The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman

The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman have modeled the likely effects of AV in severely divided societies, in order to impugn AV as a tool of interethnic accommodation. In this response, I show that Fraenkel and Grofman’s model is based on extreme assumptions that bear no relation to party and voter behavior in such societies. Models based on realistic assumptions about strategic behavior and cross-national experience with AV both demonstrate that AV generally provides centripetal incentives that can contribute to interethnic coalition-building and accommodation.     

To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting

One paradox of voting states that, in a general election, in which many citizens vote, the probability that a single voter can affect the outcome is so small that in general citizens have no rational reason for voting. However, if all citizens accept this reasoning, then none will vote, and so each vote has a large probability of affecting the outcome. Hence all should vote after all. The adoption of mixed strategies resolves this paradox: if each citizen adopts a certain (small) probability of voting, then the actual number of citizens voting will be just enough to make it worth those citizens' while to vote. A Nash equilibrium point thus occurs. Here we compute Nash equilibria for the simple case of majority voting; for the more complicated case of composite voting (for example, as in a presidential election), we draw certain qualitative inferences.     

Measuring the civic duty to vote: A proposal

Civic duty is a central concept in the study of turnout, yet little attention has been paid to how it should be measured. After a careful review of previous measures we constructed an original battery of 13 questions that were administered in a survey conducted in seven countries at the time of the 2014 European election. We show that the battery indeed taps the duty construct. We then propose a reduced battery of four questions. We show that the four questions achieve good fit measures and pass several tests of robustness and validity across the seven countries. We invite researchers to implement this battery in future research.     

The European lavender vote: Sexuality,ideology and vote choice in Western Europe

In many European democracies, political punditry has highlighted the attempts of political parties on the left to court the ‘lavender vote’ of lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals. This article examines the presence of a gay vote in Western Europe with a focus on assessing the role of sexuality in shaping individuals’ political preferences and voting behaviour. Empirically, the effect of sexuality on both ideological identification as well as party vote choice is analysed. Using a cumulative dataset of eight rounds of the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2017, this article demonstrates that partnered lesbians and gay men are more likely than comparable heterosexuals to identify with the left, support leftist policy objectives and vote for left-of-centre political parties. The analysis represents the first empirical cross-national European study of the voting behaviour of homosexual individuals and sheds new light on the importance of sexuality as a predictor of political ideology and voting behaviour within the Western European context.     

How to vote,whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls

This paper develops and tests a theory of voting and abstaining on Congressional roll calls. The theoretical model assumes that the voting behavior of legislators is oriented toward reelection, and that constituents vote retrospectively. Among the predictions of the theory are that supporters of a program are more likely to abstain than opponents, that conflicted legislators are more likely to vote on the losing side (but will abstain when the vote is very close), and that indifferent legislators will abstain when votes are not close but trade their votes when the outcome is uncertain. The empirical test is based on a series of votes on appropriations for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor from 1975 to 1982. We estimate a nested logit model of, first, the probability of voting for Clinch River, and second, the probability of abstaining from the vote, conditional on preferences regarding the program. All of the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and most are statistically significant by conventional standards. The implication is that the abstention decision, as well as yes or no votes, can be purposive, and that the pattern of abstentions is not random among supporters and opponents.The authors gratefully acknowledge research support from the Brookings Institution and the University of Michigan School of Law, and useful comments on an earlier draft by Randall Calvert, Morris Fiorina, Rodney Fort, Amihai Glazer, Keith Krehbiel, Thomas Romer, Kenneth Shepsle, Rodney Smith, Barry Weingast, the UCI Public Choice Study Group, and the Hoover Workshop on Collective Choice.     

The right to vote and nomadic voter enrolment

What model of voter enrolment is appropriate for states with nomadic minority populations? The present paper examines this question with reference to an equality-based, moral right to vote and considers four models that track some of the different institutional strategies that have been developed by states with transient populations. The paper shows that the right to vote is compatible neither with a model that makes permanent residence in a constituency an absolute condition for voter enrolment and so excludes nomads from the electoral process, nor with a model that enables nomadic voter enrolment but restricts the number of nomads that can enrol in a single constituency. But the right is, subject to certain caveats, consistent with a model that enables nomads to enrol in a constituency of their choice and, as well, with a model that enables nomads to enrol and vote in a distinct, non-territorial constituency.     

Beyond personal vote incentives: Dividing the vote in preferential electoral systems

Comparative studies of preferential electoral systems have paid much attention to the incentives for personalized instead of party-centered campaigns, but they have largely ignored how some of these systems allow “allocation errors” and so create incentives for parties to “manage” the vote and intraparty campaigns. We discuss how the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and single transferable vote (STV) systems create these incentives, and we illustrate the degree to which they affect actual electoral results across seven preferential electoral systems. The analysis reveals statistically significant differences in the vote inequality among incumbent cohorts (members of the same party and district), indicating the strong influence of vote division incentives over candidate-centered electoral environments. The results also have important implications for comparative research on legislative turnover and the incumbency advantage.     

The importance of personal vote intentions for the responsiveness of legislators: A field experiment

Individual legislators can be important agents of political representation. However, this is contingent upon their responsiveness to constituency requests. To study this topic, an increasing number of studies use field experiments in which the researcher sends a standardized email to legislators on behalf of a constituent. In this paper, we report the results of an original field experiment of this genre with the members of the German Bundestag. Supplementing previous research, we explore whether constituency requests in which voters mention a personal vote intention (rather than a partisan vote intention) increase legislators’ responsiveness, and how this treatment relates to electoral system's incentives. We find that legislators treated with a personal vote intention were more likely to respond (67 per cent) and respond faster than those treated with a partisan vote intention (59 per cent). However, we also show that the treatment effect is moderated by electoral system incentives: it is larger for nominally-elected legislators than for those elected via a party list. Our results suggest that electoral system's incentives matter for legislators’ responsiveness only when constituents explicitly signals an intention to cast a personal vote.     

