Whose shortage of affordable housing?

Abstract

Shortfalls of low‐rent units are repeatedly cited as the rationale for programs to expand the supply of affordable housing. But the poverty‐level rents studied fall well below those of major supply programs. To reassess whether HOME and the low‐income housing tax credit (LIHTC) address actual shortfalls, this article compares numbers of units with renters by measuring both affordability and incomes with the median‐income‐based metric used for all federal rental programs.

During the 1980s, there were growing surpluses of units affordable to renters with incomes between 50 and 80 percent of their area's median income, a “low‐income” range that includes most HOME and LIHTC rents. By contrast, shortages were severe and growing only at rents affordable to households with incomes below 30 percent of area median. Examination of these shortfalls and the problems they create implies that programs to expand supply are not widely needed.     

Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Local Gender‐Based Earnings Inequality and Women's Belief in the American Dream

This article ties together research on gender, income inequality, and political ideology, by exploring the effect of gender‐based earnings inequality on women's belief in a fundamental tenet of the “American Dream”—meritocracy. Focusing on gender‐based earnings inequality in women's local residential context, and drawing upon relative deprivation theory, this article argues that variation across local areas in the relative economic status of women should influence the ideological outlook of resident women. In contrast to relative deprivation theory, but consistent with rising expectations theory, I argue that ideological disillusionment should peak in contexts in which women's earnings fall closely behind men, and that ideological optimism should rebound in contexts in which women's earnings have achieved parity with that of men. Utilizing pooled survey data, I find strong evidence that individual women's belief in the American Dream varies according to whether local women's relative earnings indicate confrontation with or breaking of the “glass ceiling.”     

Growing inequality in black wages in the 1980s and the emergence of an African-American middle class

Much recent scholarship and popular discussion posits a substantial movement of African-American households into the “middle class.” Yet over the course of the 1980s, the proportion of individual black wage-earners receiving “annualized” (work experience-adjusted) wages and salaries in excess of about $35,000—three times the poverty line—fell by 22 percent, even as the share of African-Americans earning below the poverty line increased by a fifth. This was true for all age groups, and even for persons within the black community who had completed four or more years of college. The growth of low wage employment was most pronounced for black men between the ages of 25 and 34, among whom the incidence of below-poverty-level employment doubled. Black women aged 35–54 experienced relatively greater progress than any other part of the African-American community, but their gains lagged far behind those of comparable white women. We speculate on possible explanations for these developments, on the basis of which a potential public policy agenda is examined.     

Perceptional inequality and preferential judgements: An empirical examination of distributional axioms

There are two categories of income distribution evaluations: first, the more-or-less “value-free” perception of income inequality as a statistical dispersion; and second, the valuation of income distributions according to an explicit social welfare function which is meant to capture all of society's value judgements. These societal value judgements can be expressed in the form of preferences. Whereas the inequality perception of income distributions appeals to an observer's sober judgement, the revelation of preferences with respect to specific income distributions appeals to his or her sentiments. This paper is an empirical analysis which investigates the juxtaposition of preferences with respect to income distributions and corresponding perceptions of distributional inequality. We do this through a questionnaire in which attitudes towards various distributional axioms are tested. The source of our data is 1773 completed questionnaires collected from five German universities. Based on our data, we observe that individuals' preference orderings over the set of income distributionssubstantially deviate from their perceptions of distributional inequality. In fact, our test responses showed that even when some income distribution is judged to be more unequal than another, that distribution might be preferred, as it accords higher incomes to each individual. We hold that the preference for these greater incomes expresses a compensation for the increased degree of inequality. This explanation applies both to equiproportional and to equal fixed-sum increases in incomes, which implies a support of Paretian ethics.     

Nonpoor children in head start: Explanations and implications

According to the Head Start Act (1998), children are income‐eligible for the program if their “families' incomes are below the poverty line.” There are a number of statutory exceptions to this general rule and, according to the Head Start Bureau, the result is that about 6 percent of the children in the program are not poor. But the major national surveys of Head Start families report that 30 percent or more of Head Start children are not “poor.” This paper confirms and explains the high proportion of nonpoor children in Head Start: at enrollment, at least 28 percent are not poor; at midyear, at least 32 percent are not poor; and by the end of the program year, at least 34 percent and perhaps more than 50 percent are not poor. Although the presence of some of these nonpoor children seems to be an appropriate or at least understandable aspect of running a national program with Head Start's current organizational structure, the presence of others seems much less warranted and raises substantial questions of horizontal equity. Moreover, taken together, the large number of nonpoor children suggests that the program is not well targeted to fulfill its mission of providing compensatory services to developmentally disadvantaged children—and reveals the essential ambiguity of Head Start's role in the wider world of early care and education. The income and program dynamics that have led to so many nonpoor children being in Head Start are also at work in many other programs, and, thus, our findings demonstrate the need to understand better how income eligibility is determined across various means‐tested programs.     

