Does Direct Democracy Reduce Public Debt Evidence from Swiss Municipalities

Although some countries have managed toobtain balanced budgets or even budgetsurpluses in recent times, public debts ofmany OECD countries remain at high levels.Since structural reforms of public spendinghave only infrequently taken place in mostcountries, fiscal pressure will increaseagain in the future due to society's ageingand the accompanying increases in socialtransfer spending. Constitutionalrestrictions on debt levels and legal rulesof the budgetary process, such as a strongrole of the minister of finance, aresupposed to be helping against the debtbias inherent in political decision-makingprocedures. In addition to such top downbudgetary procedures, this paperinvestigates the impact of referendumapproval of budget deficits by the voterson the level of public debt in a crosssection of the 134 largest Swissmunicipalities in 1990.     

Empirical examination of public debt sustainability in African economies: A panel data analysis

This study intends to investigate public debt sustainability across 29 Sub-Sahara African (SSA) economies, employing various econometric specifications, for the sampled years 1996–2020. The study employs Bohn's (Are stationarity and cointegration restrictions really necessary for the intertemporal budget constraint? Journal of monetary Economics, 54(7), pp.1837–1847.) framework of sustainability as the baseline model to assess public debt sustainability across the sampled Sub-Sahara African economies. As additional tests of public debt sustainability in order to support the baseline findings, the study also employs panel unit root and timeseries unit tests. The baseline findings from the OLS, panel quantile and instrumental panel quantile regressions show that public debt is sustainable across the panel of SSA economies. The positive and statistically significant response of primary balance under the Bohn's framework of sustainability manifest that the intertemporal budget constraint is not violated in the sampled economies. The consistency in the estimates under the OLS, panel quantile and instrumental panel quantile regressions also show that the estimates are robust throughout the estimation process. Also, utilizing the panel unit root test for public debt sustainability, the findings show that public debt is stationary over the sampled years which implies that intertemporal budget constraint holds and that public debt is sustainable across the sampled SSA economies. However, the timeseries analysis indicate that although majority of the SSA economies have sustainable public debt ratios, four countries namely Uganda, Sudan, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire have unsustainable public debt ratios. The study has important policy implications in terms of prudent public debt management and fiscal management for the sampled SSA economies.     

Budget institutions and taxation

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.     

When the Interest Rate on the National Debt Is a Policy Variable (and “Printing Money” Does Not Apply)

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) argues that the interest rate on the national debt for a monetary sovereign is a policy variable, not subject to whether bond markets “accept” or “reject” it. This paper defines measures of the components of the standard analysis of fiscal sustainability. It then methodically describes the Federal Reserve's operations relevant for understanding why interest rates on government debt in the United States have been and continue to be driven by monetary policy. A corollary that emerges—“printing money,” as economists usually understand it—is not applicable and has never been advocated by MMT.     

Public Debt,Economic Growth,and Public Sector Management in Developing Countries: Is There a Link?

The article investigates whether differences in public sector management quality affect the link between public debt and economic growth in developing countries. For this purpose, we primarily use the World Bank's institutional indices of public sector management (PSM). Using PSM thresholds, we split our panel into country clusters and make comparisons. Our linear baseline regressions reveal a significant negative relationship between public debt and growth. The various robustness exercises that we perform also confirm these results. When we dissect our data set into “weak” and “strong” county clusters using public sector management scores, however, we find different results. While public debt still displayed a negative relationship with growth in countries with “weak” public sector management quality, it generally displayed a positive relationship in the latter group. The tests for non‐linearity shows evidence of an “inverse‐U”‐shape relationship between public debt and economic growth. However, we fail to see a similar significant relationship on country clusters that account for PSM quality. Yet, countries with well‐managed public sectors demonstrate a higher public debt sustainability threshold. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corruption and State and Local Government Debt Expansion

Theories describing rent seeking in the public sector posit a number of negative fiscal outcomes that the choices of corrupt officials may generate. The evidence presented in this article shows that states with greater intensities of public corruption have higher aggregate levels of state and local debt. If corruption in the 10 most corrupt states were only at an average level, their public debt would be 9 percent lower, or about $249.35 per capita, all else being equal. Notably, institutional control measures may not have succeeded in restraining the expansion of state and local public debt in the presence of greater levels of corruption. State and local governments would achieve more efficient levels of fiscal discipline by curbing public sector corruption.     

