Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence

This paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors. Thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying. We show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying, when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross-price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high. The empirical evidence from the U.S.supports the theory. Greater collusionreduces the level of PAC contributions.     

Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation

Pecorino (1998) models tariff lobbying in a repeated game and finds that cooperation can be maintained in a large group, even though tariff lobbying provides a rival public good to interest group members. We add small fixed costs of participation to this model and find that cooperation must break down in large groups. By contrast, if a fully rival public good directly enters the utility function, then cooperation is possible in large groups, even with small participation costs. Thus, we find only partial support for Olson’s (1965) proposition that collective action must break down in large groups.     

‘The rock that can't be moved’: China's revised geostrategies in Myanmar

ABSTRACT

Since 2011, Myanmar has undertaken a series of domestic and foreign policy reforms, including democratisation and peacebuilding, before and after the watershed November 2015 elections in the country. These reform processes have called into question whether China, which has been Myanmar's dominant great power neighbour throughout the previous era of military government in the country formerly known as Burma, would find its strategic position eroding as Myanmar further opens to the international community. However, the concept of China ‘losing’ diplomatic ground to other actors, including the West, in Myanmar implies a zero-sum game that does not adequately address Beijing's still-formidable geostrategic presence vis-à-vis its southern neighbour. China has now started to implement a more multi-faceted, ‘resilience network’-building approach to maintaining its special status in Myanmar's foreign policy, a situation which will persist as Myanmar continues its uncertain path towards further reform.     

The Logic of Transnational Action: The Good Corporation and the Global Compact

This article examines corporate participation in the UN Global Compact programme. Using data on the world's 2,000 largest companies, we address the question of why companies voluntarily assume the programme's responsibilities and promote the rights of 'global citizenship'. Our analytic approach is to view transnational corporate political behaviour as a result of firm-level decisions shaped by country-level variation in political audience effects. Drawing on earlier research on more conventional forms of corporate political activity, we expect factors influential in the standard model of firm political activity to determine participation in the Global Compact. In addition, we argue that this highly visible, less instrumental dimension of a firm's political behaviour is driven by efforts to build a good environmental and human rights reputation with its audience of external actors. The importance of environmental and human rights concerns depends on the substance of the firm's business activities, the availability of investment and 'exit' options, and the home audience's bias towards the UN and human and environmental rights. We find support for political factors as well as firm and industry-level characteristics influencing the decision to participate in the Global Compact.     

Managing the Re‐Entry Process of Returnee Government Scholars in an Emerging Transition Economy – An Embeddedness Perspective

This paper reports the findings of a study that investigates the factors affecting the re‐entry and readjustment process of returnee government scholars in Vietnam. These returnee scholars were originally sent overseas to study as part of changes introduced by the Vietnamese government to develop its domestic talent pool. Using the perspective of home country embeddedness, we find that career and community embeddedness factors, together with readjustment factors, have an effect on returnee scholars’ career and life satisfaction in their home country. These factors subsequently affected their intention to stay or re‐expatriate. The study contributes to public sector change management theory by examining factors affecting the re‐entry process of returnees within an emerging transition economy. It also adds to the limited studies on understanding and managing the re‐entry processes and state‐led diaspora strategies among returnee government scholars from emerging transition economies and their effectiveness.     

Mobilizing the Public Against the President: Congress and the Political Costs of Unilateral Action

Prior scholarship overlooks the capacity of other actors to raise the political costs of unilateral action by turning public opinion against the president. Through a series of five experiments embedded in nationally representative surveys, we demonstrate Congress's ability to erode support for unilateral actions by raising both constitutional and policy‐based objections to the exercise of unilateral power. Congressional challenges to the unilateral president diminish support for executive action across a range of policy areas in both the foreign and domestic realm and are particularly influential when they explicitly argue that presidents are treading on congressional prerogatives. We also find evidence that constitutional challenges are more effective when levied by members of Congress than by other actors. The results resolve a debate in the literature and suggest a mechanism through which Congress might exercise a constraint on the president, even when it is unable to check him legislatively.     

Can foreign aid reduce income inequality and poverty?

This paper’s goal is to examine the effect of foreign aid on income inequality and poverty reduction for the period 1971–2002. Since simple cross-country regressions cannot be taken as ‘true’ time series findings we focus on dynamic panel data techniques, which allow accounting for potential simultaneity and heterogeneity problems. We find some weak evidence that foreign aid is conducive to the improvement of the distribution of income when the quality of institutions is taken into account; however, this result is not robust. This finding is consistent with recent empirical research on aid ineffectiveness in achieving economic growth or promoting democratic institutions.     

