Industry characteristics and interest group formation: An empirical study

The role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics. However, few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries. Using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries, we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics. In cross-sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables. Our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation. We discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy.For helpful comments, we would like to thank Antonio Estache, Bruce Gardner, Dennis Mueller, Mancur Olson, and participants at the meetings of the Public Choice Society and the Southern Economic Association. The International Institute of Management of Berlin, Paul Geroski, Neal Kennedy, Alexis Jacquemin, Kenneth Platto, Joachim Schwalbach, and Hideki Yamawaki helped in providing data. The Computer Science Center of the University of Maryland is acknowledged for provision of computational resources.     

The dynamics of interest group evaluations of Congress

We apply a dynamic spatial model to interest group ratings of the members of Congress over the period 1959–1981. Spatial distances between an interest group and the members of Congress are assumed to be monotonic with the ratings. Our pooled cross-sectional time-series data set consists of 203,387 ratings by 59 interest groups. We restrict the spatial coordinates of the interest groups and members of Congress to be polynomial functions of time. Two significant dimensions are recovered: the first dimension, which accounts for approximately 75% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on economic issues; the second dimension, which accounts for approximately an additional 5% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on social issues. Nearly all the interest groups and most members of Congress are ideologically consistent. They are either liberal on both dimensions or conservative on both.     

A simple way of estimating interest group ideology

Political scientists have developed accepted numerical estimates of political ideology for legislators, candidates, parties and even nations, but interest groups lack such scores. This absence puts interest group research at a disadvantage compared to other subfields. I generate ideology scores for 72 groups across 10 years by combining groups’ evaluations of Members of Congress with Poole and Rosenthal’s estimates of Members’ ideologies. Alternative methods are explored, and the validity of the scores is demonstrated. Examinations of the scores focus on the relative distribution of groups and Members of Congress and the link between a group’s ideology and its campaign contributions.     

The interest group origins of the Bank of France

This paper contrasts different interpretations of the creation of the Bank of France. I argue that the Bank of France was the product of rent-seeking behavior rather than the pursuit of public interest, as is commonly supposed. I explain how the changing institutional constraints faced by both politicians and bankers can account for changes in France’s monetary constitution. The creation of the Bank in 1800 followed the fall of the Directory and the establishment of Napoléon’s autocratic regime. I argue that as parliamentarism and the separation of powers were weakened by Napoléon, the cost of establishing and maintaining a monopoly privilege in banking evaporated and the creation of the Bank of France became more likely.

     

Assessments of group influence,subjective political competence,and interest group membership

This research examines the relationship between citizens' assessments of how much influence the group they identify with is able to exercise in American politics and their subjective political competence and political participation. Appraisals of group influence have a powerful effect on subjective political competence, fulfilling theoretical expectations outlined by Leon Festinger many years ago. Moreover, assessments of group influence affect individuals' decision concerning membership in an interest group that promotes the interest of one's reference group. The work reported here is an improvement over past efforts in that it explicitly defines and assesses the causal importance of a concept that has been featured in prior research.     

Political choice and the child labor statute of 1938: Public interest or interest group legislation?

Federal regulation of child labor (unlike that passed in early nineteenth century England) did not materialize until the New Deal of the 1930s. The present paper examines, using anecdotal and empirical evidence, the motives underlying the passage of depression-based child labor legislation embodied in the Senate vote on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Our study, which utilizes both dichotomous and trichotomous probit models of the vote, finds evidence that there were critical and dominantprivate as opposed to public interests behind the restrictions that the FLSA placed on child labor and the exemptions that it established.     

Buffalo tales: interest group policy stories in Greater Yellowstone

Wicked policy problems—those that resist resolution and continuously cycle through different administrative jurisdictions—are time-consuming for the practitioner and expensive. In these wicked policy environs, interest group narratives contribute to this intractability through the continued construction of a policy loser’s tale. Central to our study is the analysis of group maturation with that of policy narrative elements. We explore whether there is a relationship between lobby tactics, financial resources, and professionalization of authorship of narratives and policy narrative elements. We content analyze the policy stories of the Buffalo Field Campaign (BFC) over a 10-year period (1999–2008), using the Yellowstone National Park bison and brucellosis controversy as case material and track how this new interest group’s fundamental policy story has changed over the course of its lifespan. As demonstrated through their choice of lobby tactics, the group does evolve from an unconventional to a conventional interest group, with two out of three of their constructed policy beliefs remaining unchanged and their political tactics consistently focusing on spinning the loser’s tale aimed at expanding the policy arena. Suggestions on the importance of this work to scientists, administrators, and academics are included.     

Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests

We examine the possibility of forming a competitive-share group in rent-seeking contests. The competitive-share group has the following characteristics: (a) the group is treated as a single player competing with the nonmembers to win the rent, (b) the members choose their outlays noncooperatively, and (c) the members compete to take larger shares of the rent. We show that the competitive-share group is always formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is less relative to individual rent seeking — in other words, the social cost associated with rent seeking is less.     

The prohibition-repeal amendments: A natural experiment in interest group influence

The pattern of state support for Prohibition (18th Amendment, 1919) and Repeal (21st Amendment, 1933) is analyzed and compared. This comparison is important because Prohibition is the only amendment ever to be repealed. The main thesis is that there was no wholesale change in preferences of citizens. Instead, producer interests failed to mobilize effectively in 1919, and the coupling of moral and economic arguments that worked in 1919 broke apart in 1933. Regression analysis is conducted on state legislatures (for Prohibition) and state referenda on convention delegates (for Repeal), so states are observations in the cross-sectional regression analysis. The results broadly support the main thesis.     

Local feminist policy networks in the contemporary American interest group system

The emergence of local feminist policy networks is set within the context of the New Federalism of the Reagan-Bush administrations and the transformation of the U.S. interest group system over the past three decades. A case study of policymaking in a single urban setting focuses on changes in four policy areas of special interest to women: sexual assault, domestic violence, child care, and displaced homemakers. Single-issue feminist policy networks, composed of feminist advocacy groups, women-run services, local elected officials, and urban bureaucrats responsible for delivering, funding or regulating each policy, have formed around these issues. Each is characterized by: responsive policy changes; frequent interactions between local legislators, bureaucrats, and feminists; interlocking directorates; a symbiotic support system; diverse strategies and funding sources; and a federal-type organization. Local feminists have been incorporated in a new group universe embedded within a complex system of intergovernmental grants, contracts, and mandates. These networks help to sustain feminism and its public policy agenda through crises and challenges.     

An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries

Public Choice - Perhaps the best way to summarize the empirical results is to classify the hypotheses into three groups: those which can be readily accepted because they are supported in all tests;...     

The political economy of food pricing: An extended empirical test of the interest group approach

Several recent studies have documented the magnitude and impact of distortions in food pricing. However, little attention has been paid to the nature of the political agendas that determine the levels of direct and indirect protection granted to producers and consumers. This paper offers evidence that, regardless of the degree of economic development, the level of political pressure wielded by interest groups in food markets, and hence the level of protection they receive, is an inverse function of the relative size of their constituencies. The results recommend the application of collective action concepts to the understanding of agricultural policies in countries which are at different stages of development.     

On the economic theory of interest groups: Towards a group frame of reference in political economics

This paper evaluates the development of the economic theory of interest groups. Although there is important progress, many substantial lacunae in our knowledge exist. I argue that part of the problem is the way Public Choice theory developed. Methodological individualism has led to an overindividualized ('a- social') view of human behavior. Furthermore, the importance of imperfect information has been underexposed. Acknowledging the essentially social character of human behavior and the lack of information leads to the conclusion that a more prominent place should be given to the role of social groups. A shift towards a “group frame of reference” is advocated.     

夯实法治的社会根基——对当前群体性事件的利益解读

从利益的角度观察和分析群体性事件,确立起对利益多元化的正确认识,尊重利益主体的主体地位,认真对待利益主体的权利诉求,在法治的框架下解决利益主体之间的利益冲突,是预防和解决群体性事件的关键。     

State Government Expenditure Determinants and Tax Revenue Determinants Revisited

The primary aim of the research was to test the general hypothesis that many institutional and political variables affect fiscal outcomes; that the preferences of public officials, and the decision processes used to act on those preferences, matter. State government data (state only, not state and local) from 1980, 1985, and 1990 were used to specify state tax revenue and expenditure models. A previous (Merrifield, 1991) state tax revenue model identified many significant institutional and political variables, but it was based only on 1985 data (49 observations). The larger data set (147 observations), including better data for some of the variables, indicated that most of Merrifield's (1991) findings are robust. The state expenditure models facilitated a second test of the general institutional and political variable hypothesis, as well as the hypotheses about specific variables. The expenditure model also facilitated comparisons of expenditure and tax determinants, and comparisons with results published in the literature. Though there are some noteworthy differences between the expenditure and tax models, the expenditure models also supported many of the institutional and political variable hypotheses.