Industry characteristics and interest group formation: An empirical study

The role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics. However, few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries. Using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries, we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics. In cross-sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables. Our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation. We discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy.For helpful comments, we would like to thank Antonio Estache, Bruce Gardner, Dennis Mueller, Mancur Olson, and participants at the meetings of the Public Choice Society and the Southern Economic Association. The International Institute of Management of Berlin, Paul Geroski, Neal Kennedy, Alexis Jacquemin, Kenneth Platto, Joachim Schwalbach, and Hideki Yamawaki helped in providing data. The Computer Science Center of the University of Maryland is acknowledged for provision of computational resources.     

The dynamics of interest group evaluations of Congress

We apply a dynamic spatial model to interest group ratings of the members of Congress over the period 1959–1981. Spatial distances between an interest group and the members of Congress are assumed to be monotonic with the ratings. Our pooled cross-sectional time-series data set consists of 203,387 ratings by 59 interest groups. We restrict the spatial coordinates of the interest groups and members of Congress to be polynomial functions of time. Two significant dimensions are recovered: the first dimension, which accounts for approximately 75% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on economic issues; the second dimension, which accounts for approximately an additional 5% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on social issues. Nearly all the interest groups and most members of Congress are ideologically consistent. They are either liberal on both dimensions or conservative on both.     

Explaining interest group access to parliamentary committees

This article explains why parliamentary groups invite interest groups to the parliamentary arena. It argues that interest groups’ access to committees not only reflects policy-makers’ need for information and expertise but also party preferences and institutional factors such as the type of government, parliamentary committee structure and committee agenda capacity. Results show that interest groups’ access to the parliamentary arena increases under minority governments, in the case of highly conflictual issues, and when the number of permanent committees increases. Also, results demonstrate that parliamentary groups invite interest organisations following different logics – problem-solving or confrontation logic – depending on the type of functions they have to perform – legislative and oversight activities. The article uses a novel, comprehensive database with information on the appearances of all interest groups in the Spanish parliament from 1996 to 2015.     

A simple way of estimating interest group ideology

Political scientists have developed accepted numerical estimates of political ideology for legislators, candidates, parties and even nations, but interest groups lack such scores. This absence puts interest group research at a disadvantage compared to other subfields. I generate ideology scores for 72 groups across 10 years by combining groups’ evaluations of Members of Congress with Poole and Rosenthal’s estimates of Members’ ideologies. Alternative methods are explored, and the validity of the scores is demonstrated. Examinations of the scores focus on the relative distribution of groups and Members of Congress and the link between a group’s ideology and its campaign contributions.     

The interest group origins of the Bank of France

This paper contrasts different interpretations of the creation of the Bank of France. I argue that the Bank of France was the product of rent-seeking behavior rather than the pursuit of public interest, as is commonly supposed. I explain how the changing institutional constraints faced by both politicians and bankers can account for changes in France’s monetary constitution. The creation of the Bank in 1800 followed the fall of the Directory and the establishment of Napoléon’s autocratic regime. I argue that as parliamentarism and the separation of powers were weakened by Napoléon, the cost of establishing and maintaining a monopoly privilege in banking evaporated and the creation of the Bank of France became more likely.

     

Assessments of group influence,subjective political competence,and interest group membership

This research examines the relationship between citizens' assessments of how much influence the group they identify with is able to exercise in American politics and their subjective political competence and political participation. Appraisals of group influence have a powerful effect on subjective political competence, fulfilling theoretical expectations outlined by Leon Festinger many years ago. Moreover, assessments of group influence affect individuals' decision concerning membership in an interest group that promotes the interest of one's reference group. The work reported here is an improvement over past efforts in that it explicitly defines and assesses the causal importance of a concept that has been featured in prior research.     

The impact of democracy on interest group system institutionalization

This paper provides the first large‐N study, which measures the variation in interest group system institutionalization. It shows that the level of democracy is a very strong determinant of strength of interest groups across countries. Findings are corroborated by analysing the Tunisian case to alleviate the reverse causality problem. Implications for comparative interest groups and democracy research are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political choice and the child labor statute of 1938: Public interest or interest group legislation?

