Health, Social Movements, and Rights-based Litigation in South Africa

This article investigates the impact of rights-based litigation on social struggles in the South African health sector. It considers the manner in which individuals and social movements have utilized rights and the legal process in their efforts to dismantle the ill-health/poverty cycle, in the particular context of the struggle for universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS. Relying on literature concerning the transformative potential of socio-economic rights litigation and on examples from South African case law, the article critically evaluates the gains that have been made and the obstacles that have been encountered in this context. It argues that rights-based litigation presents a powerful tool in the struggle against poverty, but also elaborates on structural and institutional hurdles that continue to inhibit the effectiveness of rights-based strategies in this regard.     

Laws of encryption: An emerging legal framework

This article examines the emerging legal framework of encryption. It reviews the different categories of law that make up this legal framework, namely: export control laws, substantive cybercrime laws, criminal procedure laws, human rights laws, and cybersecurity laws. These laws are analysed according to which of the three regulatory subjects or targets they specifically address: the technology of encryption, the parties to encryption, or encrypted data and communications. For each category of law, illustrative examples of international and national laws are discussed. This article argues that understanding the legal framework of encryption is essential to determining how this technology is currently regulated and how these regulations can be improved. It concludes that the legal framework is the key to discerning the present state and future direction of encryption laws and policies.     

Amnesties in Transition: Punishment,Restoration, and the Governance of Mercy

Despite the much vaunted triumph of human rights, amnesties continue to be a frequently used technique of post‐conflict transitional justice. For many critics, they are synonymous with unaccountability and injustice. This article argues that despite the rhetoric, there is no universal duty to prosecute under international law and that issues of selectivity and proportionality present serious challenges to the retributive rationale for punishment in international justice. It contends that many of the assumptions concerning the deterrent effect in the field are also oversold and poorly theorized. It also suggests that appropriately designed restorative amnesties can be both lawful and effective as routes to truth recovery, reconciliation, and a range of other peacemaking goals. Rather than mere instruments of impunity, amnesties should instead be seen as important institutions in the governance of mercy, the reassertion of state sovereignty and, if properly constituted, the return of law to a previously lawless domain.     

Religious Freedom and Religious Antidiscrimination

This article develops a theoretical framework that prompts a new understanding of the role of religious freedom and religious antidiscrimination in human rights law. Proceeding from the prevailing theoretical and doctrinal uncertainty over the relationship between the two rights, which are currently seen as either synonymous or as distinct and in competition, the article develops an account of the moral right to ethical independence and argues that religious freedom and religious antidiscrimination share their main normative basis on that moral right. However, religious freedom and religious antidiscrimination have different emphasis, and both are essential to secure fair background circumstances for the pursuit of different individual plans of life. The proposed framework illuminates the relationship of individual and collective aspects of religious freedom with discrimination law. The analysis has crucial implications for human rights interpretation in cases involving state interference with liberty, in relation to religion or belief, and more broadly.     

Conditional Rights,Benefit Reform,and Drug Users: Reducing Dependency?

United Kingdom government policy to increase social security claimants' entry to the labour market through conditions attached to unemployed, sickness and incapacity benefits now includes additional measures to activate particular groups such as lone parents and drug users. The latter are a prime target because of their high level of dependency on benefits and because social security rules are seen as having the potential to modify the behaviour of individuals with a lifestyle regarded as being at odds with the moral obligations of citizenship and incompatible with the government's realization of its wider economic and social goals. There are strict procedures for the identification of drug‐user claimants, enabling additional conditions to be attached to their benefit rights. This article discusses the general trend in benefit reform towards increased conditionality and evaluates the reforms affecting drug users, considering human rights and other implications. It concludes by reflecting on the status of conditional rights to social security as social rights.     