The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter

This paper explores the possibility of revising the voting system in order to provide the citizen with the alternative of voting for none of the candidates on the ballot as opposed to selecting a specific candidate or not voting at all. We describe in general terms the nature and implications of such a proposal and leave the formal development of the model for a subsequent paper. In addition, preliminary evidence is presented as to the potential effect of this alternative on the electoral system.     

Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas

Seat allocation formulas affect candidates' incentives to campaign on a personal rather than party reputation. Variables that enhance personal vote-seeking include: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. District magnitude has the unusual feature that, as it increases, the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.     

The electoral college and the rational vote

We have shown first, that if the electoral college was abolished the theoretically measured power of voters would increase and second, that in presidential elections the measure of voting power used does in fact have a highly significant impact on the decision as to whether or not to vote. Thus, the analysis predicts that the abolition of the electoral college would have a significant impact on voter participation. From a policy viewpoint, if we view participation in elections as desirable, this could be used as an argument in favor of direct election of the president. From a scientific viewpoint, we are able to make a strong and unambiguous prediction about the results of a (possible) future event from theoretical considerations. If the electoral college should be abolished, it will be possible to test our predictions. In addition, we have provided a further test of the rational behavior view of electoral participation and have shown that this model applies to presidential elections. Finally, we have shown that the theoretical measure of voting power does predict actual behavior.     

The structuring of the vote in post-communist part systems: The Bulgarian example

Abstract. Consolidated democracies involve structured linkages between citizens and political decision making elites that are typically organized via political parties. Given the economic and institutional instability and uncertainty in post-communist emerging democracies, it has often been maintained that a structuring of party systems in such countries is slow to emerge. This paper demonstrates with data from a 1991 pre-election study in Bulgaria that significant aspects of political structuring may in fact appear in post-communist polities quite early. The structuring is based on citizens' individual resources which they expect to convert into economic benefits in the economic market economy, their market location in occupational terms, their general ideological dispositions, and their evaluation of the economic performance of the incumbent governments. While the structuring of party systems may still be weaker than in Western Europe, the Bulgarian evidence casts doubt on the tabula rasa hypothesis in the study of post-communist politics. Of course, further comparative analysis of post-communist democracies is required to buttress our conclusions.     

The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years

VP-functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables. Most studies analyze macro time series. We also cover studies of individual voters, socio-economic groups and regional cross-sections. The theory starts from the Responsibility Hypothesis: voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions. It works in two party/block systems, but not else. Voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic. Egotropic voting also occurs. Voters' myopia is well established. Voting is retrospective as expectations are static. It costs the average government almost 2% of the vote to rule.     

Political interest and the decision to vote: a self-selection problem

ABSTRACT

Political interest is frequently considered as one of the most important driving factors of voter turnout. This article uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to investigate the causal relationship between political interest and the decision to vote. It introduces a recursive simultaneous equation model which is estimated via bivariate probit regression and thus avoids major drawbacks of the method of instrumental variables. The results suggest that the effect of political interest on the decision to vote is not causal, but rather results from self-selection.     

A normal vote approach to electoral change: Presidential elections, 1828–1984

This article offers a macro-level approach to a core concept in the study of electroral behavior, the normal vote. The approach uses interrupted time-series analysis and focuses upon electorally homogeneous political regions within states. After developing the approach used to generate normal vote estimates, analyses using those estimates are compared with (1) parallel analyses using survey-based research, and (2) across levels of analysis (national, regional). The comparison with survey-based analyses show that the macro-level measure follows the actual vote more closely and is more sensitive to shortterm influences. Comparisons across levels of analysis demonstrate that national level analyses obscure a volatile, dynamic electorate that exists at the regional level. These findings suggest that the creative use of the macro-level measure at the regional level has the potential to contribute new and important insights into the role of citizens in American politics, and the forces that drive the behavior of the electorate. Its particular strengths lie in the study of electoral change and its ability to contribute toward a developmental perspective on American democracy.     

Where have all the parties gone? Fraenkel and Grofman on the alternative vote – yet again

The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman (2004, 2006a, 2006b) have repeatedly attempted to show that AV is not conducive to interethnic moderation in severely divided societies. In this response to their latest attempt, I point out that neither political party coordination of the vote nor strategic voting plays any part in their analysis. In contrast, I explain how moderate parties of one ethnic group are able to induce their supporters to cast ballots for moderate parties supported by voters of another ethnic group. I also explain why the incentives for parties to arrange interethnic vote transfers are much greater under AV than they are under systems such as the single transferable vote, which is in use in Northern Ireland, and I show that Fraenkel and Grofman”s interpretations of AV’s operation in Australia, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Papua-New Guinea are contrary to the evidence.     

A probit analysis of the Senate vote on Gramm-Rudman

The Leviathan theory of government was seemingly contradicted when the U.S. Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction law. This study analyzes the Senate vote on Gramm-Rudman to try to determine whether legislators acted in their own self interest. A prisoner's dilemma argument explains how Senators made themselves better off by limiting their own spending abilities. A probit analysis shows how voting for deficit reduction was consistent with the personal incentives faced by individual legislators. The eventual failure of Gramm-Rudman to eliminate the deficit reveals a need to consider institutional as well as constitutional means of controlling government.