Income and assets of Social Security beneficiaries by type of benefit

The SIPP data have provided a first look at the relative economic status of various types of Social Security beneficiaries. They have shown that the different types of Social Security beneficiaries face very different economic circumstances. Retired workers and wife beneficiaries have the highest family incomes adjusted for family size. Aged widows and minor children have the lowest family incomes, with high proportions of poor or near poor. And disabled workers are in between, but also have high proportions of poor or near poor. Retired-worker and wife beneficiary households also have considerably more asset holdings than disabled-worker or widow beneficiary households. Beneficiaries with high family incomes are very likely to live with relatives and to rely heavily on the relatives' income. The high-income families tend to have non-means-tested sources of family income other than Social Security amounting to substantial proportions of their total income and to have high asset holdings. Conversely, beneficiaries with low family incomes are very likely to live alone or with nonrelatives, to rely heavily on Social Security and means-tested benefits, and to have low asset holdings. A majority of ever-poor beneficiaries (with the exception of widow beneficiaries) are poor in only some months of a year. This situation is not consistent with the stereotype of beneficiaries living on fixed incomes. But the change in poverty status is often due to a change in the income of other family members rather than of the beneficiary. And in some cases, a change in poverty status occurs with little or no change in income as the cost of living rises.     

Money incomes of aged and nonaged family units, 1967-84

This article provides a detailed examination of changes in the income of the aged and of other age groups from 1967 to 1984. Levels of income, income inequality, the relative importance of selected types of income, and the poverty rates of various age groups are also analyzed. The data are from the Bureau of the Census Current Population Survey and annual money income before taxes is the measure of income. The relative income gains of the aged, compared with the nonaged, in 1967-84 reversed an earlier pattern in the post-World-War-II period: From 1947 to 1967, the incomes of the nonaged rose at a faster pace than those of the aged. Differences in their income growth were greater in 1979-84 than in 1967-79. Despite the substantial difference in the rates of income growth for the aged and nonaged units in 1967-84, the relationship between age and median income was altered only slightly. In 1984, aged family units continued to have relatively low median income, especially compared with the incomes of those in middle age.     

The changing demography of multifamily rental housing

Abstract

The residents of multifamily rental housing are different from both homeowners and single‐family home renters, and these differences have implications for the housing market and for public policy. This article describes apartment residents today, discusses recent changes in their number and characteristics, projects their future growth and composition, and highlights business and policy implications of future changes.

For purposes of business and public policy, a segmentation of apartment residents into three submarkets is useful: the “affordable” market serving low‐ and moderate‐income households, some of which receive government housing assistance; the “lifestyle apartment market” serving higher‐income adult households; and the substantial “middle market.” The number of apartment renters is likely to grow moderately over time. The combination of multifamily structure type and rental tenure form offers unique opportunities not only for provision of affordable housing but also for revitalization of downtown areas and balanced “smart” growth in suburban areas.     

False Consciousness or Class Awareness? Local Income Inequality,Personal Economic Position,and Belief in American Meritocracy

Existing research analyzes the effects of cross‐national and temporal variation in income inequality on public opinion; however, research has failed to explore the impact of variation in inequality across citizens’ local residential context. This article analyzes the impact of local inequality on citizens’ belief in a core facet of the American ethos—meritocracy. We advance conditional effects hypotheses that collectively argue that the effect of residing in a high‐inequality context will be moderated by individual income. Utilizing national survey data, we demonstrate that residing in more unequal counties heightens rejection of meritocracy among low‐income residents and bolsters adherence among high‐income residents. In relatively equal counties, we find no significant differences between high‐ and low‐income citizens. We conclude by discussing the implications of class‐based polarization found in response to local inequality with respect to current debates over the consequences of income inequality for American democracy.     

