Continuity,change, and priorities: The quality and use of regulatory analysis across US administrations

This paper compares the quality and use of regulatory analysis accompanying economically significant regulations proposed by US executive branch agencies in 2008, 2009, and 2010. We find that the quality of regulatory analysis is generally low, but varies widely. Budget regulations, which define how the federal government will spend money or collect revenues, have much lower‐quality analysis than other regulations. The Bush administration's “midnight” regulations finalized between Election Day and Inauguration Day, along with other regulations left for the Obama administration to finalize, tended to have lower‐quality analysis. Most differences between the Bush and Obama administrations depend on agencies' policy preferences. More conservative agencies tended to produce better analysis in the Obama administration, and more liberal agencies tended to do so in the Bush administration. This suggests that agencies more central to an administration's policy priorities do not have to produce as good an analysis to get their regulations promulgated.     

Do child care regulations affect the child care and labor markets?

The effect of child care regulations on outcomes in the child care market and the labor market for mothers of young children is examined. The analysis uses a time series of cross sections and examines the robustness of previous cross‐section findings to controls for state‐level heterogeneity. Child care regulations as a group have statistically significant effects on most outcomes, with or without state fixed effects. However, regulations do not vary enough within state over time to allow precise identification of most individual regulation effects. The great majority of estimated regulation effects in all specifications are small and insignificantly different from 0. Some of the estimated effects seem reasonable in sign and magnitude, but others are clearly implausible. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

关于新刑诉法中社会危险性规定的思考

新刑诉法出台后,学界及司法实务界对其展开了热烈讨论.其中对于社会危险性的细化规定被视为尊重和保障人权、降低审前羁押率的重要举措.但是通过考察我国司法实践中逮捕必要性的相关规定,以及结合我国司法工作的实际情况来看,试图仅仅依靠该规定来降低畸高的审前羁押率是不大现实的,还必须建立一系列的工作制度进行配套完善.     

Conservative Mobilization and Fiscal Policies

The two conservative parties in Norway, the old Conservative Party and the younger Progressive Party increased their electoral support from 23 percent in 1975 to 34 percent in the election of 1987. The electoral mobilization by these conservative parties was mainly based on an ideologically inspired rhetoric of reduced government spending and corresponding tax reductions. With the benefit of hindsight, it may be argued that these were policies to which the two parties did not live up. Whatever their political strength in the local arena, they were unable to reduce local government income taxes. But when analysing other fiscal strategies available to local governments we do find differences related to political strength, even if the findings are not always as expected. Municipalities dominated by the conservatives are run on the principle of families paying the actual costs of having children in public day-care institutions. But so are socialist-dominated municipalities. Conservative and socialist municipalities tend to subsidize fees for home-help services for the elderly. The main fiscal source of the conservatives is fees and charges on technical services used by every household and paid according to costs. The watershed between socialist and conservative parties appears as we analyse the use of property tax - a tax used much more frequently by socialist than by conservative and centrist parties.     

Some Implications of Corporate Taxation for Rent-Seeking Activity

In this paper we show that corporate taxes are likely to have considerable implications for rent-seeking activity. We find that corporate taxation tends to significantly reduce rent-seeking, and that it favors rent-seeking by established firms and discriminates against new and zero profit firms. Indeed, we show that corporate tax regulations may completely block rent-seeking by new corporations, and that rent-seeking competitions may be characterized by an equilibrium that features a small number of profitable and well established firms. Tax regulations may therefore impart an oligopolistic tendency to rent-seeking markets. Moreover, our results may have significant implications for the effects of corporate taxes on patent races, tournaments, and other first-past-the-post competitions.     

Assessing the role of regulatory quality,favouritism, administrative requirement and licencing restriction in curtailing carbon emissions

The urgent need to achieve the Paris Agreement has compelled countries to set mitigation targets to curtail carbon emissions. Notwithstanding, stakeholders' effort to implement emission-reduction policies is often constrained by institutional challenges. This study provides new evidence about the dynamic relationship between institutional quality and carbon emissions in 63 industrialised economies. Using a reduced-form energy emission model and the system GMM technique, we exploit four institutional quality measures—favouritism, administrative requirement, licencing restriction and regulatory quality—and analyse their impact on carbon emissions. The results show that institutions play a fundamental role in mitigating carbon emissions. However, the abatement effect depends on the regulatory quality, the extent of favouritism, licencing restrictions and administrative requirements. Our findings reveal that stringent regulations such as licencing restrictions reduce carbon emissions in the short and long run. Administrative requirement such as emission reporting inhibits carbon emission in the short and long run, whereas favouritism worsens it. The results are robust to alternative model specifications. The findings from this study highlight the need for policymakers to pay close attention to favouritism, as it tends to reduce the effectiveness of emission policy regulations. Additionally, we argue for the need for stringent administrative requirements given its critical role in internalising carbon emission intensity in industrialised economies.     

