House members as residual claimants: Campaign spending in the 1980s

Through 1992, federal election campaign laws and House rules permit U.S. Representatives holding office on 8 January 1980, to personally claim unspent campaign contributions when they retire, while other House members have to forfeit such sums. These rules provide differential incentives to pre-1980 members to more aggressively seek and yet refrain from spending political contributions than other House members. Regression estimates suggest that the privilege was worth almost $71,700 to the typical pre-1980 House member during the 1987–88 election cycle.     

Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 98 countries. Our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. Employing an index of corruption based on a structural model, however, corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income, but not in high income countries.     

Determinants of publication productivity: an empirical analysis

Academic performance is typically measured as some combination of teaching, publishing, and professional service. This paper focuses on the publication aspect of academic output, estimating the determinants of publication productivity using data for Robert D. Tollison (RDT). Robert Tollison published 433 articles and books, and collaborated with 524 coauthors while at a dozen institutions over thirty-eight years. Our findings indicate that RDT’s output is significantly correlated with several factors, including co-authorship, the diversification of his research portfolio, business cycles, and academic pay. To a lesser extent, his production pattern is influenced by non-work interests and specific institutional affiliations.     

An empirical test of why incumbents adopt campaign spending limits

Archival data on annual budgets of the Communist party shed light on how this cornerstone Soviet institution was maintained and on the party-state relationships in a one-party polity. The party depended on subsidies from the state budget until the mid-1950s and became largely self-financed afterwards. The costs of maintaining the party were significant compared to other branches of government. We consider three models of the party – “party-agent”, “party-ruler” and “party-political club” – to study the evolution of the party’s institutional role and find that by the 1950s, the party transforms from an economic agent of the state into an increasingly autonomous institution.     

Procyclical government spending: a public choice analysis

Procyclical government spending occurs when government expenditures increase at a faster rate than income in an economic upturn but fall at a faster rate in a recession. Voracity effects occur when competition for increased spending proves more effective as national income increases. Public choice theory can be applied to describe the distribution of fiscal power across different tiers of government to shed insight into competition for intergovernmental transfers. Politicians have electoral incentives to press for intergovernmental transfers but they also have electoral incentives to signal their ability to manage the economy. With this mix of incentives, the prediction is that intergovernmental transfers will be procyclical and that sub-central government spending will be more procyclical than central government spending. Public choice analysis of pressure for increased public spending predicts a specific pattern of cyclical government spending. This pattern can be observed when analyzing government expenditures in 20 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006.     

Policy research and analysis: an empirical profile, 1975–1980

A content analysis was conducted on 181 randomly sampled articles published in nine leading social policy journals from 1975 through 1980. The purpose of the study was to obtain a methodological and substantive profile of the state of the art of the policy sciences. Results indicate the existence of two prevailing types of policy analysis: quantitative-empirical and rhetorical-discussive.The positions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Science Foundation, the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, or Applied Science Associates, Inc.     

Interrelationships among public spending preferences: A micro analysis

This paper examines a system of qualitative demand equations for public spending on education, welfare, housing, health, highways, and defense. The demand for public spending for a particular category is hypothesized to be a function of income, tax-price, private benefit measures, and tastes as well as demands for other public expenditure categories. Based on individual survey data, the conditional maximum likelihood estimates of the logit equations are obtained. The results indicate the significant role of tastes, private benefit variables, and tax-prices. In addition, positive rather than negative, demand interrelationships are found to exist. These findings question the validity of the median voter hypothesis as a model for public budget allocation.     

Free-riding on rent seeking—an empirical analysis

The Common Agricultural Policy is modelled as a club good providing the European Union (EU) farmer with financial benefits. We build an economic model which explains how much farmers in individual EU countries invest in rent-seeking activities in order to test for free-riding behaviour on lobbying costs. For our investigation we group the EU member countries by farm structure, and the type of benefit received. We explain the fees paid by farmers for lobbying by other countries’ fees, political variables, and country and regional agricultural characteristics. The model shows that some member countries free ride on others suggesting a form of policy path dependency.     

