Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt

In Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt the Supreme Court of the United States passed down its most important decision on abortion for just under a decade. By a majority of 5‐3, the Court ruled that two provisions in a Texas law regulating abortion on grounds of women's health were constitutionally invalid, placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of women seeking to exercise their right to abortion. This comment delineates the key ways in which the Court's application of the standard of constitutional review under Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) to the Texas provisions marks a landmark development for the protection of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe v Wade, not the least by making clear that state abortion regulations which cite ‘women's health’ justifications should not pass constitutional review where those justifications lack a credible factual basis.     

Libel: Its Purpose and Reform

Discussion of libel often fails to define defamation law's purpose and thus properly to assess its value. This article argues that defamation's purpose relates to fundamental human interests in sociality, directly linked to important aspects of human health and well‐being. Protecting such interests is arguably required by the right to private life under ECHR article 8 and should not count as a violation of the right to freedom of speech. Some current reform proposals are criticised as failing to appreciate the importance of protecting sociality. ‘Business’ libel, however, often protects not sociality but purely economic interests. The article therefore argues that the protection of libel law, as opposed to that offered by malicious falsehood and the economic torts, should be withdrawn from purely economic reputation, starting with removing the rights of corporations to sue in defamation, a position compatible with the ECtHR's decision in Karako v Hungary.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

The Heathrow Case in the Supreme Court: Climate Change Legislation and Administrative Adjudication

In R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd the UK Supreme Court allowed an appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision that there had been a series of legal errors in the designation of the Airport National Policy Statement. This case note analyses the case from an ‘internal’ doctrinal perspective and argues that the Supreme Court could have engaged more explicitly with the legal issues that arise from climate change legislation for administrative law adjudication. For courts to adjudicate well in such circumstances they need to be prepared to develop administrative law doctrine, particularly in light of the issues of integrating climate change into public decision-making and of scientific/policy uncertainty which lie in the background of climate change legislation.     

Remedies for Breach of Trust

The decision of the Supreme Court in AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co confirms the approach taken by Lord Browne‐Wilkinson in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns: where a trustee misapplies trust assets, a beneficiary is limited to a claim for equitable compensation for losses caused by the trustee's breach of duty. This seems to be a departure from traditional equitable doctrine, which held that the beneficiary could falsify the trustee's unauthorised disbursement and bring a claim for an ‘equitable debt’. This note considers the impact of the decision of the Supreme Court, and how the law regarding ‘equitable compensation’ might continue to develop.     

Dryden v Johnson Matthey: The Boundaries of Actionable Damage

In Dryden v Johnson Matthey, the claimants sought to recover in tort for becoming sensitised to platinum salts by the defendant's negligence. The Supreme Court found, unanimously, that merely becoming sensitised, as opposed to developing an allergic reaction, sufficed as actionable damage. However, the court only provided two ‘indicative factors’ for when damage was ‘actionable’: whether there had been some impairment, and whether the effect of that impairment was ‘more than negligible’. This approach is unclear, in tension with other parts of the judgment, and produces undesirable broader consequences. It misses an opportunity for the Court to provide guidance on developments in tort like preventive damages, claimant‐specific loss, and the broader raison d'être of tort. A narrow and constrained adjustment to the law to permit recovery in negligence of pure economic loss for preventive damage could have achieved the same result without relying on somewhat convoluted mental gymnastics.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

The right of the child to be heard in education litigation: an analysis of the ‘intelligent design’ Pennsylvania case on the separation of Church and State in the public schools

This paper examines a seminal case in US education law regarding the separation of Church and State in the public schools. The issue decided was whether it is constitutional under American law for a school district to mandate reference to ‘intelligent design’ (ID) as an alternative to the theory of evolution whilst instructing students only in the latter. ID theory postulates an unspecified ‘master intelligence’ as being responsible for the origins of life. A Pennsylvania court found that ID was a religious theory and held the school district had officially endorsed ID contrary to constitutional requirements. The issue of children's participation rights was not raised by the parties or the Court and student views were not solicited. The reasons for this failure to allow students to be heard in the judicial proceedings are explored as are the implications for how the notion of children's rights is understood in North America.     