Federal regulation of child labor (unlike that passed in early nineteenth century England) did not materialize until the New Deal of the 1930s. The present paper examines, using anecdotal and empirical evidence, the motives underlying the passage of depression-based child labor legislation embodied in the Senate vote on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Our study, which utilizes both dichotomous and trichotomous probit models of the vote, finds evidence that there were critical and dominantprivate as opposed to public interests behind the restrictions that the FLSA placed on child labor and the exemptions that it established.     

Buffalo tales: interest group policy stories in Greater Yellowstone

Wicked policy problems—those that resist resolution and continuously cycle through different administrative jurisdictions—are time-consuming for the practitioner and expensive. In these wicked policy environs, interest group narratives contribute to this intractability through the continued construction of a policy loser’s tale. Central to our study is the analysis of group maturation with that of policy narrative elements. We explore whether there is a relationship between lobby tactics, financial resources, and professionalization of authorship of narratives and policy narrative elements. We content analyze the policy stories of the Buffalo Field Campaign (BFC) over a 10-year period (1999–2008), using the Yellowstone National Park bison and brucellosis controversy as case material and track how this new interest group’s fundamental policy story has changed over the course of its lifespan. As demonstrated through their choice of lobby tactics, the group does evolve from an unconventional to a conventional interest group, with two out of three of their constructed policy beliefs remaining unchanged and their political tactics consistently focusing on spinning the loser’s tale aimed at expanding the policy arena. Suggestions on the importance of this work to scientists, administrators, and academics are included.     

The prohibition-repeal amendments: A natural experiment in interest group influence

The pattern of state support for Prohibition (18th Amendment, 1919) and Repeal (21st Amendment, 1933) is analyzed and compared. This comparison is important because Prohibition is the only amendment ever to be repealed. The main thesis is that there was no wholesale change in preferences of citizens. Instead, producer interests failed to mobilize effectively in 1919, and the coupling of moral and economic arguments that worked in 1919 broke apart in 1933. Regression analysis is conducted on state legislatures (for Prohibition) and state referenda on convention delegates (for Repeal), so states are observations in the cross-sectional regression analysis. The results broadly support the main thesis.     

Local feminist policy networks in the contemporary American interest group system

The emergence of local feminist policy networks is set within the context of the New Federalism of the Reagan-Bush administrations and the transformation of the U.S. interest group system over the past three decades. A case study of policymaking in a single urban setting focuses on changes in four policy areas of special interest to women: sexual assault, domestic violence, child care, and displaced homemakers. Single-issue feminist policy networks, composed of feminist advocacy groups, women-run services, local elected officials, and urban bureaucrats responsible for delivering, funding or regulating each policy, have formed around these issues. Each is characterized by: responsive policy changes; frequent interactions between local legislators, bureaucrats, and feminists; interlocking directorates; a symbiotic support system; diverse strategies and funding sources; and a federal-type organization. Local feminists have been incorporated in a new group universe embedded within a complex system of intergovernmental grants, contracts, and mandates. These networks help to sustain feminism and its public policy agenda through crises and challenges.     

The Balkan experience: Explanations of public affairs and interest group activity

This final article is a synthesis of findings from the seven country studies in this special issue. Although there are characteristics common to all group systems, particularly those transitioning to democracy, there are also significant differences. Analysis of these differences reveals a direct relationship between both the level of socioeconomic and political development and the characteristics of the group systems in all Balkan countries. In addition, we provide new insights into group system development and operation. These are particularly related to the impact of war, inter‐ethnic cleavages, constitutional arrangements (majoritarian and consociational), economic crises, geopolitics, and the major presence of external interests.     

Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests

We examine the possibility of forming a competitive-share group in rent-seeking contests. The competitive-share group has the following characteristics: (a) the group is treated as a single player competing with the nonmembers to win the rent, (b) the members choose their outlays noncooperatively, and (c) the members compete to take larger shares of the rent. We show that the competitive-share group is always formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is less relative to individual rent seeking — in other words, the social cost associated with rent seeking is less.     

The development of an interest group system in a constrained democracy: Montenegro

This article is the first comprehensive examination of Montenegro's interest group system. This system is a product of a combination of traditional influences and recent developments. The major traditional influences are a closed, patriarchal society with strong family and kinship relations, and a nonparticipatory political culture. These combined with over a quarter century of dominance by the ex‐communist party have been major impediments to the growth of interest group activity. Despite this, significant developments have occurred in the establishment of new interests and their activities, much of this made possible by the strong presence of various elements of the international community. Nevertheless, Montenegro has a bifurcated interest group system in which a small elite dominates interest group activity, while, for the most part, the mass of society do not participate in political advocacy.     