Inflationary effects of oil price shocks in Indian economy

Stabilising inflation around certain preconceived level remains the predominant objective of monetary authorities all over the world as its variability has crucial ramifications on the real economy. However, the effective operation of monetary policy to this end largely hinges on the nature and dynamics of inflation both in the short‐run and long‐run. In this context, the present study focuses on theoretical investigation of how crude oil price fluctuations affect inflation in a real economy. Moreover, the study examines the nature of relationship between crude oil price fluctuations and inflation and its impact with reference to Indian economy. The study suggest that, in India, although the price of petroleum products are insulated against international crude oil price fluctuations by way of subsidies in order to curb inflation, in the long run, inflation manifest itself in the form of worsening fiscal deficit and undermine the sustainability of public debt. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGY OF THE VICTORIAN COALITION GOVERNMENT

Abstract: This article reviews the budget sector financial management strategy of the Victorian Coalition government in the crucial period from its election in October 1992 up to the 1993–94 budget. The twin goals set by the Coalition were the elimination of the current account deficit, and the reduction of debt levels. Given infrastructure pressures, the debt reduction goal will be a difficult one to achieve. More precisely, it will be a difficult one to achieve without relying upon instruments such as assets sales, which the Coalition has viewed as artificial debt reduction techniques. The capital expenditure plans embodied in the 1993–94 state budget were not consistent with the debt reduction plans specified only months earlier by the Coalition. Victoria's debt levels are quite moderate even by OECD standards. What makes debt levels a real issue for the state is the narrowness of the tax bases of the Australian states, and the fact that Victoria is taxing at something like its maximum levels (at least, without coordinated multi-state tax increases). It is argued that, if the states could be confident that their revenue positions would hold firm (concretely, that revenue and grants as a proportion of GSP would remain constant), the appropriate debt policy goal for Victoria would be stabilisation — rather than reduction — of its debt/GSP ratio. However, the foreshadowed trend reduction of real commonwealth grants, as part of the so-called national savings campaign, makes it appropriate for Victoria — given the circumstances in which it finds itself — to target the reduction of debt/GSP levels.     

THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIGH LEVELS OF PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING: THE CASE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Abstract: The relatively small and open South Australian economy has been facing the difficulties associated with the structural adjustment of its industry for over 15 years. In addition, the South Australian public sector has been contending with financial difficulties largely as a result of a reduction in grants from the commonwealth before the failure of the State Bank of South Australia. This paper reviews the growth and current level of government indebtedness in South Australia and discusses which group(s) is likely to bear the main burden of such debt. The main consequences of high levels of state public sector debt, including budgetary inflexibility, are also examined. The paper suggests that it will be necessary for relative wages and prices to adjust more freely if the negative impacts of an inevitable state government budgetary consolidation are to be minimised. If wages and prices are not free to adjust then unemployment will continue to take the brunt of the adjustment process. In addition, out-migration of businesses and people from South Australia will accelerate, leading to a further erosion of the taxation base. The State Bank indemnity arrangements and consequent levels of public sector debt incurred will require the state government to reduce the level and quality of services provided by the state public sector, sell state public sector assets and further improve efficiency and effectiveness. However, there are a number of important arguments why taxation should be an important means by which the South Australian government moves to retire public sector debt as soon as practicable. Not the least important of these arguments is the need to ensure accountability by elected representatives of government for their expenditure decisions.     

The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and a representative union

In the recent economic literature the independence of the central bank is often considered to be one of the most effective guarantees to achieve price stability. A strong theoretical basis for this proposition is that the monetary policy delegation given to an independent central bank is an optimal instrument to avoid the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. This paper investigates the stability properties of this solution in a simple game in which the private sector (i.e. the trade unions) and the public sector (i.e. the central bank) simultaneously interact. A representative monopoly union is considered, and – in line with the recent economic debate – two types of unions are investigated: (i) the standard micro-founded trade union; (ii) the inflation-averse trade union. In both cases, we find that the requirement for the Nash equilibrium to be stable imposes a limit to the conservativeness of the central bank. Instability of the Nash equilibrium reveals a strategic co-ordination failure between the public and the private sector.     

Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls

While the basic model of time inconsistency, put forward by Barro and Gordon (Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983). Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589–610) is widely accepted now, several authors have expressed serious doubts about the empirical relevance of the model in explaining inflation. Interestingly enough, few attempts have been made so far to test for the existence of inflationary biases empirically. Theory predicts a positive correlation between a monetary authority's relative preference for the high employment goal and inflation. Using polling data from six countries as a proxy for public preferences we provide empirical evidence in favor of the Barro-Gordon-model.     