Democratization as an emancipative process: The neglected role of mass motivations

Abstract.  Despite major differences, prevailing approaches in democratization research have one thing in common: they downplay the role of mass attitudes. This article criticizes the neglect of mass attitudes, arguing that it ignores the very essence of democratization. In light of human development theory, democratization is essentially an emancipative process, for it manifests human freedom by empowering people with civil and political rights. From this premise, the author concludes that democratization should be driven by emancipative forces in the population and that these forces are reflected in particular mass attitudes: liberty aspirations. Based on evidence from the Values Surveys, the analyses show that more widespread liberty aspirations facilitate progress and impede regress in the process of democratization. No other indicator – including GDP/capita and social capital – outperforms the effect of liberty aspirations on democratization. The article concludes that human development theory is useful because its emphasis on people empowerment highlights something that has been ignored in the democratization literature: emancipative motivational forces in the population.     

How legislative gender quotas affect the gender gap in campaign spending: an analysis of the federal and regional elections in Belgium

Research on the link between gender and campaign finance in proportional electoral systems suggests that the campaign expenses of female parliamentary candidates are significantly lower than those of male candidates. On the basis of data on 10,436 candidates for nine consecutive elections in Belgium (1991–2014), this article examines whether there is indeed a gender gap in campaign expenses, and in particular whether this coincides with the introduction of legislative quota laws in the Belgian flexible-list system. We distinguish between realistic candidates that run for election from winnable list positions and unrealistic candidates running from lower ranked positions. The results show that, among unrealistic candidates, the gender gap in campaign spending arose again after the introduction of more severe gender quotas. With regard to realistic list positions, however, the significant difference between male and female candidates in the most strict quota phase disappeared, indicating that female realistic candidates were able to catch up financially with their male counterparts. The Belgian experience could provide useful insights for other countries with flexible-list systems regarding the implementation of legislative gender quotas.     

Rent-seeking and the behavior of regulators: An empirical analysis

The main contribution of this paper is to describe empirically how the rent-seeking process takes place in a regulated industry through the consistency in Board decisions. Evidence provided by discrete-choice decision models of regulators confirms that the conventional rent-seeking view of regulation is correct, namely to distribute wealth between various groups differently from what market forces would do. First of all, the structure of the rent-seeking activities in the Quebec regulated trucking industry is well explained. There exist behavioral uniformities (Russell and Shelton, 1974) in decisions taken by the Quebec Transport Commission, given its wide range of choice provided by the absence of detailed regulatory standards by the Quebec legislature. Secondly, trucking firms and large shippers are the interest groups seeking to extract artificially contrived rents. The capture theory of regulation is not a dominant political strategy and therefore does not analytically explain various trades taking place among interest groups when a permit authority is requested. So logrolling by regulators is clearly essential to maintain their non-transferable investment of time and talent and protect their political afterlife. Thirdly, large firms are more successful, at the margin, than small firms in their expansion because of their political effectiveness. The regulatory agency gives more rents to those who offer relatively strong electoral support to its party. Finally, appointed regulators do not achieve other positive payoffs from the regulatory process than those which may result from the agency problem. So the regulatory agency does not promote its own policy agenda, but rather that of the elected politicians, given the organizational and control problem between these two.I am indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support, to Gérard Bélanger, Jean-Luc Migué for helpful comments and to Sylvain Veillette, Pascal Migué, Marc Leduc for valuable research assistance. I benefitted from useful comments by the editor of this journal. All the remaining errors are mine.     

The effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes: A data envelopment analysis

Data envelopment analysis is used to analyze the efficiency of candidate campaign spending. Analysis of the measured efficiency scores of the incumbents and challengers shows that there are significant systematic effects of both district and candidate characteristics. The incumbent's residuals from the efficiency score regressions indicate those candidates who do well because of the nature of their district and those who do well because of their own abilities. Incumbents are ranked according to their observed efficiency, their unobserved efficiency and their vote share. Correlations among the rankings are significant and of the expected signs. More efficient candidates receive higher vote shares.     