Neo-liberalism,big business and the evolution of interest group activity in Latin America

In the 1980s and 1990s, the confluence of the third wave of democracy, neo-liberal economic reforms and economic crises in Latin America, produced several significant consequences for the region's underdeveloped interest group systems. By using an international political economy approach, this article examines these developments and particularly how neo-liberal policies affected the political fortunes of big business plus the broader political fall-out from neo-liberal policies. In essence, we make the argument that, for three reasons, the consequences of the confluence of these three developments for Latin America's emerging interest group system are mixed in terms of a more pluralist, open-access system. First, the influence of big business persists and in many ways has been enhanced as the economically and politically privileged position of large private companies since the 1980s has given way to economic concentration, transnationalization and the rise of multilatinas (Latin American multinational companies, which primarily operate across the region). Second, political opportunities have been opened for a range of interests, many from the left, that likely would not otherwise have emerged so early in the region. Third, the election of leaders opposed to neo-liberal policies may transform Latin America's political economy and aid in the democratization of its interest group system. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries

Public Choice - Perhaps the best way to summarize the empirical results is to classify the hypotheses into three groups: those which can be readily accepted because they are supported in all tests;...     

Legislators,organizations and ties: Understanding interest group recognition in the European Parliament

What explains Members of European Parliament's (MEPs’) decisions to recognize some interest groups as relevant policy actors? Addressing this question is fundamental for understanding the role of political elites in shaping patterns of interest representation and interest groups’ role in legislative decision making. Building on theories of legislative behaviour and informational theories of legislative lobbying, we argue that MEPs give recognition to those organizations that are instrumental for achieving key political goals: re-election, career-progression and policy influence. The pursuit of these goals generates different patterns of MEP recognition of interest groups. We contribute to the literature in three ways. Conceptually, we propose interest group recognition as a key concept for understanding interactions and links between legislative and non-legislative actors. We illustrate the high conceptual relevance of recognition for interest groups research while noting its conspicuous neglect in the literature. We address this gap and place the concept central stage in understanding legislators’ attention to and behaviour towards interest organizations. Theoretically, we build on a classic framework explaining legislators’ behaviour and refine it through the lenses of informational theories of legislative lobbying. We argue and show that legislators recognize organizations that enhance electoral prospects in their home Member States, and that legislator–group ideological proximity and an interest group's prominence in a specific policy field affect MEPs’ decisions to recognize some organizations as relevant actors. Our argument acknowledges the importance of the broader context in which MEPs operate and pays attention to how they react to and interact with it. Empirically, we propose an original and innovative research design to identify and measure recognition with the help of social media data. Our measurement strategy constitutes a significant improvement insofar that it reduces the challenges of measurement bias usually associated with self-reported data generated through interviews, surveys, or the textual analysis of newspaper articles and official documents. Our research design allows using fine-grained measures of key dependent and explanatory variables and offers the very first analysis of MEP interest group recognition that holds across decision-making events and policy areas. We test our argument on a new dataset with 4 million observations recording the recognition of more than 7,000 organizations by 80 per cent of MEPs serving in EP8. We find that MEPs are more likely to recognize organizations from their Member State, particularly under flexible- and open-list electoral institutions. MEPs are also more likely to recognize organizations that share their ideological affinities and are prominent actors in policy areas legislators specialize in.     

Providing information and building capacity: interest group involvement in the application of EU law

Practical implementation has attracted significant scholarly attention in the European Union in the last decade, and the EU compliance literature started to focus more on the players in the domestic arena to help understand the application of EU law. However, a systematic analysis on interest group activities at the application stage is yet to be conducted. Relying on enforcement and management approaches, this article argues that interest groups act as providers of legal and technical information that are needed for correct application of EU law. Also, interest groups actively demand information from political actors to build internal capacity during this period. The results show that interest groups act as providers of information, but only in the national political arena. Moreover, motivation to learn is another factor that explains the level of access seeking during application, and this type of interaction takes place in both European and national venues.