On the Relations between Agent and Principal: Angove's Pty Ltd v Bailey

In Angove's Pty Ltd v Bailey the Supreme Court faced ‘two important and controversial questions of commercial law’: whether an agent's authority could ever be ‘irrevocable’, and whether the receipt of money by an imminent insolvent could ever give rise to a constructive trust of that sum. It answered both in the affirmative, albeit subject to heavy qualifications. This note supports these conclusions in principle, however it will argue that the court's reasoning, especially in answering the second question, leaves much to be desired. In particular, it ignored the central role of fiduciary law in regulating the conduct of agents.     

Belize It or Not: Implied Contract Terms in Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas

In Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas, the Supreme Court restated the law on the implication of terms in fact, rejecting the previously authoritative approach taken by Lord Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd. This article examines two major departures from Belize in Lord Neuberger's leading judgment: the treatment of implication as a process separate from interpretation, and a return to the ‘traditional tests’ for the implication of terms. It argues that these are retrogressive steps in our understanding of contract terms, which risk fostering an incoherent and unprincipled approach to the law.     

Black Spiders Weaving Webs: The Constitutional Implications of Executive Veto of Tribunal Determinations

In R (Evans) v Attorney General, the Supreme Court quashed the Attorney General's statutory veto of the Upper Tribunal's original determination made under freedom of information legislation. The Upper Tribunal had held that so‐called ‘advocacy’ memos should be published after a full hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court split five to two, with the lead judgment of Lord Neuberger using constitutional rather than administrative language and focusing on the rule of law. This note raises four objections to the lead judgment. First, it argues that the Upper Tribunal was acting in an executive not judicial capacity and the veto was not therefore a breach of the rule of law. Secondly it suggests the veto clause is best understood as a variant Henry VIII clause. Thirdly, it suggests Lord Neuberger's judgment is founded on a paradox. Finally, it argues that the judgment undermines parliamentary sovereignty. Future implications are then considered.     

The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification

This paper provides a brief critical overview of the recent EU citizenship case‐law of the Court of Justice including Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci. While these cases open a number of new avenues of fundamental importance for the development of EU law, they also undermine legal certainty and send contradictory signals as to the essence of the EU citizenship status and the role it ought to play in the system of EU law. Most importantly, the Court's reluctance to specify what is meant by the ‘essence of rights’ of EU citizenship potentially has disastrous consequences following its own determination that such rights play a crucial role in moving particular factual constellations within the material scope of EU law. The substance and meaning of such rights is however left in suspense to harmful effects. An urgent clarification is needed.     

Politics by Other Means in South Africa Today

Rick Abel's classic Politics by Other Means (1995) used South Africa to argue for law's ‘potential nobility’, but it did so avoiding a heroic mode characteristic of much anti-apartheid writing. Abel showed how law could, with strenuous exertion, be turned into a defensive shield for the oppressed. As a sword, however, it was ‘two-edged’. It allowed the powerful to frustrate or overturn hard-won symbolic victories. Recently, the heroic mode has returned to South Africa. The Constitutional Court, in particular, is lauded for having combated ‘state capture’ under deposed President Jacob Zuma. A closer examination of this period, however, does much to vindicate Abel's earlier scepticism about law's offensive value. The spectacular deployment of law to fight politicians’ crimes has exposed the judiciary to unexpected political threats. Meanwhile, civil society's efforts to entrust judges with administrative duties shirked by the government has inevitably entailed the sacrifice of some rule of law values.     