Property Offences as Crimes of Injustice

The article provides an outline of the basic principles and conditions of criminalisation of interferences with others’ property rights in the context of a specific context: a liberal, social democratic state, the legitimacy of which depends primarily on its impartiality between moral doctrines and the fair distribution of liberties and resources. I begin by giving a brief outline of the conditions of political legitimacy, the place of property and the conditions of criminalisation in such a state. With that framework in place, I argue that interferences with others’ property rights should be viewed as violations of political duties stemming from institutions of distribution. I then discuss three implications of this view: the bearing of social injustice on the criminal law treatment of acts of distributive injustice; the expansion of criminalisation over the violation of distribution-related duties, which are considered criminally irrelevant under moral conceptions of criminalisation; and, finally, the normative significance of the modus operandi.     

The Evolutionary Game‐Theoretic Foundations of Law

Interdisciplinary work in the law often starts and stops with the social sciences. To produce a complete understanding of how law, evolutionary game‐theoretic insights must, however, supplement these more standard social scientific methods. To illustrate, this article critically examines The Force of Law by Frederick Schauer and The Expressive Powers of Law by Richard McAdams. Combining the methods of analytic jurisprudence and social psychology, Schauer clarifies the need for a philosophically respectable and empirically well‐grounded account of the ubiquity of legal sanctions. Drawing primarily on economic and social psychological paradigms, McAdams highlights law's potential to alter human behavior through expressions that coordinate. Still, these contributions generate further puzzles about how law works, which can be addressed using evolutionary game‐theoretic resources. Drawing on these resources, this article argues that legal sanctions are ubiquitous to law not only because they can motivate legal compliance, as Schauer suggests, but also because they provide the general evolutionary stability conditions for intrinsic legal motivation. In reaction to McAdams, this article argues that law's expressive powers can function to coordinate human behavior only because humans are naturally and culturally evolved to share a prior background agreement in forms of life. Evolutionary game‐theoretic resources can thus be used to develop a unified framework from within which to understand some of the complex interrelationships between legal sanctions, intrinsic legal motivation, and law's coordinating power. Going forward, interdisciplinary studies of how law works should include greater syntheses of contemporary insights from evolutionary game theory.     

Human Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological Analysis from the Perspective of Systems Theory

This article argues that the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann prepares the ground for a genuinely sociological theory of human rights. Through a presentation of Luhmann's work on human rights, it describes the historical and sociological processes that make visible why human rights emerge as a central feature of modern society. It is argued that the emergence of fundamental freedoms and human rights can be related to the dominant structure of modern society, that is, functional differentiation. Human rights are considered as a social institution, whereby modern society protects its own structure against self-destructive tendencies. By giving inalienable and equal rights to all human beings, society ensures that the differentiation between different functional subsystems is maintained and at the same time institutionalizes specific mechanisms to increase stability and protection of the individual. The article first examines some features of the systems-theoretical framework that are used to describe and analyse the issue of human rights. Next, it presents a brief overview of the semantic evolution of human rights. This reconstruction focuses on the question how the modern semantics of human rights can be linked to a specific structural societal transformation. The second part of the essay is devoted to the social function of human rights. After focusing on the general function, it makes a distinction between 'fundamental freedoms' on the one hand, and the 'rights of equality' on the other.     

Human Rights in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization: The Alien Tort Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization in Doe v. Unocal

This article examines a widely publicized corporate accountability and human rights case filed by Burmese plaintiffs and human rights litigators in 1996 under the Alien Tort Claims Act in U.S. courts, Doe v. Unocal , in conjunction with the three main theoretical approaches to analyzing how law may matter for broader social change efforts: (1) legal realism, (2) Critical Legal Studies (CLS), and (3) legal mobilization. The article discusses interactions between Doe v. Unocal and grassroots Burmese human rights activism in the San Francisco Bay Area, including intersections with corporate accountability activism. It argues that a transnationally attuned legal mobilization framework, rather than legal realist or CLS approaches, is most appropriate to analyze the political opportunities and indirect effects of Doe v. Unocal and similar litigation in the context of neoliberal globalization. Further, this article argues that human rights discourse may serve as a common vocabulary and counterhegemonic resource for activists and litigators in cases such as Doe v. Unocal , contrary to overarching critiques of such discourse that emphasize only its hegemonic potentials in global governance regimes.     