State budget periodicity: An analysis of the determinants and the effect on state spending

Much of the public budgeting literature focuses on the institutional rules of budgeting and how those rules affect process and outcomes. This study focuses on a particularly rudimentary rule of budgeting: the length of the budget period. State budgets are dictated (constitutionally or statutorily) to recur over one-or two-year intervals. Statistical analysis of the determinants of state budget periodicity shows that the more states spend, ceteris paribus, the more likely they are to budget annually. I hypothesize that budget periodicity has the opposite effect on spending: Biennial budget states spend more, ceteris paribus, than annual budget states spend. Ordinary least squares analysis does not support the hypothesis, but with instrumental variable methods, biennial budgeting exhibits a positive and statistically significant effect on state spending.     

An examination of the causal relationship between government spending and revenue: A cointegration analysis

This paper tests the validity of the proposition that there is a causal relationship between government expenditure and government revenue for Greece over the period 1957–1993. The empirical analysis employs tests of cointegration as pre-tests for Granger tests of causality. The empirical evidence suggests that there is a long-run relationship between government spending and government revenue and expenditures cause revenues.     

China's defence spending: new questions

China has rapidly expanded its spending on defence over the past decade, at a pace that has closely mirrored its economic growth. However, a slowdown in growth over the past year has raised new questions over the implications for defence spending.     

Elections and government spending

It is widely believed that electoral pressures cause legislators to favor government spending programs. This electoral theory of spending is shown to encompass two core hypotheses: (1) the electoral consequences hypothesis, which states that support for spending programs improves the representative's electoral showing; and (2) the legislator insecurity hypothesis, which states that greater electoral insecurity leads representatives to be more in favor of spending programs. A test of these ideas using spending scores for U.S. representatives in 1986 finds that neither hypothesis is supported by the data.     

Terrorism and pork-barrel spending

The horrifying, tragic events of 9/11 made Americans aware of their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and triggered the creation of the Department of Homeland Security along with a substantial increase in federal spending to both thwart terrorist attacks and to increase our ability to respond to such emergencies. Much of this large increase in spending was in the form of direct transfers to states and cities through several grant programs. Homeland Security grants may be used for protection against terrorist activities, thereby enhancing public interests, or as wealth transfers to state and local governments, enhancing the reelection efforts of incumbents, and thus, private interests. Using 2004 per capita Homeland Security grant funding to states and their cities, we find that the funding formula used for some of the grant programs, which allocates almost 40% of the funds in some grant programs through a minimum percent to each state with the rest allocated based on population, means that per capita funding is related to electoral votes per capita, i.e., to the politics of Presidential re-election. However, the funding in other grant programs is also related to some of the dangers and vulnerabilities faced by states and their cities. Some of the variation in per capita grant allocations is also explained by the amount of airport traffic in the state and the state's population density, which are variables closely linked to the state's vulnerability to attack. Per capita Homeland Security grant allocations, however, do not seem to be related to the closeness of the 2000 presidential race.     

Nationalisation of multilevel party systems: A conceptual and empirical analysis

The concept of ‘nationalisation’ is vigorously discussed in the literature and three dimensions have been proposed. A first dimension considers the extent to which a party's vote in territorial units varies across time and this is labeled ‘dynamic nationalisation’. ‘Distributional nationalisation’ focuses on the degree to which there is an equal distribution of party votes across territorial units. Finally, ‘party‐linkage nationalisation’ concerns the extent to which candidates link together under common party labels. In addition to a conceptual debate there has been a simultaneous debate on the measurement of the various forms of nationalisation. This article contributes to both debates and argues that most of the literature on nationalisation suffers from a methodological nationalism bias – that is, the tendency of many scholars to choose the statewide level and national election as the natural unit of analysis. This claim is supported by a conceptual and empirical analysis regarding the effects of decentralisation on nationalisation. The conceptual analysis shows that the non‐robust findings of many studies concerning the effects of decentralisation on nationalisation can be related to the methodological nationalism bias. An effect of decentralisation is found once nationalisation is conceptualised with regard to its multilevel dimension and the measurements of nationalisation are differentiated according to parties, regions and type of elections (national or regional). An empirical analysis on the nationalisation of party systems, parties and regions in 18 countries for national and regional elections held between 1945 and 2009 shows that regional authority has a significant and robust effect on regions and regional elections but not on parties, party systems and national vote shares.