University-industry research links in Japan

Some analysts have argued that research links between universities and industry in Japan must be weak because Japanese universities do not produce high quality science and because regulations restrict links. This article begins by examining the structure and funding of universities and indicators of the performance of Japanese science. The results do not lend support to the view that the universities do not produce research useful to industry. In addition, the system is evolving in directions more favorable for university research excellence. Examining the regulations governing university-industry interaction, and their observance, reveals no insuperable barriers. Thus, it is not surprising that bibliometric indicators suggest Japanese companies collaborate with Japanese academics more than with foreign institutions. R & D managers describe long-lasting relationships with academics, perhaps originating in college days, which continue with mutual benefits and obligations on both sides and provide valuable access to the wider network of the scientific community-access that money alone cannot buy. The stories of individual research collaborations establish the substantive nature of the underlying work, the importance of experimentation performed on university instrumentation, and the crucial role of personnel exchange.     

Presidential priorities,congressional control,and the quality of regulatory analysis: an application to healthcare and homeland security

Elected leaders delegate rulemaking to federal agencies, then seek to influence rulemaking through top-down directives and statutory deadlines. This paper documents an unintended consequence of these control strategies: they reduce regulatory agencies’ ability and incentive to conduct high-quality economic analysis to inform their decisions. Using scoring data that measure the quality of regulatory impact analysis, we find that hastily adopted “interim final” regulations reflecting signature policy priorities of the two most recent presidential administrations were accompanied by significantly lower quality economic analysis. Interim final homeland security regulations adopted during the G.W. Bush administration and interim final regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act in the Obama administration were accompanied by less thorough analysis than other “economically significant” regulations (regulations with benefits, costs, or other economic impacts exceeding $100 million annually). The lower quality analysis apparently stems from the confluence of presidential priorities and very tight statutory deadlines associated with interim final regulations, rather than either factor alone.     

Privatizing Public Nursing Homes: Examining the Effects on Quality and Access

This study examines the effects of local government divestment on quality and access to care for Medicaid recipients in privatized nursing homes. The central hypotheses are concerned with the impact of new ownership on both aspects of organizational performance. The analysis indicates that privatization of nursing homes involves a complex set of trade-offs. Changing organizational ownership to for-profit increases the number of regulatory violations, decreases residents' quality of life, but does not influence Medicaid admissions. While no decline in quality is found among divested nonprofit facilities, access to care declines in the comparison groups of nonprofit homes. The author concludes that as counties minimize their roles as service producers, federal, state and local governments should enhance their regulatory capacity by improving quality assurance mechanisms and providing adequate reimbursement for low-income clients.     

Campaign finance reform and electoral competition

Using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002, this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races. This is reflected in several dimensions. Conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins. The regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office. And they increase the probability that incumbents win re-election. Campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent.     

Paradoxes and Pendulum Swings: Performance Management in New Zealand's Public Sector

Under New Zealand's radical state sector reforms, 'empowered' managers are held accountable in an arm's length way by politicians and control agencies through the use of clearly stated objectives and the availability of quality information about progress towards those objectives. However, empirical research indicates that this thermostatic metaphor embodies a number of paradoxes. A great deal of international attention has been paid to these reforms, but New Zealand has not discovered any ultimate resolution of the fundamental paradox of modern bureaucracy — the tendency for control to subvert purpose — and is now seeking a new 'balance' between these two managerial imperatives.     

环境规制降低了重污染行业的投资效率吗?

在低碳经济背景下,实现经济与环境双重目标的和谐发展至关重要。本文首次基于投资效率视角,利用投资支出与投资机会敏感性模型,分析环境规制对重污染行业的影响。研究发现,环境规制从整体上降低了重污染行业的投资效率,对非国有企业投资效率的负面影响非常显著;地方国企存在着投资规模过大的现象;是否为重污染行业、行业环境规制强度与污染排放强度三者之间整体上呈高度正相关,但仍存在着细微的差异,这种差异使中央国企在投资支出上的表现不尽相同;所在地为地方政府环境治理水平较低地区的企业,投资效率下降显著。上述结果表明,我国的经济发展与环境保护之关系并未达到波特假设的双赢局面;地方政府对地方国企的支持,使重污染行业非国有企业在环境规制中处于相对不平等地位;设计至少与污染排放强度相匹配的环境规制强度,有利于刺激高环境治理水平企业的投资;提升地方政府和企业的环境治理水平,是实现经济发展与环境治理双赢的重要途径。     