Can the Human Rights Bodies be Used to Produce Interim Measures to Protect Environment-Related Human Rights?

International environmental law does not protect individuals as such. On the other hand, human rights do not formally encompass the right to a healthy environment. This article argues that human rights bodies are suitable forums to protect environment-related human rights. They can do so by producing interim measures to prevent States' actions or inactions towards the environment from infringing on human rights, even if the harmful character of those actions is uncertain. It is demonstrated that the recourse to the precautionary principle is possible to achieve such anticipatory protection and is supported by recent developments in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice. In particular, the article shows that human rights bodies can develop interrelationships and interdependency between rights of different normative values in different areas of international law that will lead to equitable interim measures prescribing positive obligations that are reasonable and appropriate.     

What Happens to Law in a Refugee Camp?

How do people living in a refugee camp engage with legal practices, discourses, and institutions? Critics argue that refugee camps leave people in “legal limbo” depriving them of the “right to have rights” despite the presence of international humanitarian actors and the entitlements enshrined in international law. For that reason, refugee camps have become a highly visible symbol of failed human rights campaigns. In contrast, I found in an ethnography of the Buduburam Refugee Camp in Ghana, West Africa, that although people living as refugees faced chronic insecurity and injustice, they engaged extensively with several different facets of the law. I illuminate three interrelated dimensions of their experiences: (1) their development as international legal subjects; (2) their alienation from domestic legal institutions; and (3) their agency within the legal field. The article contributes to the research agenda on law in humanitarian settings an empirically grounded account of the subjective dimensions of legal alienation and mobilization in a refugee camp. More broadly, it contributes to international human rights debates by theorizing a mixed outcome of international human rights campaigns: the emergence of wards of international law, people deeply embedded in the international legal system, but alienated from local law.     

The health and human rights movement: progress and obstacles

There is a new maturity about the health and human rights movement as it endeavours to integrate human rights into health policies at the national and international levels. In addition to the traditional human rights techniques, such as "naming and shaming", the movement is also using new approaches such as indicators, benchmarks and impact assessments. However, it is confronted with a range of major obstacles and this article focuses on two of them: the inadequate engagement within the health and human rights movement of (i) established human rights non-governmental organisations and (ii) health professionals. This article argues that established human rights non-governmental organisations should work on health and human rights issues, such as maternal mortality, just as vigorously as they already campaign on disappearances, torture and prisoners of conscience. Also, it emphasises that health and human rights complement and reinforce each other. Nevertheless, many health professionals have never heard of the right to the highest attainable standard of health. The article argues that there is no chance of operationalising the right to health without the active engagement of many more health professionals, and it makes some preliminary observations about steps that might be taken to deepen health professionals' engagement in the health and human rights movement.     

Punishment, Socially Deprived Offenders, and Democratic Community

The idea that victims of social injustice who commit crimes ought not to be subject to punishment has attracted serious attention in recent legal and political philosophy. R. A. Duff has argued, for example, a states that perpetrates social injustice lacks the standing to punish victims of such injustice who commit crimes. A crucial premiss in his argument concerns the fact that when courts in liberal society mete out legitimate criminal punishments, they are conceived as acting in the name of all citizens—on behalf of the whole political community. Resisting this premiss, Peter Chau has suggested that courts ought to be conceived as acting only in the name of “just citizens”: citizens who cannot be plausibly seen as having contributed to distributive injustice. When conceived in this way, Chau argues, courts can no longer plausibly be regarded as lacking standing to punish. This article uses the debate between Duff and Chau to explain why the question of whether to punish socially deprived offenders can only be answered adequately when connected to broader concerns of democratic theory. Specifically, it argues that Chau’s proposal is not available within the context of the kind of political community upon which (Duff rightly believes) a system of liberal criminal law depends for its justification and maintenance: a community in which citizens see the law as embodying shared norms whose specific demands they disagree about. State officials are morally permitted to see themselves as acting on behalf of a subset of the citizenry, I argue, only in circumstances of democratic crisis: circumstances in which a moral community can no longer be plausibly said to exist.     