Right target; wrong tactics: the trump administration upends East Asian order

President Donald Trump initiated a tariff war claiming that the ultimate target was mercantile Chinese economic practices. Numerous countries share such concerns about China. Yet the Trump administration’s approach is wrong for at least three big reasons. First, tariffs avoid addressing the most fundamental complaints about China while they undermine the longstanding and beneficial global liberal trade order. Second, the U.S. approach has been unilateral rather than multilateral, weakening America’s bargaining position while alienating close allies. Third, the Trump administration escalates what is an economic challenge into an existential threat, ignoring numerous benefits from Chinese policies as well as ignoring multiple areas where China has been a powerful global partner. Middle powers in Asia have acted collectively and individually to bolster the global trading system and avoid the worst consequences of the Trump actions while seeking to avoid making permanent binary choices between the United States and China. Beyond the immediate problems, the Trump tariff wars are creating, they also generate damaging second order effects that are undermining domestic and regional policies conducive to enhanced American strengths and an economically less mercantilist China.     

The friend of my enemy is my enemy: International alliances and international terrorism

Terrorism is an instrument for groups that cannot achieve their political goals legally. One important strategic function of terrorism is to weaken the government – either directly by attacking representatives or supporters of the government or indirectly by causing a political response that is unpopular among the population. Often, however, political stability of the home government is buttressed by foreign powers. In this case, the terrorists can have a strategic interest in attacking nationals of these foreign countries. This article analyses this logic by looking at international alliances as a proxy for international support. If the friend of my enemy is my enemy, then terror entrepreneurs, which seek to overthrow their home country's government (the enemy), may find it attractive to target nationals of the foreign allies of their country (the friends of the enemy). The theory in this article predicts that attacking nationals of a foreign ally is particularly attractive if this ally is militarily more powerful than the home country. Moreover, the combined effect of alliance and relative power differentials becomes stronger the more democratic the ally and becomes weaker the more democratic the terrorists' home country. Empirical support for the hypotheses in this article is found in an analysis of a directed country dyad sample of international terrorism.     

Large‐scale solidarity? Effects of welfare state institutions on the admission of forced migrants

The variation among countries when it comes to the admittance of forced migrants – refugees and asylum seekers – is substantial. This article explains part of this variation by developing and testing an institutional explanation to the admission of forced migrants; more precisely, it investigates the impact of domestic welfare state institutions on admission. Building on comparative welfare state research, it is hypothesised that comprehensive welfare state institutions will have a positive effect on the admission of forced migrants to a country. There are three features of comprehensive welfare state institutions that could steer policies towards forced migrants in a more open direction. First, these institutions have been shown to impact on the boundaries of social solidarity. Second, they enhance generalised trust. And third, they can impact on the citizens’ view of what the state should and can do in terms of protecting individuals. The argument is tested using a broad comparative dataset of patterns of forced migration, covering 17 OECD countries between 1980 and 2003. This analysis shows that comprehensive welfare state institutions have a significant positive effect on the admission of forced migrants, under control for a number of factors often highlighted in migration research.     

The Conditional Nature of Political Risk: How Home Institutions Influence the Location of Foreign Direct Investment

What determines whether countries' institutions attract or deter investment? Although existing theories predict that multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid locations where institutions cannot constrain public and private actors' opportunistic behavior, we argue host institutions' attractiveness depends on firms' home environment. Home country institutions shape firms' practices and capabilities, thus helping to determine the environments that firms are best prepared to face abroad. We test our predictions using multiple data sets at different levels of analysis: firm‐level data on MNEs' foreign subsidiaries, data on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) positions, and longitudinal data on bilateral FDI flows. We find that states with independent judiciaries are particularly attractive to investment from countries also possessing independent courts. Similarly, countries with low judicial independence disproportionately send FDI to countries lacking independent judiciaries. These findings' implications challenge conventional wisdom: “Good” institutions may not attract all investors, and “bad” institutions may not always deter, as current research suggests.     

Canada’s minority government

Canada’s general election on 21 October saw Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal party lose its parliamentary majority. Hamstrung by its new minority status, the Liberal government will probably avoid major departures from current policy. Moreover, unless a major crisis emerges, domestic concerns will take priority over foreign issues.     

COVID-19 and American Attitudes toward U.S.-China Disputes

The COVID-19 outbreak has fueled tension between the U.S. and China. Existing literature in international relations rarely focuses on virus outbreaks as factors affecting international relations between superpower countries, nor does research examine an outbreak’s potential influence on the public’s opinion about their country’s foreign policy. To bridge this research gap, this study explores the extent to which the American public may be prone to favor policies that “punish” China via existing U.S.-China disputes, such as the South China Sea dispute and the U.S.-China trade war. I conducted an online survey using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and ran multinomial and ordered logit models to estimate the association between an individual’s preferred policies and the country or government an individual blame for the impact of the pandemic. After controlling several essential confounding factors, such as one’s levels of nationalism and hawkishness, I found strong evidence that there is a positive association between people’s attribution of blame to the Chinese government and the likelihood of supporting aggressive policy options in the two disputes with China. That is to say, U.S. citizens who believe that the Chinese government is solely culpable for the outbreak in the U.S., compared to those who think otherwise, are more likely to support hawkish policy options, such as confrontational military actions, economic sanctions, or higher tariff rates. The research provides a glimpse into where Americans may stand in these disputes with China and the potential development of U.S.-China relations in the post-pandemic era.