Environmental Federalism Revisited: Second‐Order Devolution in Air Quality Regulation

In this paper we examine states' use of local clean air agencies and provide a preliminary assessment of what causes states to devolve air quality policy authority to the local level. Data from a unique comparative state survey shows that states vary widely in the number of local clean air agencies they employ and the amount of authority these agencies have to set standards, monitor air quality, and enforce regulations. Multivariate analyses suggest that second‐order devolution is partly driven by a general propensity to decentralize policy authority, but that policy‐specific factors relating to the problem and interest group environment affect devolution as well. These findings indicate that local agencies play an important role in U.S. air quality regulation, and that the dynamics of state devolution to local agencies deserve further study.     

The complications of controlling agency time discretion: FDA review deadlines and postmarket drug safety

Public agencies have discretion on the time domain, and politicians deploy numerous policy instruments to constrain it. Yet little is known about how administrative procedures that affect timing also affect the quality of agency decisions. We examine whether administrative deadlines shape decision timing and the observed quality of decisions. Using a unique and rich dataset of FDA drug approvals that allows us to examine decision timing and quality, we find that this administrative tool induces a piling of decisions before deadlines, and that these “just-before-deadline” approvals are linked with higher rates of postmarket safety problems (market withdrawals, severe safety warnings, safety alerts). Examination of data from FDA advisory committees suggests that the deadlines may impede quality by impairing late-stage deliberation and agency risk communication. Our results both support and challenge reigning theories about administrative procedures, suggesting they embody expected control-expertise trade-offs, but may also create unanticipated constituency losses.     

GRESHAM'S LAW: THE REGULATORY ANALOGY

The authors argue that delegation of discretion over environmental regulation to the states may trigger a process analogous to Gresham's Law in which lax regulation in one state drives out stringent regulation in neighboring states. This devolution to regulatory laxity is illustrated by the lax pesticide regulations in five Midwestern "agricultural" states. Questions are raised about the effects of the Reagan Administration's commitment to reduce the stringency of federal environmental regulations and delegate more regulatory discretion to the states.     

Do Managers Face a Performance Trade-Off? Correlations Between Production and Process Performance

The existence of multiple goals in public organizations inevitably raises the concern that managers face performance trade-offs. In particular, scholars have expressed the fear that public managers, in order to secure high production performance, are forced to sacrifice performance on goals like equity, accountability, and procedural justice. However, our knowledge of whether such trade-offs exist is scarce. Using an administrative 10-year panel data set of Danish public schools and principals, this article analyzes trade-offs between production performance (measured by student performance and student pass rate) and process performance (measured by equity, accountability, and procedural justice). Results show no evidence of trade-offs. In contrast, principals who succeed in raising student performance generally also succeed in securing high pass rates, high equity, high accountability, and high procedural justice. These results suggest that managers who are able to secure high performance on one dimension of performance will likely also be high-performing on other performance dimensions.     

How parties and interest groups protect their ties: The case of lobbying laws

Scholars have recently shown renewed interest in the study of party-interest group ties. According to previous studies, traditional ties between parties and organized interest are a matter of the past. Globalization, deindustrialization, and neoliberalism have posed serious challenges to their survival. Recent contributions suggest that, while these ties are indeed weaker than before, they have not disappeared. How do parties and groups protect their ties? This paper attempts to provide a partial, though often neglected, answer: their relationship survives when both actors work together to protect it. While previous literature identified regulatory policies, such as ethics and transparency regulations, as detrimental to party-group ties, their introduction is erroneously treated as independent from these ties. Through a comparative case study of the introduction of lobbying laws in Austria, Australia, and Ireland, this paper suggests that parties and groups shape the content of lobbying regulations in such a way to protect their relationship.     

AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC POLICY AND THE PROBLEM OF FRAGMENTATION

Abstract: Politics matters in policy. In particular, the way in which a society organises its structures for bargaining affects the extent to which it is able to solve the general problem of "externalities" resulting from private choice. Two "ideal type" societies, the corporatist and the pluralist, are contrasted. It is suggested that the apparently superior economic performance of corporatist societies may be due to the fact that they have more efficient means of making collective choices than do pluralist societies. It is argued that, as a society which is best described as fragmented rather than pluralist or corporatist, Australia may be missing out on the advantages offered by well-structured bargaining. In particular, it may be possible significantly to improve decision-making practices by means of an Accord between business and government which promotes policy-related trade-offs within an agreed general framework.