique employed by voters. Among other findings, we show that “electing the best candidate” does not always maximize voter welfare. Furthermore, “myopic” voting is sometimes superior to “farsighted” voting. These findings have implications for interpretations of empirical studies of voter behavior.     

Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians

This paper analyzes principal-agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters, challengers, and incumbents. The introduction of a last period (via finite-livedness) in combination with voters' imperfect information about politicians' preferences causes time-varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians. Political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences, potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments. In the extreme, sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office. A systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist, and depends on how quickly sorting takes place. We show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences. In addition, if sorting is a significant feature of political markets, cross-sectional studies will tend to oversample little- and non-shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies. Reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed.We wish to thank John Bond, Donald Deere, Gertrud Fremling, Tim Gronberg, Michael Munger, Russell Roberts, and the participants of workshops at Dartmouth College, Texas A&M University, University of Houston, University of Texas, Yale Law School, and the 1987 Public Choice Meetings for valuable discussions on earlier drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was issued as working paper E-87-34 by the Hoover Institution. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Sentencing Commission nor those of any of its Commissioners. Any remaining errors are of course our own.     

When and why politicians do not keep their welfare promises

Although the welfare state is a core theme in most national elections in Western democracies, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the causes of welfare state pledge‐breaking. This article presents an argument that explains when governments do not do what they promised and tests it using an innovative research design with data covering four decades and 18 countries. The argument is able to account for several important but, until now, undescribed phenomena. First, nowadays, governments, on average, deliver less welfare than they promised, whereas in the 1970s they used to deliver more than promised. Second, the pledge‐breaking of governments has become highly dependent on the parliamentary opposition's position on the welfare issue. When the opposition favours fiscal and economic responsibility, governments’ tendency to deliver less welfare than promised is amplified. In contrast, when the opposition emphasises the positive benefits of generous welfare, such as equality and social justice, governments become more prone to keep their promises. Third, this conditional effect of the opposition is a recent occurrence that only emerged after the number of potential swing voters increased as class‐based voting gradually declined from the 1970s onwards.     

The changing representation interface: democracy and direct contact with politicians

The interface between politicians and the electorate is a vital component of the infrastructure of democracy and politicians now have many more tools available to communicate and engage with the electorate. Direct contact between politicians and the electorate is associated with increased levels of civic engagement. In this article, we examine the responsiveness of politicians in the UK by conducting: (i) an innovative test of responses to an undecided voter's email and (ii) follow-up interviews with electoral candidates. We found that a majority of electoral candidates had an identifiable email address and more than half responded to our undecided voter's email. However, there were considerable differences in the content relevance of the responses. There were also very few follow-up emails or further contact from the electoral candidates, suggesting only limited evidence of an integrated communication strategy. Electoral candidates also expressed concerns about communicating in a way that was ‘on record’. The findings provide a unique insight into the dynamics of communication between politicians and the electorate and the changing nature of the representation interface. Whilst the Internet has the scope for more personalized and two-way communication and for electors to hold politicians to account, it seems that politicians are more focused on campaign advantage rather than renewing the representation interface.     

Male and female politicians on Twitter: A machine learning approach

How does the language of male and female politicians differ when they communicate directly with the public on social media? Do citizens address them differently? We apply Lasso logistic regression models to identify the linguistic features that most differentiate the language used by or addressed to male and female Spanish politicians. Male politicians use more words related to politics, sports, ideology and infrastructure, while female politicians talk about gender and social affairs. The choice of emojis varies greatly across genders. In a novel analysis of tweets written by citizens, we find evidence of gender-specific insults, and note that mentions of physical appearance and infantilising words are disproportionately found in text addressed to female politicians. The results suggest that politicians conform to gender stereotypes online and reveal ways in which citizens treat politicians differently depending on their gender.     

More politicians,more corruption: evidence from Swedish municipalities

In the literature on political economy and public choice, it is typically assumed that government size correlates positively with public corruption. The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive, owing to both measurement problems and endogeneity. This paper creates a corruption index based on original data from a survey covering top politicians and civil servants in all Swedish municipalities. The effect of more politicians on corruption problems is analyzed using discontinuities in the required minimum size of local councils. Despite the fact that Sweden consistently has been ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world, the survey suggest that non-trivial corruption problems are present in Sweden. Municipalities with more local council seats have more reported corruption problems, and the regression discontinuity design suggests that the effect is causal.     

Distilling frenzy from academic scribbling: How economics influences politicians

Some economists misunderstand the way their work is used in policymaking. They claim to be providing dispassionate predictions and parameter estimates to politicians, but often—sometimes unwittingly—the economists' main contribution is to construe a complex issue as a problem (for example, a market imperfection) capable of solution. And the economists' solutions depend as much on their conception of the public good as on their technical algorithms. As a result, for good or ill, economics is as influential for its implicit ethical theory as for its predictions. Ignorance of that fact makes some social scientists less influential with policymakers than they might otherwise be.     

Pay for politicians and campaign spending: evidence from the French municipal elections

Public Choice - This paper investigates the relationship between taxation and firm performance in developing countries. Combining firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and tax data...     

Competing bureaus and politicians: A compliance approach to the diversion of public funds

This article analyzes the effects of the compliance relationship between the governing party and two competing bureaus producing differentiated goods. We assume that the three players simultaneously and independently take their decision in terms of production and rents with perfect knowledge of each others strategies. Unlike Niskanen's competitive results, which are invariant with respect to the monopoly solution and only depend on the characteristics of the review process, here the budgetary equilibrium changes depending on the nature of the goods supplied by the competing bureaus and is affected both by their demand and cost conditions and by the resources available to the governing party.     

Electoral incentives and elite racial identification: Why Brazilian politicians change their race

Scholars recognize that individuals change how they racially identify themselves over time and even from situation to situation. Politicians, however, are typically presumed to have stable, innate racial identities. In this article, I contend that politicians strategically change their self-professed race in response to electoral incentives. Using original data from Brazilian elections, I show that more than a quarter of the political candidates that competed in Brazil’s 2014 and 2016 elections changed their publicly declared race from one election to the next. My analysis indicates the racial composition of the electorate and the electoral rules that govern competition affect patterns of racial change. These results suggest that candidates “racially position” themselves as members of the racial group that provides the greatest electoral rewards. This strategic behavior calls into question extant theories which assume elite racial group membership is fixed and exogenous to electoral outcomes.