Unionization and Work Attitudes: How Union Commitment Influences Public Sector Job Satisfaction

This article explores whether union commitment dampens public sector job satisfaction. By examining the connection between union commitment and two workplace attributes that are presumed to be more prevalent in public sector workplaces—perceptions of higher red tape and greater public service motivation—this article develops three hypotheses exploring the direct and indirect relationships between union commitment and public sector job satisfaction. The findings from a series of structural equation models indicate that union commitment directly increases members’ job satisfaction, but it more prominently increases members’ job satisfaction indirectly by reducing perceived red tape and enhancing public service motivation.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

Democracy,public debt transparency,and sovereign creditworthiness

Democratic Advantage (DA) arguments explicitly and implicitly assume that democracies have more transparent public debt, enhancing sovereign creditworthiness. This study questions the assumed link between transparent public debt practices and democracy in developing countries. It finds that such practices, which are crucial for investors, (a) do not depend on democratic governance and (b) largely erase the effect that DA variables regime type, rule of law, and property rights have on creditworthiness. In other words, transparent public debt and democracy should not be assumed to go together, and transparent debt practices affect creditworthiness more than DA variables. The findings identify public debt transparency as a statistical and theoretical confounder for current iterations of the DA thesis, which must be addressed to better understand the relationship between democratic governance and sovereign creditworthiness. The policy implication is to not assume that transparent public debt practices are only available to democracies.     

Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings

Empirical analyses of public corruption focus predominantly on international differences; regional differences in public corruption within a single country receive little attention. We empirically investigate the effect of public corruption in the United States on state bond ratings, which previous research shows are inversely related to net interest costs on public debt. After controlling for various economic influences on bond ratings, we find that more corrupt states have lower bond ratings, which implies that taxpayers in more corrupt states face a negative pecuniary externality by paying a premium for debt.     

Bribery and Public Debt Repudiation

In cases where policy makers accept ``bribes'' offered by organised lobbies or interestedparties, government decisions can be modelled as a first price menu auction. In this paper we adaptthis structure to model debt repudiation. We considera one-period model in which two generations, parents and children, are present, and debt titles are unevenlydistributed among parents. The government can repaythe debt by a combination of taxes on the children'sincome and on the outstanding debt. We excludeintergenerational conflicts, assuming that the parents'and children's objective is to maximise the utility ofthe family. In this perspective, families make offersthat relate monetary contributions to the taxstructures chosen by the government. On the hypothesisthat all interests are represented, we obtain theresult that the government is indifferent to the taxstructure.     

Once more into surplus: Reforming expenditure management in Australia and Canada

Canadian and Australian federal government budgets have returned to surplus. Over the past two decades both countries have undertaken financial management and budgetary reforms in an effort to control expenditure growth and public debt. They exchanged ideas, borrowed techniques, and shared reform experiences. Yet during the mid-1980s and early 1990s they displayed markedly different levels of success in expenditure control. This article explains why relatively similar instruments of expenditure control and financial management produced different outcomes in Australia and Canada. The analysis suggests that budgetary techniques will have marginal impact unless they are congruent with broader policy management systems and administrative cultures. The comparative analysis provides important lessons for budget reformers in all jurisdictions.     

Fiscal Consolidation and Australia's Public Debt

Australia has experienced one of the fastest growing public debt levels in the world post‐Global Financial Crisis due to a series of large federal budget deficits driven by high government spending. In this paper we examine the balance sheet implications of this escalating public debt, before proposing some macro‐fiscal objectives for determining its sustainable level. These objectives are to (i) restore the federal government's solvency; (ii) eliminate foreign public debt; and (iii) achieve budgetary balance over the business cycle. Empirically, we first examine how much fiscal consolidation is required for debt stabilisation at current levels, before considering what sized budget balances are needed to achieve the target debt to GDP ratios consistent with the proposed objectives. The results show that no target debt to GDP level consistent with the optimal levels will be met on current fiscal settings in the medium term. This implies significantly greater fiscal consolidation is required to minimise future fiscal risk.     

THE FIRST TWO OIL SHOCKS: POLICY RESPONSE AND EFFECTIVENESS

A simultaneous, comparative review of the attempts by different countries and country groupings to react to the economic problems caused by the two oil shocks. of the 1970s can help us evaluate the relative success of those efforts. In general, the world has yet to recover from those shocks, with various combinations of slow growth, high unemployment, high inflation rates, and substantial governmental andlor international debt still facing countries everywhere. It appears that different combinations of traditional fiscal and monetary policy largely shifted the temporal impact of the shocks or altered the trade-offs among problem categories. It also appears that energy policy may be a more powerful tool with which to approach the possibility of future shocks than any combination of economic policies.     

Serial payers,serial losers? The political economy of Argentina’s public debt

A global neoliberal architecture has enabled many countries to increase their public debts to meet their fiscal needs. But since 2008 a number of European and North American economies have faced financial crises induced by unsustainable debts. This paper analyses the case of post-default Argentina since 2001, so as to better comprehend the political economy of public debt, especially in cases where governments are elected on anti-austerity platforms. Presidents Néstor and Cristina Kirchner were committed to a debt-reduction policy, yet Argentina faced a new, ‘selective’, default in 2014. This paper analyses how the country has been trapped in a cycle of debt dependency, which can only be interrupted by a comprehensive audit of the debt’s legitimacy followed by debt cancellation. Critical lessons are provided for other countries facing similar situations.