Is There an Association Between Gasoline Prices and Physical Activity? Evidence from American Time Use Data

Obesity is epidemic in the United States, and there is an imperative need to identify policy tools that may help fight this epidemic. A recent paper in the economics literature finds an inverse relationship between gasoline prices and obesity risk—suggesting that increased gasoline prices via higher gasoline taxes may have the effect of reducing obesity prevalence. This study builds upon that paper. It utilizes cross‐sectional time series data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) over 2003–2008, utilizes the increases that occurred in gasoline prices in this period due to Hurricane Katrina and to the global spike in gasoline prices as a “natural experiment,” and explores how time spent by Americans on different forms of physical activity is associated with gasoline price levels. Economic theory suggests that higher gasoline prices may alter individual behavior both via a “substitution effect” whereby people seek alternatives to motorized transportation, and an “income effect” whereby the effect of higher gasoline prices on the disposable family budget leads people to make various adjustments to what they spend money on. The latter may lead to some increase in physical activity (for example, doing one's own yard work instead of hiring help), but may also lead to decreases in other physical activities that involve expenses, such as team sports or workouts at the gym. Thus, ultimately, the relationship between gasoline prices and physical activity must be empirically determined. Results from multivariate regression models with state and time fixed effects indicate that higher gasoline prices are associated with an overall increase of physical activity that is at least moderately energy intensive. The increases are most pronounced in periods where gasoline prices fluctuate more sharply and unexpectedly. These results appear robust to a number of model specifications. One of the major components of this increase appears to be an increase in housework that is at least moderately energy intensive—such as interior and exterior cleaning, garden, and yard work. This tentatively suggests that there is an income effect of higher gasoline prices, or a possible increase in prices of such services when gasoline prices increase. However, the increases in physical activity associated with increased gasoline prices are weaker among minorities and low socioeconomic status (SES) individuals. Hence, while a policy that increases gasoline prices via raised gasoline taxes may have benefits in terms of increasing overall physical activity levels in the United States, these benefits may not accrue to low SES individuals to the same extent as to their higher SES counterparts. This suggests that if increasing physical activity is the primary goal, then it may be more efficient to use a tax that can exert an income effect on mid‐to‐high SES households, such as a targeted income tax. On the other hand, if gasoline taxes are imposed to address other negative externalities of gasoline use, then these taxes may have the added benefit of increasing physical activity at least among some segments of U.S. society.     

Entertaining Beliefs in Economic Mobility

Americans have long believed in upward mobility and the narrative of the American Dream. Even in the face of rising income inequality and substantial empirical evidence that economic mobility has declined in recent decades, many Americans remain convinced of the prospects for upward mobility. What explains this disconnect? I argue that their media diets play an important role in explaining this puzzle. Specifically, contemporary Americans are watching a record number of entertainment TV programs that emphasize “rags-to-riches” narratives. I demonstrate that such shows have become a ubiquitous part of the media landscape over the last two decades. Online and lab-in-the-field experiments as well as national surveys show that exposure to these programs increases viewers’ beliefs in the American Dream and promotes internal attributions of wealth. Media exemplars present in what Americans leisurely consume every day can powerfully distort economic perceptions and have important implications for public preferences for economic redistribution.     

Hidden Costs and Deadweight Losses: Bundled Parking and Residential Rents in the Metropolitan United States

There is a major housing affordability crisis in many American metropolitan areas, particularly for renters. Minimum parking requirements in municipal zoning codes drive up the price of housing, and thus represent an important potential for reform for local policymakers. The relationship between parking and housing prices, however, remains poorly understood. We use national American Housing Survey data and hedonic regression techniques to investigate this relationship. We find that the cost of garage parking to renter households is approximately $1,700 per year, or an additional 17% of a housing unit’s rent. In addition to the magnitude of this transport cost burden being effectively hidden in housing prices, the lack of rental housing without bundled parking imposes a steep cost on carless renters—commonly the lowest income households—who may be paying for parking that they do not need or want. We estimate the direct deadweight loss for carless renters to be $440 million annually. We conclude by suggesting cities reduce or eliminate minimum parking requirements, and allow and encourage landlords to unbundle parking costs from housing costs.     

