Dynamic anarchy: the evolution and economics of the beguny sect in eighteenth-twentieth century Russia

Public Choice - The paper investigates the possibility of evolution in superstitions that support self-governance arrangements. To show that superstitions may adapt to changes in economic...     

Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment

In a series of experiments we show that people learn to playthe efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. Thisresult persists despite quite different experimentenvironments and designs, like different propensities ofcompetition, group sizes etc., and is interpretable as aresolution of the so-called Tullock paradox which states thatreal-world rent-seeking expenditures are much lower than whatthe standard rent-seeking model predicts.     

Efficient local charity with self-selection

How is charitable giving within a city influenced by the prospect of donor and recipient migration? The theoretical literature on charitable contributions in a closed economy has mainly argued that the market level of private giving will tend to be lower than optimal, wherever there exists a local fiscal externality between donors and recipients. Interjurisdictional models of voluntary redistribution, on the other hand, abstract from altruism to explore the interjurisdictional fiscal externality resulting from the failure of one community to account for the migration impacts of its actions on other communities. This paper integrates and extends both literatures by allowing for local altruism among the mobile residents of a system of local economies. Within a single community, mobility thus introduces adverse selection considerations for each donor via the migration of both recipients and other donors. Moreover, any change in the local transfer level influences both equilibrium wages and donor behavior system-wide. The analysis demonstrates that the market level of local charitable giving will be lower than is either ‘locally’ or ‘globally’ optimal in some cases and plausibly higher than optimal in others, depending on the effect of migration and expectations on wages. The self-selection nature of donor decision making does eliminate the usual interjurisdictional fiscal externality, though it leaves a role for government intervention via subsidies to altruistic behavior.     

Efficient bilateral taxation of externalities

We consider the quadratic voting mechanism (Lalley and Weyl in Quadratic voting. Working paper, University of Chicago, 2015; Weyl in The robustness of quadratic voting. Working paper, University of Chicago, 2015) and focus on the incentives it provides individuals deciding what proposals or candidates to put up for a vote. The incentive compatibility of quadratic voting rests upon the assumption that individuals value the money used to buy votes, while the budget balance/efficiency of the mechanism requires that the money spent by one voter by redistributed among the other voters. From these assumptions, we show that it follows that strategic proposers will have an incentive to offer proposals with greater uncertainty about individual values. Similarly, we show that, in an electoral setting, quadratic voting provides an incentive to propose candidates with polarized, non-convergent platforms.     

Efficient Influence Activities with Endogenous Rent

This paper analyzes the effects of influenceactivities on organizational efficiency ina principal-agent framework with endogenousrent. It shows that, with endogenousrent, influence activities canimprove efficiency even if theirinformative value is low. Effects on thedissipation rate of rent are alsoconsidered. In particular, it is shownthat, with endogenous rent, more powerfulincentives on influence activities only increasethe dissipation rate when the sum ofthe elasticities of the influence costsfunction and of the production function isgreater than one.     

如何建设效率政府

建设效率政府,除了要建立公共管理的绩效管理制度,促进政府管理绩效的提高之外,还必须采取具体对策与措施提高政府行政效率。     

Institutional Impediments To Efficient Water Allocation

Current water institutions were developed for conditions of water penty rather than scarcity and are unable to allocate water resources efficiently under conditions such as those in the arid West. This paper reviews riparian, appropriation and correlative water law as well as existing admin- istrative rules governing water use in California and finds that all of these institutions violate norms of economic efficiency. The review suggests that decentralized water systems such as mutual irrigation companies with their appropriate laws are more flexible than centralized federal or state systems in promoting water movement to higher valued use. The paper concludes that institutional mechanisms which promote rather than inhibit water trades and transfers are more appropriate to arid areas and that these institutions will become increasingly popular as water becomes increasingly scarce.     

湖南利用外资应注重质量提升

湖南利用外资起点低增长快,对推动湖南经济的发展起着越来越重要的作用。但是,湖南在利用外资的质量方面还存在诸多问题。因此,要进一步提高利用外资水平,还须在保证数量快速增长的同时,注重质量和效益的提升。今后,湖南应通过采取各种切实可行的对策,提升利用外资的质量,实现数量与质量的同步提高。     

Scalable Protocols Offer Efficient Design for Field Experiments

Experiments conducted in the field allay concerns over externalvalidity but are subject to the pitfalls of fieldwork. Thisarticle proves that scalable protocols conserve statisticalefficiency in the face of problems implementing the treatmentregime. Three designs are considered: randomly ordering theapplication of the treatment; matching subjects into groupsprior to assignment; and placebo-controlled experiments. Threeexamples taken from voter mobilization field experiments demonstratethe utility of the design principles discussed.     

高效生态经济:一种新的理论与逻辑的结合

高效生态经济是 2 1世纪经济发展的新主题 ,也是我国经济发展面临的新选择。高效生态经济作为区域经济发展的增长极 ,可以促进和拉动相关产业发展 ,可以促进区域经济再上新台阶 ,诱发和培植新的经济增长点和生长点。     

应急管理中公共政策的有效执行

公共政策是政府进行应急管理的基本手段,应急管理中公共政策的有效执行,有利于危机的化解。目前,我国应急管理中政策执行存在缺乏强有力的执行组织、社会参与不足、执行手段单一、问责机制不健全等问题。为此,必须建立高效统一的政策执行组织,动员社会力量参与执行,整合执行资源,综合运用多种执行手段、加强执行问责,以促进政府应急管理中公共政策的有效执行。     

Efficient allocation and unanimous consent with incomplete demand disclosures?

The following hypothesis about behavior in collective economic decisions is proposed. Individuals disclose latent demands accurately provided that doing so results in no appreciable loss of opportunity for material gain. On the foundation of this behavioral hypothesis, the following procedure is suggested. A collective good intermediary (CGI) solicits reports about latent demand schedules from a sample whose replies will not appreciably affect their own cost-shares. The CGI uses their reports to estimate the statically efficient program size and tax-shares adequate to finance it. The CGI then presents a proposal to the entire pertinent population on a this-or-nothing basis. If approved nearly uanimously, the proposal is adopted. It is concluded that if a program is worth adopting, i.e., generates a positive, aggregate net benefit, complete disclosure by all will not be needed to finance it. Most participants may, therefore, not need to estimate, even for themselves, their maximum personal benefit. The task of setting cost-shares to attain nearly unanimous consent will be easier the greater the aggregate gain from the efficient choice.     

建立效率与公平相统一的企业所得税制度

企业所得税改革问题是近两年来经济学界讨论的一个热点,大多数学者将关注的焦点放在了企业所得税改革的一些具体问题上,比如:内外资企业所得税合并、企业所得税税收优惠、企业所得税中“超国民待遇”问题等等。笔者认为企业所得税改革的具体问题固然重要,但如果偏离或违背了增强企业活力,建立效率与公平统一的企业所得税,促进我国经济可持续发展这一总体思路,一切都是空谈。