     

Changing Horses in Wartime? The 2004 Presidential Election

The literature makes clear that foreign policy affects voting, but it does not lead to clear expectations as to how a war will affect voting. Will views about the advisability of the war predominate? Or will the indirect effect through the incumbent’s image be more important? Will a war crowd out other potential issues, particularly domestic ones? This paper addresses these questions through a series of focused analyses of NES survey data. We find that an increase in strong Republican partisans clinched the election for President Bush. The Iraq War was not a direct vote gainer for the President, but the larger War on Terrorism burnished his image as a leader, at least long enough to win the election. Likewise, the cultural war allowed President Bush to retain some of the votes that he might otherwise have lost due to the unpopularity of the Iraq War.     

Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of Defense Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies

In this article, we present a new theory that, given the economic consequences of military spending, some governments may use military spending as a means of advancing their domestic non‐military objectives. Based on evidence that governments can use military spending as welfare policy in disguise, we argue that the role of ideology in shaping military spending is more complicated than simple left‐right politics. We also present a theory that strategic elites take advantage of opportunities presented by international events, leading us to expect governments that favor more hawkish foreign policy policies to use low‐level international conflicts as opportunities for increasing military spending. Using pooled time‐series data from 19 advanced democracies in the post–World War II period, we find that government ideology, measured as welfare and international positions, interacts with the international security environment to affect defense spending.     

National Human Rights Institutions: Domestic implementation of international human rights law

Does adopting a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) make states’ international commitments to not torture more constraining? Many researchers have explored international human rights treaties’ abilities to constrain leaders from violating human rights, some focusing exclusively on the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Thus far, findings are not promising unless certain domestic conditions apply such as sufficient democratic space to air grievances or independent judiciaries. This article continues to explore domestic conditions by focusing on another liberal institution—National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). Torture is usually a secretive practice, and NHRIs act as information providers to potential mobilizers and domestic legal systems assuring international legal commitments are not empty promises. Using statistical analysis on 153 countries over the years 1981–2007, I find that when a country has ratified the CAT, the presence of an NHRI substantively decreases the chances the state will be an egregious offender.     

The International Economic Interests of U.S. States

During the 1970s, global interdependence penetrated deeply intothe U.S. economy, drawing state governments into novel internationaltrade and investment activities. State promotional programssought to capture revenue and job creation benefits from exportexpansion and foreign investment inflows, while other stateactions attempted to minimize costly local disruptions associatedwith import competition and foreign control of resources. Asforeign and domestic economic factors intertwined, nationaljurisdiction in matters of foreign affairs increasingly overlappedtraditional state government prerogatives concerning economicdevelopment and citizen welfare. State governments began directlobbying on international issues, leading to both complementaryand conflictual national-state positions. As the United Statesadjusts to an interdependent global economy, a new internationaldimension will be added to federal relationships. National andstate officials must fashion creative new instruments to accommodatediverse domestic political and economic needs while still exertingpositive leadership in international economic forums.     

Tax Britannica: Nineteenth Century Tariffs and British National Income

The literature on British economic history presumes thatBritain was a free trader after the repeal of the Corn Lawsand that her tariff levels were thus below those which wereoptimal for maximizing utility. Presumably, if the optimalBritish tariffs had been positive and greater than the levelsestablished by mid-century, a reduction to zero of all tariffsthat remained would have lowered British welfare even further.In this paper, we use a simple computable general equilibriummodel to simulate a drop in all British tariffs to zero. Theresulting substantial net increase in British welfaresuggests that British tariffs were much higher than would beconsistent with an optimum tariff policy. More important, thesize of British losses from her high tariff levels suggeststhat British policy was not consistent with the stance of anideological free trader.     

Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy

We investigate whether the effect of government corruption is conditional on a country’s institutional structure. Federal systems have an additional layer of government, making lobbying relatively more costly. We investigate whether the effect of government corruption on environmental policy (in the form of restrictions on energy use) is conditional on a federal system being in place. Using 1982–96 data from 11 industry sectors in 12 OECD economies we find that while greater government corruption reduces the stringency of environmental policy, the effect declines in federal systems.     

Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory

Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to examine domestic responses to the president's decision to “back down” from public threats and “back into” foreign conflicts. We find the president loses support in both cases, but suffers more for “backing out” than “backing in.” These differential consequences are partially explained by asymmetries in the public's treatment of new information. Our findings strongly suggest that concerns over consistency undergird audience costs theory and that punishment for inconsistency will be incurred, regardless of the leader's initial policy course.