Homeownership and Wealth among Low- and Moderate-Income Households

Abstract

Although currently neither politically nor fiscally feasible, the notion that access to inexpensive, presumably high‐quality housing should be a government‐guaranteed universal right would be a terrible idea even if it were popular and affordable. The proposition fails on three counts. It isn't necessary. It doesn't make economic sense. And, most compelling, were such a policy to be implemented, its putative beneficiaries would not thank us.

Even if we should not promulgate “a right to decent, affordable housing,” we want to assure that all Americans have access to decent, affordable housing. Happily, we can count on the private housing market (coupled with rising prosperity) to serve 95 percent of the country's households. Serving the remaining 5 percent requires concerted measures to scale back onerous housing regulations that prevent the private housing sector from meeting the needs of lower‐income and untypical households.     

Economic Prosperity and Housing Affordability in the United States: Lessons from the Booming 1990s

The United States is facing an acute shortage of reasonably priced housing with over 35% of households paying more than 30% of their income for housing costs in 2015. As the U.S. economy recovers from the Great Recession, will housing become less unaffordable as incomes rise and households could potentially pay a lower share of their income for housing costs? To see if this is likely, I examined the change in housing affordability in the 100 largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United States between 1990 and 2000, a period of exceptional economic prosperity. I used the percentage of housing cost-burdened households (those that pay more than 30% of their gross income on ownership or rental costs) as a measure of the availability of reasonably priced housing. I used discriminant analysis techniques to detect statistically significant differences in the percentage of cost-burdened households in the 100 MSAs based on a variety of factors. I found that despite the phenomenal economic prosperity of the 1990s, about 30% of households were cost-burdened both in 1990 and 2000. High MSA median income was correlated with a greater shortage of reasonably priced housing. Neither economic growth rate nor poverty rate nor population growth rate distinguished high-shortage MSAs from low-shortage ones. Large MSAs and MSAs in the West had greater shortages than other MSAs. Economic prosperity did not alleviate the problem of lack of reasonably priced housing in the past, and is not likely to do so in the near future. Planners and policy-makers need to enact new policies at local, regional, state, and federal levels to effectively address America’s chronic affordable housing shortage.     

Causes of Urban Sprawl in the United States: Auto reliance as compared to natural evolution,flight from blight,and local revenue reliance

This paper describes a statistical study of the contribution of theories previously offered by economists to explain differences in the degree of urban decentralization in the U.S. The focus is on a relative comparison of the influence of auto reliance. A regression analysis reveals that a 10 percent reduction in the percentage of households owning one or more autos would reduce the square mile size of an urban area by only 0.5 percent and raise its population density by only 0.7 percent. Factors falling under the categories of “natural evolution” and “flight from blight” exert a far greater magnitude of influence. For instance, a 10 percent reduction in per capita income would reduce the square mile size of an urban area by 11.4 percent and raise its population density by 10.1 percent, while a 10 percent decrease in the percentage central place(s) population poor would reduce the square mile size of an urban area by 2.6 percent and raise its population density by 1.7 percent. A significant increase in urban decentralization will require more than just reduced auto reliance. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Market factors affecting spatial heterogeneity among urban neighborhoods

Abstract

Institutional factors perpetuating segregation in urban neighborhoods— redlining by lenders and insurers, steering by brokers, and discrimination by owners—have attracted much attention recently. But natural market forces (demand, supply, and equilibrium price adjustment) can also create neighborhood heterogeneity in income, race, and housing characteristics.

This article establishes a framework to examine the market forces that create spatial clustering of households. On the demand side, differences in resident preferences and incomes lead to clustering; on the supply side, differences in cost functions, created by market specialization or location‐specific features, are important. Equilibrium price adjustment reinforces tendencies toward heterogeneity and leads to differential affordability patterns. Bid‐rent and other models of residential location, discrimination in urban housing markets, and the Tiebout model are discussed. A research agenda is proposed to measure neighborhood heterogeneity, isolate its influence on educational and employment opportunities, and evaluate policies for ameliorating its adverse effects.     