Re-Evaluating ‘Best Interests’ in the Wake of Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust & Anors

In Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust, the latest of a number of cases concerning whether a child can travel abroad for treatment that doctors in the UK do not consider to be in their best interests, the High Court held that the hospital had acted unlawfully by failing to consider the child's rights under EU law when refusing to allow her to travel. Although this derogation could be justified on public policy grounds, as such treatment was, on the facts, in her best interests, no further interference with her rights was justified. In making this finding, the court recognised the ‘stress’ that such a case placed on the best interests test, lending weight to the argument for moving instead to a risk of significant harm threshold for judicial intervention in parental decisions, which better accounts for legitimate differences of value and strikes a better balance under Article 8 ECHR.     

Price v. Time Revisited: The Need For Medium-Neutral Shield Laws In An Age Of Strict Construction

Journalists were alarmed when, in 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied shield-law protection to Don Yaeger, an investigative reporter for Sports Illustrated, in a libel suit by fired football coach Mike Price. Yaeger is a journalist, and Alabama's shield law offers absolute protection even when a journalist is a party to a case. The court's decision turned on the fact that Alabama's seventy-three-year-old statute does not include the word “magazine.” This article shows that this hole in the “covered medium” language of Alabama's statute is not uncommon among the nation's thirty-six shield laws and that the Eleventh Circuit's strict reading of the statute's text is not at odds with current trends in statutory interpretation. Those two facts, combined with the rise of the Internet as an important vehicle for journalism, suggest the time is ripe to scrutinize and modernize shield laws, some of which have been on the books for more than a century.     

‘Reasonable Offers’ As a Defence to Unfair Prejudice Petitions: Prescott v Potamianos

It is long established that a ‘reasonable offer’ for a petitioner's shares can defeat an unfair-prejudice petition. Lord Hoffmann gave guidance about such offers in O'Neill v Phillips. Now, in Prescott v Potamianos, the Court of Appeal has set out three factors that help to determine in general whether an offer is ‘reasonable’. Those factors are: the value offered; the likelihood of implementation; and the proximity to the unfairly prejudicial conduct. The Court's guidance is useful for lawyers and their clients, as well as being broadly favourable for petitioners. But the Court emphasised that the unfair-prejudice jurisdiction is based on fairness and so requires a considerable degree of flexibility. Such flexibility impairs the certainty that Lord Hoffmann was seeking to promote, and may create difficulties for parties making or receiving offers.     

Fundamental rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat

This article takes stock of the emerging scholarship on the European Court of Justice's 2008 Kadi decision and seeks to make sense of the court's apparent evasiveness towards international law. The article argues that Kadi is best understood as an act of civil disobedience prompted by the UN Security Council's misapplication of foundational principles of the international order. In turn, the court's forceful articulation of the stakes in this case signals a prioritisation of basic rights within the supranational constitutional architectonic. In this respect, the ‘domestic’ constitutional implications of Kadi are just as far reaching as its consequences for the EU's status as an actor under international law.     

Clashing conceptions of press duties: Public journalists and the courts

This article bridges the growing, but controversial, public journalism movement with First Amendment jurisprudence and libel law. It examines whether the movement finds support in laws that affect the press and, in particular, in court‐created defenses and privileges that protect journalists in modern defamation law. Do defenses that safeguard journalists in their traditional routines as fact gatherers and reporters also protect them in the kinds of roles and duties envisioned by public journalism advocates? Furthermore, has the United States Supreme Court, in non‐defamation cases involving the First Amendment, expressed concern for protecting what might be called the “public journalism functions” of the press? Does the Court create a different image for the press than the one envisioned by public journalism advocates? This article addresses these questions. It ultimately concludes that public journalists and courts have two very different conceptions about the role that journalists play in a democracy.     

Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights

In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v Estonia upheld a decision of the Estonian Supreme Court to impose liability on the owners of an internet news portal for defamatory comments which had been posted on their website by anonymous third parties. This note suggests that the decision is important in the context of publications with a ‘public interest’ element to them, because it appears to afford more protection to the right to reputation (deriving from the Article 8 right to privacy) and less to freedom of expression than was formerly the case. It is further argued that the Court's emphasis on the positive obligation of states to protect this right to reputation may mean that the existing English law in this area, including, potentially section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, is inconsistent with the ECHR jurisprudence.