Rights,goals, and hard cases

Rights have two properties which prima facie appear to be inconsistent. The first is that they are conditional in the sense that one some occasions it is always justifiable for someone to act in a way which appears to be inconsistent with someone else's rights, such as when the defence of necessity applies. The second is that rights are indefeasible in the sense that they are not subject to being defeated our outweighed by utilitarian or policy considerations. If we view rules and the rights which they establish as being subject to a ceteris paribus clause, the form of which generates out the exceptions, the conditionality of rights becomes reconcilable with their nondefeasibility. Such a view of rules and rights would entail that the goals of the law and their orderings be considered as a part of the law. When so viewed, propositions about goals and their orderings become legitimate premises for legal reasoning, furnishing solutions to hard cases in the law of torts, without resort to balancing of interests or judicial discretion.     

Do We Need Unicorns When We Have Law?

Abstract.  Theoretical justifications of human rights have been troubled by many criticisms and objections. It has been objected that the source of human rights is unclear as is the meaning attached to human rights. Yet today many human rights have been adopted in positive law. Law students today need to learn about this positive law of human rights and may consider that those debates in human rights theory are pointless. This article examines the extent to which the positive law of human rights answers these questions satisfactorily. It concludes that positive law offers several important answers to these criticisms, but suggests they cannot replace the need for a normative justification. The article concludes that approaches which integrate theory and positive law are fruitful avenues of inquiry.     

基本权利第三人效力的范畴与本质

基本权利第三人效力,也被称为水平效力、私人效力、基本权利在私法或私人法律关系中的效力等。第三人效力是指,基本权利能否以及在何种程度上可以对诉讼当事人之间的民事实体法律关系产生影响。实践中,公私二元划分是第三人效力探讨的基础;基本权利客观法属性是第三人效力的规范范畴;基本权利人类图像与自由权的多重面向是第三人效力的价值范畴;基本权利保护义务是第三人效力的义务范畴;基本权利取向解释是第三人效力的方法范畴。第三人效力具有体系正义、规范正义和个案正义的诉求,本质上是涵盖不同范畴的结构性效力。提出第三人效力的目的在于国家通过干预社会和消解社会不公正,为私人主体创造秩序和自由。     

Accommodating Children's Rights in a Post Human Rights Act Era

This article considers why so little case law currently acknowledges that children have recognisable rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and argues that the family courts are not meeting the demands of the Human Rights Act 1998 in this regard. It suggests that a reinterpretation of the 'paramountcy principle' in the Children Act 1989 should be accompanied by a radically different judicial approach to evidence relating to children's best interests. The article considers the difficulties that such an approach might produce when applied to teenagers intent on refusing life-saving medical treatment. It further argues that the courts should call on the substantial body of rights jurisprudence to provide legal and moral support for this revised approach.     

Taking Metaregulation to the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Regime: The Case of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

This article argues that regulatory scholarship can be harnessed to promote human rights, in this case the rights of persons with disabilities. It argues that the regulatory regime of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the Convention) establishes a human rights metaregulatory regime. It shows that the Convention delegates all of the regulatory functions to four different actors, to the effect that no single actor has the full range of regulatory competencies. The implication of this high degree of delegation is that the Convention establishes a three‐party framework whereby the interaction between the regulatee and the two regulators is mediated by an oversight body. While organically independent, each actor is functionally interdependent so that an equilibrium is established. At a time where the effectiveness of the UN human rights treaty system is under assault, this article argues that the metaregulatory regime of the CRPD provides an optimistic vision for the future of human rights treaties.     

European Human Rights Law and the Normalisation of the ‘Closed Material Procedure’: Limit or Source?

Once a legal abnormality that was criticised on human rights grounds, the closed material procedure (CMP) has now become the main mechanism for dealing with allegedly sensitive security information in the UK. This article considers the role of European human rights law in that process. It argues that the CMP can be conceptualised as the product of human rights law, which has developed so as to legalise and normalise its use, and that this process is symptomatic of a deeper inter‐relationship between human rights law and the preservation of states' security interests, which renders the former inherently unsuitable for dealing with security phenomena.