Welcome Mats and On‐Ramps for Older Adults: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansions on Dual Enrollment in Medicare and Medicaid

For many low‐income Medicare beneficiaries, Medicaid provides important supplemental insurance that covers out‐of‐pocket costs and additional benefits. We examine whether Medicaid participation by low‐income adults age 65 and up increased as a result of Medicaid expansions to working‐age adults under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Previous literature documents so‐called “welcome mat” effects in other populations but has not explicitly studied older persons dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. We extend this literature by estimating models of Medicaid participation among persons age 65 and up using American Community Survey data from 2010 to 2017 and state variation in ACA Medicaid expansions. We find that Medicaid expansions to working‐age adults increased Medicaid participation among low‐income older adults by 1.8 percentage points (4.4 percent). We also find evidence of an “on‐ramp” effect; that is, low‐income Medicare beneficiaries residing in expansion states who were young enough to gain coverage under the 2014 ACA Medicaid expansions before aging into Medicare were 4 percentage points (9.5 percent) more likely to have dual Medicaid coverage relative to similar individuals who either turned 65 before the 2014 expansions or resided in non‐expansion states. This on‐ramp effect is an important mechanism behind welcome mat effects among some older adults.     

The Food Stamp Program and Supplemental Security Income

The Food Stamp Program (FSP) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are important parts of national public assistance policy, and there is considerable overlap in the populations that the programs serve. About half of all SSI recipients reside in FSP recipient households. This article uses Social Security administrative data and the Food Stamp Quality Control samples for federal fiscal years 2001-2006 to study the prevalence of food stamp receipt among households with SSI recipients, the contribution of FSP to household income, and the importance of various FSP features in contributing to the well-being of recipient households. The prevalence of FSP participation among households that include SSI recipients is estimated to have grown steadily over the entire 2001-2006 period, rising from 47.4 percent in 2001 to 55.6 percent in 2006. This growth has occurred across all age groups of SSI recipients. The FSP contribution to household income has grown as well. In 2001, FSP increased the income of the households of SSI/FSP recipients by 13 percent; by 2006 the increase was 16.8 percent. Almost 80 percent of the food stamp recipient households that include SSI recipients receive increased benefits because of excess housing costs. In 2006, 44 percent of SSI recipients lived in households that did not receive food stamps. Given available information, it is difficult to gauge the FSP eligibility of nonparticipating households and, therefore, to assess the potential benefit of outreach efforts. Currently available measures of FSP take-up probably overstate participation among eligible households that include SSI recipients, and there is some evidence that enhanced state promotion of the FSP raises participation among households with SSI recipients. We conclude with recommendation for review and renewal of collaboration between the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the agency responsible for administering the FSP) and the Social Security Administration in ensuring that eligible SSI recipients utilize FSP benefits.     

“The Information Gap?”

While the “achievement gap” generally and appropriately focuses upon gaps in test scores and other outcome measures, there may also be an “information gap” between higher and lower income parents that creates a disadvantage for lower income families in choosing good schools. In this article, we examine the extent to which there is such a gap, with a focus on data from a new survey of low‐ and moderate‐income parents who have made school choices. We find that, at least in relatively mature school choice environments like Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Washington, DC, most low‐ and moderate‐income parents report being quite well informed and they engage in a variety of different activities to become informed. Thus, the information gap between lower and higher income parents may not be as large as scholars and policymakers had assumed. We do find that parents at the very lowest end of the income spectrum, especially those earning less than $10,000 per year, do feel less well‐informed and gather less information, but even here the differences are not enormous, relative to higher income parents.     

Varieties of Regulation and Financialization: Comparative Pathways to Top Income Inequality in the OECD, 1975–2005

Abstract

With financialization now acknowledged as one of the most potent threats to income equality, can finance-driven inequality be explained by a singular causal argument? Taking the case of top incomes across the OECD, this paper addresses the standard causal narrative of finance-driven inequality, where rising top income inequality is explained as a function of deregulation, financial sector growth, and a parallel weakening of the role of trade unions and the government. Applying fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to a time-series dataset (1975–2005), it assesses the ways in which configurations of institutions combined in different ways prior to the recent financial crisis, to create policy contexts conducive to top income growth. It does this by adopting a time-series approach to QCA, involving calibration and analysis of data at three successive historical waves. Results suggest that top incomes in the era of finance-driven capitalism were subject to a diversity of causal paths which generated similar outcomes in different contexts, in a manner which departs substantially from the standard narrative. In doing so, it elaborates on the application of time-series approaches to case-based analysis, and uses its results to discuss the ways in which institutions may combine in different ways to generate similar, or divergent outcomes.